A New Korean Sunshine: Managing the New Nuclear Crisis Through Limited Nuclear Deterrence and Economic Prosperity on the Korean Peninsula
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Nino, Juan
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Nino, Juan. 2020. A New Korean Sunshine: Managing the New Nuclear Crisis Through Limited Nuclear Deterrence and Economic Prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. Master's thesis, Harvard University Division of Continuing Education.Abstract
Negotiations for denuclearization and disarmament of the Democratic People’sRepublic of Korea (DPRK) have thus far failed. Economic sanctions, threats and nuclear
treaties from world powers have proven to be ineffective as the DPRK’s nuclear program
continues to gain traction. Furthermore, few instances of “denuclearization” have
succeeded under previous models.
By improving the DPRK’s economy and inviting it to the trading table, the West
can create strong economic and political incentives to open the country to re-negotiate
disarmament when it stands to gain or lose far more. Since those incentives are currently
lacking, they must be crafted to secure a place for the US in Asia.
This thesis hypothesizes that there is a hybrid approach to increasing security in
the Korean Peninsula: One in which a nuclear deterrent is allowed, and an economic
boon improves bargaining position for the west over the long term.
The methods used to support this hypothesis are based on classic thought on game
theory, deterrence theory to explain how to stabilize the area then I propose how policies
that improve economic prosperity will create strong economic and political incentives to
open the country to eventually re-negotiate denuclearization and disarmament.
In this thesis, I propose economic incentives above disarmament as the basis of
negotiations, encouraging economic growth in place of sanctions to mitigate long term
nuclear risk and increase prosperity and stability in the Korean Peninsula.
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