Targeting health subsidies through a nonprice mechanism: A randomized controlled trial in Kenya
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Dupas, P., V. Hoffmann, M. Kremer, and A. P. Zwane. 2016. “Targeting Health Subsidies through a Nonprice Mechanism: A Randomized Controlled Trial in Kenya.” Science 353 (6302) (August 25): 889–895. doi:10.1126/science.aaf6288. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.aaf6288.Abstract
Free provision of preventive health products in the developing world can dramatically increase access. A concern about free provision is that people who receive health products for free may not use them, with associated wasted resources. We report on a randomized controlled trial in Kenya of a screening mechanism combining free provision of dilute chlorine solution for water treatment with a small non-monetary cost (monthly voucher redemption) for households to obtain the product. Relative to a free distribution program, this mechanism reduces the quantity of chlorine procured by 60 percentage points, but reduces the share of households whose stored water tests positive for chlorine residual by only one percentage point, dramatically improving the tradeoff between errors of inclusion and exclusion.Citable link to this page
https://nrs.harvard.edu/URN-3:HUL.INSTREPOS:37374308
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