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Now showing items 31-40 of 215
Random Utility Theory for Social Choice
(Curran Associates, Inc., 2012)
Random utility theory models an agent's preferences on alternatives by drawing a real-valued score on each alternative (typically independently) from a parameterized distribution, and then ranking the alternatives according ...
Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers
(ACM Press, 2012)
In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compatibility requirement with the goal of minimizing expected ...
Truthful Prioritization Schemes for Spectrum Sharing
(IEEE, 2012)
As the rapid expansion of smart phones and associated data-intensive applications continues, we expect to see renewed interest in dynamic prioritization schemes as a way to increase the total utility of a heterogeneous ...
Accounting Mechanisms for Distributed Work Systems
(AAAI Press, 2010)
In distributed work systems, individual users perform work for other users. A significant challenge in these systems is to provide proper incentives for users to contribute as much work as they consume, even when monitoring ...
Dynamic Matching with a Fall-Back Option
(IOS Press, 2010)
We study dynamic matching without money when one side of the market is dynamic with arrivals and departures and the other is static and agents have strict preferences over agents on the other side of the market. In enabling ...
Hybrid Transitive Trust Mechanisms
(International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2010)
Establishing trust amongst agents is of central importance to the development of well-functioning multi-agent systems. For example, the anonymity of transactions on the Internet can lead to inefficiencies; e.g., a seller ...
Toward Automatic Task Design: A Progress Report
(Association for Computing Machinery, 2010)
A central challenge in human computation is in understanding how to design task environments that effectively attract participants and coordinate the problem solving process. In this paper, we consider a common problem ...
Chain: A Dynamic Double Auction Framework for Matching Patient Agents
(AI Access Foundation, 2007)
In this paper we present and evaluate a general framework for the design of truthful auctions for matching agents in a dynamic, two-sided market. A single commodity, such as a resource or a task, is bought and sold by ...
Strong Activity Rules for Iterative Combinatorial Auctions
(Elsevier, 2010)
Activity rules have emerged in recent years as an important aspect of practical auction design. The role of an activity rule in an iterative auction is to suppress strategic behavior by bidders and promote simple, continual, ...
Multi-Item Vickrey-Dutch Auctions
(Elsevier, 2009)
Descending price auctions are adopted for goods that must be sold quickly and in private values environments, for instance in flower, fish, and tobacco auctions. In this paper, we introduce efficient descending auctions ...