| dc.description.abstract | In “The Spokesperson—In the Crossfire,” Nachman Shai builds a strong case for the proposition that “truth” rather than “spin” is the basis of effective public information efforts, even in that most trying of situations—a nation at war.
Shai focuses on the turbulent decade in Israeli life that begins with the Lebanon War (1982) and ends with the Gulf War (1991). On the basis of a careful analysis of the interplay of Israel’s press, military, government, and people during this conflict-ridden period, he concludes that the only “bulletproof vest” available to the military spokesperson is truthfulness.
Shai writes from experience. When Moshe Arens was appointed Israel’s defense minister in the aftermath of the Sabra and Shatila refugee camp massacres, he chose Shai as his media advisor. Six years later, Shai was selected as chief spokesperson for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).
He became a widely respected public figure during the Gulf War. He had the task of explaining wartime events to the Israeli press and public, and it was his voice that people heard over the radio as they huddled in bomb shelters during Iraqi missile attacks. One writer said: “Nachman Shai, not Yitzhak Shamir, was the hero of the Gulf War. He was the one who conducted a personal dialogue with the public.” A nationwide poll indicated that 67 percent of Israelis regarded him as “completely trustworthy” while 26 percent found him “mostly trustworthy.”
But Shai’s credibility was sharply questioned shortly after the Gulf War when it was alleged that thousands of defective gas masks had been distributed to the public. Shai had unwittingly assured Israelis that the gas masks were completely safe, but a number of journalists claimed that he had lied to protect his superiors. “It’s back to business as usual,” wrote one reporter.
“Business as usual” was a reference to the government’s false statements during the Yom Kippur War, the Lebanon invasion, and the Intifada. These attempts at manipulating public opinion had poisoned the IDF’s relationship with the press and weakened its standing with the Israeli people.
It is a pattern familiar to American citizens and journalists, who have not yet regained the trust in government they had before the Vietnam war.
Shai is too seasoned a practitioner to assume that truthfulness in public information efforts is merely a question of the spokesperson’s personal integrity. He proposes organizational systems that are designed to make the spokesperson as fully informed as possible. He recommends, for example, that the defense spokesperson participate in deliberations at the highest levels of the military.
Not everyone will agree with all of Shai’s conclusions and recommendations. What cannot be disputed, however, is that the costs of public deception are high and getting higher and the chances that any such deception will escape detection by the press are low and getting lower. Policy makers in all countries and in all sectors of government, not just in Israel and in the military, can gain from a careful reading of Nachman Shai’s compelling and insightful paper. | en_US |
