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dc.contributor.authorKremer, Michael R.
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-24T15:25:39Z
dc.date.issued1998
dc.identifier.citationKremer, Michael R. 1998. Patent buyouts: A mechanism for encouraging innovation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 113(4): 1137-1167.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0033-5533en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3693705
dc.description.abstractIn 1839 the French government purchased the Daguerreotype patent and placed it in the public domain. Such patent buyouts could potentially eliminate the monopoly price distortions and incentives for rent-stealing duplicative research created by patents, while increasing incentives for original research. Governments could offer to purchase patents at their estimated private value, as determined in an auction, times a markup equal to the typical ratio of inventions' social and private value. Most patents purchased would be placed in the public domain, but to induce bidders to reveal their valuations, a few would be sold to the highest bidder.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomicsen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherMIT Pressen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1162/003355398555865en_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.titlePatent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovationen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionProofen_US
dc.relation.journalQuarterly Journal of Economics -Cambridge Massachusetts-en_US
dash.depositing.authorKremer, Michael R.
dc.date.available2010-02-24T15:25:39Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1162/003355398555865*
dash.contributor.affiliatedKremer, Michael


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