Probabilistic Predeterminism in International Security: Historical Institutionalist and Path-Dependent Perspective on the U.S. Colonial Institutions and the U.S.-Philippine Alliance.

Probabilistic Predeterminism in International Security: Historical Institutionalist and Path-Dependent Perspective on the U.S. Colonial Institutions and the U.S.-Philippine Alliance.

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Abstract

This research presents a fresh perspective on the nature of the U.S.-Philippine alliance outside of political actors and threat-centric explanations, which presently dominate international security literature. It proposes that “colonial institutions” and “history” matter in the alliance’s formation and persistence, where the existence of such colonial institutions predetermined historical political choices throughout time. It answers the question of *how* the U.S.-Philippine alliance persisted despite anti-American political actors such as Rodrigo Roa Duterte and varying levels of existential threats throughout history.

The research findings of this study suggest that the U.S. colonial institutions, using the method of descriptive inferences, perennially increased the probability of both the United States and the Philippines maintaining a political trajectory toward security alliance, often manifesting through *restricting* effects where the existence of prior colonial institutions, including its effects, deterred deviant political actor from deviating. This is due to the existence of mutually reinforcing security dependencies that the colonial institutions caused, making it costlier to leave the alliance and, therefore, effectively increasing the probability of the two states choosing an alliance over another alternative, given the predetermined cost of choosing the latter due to the colonial institutions’ existence.

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to the Supreme Maker of heaven and earth. Also, to all those who have believed in the Truth throughout the ages: those who are dead, those who were persecuted, those who are still in the world, and those of the future to come. I join thee with the heavenly throng. *Omnia Tempus Habent.*

To the U.S. and Filipino veterans who fought side by side in defending the Commonwealth, including my grandfather Jose Seralbo, who served in World War II and navigated the thick and dangerous jungles of the Sierra Madre alongside his comrades in arms.

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Finally, I thank my ecclesiastical brethren for their spiritual guidance and support, especially when the possibility of giving up was real. I wouldn't have been able to press

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Table of Contents

List of Figures

Chapter I.

Introduction

The 21st-century world has witnessed an increasingly aggressive People's Republic of China (PRC), which has arguably led to a stronger alliance between the United States (US) and the Philippines. These two countries have similar interests in restricting Beijing's influence in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. After all, most Philippine political actors are loyal to the United States. The present state of scholarship pertaining to the alliance reflects the arguments above as it is dominated by non-institutional explanations of the alliance's persistence, namely (1) political-actor-centric explanations and (2) threat-centric explanations. Scholars who argue for a political-actor-centric explanation state that political actors are central in acting as the primary independent variable in determining the country's alliance, not the existence of certain institutions. For instance, Gregory Winger argues that Philippine state actors, including former Philippine President Fidel Ramos and Duterte's Secretary of Defense Delfin Lorenzana, both of whom had a close affinity with the United States, "shielded the partnership from the worst of Duterte's barbs and identified a way forward for the alliance."[1]

On the other hand, threat-centric explanations argue that existential threats in the international political system are the primary independent variable in fostering motivation for states to form alliances. For instance, scholars such as Rachel Winston and William J.

[1] Gregory Winger, "Alliance Embeddedness: Rodrigo Duterte and the Resilience of the US–Philippine Alliance," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 17 no.3, (2021): 15, https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orab013.

Barnds suggest that the U.S.-Philippine alliance mainly exists due to the existential threat of the PRC to both Philippine and U.S. security interests, especially in the case of the current South China Sea tension.[2] However, the problem with these explanations is that they treat the existence and continuation of the alliance as "little more than vessels upon which states imprint their pre-constituted interests."[3] In other words, institutions for these explanations are merely subject to the predetermined sentiments of the state, whether such sentiments stem from specific political actors or the existence of external threats. However, the weakness of these arguments is that they forget the vice versa, i.e., the institutions' ability to shape states' interests first and foremost.

To be clear, this research is not dismissing the validity of the above explanations. Indeed, causality in politics is hardly univariate by nature, i.e., political actions are rarely caused by a single variable. Instead, causality in politics and international alliances is almost always multivariate, i.e., there are multiple and often interacting causes in producing a single political phenomenon, such as asking what caused the Cold War. As Joseph S. Nye Jr. points out, for instance, the cause of the Cold War was multivariate in the sense that its causes may be categorized by (1) domestic factors, e.g., the Soviet Union weakened by war, (2) individual factors, e.g., Stalin's paranoia, and (3) systemic factors, e.g., World War II and resulting bipolarity. Much like Nye Jr.'s claims, this paper agrees that both the roles of political actors and the existence of threat (or at least

[2] Rachel Anne Winston, "Philippine Hedging Strategy in the South China Sea: An Analysis of Approaches by President Benigno Aquino III and President Rodrigo Duterte," Master's thesis., Harvard University - Extension School, 2020, https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/37365047; William J. Barnds, "Political and Security Relations," in *Crisis in the Philippines: The Marcos Era and Beyond. Preface by David D. Newsom,* ed. John Bresnan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014): 228-257.
[3] Solingen and Wan, "Critical Junctures, Developmental Pathways, and Incremental Change in Security Institutions," 553.

the perception of one in the future) are variables which contribute to the existence of the alliance.

The Problem and Research Question

However, this research argues that these threat-centric and political actor-centric explanations are insufficient in explaining this paper's research question of *how* the U.S.-Philippine alliance persisted *despite* the existence of deviant political actors, such as Rodrigo Duterte, and the non-existence of external threats, such as in the case of the newly independent Philippines in 1947 when neither the Soviet Union nor China posed a real immediate threat to the Philippine state? Logically speaking, if only political actors and the existence of threats mattered in the persistence of an alliance, then the lack of these variables should have produced a non-persistence of the alliance. However, such was not the case in the history of the U.S.-Philippine security relationship. On the contrary, the alliance has persisted for almost a century despite active political actor efforts against the alliance and varying levels of existential threats. It, therefore, follows that an exploration of a "new" variable is necessary.

Thesis and Theory

In dealing with the problem, this thesis proposes that one should go back in time to seek other variables that explain the persistence of the U.S.-Philippine alliance beyond the post-colonial threat and political actor-centric explanations. This research traces the history of the U.S. colonial institutions and how it affected both U.S. and Philippine political actors in producing an argument for their causal role in the persistence of the U.S.-Philippine alliance. The objective is to produce a case that may yield new ideas and

research paths for future researchers. This is consistent with the American Political Development (APD) approach under the field of historical institutionalism (HI), which aims to put emphasis on historical narratives (history matters) to generate new variables available for future consideration. As Daniel J. Galvin argues, "historical discoveries, by presenting the researcher with something new to be explained, also encourage the development of new *hypotheses* and *concept*."[4] As Suzanne Mettler and Richard Valelly described, historical institutionalist scholars, particularly in the APD approach, "has a strong tendency to produce *new* accounts of the links between past and present."[5] Given such, this theses presents a *new* account:

> The historical persistence of the U.S.-Philippine security alliance (dependent variable) is caused by U.S. colonial institutions, namely the Treaties of Paris and Washington, alongside the physical presence of the U.S. colonial bases in the Philippines (independent variable), because the existence of the U.S. colonial institutions caused a mutual security dependency between the U.S. and the Philippines (mechanism 1) which restricted deviant political actors in shifting the alliance towards a different political trajectory (mechanism 2), both increasing the probability of the alliance's continuation.

This research primarily employs the path-dependency theory in explaining how such mutual dependency between the U.S. and the Philippines seemingly led to a "pre-destined" (but not unbreakable) path of alliance together, explaining its persistence for almost a century. Path dependency is a theoretical framework that emphasizes the notion that "each step in a particular direction makes it more difficult to reverse course."[6] In

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[4] Daniel J. Galvin, "Qualitative Methods and American Political Development," in *The Oxford Handbook of American Political Development,* eds. Richard Valelly, Suzanne Mettler, and Robert Lieberman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 213-215.
[5] Suzanne Mettler and Richard Valelly, "Introduction: The Distinctiveness and Necessity of American Political Development," in *The Oxford Handbook of American Political Development,* eds. Richard Valelly, Suzanne Mettler, and Robert Lieberman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 14-16.
[6] Pierson, Paul, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis.* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 21.

other words, path dependency claims that an institution's presence acts as a filter in limiting other events from partaking.[7] Most historical institutionalist scholars would argue that this is due to the presence of self-reinforcing sequences, the notion in which "each step in a particular direction makes it more likely that a unit will continue to follow that same direction."[8] Paul Pierson explains this phenomenon with the notion of "increasing returns," arguing that the existence of institutions incrementally increases the benefits of remaining towards the same trajectory, akin to the example of the QWERTY keyboard in which prolonged use incrementally increases the efficiency and effectivity of the user in time through familiarity and muscle memory.[9]

Path-dependency is part of the historical institutionalist (HI) approach, a branch of scholarship within political science and international relations that makes the inquiry of *how* and *when* institutions shape political developments, placing emphasis on the endogenous (institutional) origins of political preferences rather than individual-level traits in accounting for political preferences and outcomes.[10] As this thesis shows, the development of the U.S. colonial institutions led to a slow-moving but consistent formation of dependency, which incrementally increased the cost of leaving the alliance over time and increased the benefits of remaining on the same path, explaining its persistence and maintenance towards the same political trajectory of an alliance.

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[7] James Mahoney, Khairunnisa Mohamedali, and Christoph Nguyen, "Causality and Time in Historical Institutionalism," in *The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism*, eds., Ofreos Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti, and Adam Sheingate (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press: 2016), 72-75.
[8] Mahoney, Mohamedali, and Nguyen, "Causality and Time in Historical Institutionalism," 82; Paul Pierson, "Not Just What, but *When*: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes," *Studies in American Political Development* 14, no.1, (2000): 74. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X00003011.
[9] Pierson, *Politics in Time*, 2-24.
[10] Ofreos Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti, and Adam Sheingate, "Historical Institutionalism in Political Science," in *The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism*, eds., Ofreos Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti, and Adam Sheingate (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press: 2016): 3-7.

The independent variable of this thesis research is the U.S. colonial institutions, which may be categorized by (1) U.S. military jurisdiction institutions in the Philippine islands and (2) U.S. military bases in the Philippines, including but not limited to Subic Bay Naval Base. These bases may also be referred to as "colonial bases" throughout the paper, with them being colonial institutions. Both shall be discussed shortly. The conception of these institutions may be traced back to the events of February 18, 1898, when the U.S. Secretary of Navy John Davis Long informed Commodore George Dewey, commander of the Asiatic Squadron, of the sinking of the *Maine* in Havana Harbor.[11] On February 25, Dewey received orders from Roosevelt:

> Order the squadron except *Monocacy* to Hong Kong. Keep full coal. In the event of declaration of war with Spain, your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in the Philippine Islands.[12]

The commodore responded to Long and Roosevelt's telegrams the same month, gearing the Asiatic Squadron for a potential naval battle against Spain, and asked the U.S. Consul General Oscar F. Williams in Manila to provide intelligence on the Manila garrison's capabilities.[13] On April 25, Dewey received a telegram from Long informing him that:

> War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavour.[14]

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[11] Edwin P. Hoyt, *The Lonely Ships: The Life and Death of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet* (New York: McKay, 1976), 51.
[12] H.W. Brands, *Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines* (New York: Oxford University Press: 1992), 22-23.
[13] Hoyt, *The Lonely Ships*, 51.
[14] Brands, *Bound to Empire*, 23; Hoyt, *The Lonely Ships*, 54.

As the Asiatic squadron approached Subic Bay en route to Manila, the commodore noted its strategic potential for a future naval base, a prediction that would eventually turn into reality. After months of bloody jungle warfare with Spanish forces, by December 10, 1898, the entire Philippine islands were ceded to the United States as part of the Treaty of Paris. There are presently numerous explanations on the United States' rationale in the colonization of the islands, e.g., Claude A. Buss arguing for the U.S. interest in expanding sea power towards the "China market," in which the United States needed to protect its commercial lines in the Pacific.[15] While the number of explanations may be numerous, they are not included in the scope of this research, for what matters here are the institutional developments that came after that make up the independent variable of this study.

The first set of institutions that resulted from the events was the establishment of treaty institutions pertaining to U.S. military jurisdiction over the Philippine islands, granting the United States sovereign rights and placing the islands under the U.S. military government. These institutions consist of the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and the Treaty of Washington in 1900. Both institutions stipulated the transfer of Spanish sovereignty on the Philippine islands, making the United States the sole sovereign of the Philippines. As Article III of the Treaty of Paris set out, "the United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and harbour of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines."[16] The Treaty of Washington in 1900 added that "Spain relinquishes to the United States all title and claim

[15] Claude A. Buss, *The United States and the Philippines: Background for Policy* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), preface.
[16] United States and the Spanish Empire, *Treaty of Paris,* December 10, 1898, https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc27899/m2/1/high_res_d/BRAC-1995_01544.pdf.

of title, which she may have had at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace of Paris, to any and all islands belonging to the Philippine Archipelago."[17] The existence of the two legal institutions granted the stationing of the U.S. Asiatic Squadron (U.S. Navy) with indefinite terms outside the jurisdiction of other sovereign nations.[18] Such was of strategic importance for it allowed the right of stationing U.S. military vessels on a permanent basis without the need for resupply from the U.S. mainland, hence allowing an indefinitely forward-deployed U.S. military naval assets in the Asia-Pacific. It also signaled the reduction of U.S. reliance on European powers in the region, such as the British in Hong Kong, especially given that the British previously asked the U.S. Navy to leave its docks while U.S. vessels were docked in Hong Kong in April 1898.[19]

The second set of institutions that resulted was the establishment of the U.S. colonial bases in the Philippines, acting as the physical manifestation of the legal institutions by granting the U.S. Asiatic Squadron a permanent dock and facilities in the Pacific. The Naval War Board was specifically in operation as early as May 20, 1898, with the purpose of advising the U.S. government on Naval affairs, in which it recommended that formal military defense infrastructure in the Philippines should be built to protect the U.S. fleet in the Asia-Pacific.[20] By May 21, 1898, William McKinley ordered the Secretary of War and the Navy to carry out the board's recommendations.[21] By March 30, 1900, the General Board of the Navy was established under the leadership

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[17] William McKinley, "Document 1019," December 3, 1900, *Foreign Relations of the United States,* Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 3, 1900, (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1902), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1900/d1019.
[18] William R. Braisted, "The Philippine Naval Base Problem, 1898–1909," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 41, no.1 (1954): 21, https://doi.org/10.2307/1898148.
[19] Hoyt, *The Lonely Ships,* 53.
[20] Braisted, "The Philippine Naval Base Problem, 1898–1909," 22.
[21] Braisted, 22

of Admiral Dewey,[22] serving for the construction of the U.S. colonial bases, including Subic Naval Base, which would become one of the largest U.S. naval bases in history throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, as the rest of this paper shall show later.

The General Board concluded through a report on April 1900 by Lieutenant John M. Elliot that the threat stemming from Japan extended to the Philippines, warning that "the Navy should be 'especially prepared' to reckon with Japan."[23] The report also warned of a looming Russian threat in the Pacific.[24] In October 1901, Admiral Henry C. Taylor, the chief of the Bureau of Navigation, addressed Elliot's point and proposed a "self-sustaining" naval base in the Philippines, with fortifications against land and sea attack, a dockyard with complete drydocks and workshops, a power plant with 200,000 tons capacity, railways connecting the naval base with its defenses and the capital city of Manila, a naval hospital, and a "special village for personnel."[25] The following month, Theodore Roosevelt gave Secretary Long the order to take "active steps" to establish a permanent base at Subic Bay in Olongapo.[26] The independent variable of this study, therefore, consists of both legal and physical institutions that powered the U.S. military presence in the colonial Philippines. Figure 1 visually summarizes the two sets of institutions under the independent variable, namely those pertaining to the U.S. military jurisdiction and those relating to U.S. military physical institutions.

[22] Braisted, 23.
[23] Braisted, 23.
[24] Braisted, 23.
[25] Braisted, 25.
[26] Braisted, 25.



Figure 1. Independent Variable Institutional Breakdown.

This figure lists the colonial institutions included in the greater term "U.S. colonial institutions," which is the independent variable of this study.

The dependent variable of this study is the observed outcome of the U.S.-Philippine alliance's persistence towards the same trajectory throughout history. This alliance's persistence is observed in the fact that the alliance remains existent today more than a century after the first colonial institutions were established, considering several attempts of certain political actors to break away from the alliance throughout history. These attempts include the case of Marcos Sr.'s renegotiation of the alliance from 1975-1979, the 1991 Philippine Senate's attempt to lessen dependency on the alliance by establishing a more self-reliant Philippine military, and Rodrigo Duterte's anti-American and pro-China stance in which he threatened to scrap the U.S.-Philippine alliance totally. As may be observed in this research, examining the *failure* of each of these cases in shifting the alliance away towards a different political trajectory may provide a valuable explanation of the persistence of the alliance today.

Methodology and Data

This research primarily applies the APD method of *descriptive inference.* It involves describing, through historical narratives and interpretation of primary data, the sequence of events that happened in history, allowing for causal inferences. In other words, descriptive inferences describe how a causality may exist through historical interpretation in order to argue for a causality. This is contrary to testing causality in quantitative analyses which often relies on controls, quantitative correlations, etc., to make causal inferences. In essence, descriptive inferences may sound like a historical narrative commonly found in history books. However, descriptive inferences are "not the same as simple description: it involves an inference, from known to unknown, that can be incorrect or otherwise flawed. And both description and descriptive inference often rest on the interpretation of inherently – sometimes deliberately-ambiguous actions."[27] The difference between descriptive inferences and pure historical narratives as employed by historians is that the former argues for causality and is geared towards the generation of new hypotheses and theoretical generalizations,[28] while the latter does not.

This research conducts descriptive inferences through process tracing, using historical narratives from gathered archival data to interpret the events that led to the developments of the dependencies and the role of the colonial institutions. For the purpose of the research, the following archival sources shall be used: the U.S. Department of State - Office of the Historian's *Foreign Relations of the United States*

[27] Suzanne Mettler and Richard Valelly, "Introduction: The Distinctiveness and Necessity of American Political Development," in *The Oxford Handbook of American Political Development,* eds. Richard Valelly, Suzanne Mettler, and Robert Lieberman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 14-16.
[28] Mettler and Valelly, "Introduction: The Distinctiveness and Necessity of American Political Development," 14-16.

(FRUS) collection with thousands of telegrams and memorandums dating 1961 – 2000, the National Security Archive's Digital National Security Archive collection in which 215 telegrams and documents from 1950 to 1989 that was found directly or indirectly related to the case, as well as the United States' National Archives Central Foreign Policy Files with 20,744 telegrams related to the keyword "Philippines" from 1974 to 1979. In addition to these archival sources, other sources such as published books, military manuals, academic papers, archived videos, military documents, as well as reports shall be used.

Research Structure

Chapters II and III discuss the role of the U.S. colonial institutions in fostering the causal mechanism of a mutual security dependency between the United States and the Philippines, showing a path-dependent process in which the existence of the U.S. colonial institutions perennially increased the cost of deviating away from the alliance for both the United States and the Philippines, and increased the benefits of remaining in the alliance. Collectively, both chapters show the institutional causal role of the colonial institutions in leading both the Philippines and the United States toward mutually reinforcing security dependency, where the United States depended on the Philippines as a staging ground while the Philippines depended on the United States for its external security and funding the AFP, triggering a mutually dependent scenario for both states.

Chapters IV and V, on the other hand, discuss the role of a restricting effect in preventing deviant political actors from deviating away from the alliance's status quo trajectory of persistence, explaining the persistence of today's alliance rather than a shift towards other political trajectories. Chapter IV begins by conducting a specialized case

study in highlighting the first case of how such aforementioned dependencies, as discussed in Chapters II and III, resulted in a restricting effect in which the existence of the aforementioned dependencies, as discussed in Chapters II and III, shaped the U.S. and Philippine negotiation choices in the Cold War context of the 1975 to 1979 alliance renegotiation between Marcos Sr. and the Ford/Carter administrations, preventing both parties from drastically shifting away from the alliance. It also shows the process of how such restrictive effect enabled a self-reinforcing sequence, evolving the alliance institutions further to incrementally increase the benefit of remaining towards the same trajectory, further "locking" the two states together towards a "predetermined" political path of an alliance, hence the continued persistence of the alliance. Chapter V then evaluates the aforementioned institutions and dependencies' role in restricting the Philippine state in the post-Cold War context, manifesting up to the present day as of the writing of this paper. It covers the failure cases of both the Philippine Senate's closing of the colonial bases in 1991 and Duterte's pro-China foreign policy in permanently removing the United States' necessary role in Philippine national security, hence the existence of the alliance's persistence in the present context. Chapter VI states the conclusion of this research.

Chapter II.

U.S. Dependency on the Philippines

This chapter traces the process of how the early existence of the U.S. colonial institutions led the United States towards a pre-determined dependency on the Philippines. In essence, this chapter virtually traces the institutional role of the U.S. colonial institutions in conceiving early U.S. dependencies on the Philippine islands for U.S. national security, resulting in the conception of post-colonial institutions allowing for their continuation after the colonial era. This chapter is divided into three sections: (1) an evaluation of the institutional significance of the Treaty of Paris and Washington during the colonial Era, (2) their "carrying over" effects to the post-colonial era, and (3) further theoretical implications which may be made in the observed historical narrative. The first section highlights the notion that the U.S. colonial institutions in the Philippines, i.e., the treaties and the U.S. colonial bases, have been vital in fostering the United States' strategic dependency on the islands. In showing such, four interdependent historical cases shall be under examination. The second section continues the historical narrative in the post-colonial context, describing how the strategic dependency from the colonial era had to persist from the perception of U.S. political actors, causing the conception of the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) and later the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), two institutions which enabled the continuation of the U.S. security dependency on the island. The third section summarizes the claims and further theoretical implications which may be considered.

The Colonial Era

U.S. colonialism of the Philippines served as the critical juncture in leading the United States towards strategic dependency on the islands through the utilization of its central natural geographic advantages, including the Philippines' proximity to China, Japan, and the rest of the Far East. The islands' strategic proximity gave the United States tremendous advantage through the reduction of military reaction time in existential crises in the region, permitting for a constant "forward deployment" of U.S. troops in the Asia-Pacific, perennially increasing the efficiency and effectivity of U.S. forces in the Pacific. Such was institutionally guaranteed and entrenched in the existence of the Treaties of Paris in 1898 and Washington in 1900, granting the United States total jurisdiction and sovereignty over the Philippine islands and acting as a necessary factor in the aforementioned dependencies. The strategic utilization of the Philippines through the treaties, alongside the dependencies which developed with it, may be observed in four historical contexts during the colonial era: (1) the Boxer Rebellion, (2) Siberia in 1917, (3) the development of War Plan Orange, (4) and the Second World War, where in each case it may be observed that the presence of the colonial institutions, namely the colonial bases and treaties, served as a necessary factor in enabling the United States to strategically depend on the Philippines for its foreign policy objectives in the Far East. The following cases shall be discussed further below.

The Boxer Rebellion

One primary example was the utilization of the Philippines for immediate deployment of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. ground forces during the Boxer Rebellion.[29] On March 27, 1900, Judson Smith from the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Mission at Congregation House, No. 14 Beacon Street in Boston, sent a telegram to John Hay, asking the Secretary whether the United States had taken measures to demonstrate power against China.[30] On the same day, the Secretary replied that the fleet in the Philippines had been ordered for such contingency.[31] John Hay's statements reflect the reality and strategic viability of the U.S. Naval presence in the Philippines. On May 17, 1900, E.H. Conger, the U.S. Minister to China in the Legation of the United States, sent a telegram to Rear Admiral Kempff at Yokohama, the second in command of the United States naval force on Asiatic Station.[32] It stated, "situation becoming serious. Request warship Taku soon as possible."[33] The following day, the U.S. gunboat *USS Wheeling* departed from the Philippines as ordered to patrol the northern coast of China.[34]

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[29] Leonard David, *Revolutionary Struggle in the Philippines*. (London: Palgrave Macmillan London, 1989), 95.

[30] Mr. Hay to Mr. Conger, Mr. Smith to Mr. Hay, and Mr. Hay to Mr. Smith, "Document 98" April 9, 1900, Foreign Relations of the United States, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 3, 1900, (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1902), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1900/d98.

[31] Mr. Hay to Mr. Conger, Mr. Smith to Mr. Hay, and Mr. Hay to Mr. Smith, "Document 98," https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1900/d98.

[32] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Mr. Conger to Admiral Kempff at Yokohama, and Mr. Conger to Rear Admiral Kempff, "Document 107," May 19, 1900, Foreign Relations of the United States, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 3, 1900, (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1902), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1900/d107.

[33] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Mr. Conger to Admiral Kempff at Yokohama, and Mr. Conger to Rear Admiral Kempff, "Document 107," https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1900/d107.

[34] "Wheeling I (Gunboat No. 14)," Naval History and Heritage Command, February 29, 2016, https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/w/wheeling-i.html.

On May 21, 1900, the *USS Newark* was ordered to join the action, sailing to Taku.[35] The *USS Newark* was at Nagasaki at that time.[36]

By June 5, 1900, the situation worsened in China, and Conger telegrammed John Hay, stating that "more ships are badly needed at Taku." The nearest possible reinforcements were in the Philippines.[37] Responding to the situation, Real Admiral George C. Reamey ordered the U.S. Marines stationed in Manila and Olongapo (most probably in Subic Bay) to China, boarding the *USS Newark* on June 14, 1900.[38] The force consisted of Major Littleton W.T. Waller as commanding officer, alongside seven officers and 131 U.S. Marines.[39] The troops remained in China until September 28, 1900, when they were ordered back to the Philippine islands.[40]

In this case, it may be observed that the Philippines had become of naval and geostrategic value to the United States, allowing the islands to be a "gateway" in the Asia-Pacific. The central and proximate location of the Philippines vis-à-vis other East Asian states, e.g., Japan, China, and Russia, allowed fast U.S. military reaction and deployment to existential crises in the region. As Admiral Dewey reported to John Davis Long in 1898, the island of Luzon, where Subic Bay is located, was strategically proximate to the trade route between Manila, China, and Japan,[41] further inferring that the

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[35] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, "Document 108," May 21, 1900, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 3, 1900 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1902), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1900/d108.
[36] Hoyt, *The Lonely Ships*, 67
[37] Harry Allanson Ellsworth, *One Hundred Eighty Landings of the United States Marines 1800-1934*. (Washington D.C.: History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1974), 35. https://www.marines.mil/portals/1/Publications/One%20Hundred%20Eighty%20Landings%20of%20United%20States%20Marines%201800-1934%2019000305500_1.pdf.
[38] Ellsworth, *One Hundred Eighty Landings of the United States Marines 1800-1934*, 35
[39] Ellsworth, 35
[40] Ellsworth, 39
[41] John Davis Long, *Papers of John Davis Long, 1897-1904* (Massachusetts: The Massachusetts Historical Society, 1939), 189, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=miun.abz5335.0078.001&view=1up&seq=220.

islands were strategically close to major centers in the Asia-Pacific, including Hong Kong, Canton, Shanghai, Nagasaki, and Yokohama, hence making it a valuable military asset to the United States.[42] The time and distance travel would have been significantly longer if U.S. forces had come from the U.S. mainland, causing significant lag in operations as well as missed opportunities for time-sensitive strategic and tactical opportunities.

The Siberian Case of 1917

The Boxer Rebellion was not an isolated case. The utilization of the 31st Infantry Regiment also highlighted the Philippines' strategic role as a staging point for the US military in the Pacific. In late 1917, Russia was in chaos and was amid a civil war. At the order of Woodrow Wilson, the 31st Infantry Regiment departed from the Philippines onward to Vladivostok,[43] the Russian seaport in the Pacific. The 31st Infantry was formed in the Philippines on the 13th of August 1916 at Fort McKinley in Manila,[44] one of those primarily created and stationed outside the mainland United States. They remained operational in Siberia until February 15, 1920, when they were ordered back to Manila, with the last contingent leaving on April 1, 1920.[45] The last contingent arrived in Manila on April 17, 1920,[46] suggesting that the expeditionary force took approximately

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[42] Long, *Papers of John Davis Long, 1897-1904*, 189.
[43] Barry R. McCaffrey and J. Stephen, *The 31st Infantry Regiment: A History of "America's Foreign Legion" in Peace and War*. (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2018), 15.
[44] Patrick Feng, "The 31st Infantry Regiment," Army Historical Foundation, accessed March 1, 2023, https://armyhistory.org/31st-infantry-regiment#:~:text=The%2031st%20Infantry%20was%20a,Vladivostok%2C%20arriving%20on%2021%20August.
[45] McCaffrey and Stephen, *The 31st Infantry Regiment: A History of "America's Foreign Legion" in Peace and War*, 45
[46] McCaffrey and Stephen, 46

seventeen days to go from Vladivostok (East Sea) to the Philippines. The Vladivostok route to the U.S. mainland in the absence of the Philippines would have more days due to the significant difference in distance, accentuating the United States' tremendous advantage in military operations via the Philippines, especially in cases when reactive speed is of strategic necessity. While the Siberian case did not require such response immediacy per se, such capability mattered especially in larger conflicts, as will be shown in later cases. The case of Siberia nevertheless shows how the presence of the Philippine bases, through the treaties, provided such strategic capability for the U.S., providing perennial value and advantage.

The War Plan Orange

The dependency on the Philippines may further be observed within the War Plan Orange, which was the United States' military strategy for addressing the pre-WWII Japanese threat in a potential naval and land conflict in the Pacific. During the colonial era, the Philippines alone, as part of U.S. sovereignty, had U.S. military installations which had the capability of supporting a naval force able to challenge the Japanese Navy in Asia-Pacific.[47] By July 7, 1923, the Joint Army-Navy Board, consisting of the Army and Navy's top officials, including the Chief of Staff of the Army and Navy's Chief of Naval Operations, jointly concluded in a memorandum to both the U.S. Secretary of Navy and War stating:

> (1) That the islands were of great strategic value to the United States, for they provided the best available bases for military and naval forces operating in defense of American interests in the Far East. (2) That their

[47] Louis Morton, "War Plan ORANGE: Evolution of a Strategy." *World Politics* 11, no.2 (1959): 227, https://doi.org/10.2307/2009529.

> capture by Japan would seriously affect American prestige and make offensive operations in the Western Pacific extremely difficult. (3) That the recapture of the Islands would be a long and costly undertaking, requiring a far greater effort than timely measures for defense. (4) That national interests and military necessity required that the Philippines be made as strong as possible in peacetime.[48]

A proximate U.S. Naval base as a staging ground against the United States' adversaries was specifically important, as accentuated earlier, with them providing the increased capability for time-sensitive responses. As Alfred Thayer Mahan stated, the great U.S. naval strategist, without the overseas U.S. Naval bases, U.S. warships were akin to "land birds, unable to fly beyond the shore,"[49] meaning that the U.S. Navy without the Philippines meant it would have to be stationed far away from the adversary, giving Japan in the case of War Plan Orange a significant advantage in maritime operations in the Pacific. Indeed, this was what happened in WWII, as will be discussed later. Given the Philippines' strategic value to the United States, the War Plan Orange also included the plan to defend the Philippines against Japanese forces in which the "U.S. Navy would react to the Japanese challenge by marshalling its forces (battleships and supply vessels) along the West Coast of the United States and the proceed to move its battle fleet from San Francisco across the Pacific via Hawaii, Midway, and Guam, to establish a forward operating base at Manila Bay in the Philippines."[50]

While waiting for U.S. Navy reinforcements from the U.S. mainland, the 1928 revision of the plan stated that U.S. land forces in the Philippines were to hold out in the

[48] Morton, "War Plan Orange: Evolution of a Strategy," 230.
[49] Edward S. Miller, *War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945*. (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 66.
[50] Sewall Menzel, *The Pearl Harbor Secret: Why Roosevelt Undermined the U.S. Navy*. (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020), 21.

Bataan Peninsula, denying the enemy access to Manila Bay.[51] The presumption was that in an estimate of six months, "the U.S. Pacific Fleet would have fought its way across the Pacific, won a victory over the Combined Fleet, and made secure the line of communications."[52] Furthermore, "the men and supplies collected on the west coast during that time would then begin to reach the Philippines in a steady stream. The Philippine garrison, thus reinforced, could then counter-attack and drive the enemy into the sea."[53]

The War Plan Orange, however, has eventually been replaced by the RAINBOW plan, a revision which recognized a "two-ocean war" with multiple enemies, with Germany being the primary opponent.[54] Eventually, this meant that the reinforcements that the Philippine garrison was hoping for would not arrive in time, leaving them incapable of defending the islands indefinitely. Nevertheless, it did not mean the Philippines lost its strategic value to the United States. In fact, as history shows, the following years before the Second World War saw the intensification of coastal artillery and defense positions in the islands, including bomb-proofing, tunnel systems, and modernized naval guns.[55] The key inference in this case is that the Philippines continued to be of strategic value to the United States pre-WWII. Figure 2 maps U.S. defenses in

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[51] Glen M. Wilford, *Pacific Rampart: A History of Corregidor and the Harbor Defense of Manila and Subic Bays.* (Virginia: Redoubt Press, 2020), 228.
[52] Louis Morton, "Decision to Withdraw to Bataan," in *Command Decisions*, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1990), 154. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uiug.30112048333402&seq=1.
[53] Morton, "Decision to Withdraw to Bataan," 154.
[54] Joseph Arthur Simon, *The Greatest of All Leathernecks*. (Baton Rouge, Louisianna: Louisianna State University Press, 2019), 148, muse.jhu.edu/book/67405; Wilford, *Pacific Rampart: A History of Corregidor and the Harbor Defense of Manila and Subic Bays*, 228.; Morton, "Decision to Withdraw to Bataan,"156.
[55] Wilford, 227-261.

Manila by 1935, while Figure 3 visualizes the mine defenses at the entrance of Manila Bay.



Figure 2. U.S. Positions in Manila Bay

Glen M. Wilford, Pacific Rampart: A History of Corregidor and the Harbor Defense of Manila and Subic Bays (Virginia: Redoubt Press, 2020), 391.



Figure 3. Mine Defenses in Manila Bay

Glen M. Wilford, Pacific Rampart: A History of Corregidor and the Harbor Defense of Manila and Subic Bays (Virginia: Redoubt Press, 2020), 258.

The Second World War

The strategic value of the Philippines, as accentuated in War Plan Orange, specifically made the Philippines a prime target of Japanese forces during the onset of the Second World War. While the Philippines fell in the early stages of WWII, thus preventing the United States from utilizing the strategic value of the islands to a great extent against the Japanese, the notion that the fall of the Philippines in WWII gave the Japanese an upper hand in the region without proximate significant U.S. military presence, allowing secure lines of supply routes to the Japanese mainland from Southeast Asia, shows in itself the strategic necessity of the U.S. colonial bases first and foremost. This was highlighted by the notion that the Japanese strategic denial of U.S. forces in the Philippines produced significant strategic advantages for the Japanese forces, with U.S. forces being pushed back far to the Pacific.

Nevertheless, the Philippines played a significant strategic role in the United States' plan pertaining to the invasion of Japan late in the course of the war, specifically the invasion of Okinawa through Operation Iceberg, affirming the strategic value of the islands in acting as a U.S. "staging point" in the Pacific. Initially, there were debates about whether Formosa (Taiwan) or the Philippines should be utilized for the invasion.[56] However, as stated by Lieutenant General Millard F. Harmon, the commanding general of the Army Air Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas (CGAAFPOA), the capture of Luzon was essential as it cut off Japanese communications to South China and Malaya.[57] General Robert C. Richardson, Jr., the commanding general for the United States Army Forces

[56] Chas. S. Nichols and Henry I. Shaw, *Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific.* (Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1955), 13-14, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.$b675886&seq=9.
[57] Nichols and Shaw, *Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific,* 15.

Pacific, resonates with this and argues that Philippines would likewise be a suitable staging point for B-29 bombers in operations against the Japanese islands.[58]

The Philippines, as part of the greater U.S. strategy, was hence used as a staging ground for the invasion of Japan through Operation Iceberg (Okinawa), emulating the cases of the Boxer Rebellion and Siberia. The islands became part of the logistical network of islands which connected the United States' West Cost to the Japanese mainland (southern route), consisting of the U.S. West Coast, Oahu, Espiritu Santo, New Caledonia, Guadalcanal, the Russell Islands, and Leyte (Philippines).[59] The Philippines bore majority of the U.S. logistical operations with Leyte hosting 186 ships, 71,163 troops, and 320, 148 measurement tons of supplies, in proportion to the total of 458 ships, 193,852 troops, and 824,567 measurement tons of supplies distributed between Leyte, Guadalcanal-Espiritu-Russells, Sapian-Tinian, Guam, Oahu, and San Francisco-Seattle.[60] At a grander scale, the Philippines were also to play a major role as a major staging ground for Operation Downfall, the planned invasion of the Japanese mainland, including its major cities. The operation was divided between Operation Olympic, referring to the invasion of the Kyushu Island, and Operation Coronet, referring to the invasion of the Honshu Island, where Tokyo and Osaka are located. Figures 4 and 5 explain in detail the Philippines' geographic role as a staging point for Operation Downfall. While it did not materialize due to the Japanese surrender after the dropping of the atomic bomb, the

[58] Nichols and Shaw, 16.
[59] Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens, *Okinawa: The Last Battle*. (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2000), 36, https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/okinawa/index.htm#contents.
[60] Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, *Okinawa: The Last Battle*, 493

existence of Operation Downfall nevertheless accentuated the Philippines' strategic value as a staging point for the United States.



Figure 4. Operations Olympic and Coronet Plans

Department of the Army, "Downfall" Plan for the Invasion of Japan, 28 May 1945 (Reports of General McArthur, 1994), 396, Plate No. 112, https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/macarthur%20reports/macarthur%20v1/ch13.htm.



Figure 5. Staging Grounds of Operations Olympic and Coronet

Department of the Army, Staging of Forces for "Olympic" (Reports of General McArthur, 1994), 412, Plate No. 117, *https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/macarthur%20reports/macarthur%20v1/ch13.htm*.

The Post–Colonial Era

The strategic value became so embedded within the United States security scheme in the Far East that the United States became dependent on it, especially as contemplation on the exact future of the U.S. bases began. The colonial bases' persistence beyond the colonial era was vital for the United States, with them being the very foundation of U.S. national security in relation to the Pacific. This effectively restricted the possible set of options for the United States, meaning that it would be predetermined and limited towards the option of having to negotiate for a new security agreement for the continuation of its colonial bases one way or the other, else it would face the high cost of leaving the dependency. This was especially true with the notion that political spaces were limited, making the early filling of political space important as latecomers become "severely disadvantaged."[61]

For the United States, this meant that its early positioning in the Philippines allowed for filling a rather limited political space, with other alternatives such as Hong Kong or any other geographically viable bases already filled by other states such as the British, therefore restricting the United States access. This filling of political spaces explains the emergence of path-dependent processes, where the importance of early filling of political spaces allows for the entrenchment of specific institutions, which fosters the continuation of the political paths towards the same trajectory throughout time and discourages "latecomers" from making significant changes in the status quo.[62] As a result of such early filling of political space and the dependencies which already emerged in the context of U.S. colonialism in the Philippines, the United States, as the sub-

[61] Pierson, "Politics in Time," 71-74.
[62] Pierson, 71-74.

sections below show, had to make significant efforts in negotiating for the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) which allowed the continuation of the colonial bases beyond the colonial era. The MBA would then evolve into the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) in 2014, ensuring continued American military access to the Philippines in the present day, marking the United States' persistent dependency on the Philippines for its national security objectives.

The Military Base Agreement of 1947

The idea of a replacement institution was reflected in a telephone conversation between General George C. Marshall (Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army) and General Malin Craig (former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army) on November 1, 1943, where Marshall implied that the United States Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Secretary of Navy Frank Knox recommended that the United States get "certain commitments" on the Naval Bases and Air Fields in the Philippine islands with President Quezon,[63] the Philippine president on exile in the United States. By 1945, in a secret document JPS 756/1, the Joint Chief of Staff concluded the Philippines remained "strategically located and adequately developed, comprising the foundation of a base system essential to the security of the United States, its possessions, the Western Hemisphere, the Philippines and for the projection of military operations."[64]

Fleet Admiral William D. Leavy, the Military Adviser to Truman, added in a memorandum for the President dated October 19, 1946, stating that "the bases in the

[63] Chintamani Mahapatra, "American Bases in the Philippines: A Journey to the Past," *Indian Quarterly* 45, no. 1 (1989): 26.
[64] Mahapatra, "American Bases in the Philippines," 27

Philippines would be needed for 'one hundred years and beyond' to function as both 'outposts' and 'springboards' from which American military might might be projected in order to 'uphold American policies and interests' in the Far East, including the fulfillment of its international commitments,"[65] emphasizing the need to replace the Treaties of Paris and Washington with post-colonial institutions which would allow continued U.S. strategic utilization of the islands and the U.S. colonial bases. The term "springboard" resonated with the events of the Boxer Rebellion, expeditions in Siberia, and WWII, where the Philippines was used as a staging ground (or was intended to be) for U.S. military operations in the Asia-Pacific.

The U.S. officials were not wrong. By 1949, history witnessed further closure of political space as Mao's communist victory in China made it unlikely that the U.S. 7th fleet would be allowed to continue basing rights in the country. The U.S. 7th fleet was stationed in China during the course of the Chinese Civil War, aiding Chang Kai Shiek's nationalist army in transferring troops from southern China to the northern parts and Manchuria in Chang Kai Shiek's attempt to strengthen his "hand in the northern areas relative to the communist forces," as described by Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, commander of the U.S. 7th fleet.[66] The U.S. 7th fleet itself is an important naval asset of the United States in the Pacific, participating in major battles such as the Battle of Leyte Gulf.[67]

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[65] Mahapatra, 28

[66] Gerald E. Wheeler, *Kinkaid of the Seventh Fleet: A Biography of Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, U.S. Navy*. (Washington: Naval Historical Center, U.S. Navy, 1995), 444, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uva.35007002211575&view=1up&seq=466.

[67] "Commander, U.S. 7th fleet," U.S. 7th Fleet, accessed March 1, 2024, https://www.c7f.navy.mil/Subs-and-Squadrons/#:~:text=The%20U.S.%207th%20Fleet%20was,Western%20Pacific%20and%20Indian%20Oceans.

Such foreseen dependency on the Philippines deemed it essential for the U.S. to plan for further permanency in the Philippines through institutional means. Along such lines, Admiral Chester Nimitz informed the Joint Chief of Staff on December 11, 1946, that the U.S. naval presence was of essential importance in supporting U.S. naval operations in the Pacific.[68] He specifically recommended that the United States would need the following: (1) Subic Naval Base, (2) Sangley Point Naval Air Station, (3) rights for Leyte-Samar and Tawi Tawi anchorages, (4) and construction rights for naval air bases at Mactan and Appari.[69] A year prior, after U.S. landings in the Philippines took place, the U.S. military began construction in Subic Bay with immediacy,[70] suggesting the urgent nature of the situation for U.S. officials. Paul V. McNutt, the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines responsible for the base negotiations, also resonated with the notion of keeping the bases and extraterritorial U.S. rights in the Philippines after the islands' independence. In a telegram from McNutt to the Secretary of State on January 27, 1947, the U.S. Ambassador emphasized that:

> I cannot, in good conscience, overlook the absolute necessity of guaranteeing our security by every and all means available to us. In this troubled and critical period of world history to do otherwise would be to betray our sacred trust. The establishment of these bases, not for aggression but for, defense, will guarantee our own safety and advance the cause of peace and security, which is the aim of the United Nations.[71]

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[68] James F. Schnabel, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume I, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1945 – 1947*. (Washington, D.C.: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, 1996), 159, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Policy/Policy_V001.pdf.
[69] Schnabel, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume I, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1945 – 1947*, 159.
[70] "Naval Bases in the Philippines," Naval History and Heritage Command, February 18, 2022, https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/organization-and-administration/historic-bases/philippine-bases.html#Cavite.
[71] The Ambassador in the Philippines (McNutt) to the Secretary of State, "Document 892," January 27, 1947, *Foreign Relations of the United States,* The Far East, Volume VI, eds., John G, Reid and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1972), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v06/d892.

The term "defense" in this sense was subjective and encompassed the possibility of offensive movements. As McNutt suggested in an earlier Collier editorial (magazine) dated July 13, 1946, it may include the use of the Philippine bases as a staging ground for U.S. operations in the Far East. In the editorial, McNutt specifically laid out the U.S. objectives vis-à-vis the Philippine bases and their strategic implication:

> We are already committed to the maintenance of naval and air bases in the Islands. These are not designed merely for the protection of the Philippines, nor even for the defense of the United States. These bases are expected to be secondary, supporting installations, for supply, repair, and staging activities for all our armed forces in the Far East. The Philippines, with their sufficient hinterland and ready supply of civilian labor, are ideal for such establishments. Neither Guam, nor Okinawa, nor any other of the islands in the far Pacific can provide the facilities for logistics which are available in the Philippines. Committed as we are to long-time occupation of Japan, to a strong policy in Asia, the Philippines are destined to play a major role in our diplomacy in the Orient.[72]

Fortunately for the United States, the colonialism of the Philippines also allowed the existence of the Tydings – McDuffie Act, a 1935 legal institution which established the "right of the United States to expropriate property for public uses, to maintain military and other reservations and armed forces in the Philippines, and, upon order of the President, to call into the service of such armed forces all military forces organized by the Philippine government."[73] It further added that "land or other property as has heretofore been designated by the President of the United States" may be exempt from the transfer of property upon Philippine independence,[74] i.e., the President of the United States had

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[72] Patricio Royo Mamot, "Paul V. McNutt: His Role in the Birth of Philippine Independence," Order No. 7422804, (PhD. Diss., Ball State University, 1974), 147. http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/dissertations-theses/paul-v-mcnutt-his-role-birth-philippine/docview/302747347/se-2.

[73] The Philippine Independence (Tydings-McDuffie) Act, Section 2 (12), March 24, 1943. https://loveman.sdsu.edu/docs/1934PhilippineIndep.pdf.

[74] The Philippine Independence (Tydings-McDuffie) Act, Section 5, March 24, 1943. https://loveman.sdsu.edu/docs/1934PhilippineIndep.pdf.

the power to designate land or other property which may be exempt in the transfer of sovereignty process, including U.S. military bases. Most importantly, it stated that U.S. sovereignty would be withdrawn on Philippine independence "except such naval reservations and fueling stations…"[75] This virtually meant that, upon Philippine independence, the United States may keep any military reservations it deemed strategic for U.S. and/or Philippine interests. As Manuel A. Roxas, the first President of the Philippines, put it in 1947, "The President of the United States was authorized to establish these bases here. The President of the Philippines was authorized to negotiate for them."[76]

The result of the Tydings – McDuffie Act was renegotiating the U.S. naval reservations and fueling stations after recognizing the Philippines' independence.[77] The negotiations ended on March 14, 1947, with the signing of the Mutual Bases Agreement (MBA), with the signatories being Paul V. McNutt (U.S.) and Manuel A. Roxas (Philippines), granting the U.S. the use of bases "free of rent"[78] and hence the continuation of the United States' previous legal jurisdiction in the Philippines, i.e. the continuation of the U.S. military access to the Philippines as previously granted by the Treaties of Paris and Washington. The original term was 99 years, allowing the United States to retain its colonial bases, namely Clark Field Airbase, Fort Stotsenberg, Leyte-

[75] The Philippine Independence (Tydings-McDuffie) Act, Section 10(a), March 24, 1943. https://loveman.sdsu.edu/docs/1934PhilippineIndep.pdf.
[76] The Ambassador in the Philippines (McNutt) to the Secretary of State, "Document 895," March 14, 1947, Foreign Relations of the United States, The Far East, Volume VI, eds., John G, Reid and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1972), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v06/d895.
[77] Recognition of Independence, 22 U.S. Code § 1394 (March 24, 1934, and August 7, 1939). https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/1394.
[78]Agreement Concerning Military Bases, Manila, 14 March 1947. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2158&context=ils.

Samar Naval Base (including shore installations and air bases), Subic Bay Naval Base, and Sangley Point Naval Base (including the air station), among many other smaller military installations such as Camp Wallace (Cubi Point) in San Fernando, La Union,[79] as Nimitz specifically requested on December 11, 1946 as mentioned earlier. The agreement also allowed the United States to acquire or swap for additional bases as needed.[80] Following the signing of the MBA, the Agreement on Military Assistance was signed on March 21, 1947, granting U.S. military aid to the Philippines.[81]

The United States' sentiment and rationale may also be observed in Franklin D. Roosevelt's statement to his son Elliot, in which he said, according to his son's memoirs, that the British "don't begin to understand our thinking in terms of the Philippines, as a future base for operations against Japan,"[82] supporting the notion in which at the time of Tydings-McDuffie Act's formulation, U.S. political actors already foresaw the Philippine islands as a staging point of a future U.S. military operation in the Asia-Pacific. In his memoirs, Truman also affirmed this by recalling that "the Philippine Islands are a vital strategic center in the Pacific, and we were anxious that a military agreement with the Philippines be concluded…"[83] By 1948, as highlighted by Truman in his telegram to George Marshall, the United States viewed the continuation of the colonial institutions not as a negotiation on a trading basis but rather as a certainty in which the United States

[79] Agreement Concerning Military Bases, Manila, 14 March 1947. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2158&context=ils.
[80]Agreement Concerning Military Bases, Manila, 14 March 1947. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2158&context=ils.
[81] Agreement on Military Assistance, Manila, 21 March 1947. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2155&context=ils.
[82] Elliot Roosevelt, *As He Saw It*. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946): 162; Chintamani Mahapatra, "American Bases in the Philippines: A Journey to the Past," *Indian Quarterly* 45, no. 1 (1989): 24.
[83] Harry Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman Volume 1: Year of Decisions*. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955): 277.

would obtain any future bases it would desire in the islands as if U.S. jurisdiction during the colonial era was to continue on out of necessity.[84] In conclusion, the end of U.S. colonialism in the Philippines, with the strategic dependency derived from the historical progression of the colonial era through U.S. bases and treaties, led to the integration of the Philippines as part of the U.S. national defense, which transformed and mutated the U.S. colonial institutions to a bilateral nature under the alliance between the United States and the Philippines, i.e., the MBA, allowing the United States to maintain a sense of status quo pertaining to its legal rights in maintaining its military presence in the Philippines and hence keeping its strategic dependency on the islands.

Continuation to the Cold War

Through the institutionalization of the MBA, the U.S. strategic dependency on the Philippines as a staging ground via the U.S. colonial bases continued forward throughout the Cold War. The U.S. military presence in the Philippines in the context of the Cold War was specifically "essential" and "imperative" in the lens of the 1950 U.S. Joint Chief of Staff,[85] especially in light of the U.S. foreign policy transformation in Asia in which the United States found new adversaries in the region: the Soviet Union and the newly established People's Republic of China (PRC). By 1949, Mao Zedong's communist party brought Chang Kai Shiek on a retreat to Taiwan, accentuating the rise of communism in

[84] Memorandum by President Truman to the Secretary of State, "Document 477," July 14, 1948, *Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Vol. VI, eds. John G. Reid, David H. Stauffer, S. Everett Gleason, and Frederick Aandahl (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1974), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v06/d477.

[85] The Secretary of Defense, "A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of Defense on The Position of the United States with Respect to the Philippines," NSC 84, September 14, 1950, Digital National Security Archive, 2. http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/government-official-publications/position-united-states-with-respect-philippines/docview/1679082467/se-2.

the region. By 1950, the Soviets and the Chinese signed their Friendship Treaty, forming a security alliance stating that "in the event of one of the agreeing parties being subjected to attack by Japan or any state allied with her, thus finding itself in a state of war, the other high contracting party will immediately render military and other aid with all means at its disposal."[86] The statement "any state allied with her [Japan]" obviously referred to the United States. Dean Acheson, in a speech to the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, responded to the situation by asking the question of "what is the situation in regard to the military security of the Pacific area, and what is our policy in regard to it?"[87]Acheson answered his own question by concluding that the United States was in a situation of "containment," with its "defensive perimeter" running from Japan to the Philippines.[88] Such situation was akin to the containment of communist in Europe, with West Germany being included in the United States' "defense perimeter" against the spread of communism in the region, therefore mirroring the situation in Europe.

Hence, the strategic importance of the Philippines as a staging ground, as allowed by the MBA and the colonial, would be manifested as being the front lines against communist containment in Asia, being the U.S. colonial bases in the islands vital for the maintenance and logistics for the forward-deployed U.S. fleet. Up to 60 percent of the fleet's maintenance was serviced at Subic Bay.[89] The Philippines' strategic value was

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[86] "Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Aid Between the USSR and the Chinese People's Republic," in *The Cold War through Documents: A Global History*, eds., Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018): 224-227, 226.
[87] "Acheson on the American Defense Perimeter in Asia," in *The Cold War through Documents: A Global History*, eds., Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018): 85.
[88] "Acheson on the American Defense Perimeter in Asia," 86.
[89] "Naval Bases in the Philippines," Naval History and Heritage Command, February 18, 2022, https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/organization-and-administration/historic-bases/philippine-bases.html#Cavite.

especially true in the midst of the looming takeover of Formosa and possibly Hong Kong by communist China, which would "expose the remainder of Southeast Asia and would sharply increase the threat to Japan and the remainder of the offshore island chain."[90] The Soviets were also part of the existential threat in the lens of the United States, in which a Joint Chief of Staff intelligence report on May 2, 1950, once suggested that the Soviet Union had the primary goal of "installation of a communist regime, the elimination of U.S. influence 'as soon as possible,' and the 'den[ial of] military bases to the United States."[91] By 1951, the United States underwent one of the most ambitious military base construction: the Cubi Point Naval Air Station, in which an entire mountain was cut in half to create a 10,000-foot runway, taking five years and an estimated 20 million man-hours to complete.[92] It was to serve as the "primary maintenance, repair and supply center for the 400 carrier-based aircraft of the Seventh Fleet's carrier force."[93]

By 1965, the United States continued to build extensive military Air Force structures in the Philippines for the Vietnam War, including the U.S. Air Force facility in Mactan, Cebu.[94] William McCormick Blair (U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines) also held a meeting with the newly elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos on December 13,

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[90] The Executive Secretary, "A Report to the National Security Council by The Executive Secretary on United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia," NSC 48/5, May 17, 1951, Digital National Security Archive, 16. https://www.proquest.com/dnsa/docview/1679066643/1E2B23DB1F144CC8PQ/3?accountid=11311&sourcetype=Government%20&%20Official%20Publications.

[91] Colleen Woods, *Freedom Incorporated: Anticommunism and Philippine Independence in the Age of Decolonization*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020), 105, https://muse-jhu-edu.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/pub/255/monograph/chapter/2585433.

[92] Gerald R. Anderson, *Subic Bay: From Magellan to Pinatubo*. (self-pub, 2016), 230.

[93] Anderson, 230.

[94] Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk, "Document 317," November 5, 1965, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, eds. Edward C. Keefer and David S. Patterson (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2000). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v26/d317.

1965, discussing the arrival of the *USS Enterprise* at Subic Bay, with the vessel being the very first U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.[95] The aircraft carrier was transferred to the 7th Fleet on October 1, 1965, and was scheduled to engage in combat in Vietnam.[96] The ship received a normal berth at Subic Bay in November of 1965 and finally sailed for action on the 30th of November from Subic Bay to Vietnam,[97] making the Philippines once again an active staging ground for U.S. military operations. As noted in a U.S. Department of State National Policy Paper on the Philippines in 1965:

> Bordering the South China Sea facing communist China, the Philippines provides the key access to Southeast Asia. It also provides key air transit routes and facilities and sea route surveillance bases in the Far East. Its principal military importance to the U.S. lies in the fact that the bases had facilities we maintain and use in the islands constitute the southern anchors of the U.S. defense perimeter in the Western Pacific. With the tightening of restrictions on base rights throughout the Pacific, and the prospective loss of some base facilities in the future, maintenance of our Philippine facilities becomes even more important.[98]

The first day of the *USS Enterprise* in Vietnam involved a busy schedule with "125 strike sorties on that date, unloading 167 tons of bombs and rockets on the enemy, and 131 sorties on the following day."[99] After 45 days in combat, with its crew participating in 4,242 combat sorties, the *USS Enterprise* returned to Subic Bay for

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[95] Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State, "Document 319," December 14, 1965, Foreign Relations of the United States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, eds. Edward C. Keefer and David S. Patterson (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2000). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v26/d319.

[96] "Enterprise VIII (CVAN-65) 1961-1965," Naval History and Heritage Command, July 8, 2015. https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/e/enterprise-cvan-65-viii-1961-1965.html.

[97] "Enterprise VIII (CVAN-65) 1961-1965."

[98] United States Department of State, "National Policy Paper on the Republic of the Philippines – Part II," December 1, 1965, Digital National Security Archive, 111. http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/dnsa/government-official-publications/national-policy-paper-on-republic-philippines/docview/1679141805/sem-2?accountid=11311.

[99] "Enterprise VIII (CVAN-65) 1961-1965."

recuperation.[100] It was often supported by various U.S. Air Units deployed in the Naval Air Station Cubi Point in the Philippines, including the Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron (VQ)-1, the VAW-13, and the Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron (HS)-4.[101] The (VQ)-1 provided Douglas EA-3B *Skywarriors*, which provided Surface to Air Missile (SAM) and radar threat warning services for enemy jets, while the (HS)-4 provided anti-sub capabilities.[102] The *USS Enterprise* would dock at Subic Bay multiple times a year during the Vietnam War for resupply and recuperation.[103] The utilization of the U.S. bases in the Philippines was also not limited to the U.S. military. For instance, a "large Korean contingent in Vietnam" in need of medical assistance was reported to have been transferred to the U.S. military hospital at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines for transit to Korea, in which Korean Army medical officers worked in the U.S. bases in the Philippines.[104] The aforementioned military units only represent a small portion of U.S. and foreign military units which utilized the U.S. colonial bases in the Philippines as a "staging point." As stated in the United States' National Policy Paper on the Philippines, approved by Dean Rusk on March 3, 1966, "the Republic of the Philippines stands as one of the chief monuments to our presence in the Far East," further emphasizing that "control of this chain by forces friendly to the U.S. continues to be essential to maintain the U.S. strategic posture in the Pacific, not only to ensure the

[100] "Enterprise VIII (CVAN-65) 1966-1970," Naval History and Command, September 10, 2018. https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/e/enterprise-cvan-65-viii-1966-1970.html.
[101] "Enterprise VIII (CVAN-65) 1961-1965."
[102] "Enterprise VIII (CVAN-65) 1961-1965."
[103] "Enterprise VIII (CVAN-65) 1966-1970."
[104] Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State, "Document 319," December 14, 1965, Foreign Relations of the United States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, eds. Edward C. Keefer and David S. Patterson (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2000). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v26/d319.

outward projection of U.S. power in the Far East but also to protect the westward oceanic approaches to the United States."[105] Of course, it was the institutional existence of the MBA which allowed this.

The withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam in 1975 failed to halt the strategic value of the MBA, as the withdrawal only further amplified the strategic value of the Philippines. This topic shall be the focal point of Chapter 4. By 1979, the Soviet Union replaced the United States at Cam Rhan Bay, establishing the Soviet Pacific Fleet in direct competition against the U.S. 7th fleet for supremacy in the South China Sea.[106] By 1986, the U.S. colonial bases and the MBA remained an essential aspect of the U.S. defense network abroad with Captain Alva M. Bowen, Specialist in National Defense at Congressional Research Service, arguing that Clark Air Force Base is "regarded as essential to the Pacific-Indian Ocean airlift system," while Subic Bay as essential to "combat operations of several carrier battle groups at the same time and often does, and can expand its logistics back up for naval operations throughout the western Pacific and the Indian Oceans."[107] As Bowen further claimed, a significant military reason for the United States to remain in the Philippines was to "enable prompt military response in a crisis,"[108] mirroring the U.S. rationale during the Boxer Rebellion and Siberia cases in the

[105] United States Department of State, "National Policy Paper on Republic of the Philippines-Part I," December 1, 1965, Digital National Security Archive, 1;3. http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/dnsa/government-official-publications/national-policy-paper-on-republic-philippines/docview/1679152266/sem-2?accountid=11311.
[106] Gregory P. Corning, "The Philippine Bases and U.S. Pacific Strategy," *Pacific Affairs* 63, no. 1 (Spring, 1990): 13, http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/scholarly-journals/philippine-bases-u-s-pacific-strategy/docview/1301432717/se-2?accountid=11311.
[107] United States Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, "Assessing America's Option in the Philippines," February 3, 1986, Digital National Security Archive, 87. http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/dnsa/government-official-publications/assessing-americas-options-philippines/docview/1679091900/sem-2?accountid=11311.
[108] United States Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, "Assessing America's Option in the Philippines," February 3, 1986, Digital National Security Archive, 67.

colonial era. Figure 6 visually highlights the overlapping influence between the Soviet Union and the U.S. in the South China Sea area, as per Bowen's statement.



Figure 6. Bowen's U.S.-Soviet Overlap Analysis

United States Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, (Assessing America's Option in the Philippines," February 3, 1986, Digital National Security Archive), 72. http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/dnsa/government-official-publications/assessing-americas-options-philippines/docview/1679091900/sem-2?accountid=11311

Dealing with the issue of the South China Sea was especially important for the United States as the Japanese and Koreans were reliant on the waters for their energy supply and on the trans-Pacific Sea lanes.[109] The communists cutting Japan and Korea's "life support" would equate to the United States' inability to fulfil its defense obligations in the region, likely giving them away to communist influence. The U.S. Bases are located directly facing the South China Sea. Furthermore, the U.S. colonial bases in the Philippines in the eighties served as vital ground in a future war in the region, being an "alternative" to the bases in Northeastern Asia.[110] In other words, the U.S. colonial bases through the MBA served not only the security of the United States but also its allies on which the U.S. depended. Lastly, Bowen indicated in his report that the Philippines was a vital location supporting U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf.[111] This is because the "planned United States response to an emergency in the Persian Gulf region calls for the marriage of equipment and supplies embarked in ships pre-positioned at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean with troops lifted from the scene. Alternate routing not including Clark Air Base would require a lot more airlift and would be more dependent on allies [*sic*] cooperation."[112]

To further highlight the importance of the bases to the United States in the context of 1986, Bowen's forecast of what would have occurred if the colonial bases and the MBA were to be removed may be closely examined. As may be seen in Figure 7,

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[109] United States Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 73.
[110] United States Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 75.
[111] United States Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 75.
[112] United States Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 75.

Bowen's analysis in such a counter-factual scenario was that the United States would have lost a significant strategic reach to the southwestern part of the South China Sea as well as the rest of Southeast Asia if the colonial bases in the Philippines and the MBA were to be removed. As mentioned earlier, the Southwestern part of the South China Sea was especially important as it was the gateway to the South China Sea and, hence, the "life support" sea lanes of Japan and South Korea. The executive office of the U.S. government resonated with Bowen's rationale. For instance, a year even before Bowen's report to Congress, the White House released its National Security Decision Directive No. 163 on February 20, 1985, stating that "The United States has vital interests in the Philippines" and that "continued and unhampered access" to the U.S. bases were of "prime importance" in deterring any other states which would attempt to destabilize and dominate the Asia-Pacific region.[113]

Congressional testimony of Richard Armitage, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, also concluded in 1985 that the removal of the colonial bases in the Philippines would "pose a major threat to U.S. interests, since there are no attractive basing alternatives."[114] The testimony further inferred that "neither Guam nor the Northern Marianas offer the geostrategic advantage of the Philippines, nor could they provide inexpensive labor" and that "the operational costs of a move would also be

[113] United States National Security Council, "United States Policy Towards the Philippines," February 20, 1985, National Security Decision Directive No. 163, Digital National Security Archive, 1. http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/dnsa/government-official-publications/united-states-policy-towards-philippines/docview/1679149447/sem-2?accountid=11311

[114] Jeffrey D. Simon, "Country Assessments and the Philippines, Jeffrey D. Simon, March 1987, Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense," N-2588-OSD, Digital National Security Archive, 15. http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/dnsa/government-official-publications/country-assessments-philippines/docview/1679050212/sem-2?accountid=11311.

prohibitive."[115] This meant that losing the bases would produce extremely large set-up costs, which have deemed the bases irreplicable. The large set-up cost effect shall be discussed further in the context of the post-Cold War era, with it explaining the existence of the *restricting* effect and, hence, a path-dependent process as discussed in the further chapters. For now, it may be concluded that the U.S. strategic dependency on the Philippines, as institutionalized in the MBA, persisted throughout the Cold War.



Figure 7. Bowen's Counter Factual Analysis

United States Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, (Assessing America's Option in the Philippines," February 3, 1986, Digital National Security Archive), 83. http://search.proquest.com.ezp-

[115] Simon, "Country Assessments and the Philippines, Jeffrey D. Simon, March 1987, Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense," 16.

prod1.hul.harvard.edu/dnsa/government-official-publications/assessing-americas-options-philippines/docview/1679091900/sem-2?accountid=11311

The Post-Cold War (Present Day)

By 1991, the colonial bases were eventually voted to close by the Philippine government due to domestic nationalist sentiments, forcing the United States military to leave permanently and hence causing the scrapping and death of the MBA. Nevertheless, the non-existence of the MBA failed to act as a critical juncture in removing the already entrenched dependencies which the MBA produced for the United States and the Philippines. The aftermath of the U.S. base closure and the death of the MBA therefore saw both an intensification of U.S. efforts to regain its strategic position in the Philippines and backlash within the Philippine state, which led to the signing of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the two countries which became effective in 1999, reviving the U.S. military presence in the Philippines. This topic shall be one of the focal points in Chapter 5. A few years later, after the VFA, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) of 2014 was signed, allowing the United States to station troops in the Philippines for the purposes of Philippine defense again. The agreement stressed that the U.S. may undertake the following activities: "security cooperation exercises; joint and combined training activities; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities; and such other activities as may be agreed upon by the Parties."[116] Similar to the function of the U.S. colonial bases at Subic and Clark, the EDCA likewise enabled the United States to conduct "training; transit; support and

[116] Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America on Enhanced Defense Cooperation, April 28, 2014. https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2014/04apr/20140428-EDCA.pdf.

related activities; refueling of aircraft; temporary accommodation of personnel; prepositioning of equipment, supplies, and materiel; deploying forces and materiel; and such other activities as the Parties may agree."[117] This shall also be discussed further in Chapter 5 of this paper.

The most important of the was the statement "and such other activities as may be agreed upon by the Parties," implying a likely agreement of usage of the islands as a future staging ground of U.S. military operations, given if the U.S. and the Philippine constitution and state allow for it. Looming speculations of such possibility in the present day under Ferdinand Marcos Jr. are already present. For instance, while Marcos stated that the Philippines would not be used as a "staging point" of any U.S. military operations in the Indo-Pacific,[118] discussions of a "civilian port" on August 30, 2023 were held between the Philippines and the U.S. military which would "boost American access to strategically located islands facing Taiwan,"[119] suggesting that the military activities in the "civilian ports" are happening. Future history shall accentuate whether this was indeed the case.

[117] Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America on Enhanced Defense Cooperation, April 28, 2014. https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2014/04apr/20140428-EDCA.pdf.
[118] Filane Mikee Cervantes, "PH won't be 'staging post' for any military action – Marcos," *Philippine News Agency*, May 1, 2023. https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1200468.
[119] Reuters, "U.S. Military in Talks to Developing Port in Philippines Facing Taiwan," *Inquirer*, August 30, 2023. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1824306/u-s-military-in-talks-to-develop-port-in-philippines-facing-taiwan.

Chapter Observations and Conclusion

As may be observed in the historical case above, the Treaties of Paris and Washington geared the United States toward strategic dependency on the Philippines pertaining to its military objectives in the region, making the removal of the treaties without replacement tremendously expensive for the U.S. as Philippine independence came in. This may be observed in the four colonial cases presented in this chapter, namely the Boxer Rebellion, Siberia, War Plan Orange, and WWII. In these four cases, it may be noted that the colonial institutions' early existence mattered in entrenching the colonial bases within the U.S. security apparatus in a rather limited political space, allowing the colonial bases to shape U.S. military capability in the region. Without such early entrenchment of the bases, other political trajectories may have opened, e.g., large U.S. security investments in other regions as opposed to the Philippine islands, or worse, closed, e.g., the closure of political space in the Philippines with other states fulfilling it, such as Japan.

The existence of the U.S. dependency, on the other hand, as accentuated in the four cases presented, initiated the United States to establish the MBA for the continuation of such dependencies in the post-colonial context. As these dependencies were by-products of the colonial institutions' existence, it may be inferred that these post-colonial developments may be attributed to the colonial institutions' causal role in shaping the Philippine islands as a U.S. "staging ground." Logically speaking, such dependency wouldn't have been possible without the existence of the colonial institutions, especially the bases such as Subic Bay and Clark. This was due to the notion that it was the colonial bases on which the U.S. depended in the first place. On the other hand, these colonial

bases wouldn't have been possible without the MBA, which was a by-product of the United States' dependency. The essence here is highlighting the continuation of U.S. dependency throughout history via the existence of the colonial institutions and/or their by-products, where such dependencies and colonial institutions are entwined in a way that the presence of the other explains their existence. It shows the colonial institutions' necessary function in fostering the continued U.S. dependency on the Philippine islands.

Chapter III.

Philippine Dependency on the U.S.

This chapter traces the process of how the early existence of the U.S. colonial institutions made the development of a dependent Philippine state on the U.S., causing a mutually reinforcing security dependency between the United States and the Philippines. As shall be shown, the United States' dependency on the Philippine islands for its military presence in the Asia–Pacific, through the institutions that allowed for it, resulted in post-colonial Philippine security dependency on the U.S., as allowed by alliance enforcing (e.g., MDT) and compensatory (*quid pro quo*) institutions (e.g., U.S. military aid). In other words, this chapter traces the process by which the United States' dependency on the Philippines caused the conception of both alliance-enforcing and compensatory institutions necessary for the continuation of the colonial bases, leading to a Philippine dependency on the United States' security guarantee (through the alliance enforcing institutions) and military financial/material aid (through the compensatory institutions).

Viewing the case from a realpolitik view, the institutional existence of both alliance-enforcing and compensatory institutions was a necessary pre-requisite for the colonial bases' persistence throughout the Cold War, given that rationally, a *quid* had to exist for the Philippine state in allowing the United States to continue operating in the Philippines, all else being equal. In a counterfactual and theoretical sense, it would have been irrational and unlikely for the Philippine state to allow the continued existence of

the United States military in the Philippines without any explicit benefit in exchange, all else being equal. Both institution types are further discussed below through the provided historical narrative. The last section covers the chapter's conclusion.

Alliance Enforcing Institutions

The idea of security insurance in the context of the U.S.–Philippine post-colonial relationship may be observed in a parallel manner alongside the continuation of the U.S. strategic dependency as early as July 4, 1946, both the day of the signing of the Treaty of General Relations and Philippine independence. Alongside the Tydings – McDuffie Act, the Treaty of General Relations allowed the temporary continuation of U.S. military access in the Philippines until the eventual signing of the MBA under the condition that such temporary institutions were "necessary to retain for the mutual protection of the United States of America and of the Republic of the Philippines" as Article I of the treaty stated.[120] In exchange for the "mutual protection" that the Treaty of General Relations granted, the Philippine state agreed to continue American sovereignty pertaining to its colonial bases, including "necessary appurtenances to such bases, and the rights incident thereto"[121] The post-colonial existence of the colonial bases and of the Treaty of General Relations hence shaped and influenced Philippine political actors' answer to the important question of what the nature and state of the Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) would be.

[120] Treaty of General Relations, Manila, July 4, 1946. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2162&context=ils.
[121] Treaty of General Relations, Manila, July 4, 1946.

In theory, the Philippine state had the political option of breaking away from the United States after its independence. Nevertheless, the existence of the colonial institutions, including the Treaty of General Relations and the colonial bases, perennially increased the benefits of remaining towards the same trajectory of U.S. existence in the Philippines and the cost of leaving it, with the United States guaranteeing Philippine security due to the U.S. dependencies which developed during the colonial era. For the United States, guaranteeing Philippine security was essential in guaranteeing the security of its own colonial bases, with the two being inseparable. Therefore, rationally speaking, remaining towards the same trajectory of U.S. alignment was more logical than establishing an independent AFP, which would have cost tremendous amounts of resources for the war-weary Philippine state. Therefore, the head of the newly formed republic, President Manuel Roxas, chose to remain under the U.S. umbrella and announced on July 3, 1946 that:

> I am firm in my purpose not merely to cooperate with America's policy in the Philippines, but also do everything in the power of the Philippine government in enabling the United States to safeguard all military, naval and airbases it may desire permanently to establish here. As president of the Philippines, I will so arrange the defense of these islands that it may be intimately coordinated with the plans of the United States for the maintenance of defensive bases in the Philippines. We will maintain as large an army as our resources permit and it will cooperate very closely with armed forces of the United Sates based in the Philippines.[122]

For Manuel Roxas, the presence of the U.S. colonial military bases through the MBA ensured that the Philippines would be under the umbrella of the U.S. forces, with himself using the term "guarantor" in an undated memorandum released by the Philippine

[122] Statement of His Excellency Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines, on Cooperation with the United States, July 3, 1946. https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1946/07/02/statement-of-president-roxas-on-the-cooperation-with-the-united-states-july-3-1946/.

Department of Foreign Affairs stating that "we [the Philippines] are fortunate to have as the guarantor of our security the United States of America, which is today the bulwark and support of small nations everywhere in the world." [123] Such a guarantee was physically manifested in the existence of U.S. forces in the Philippines, deterring and denying the Philippines against existential threats stemming from the region. For the Philippine state, the idea of a U.S. guarantee was an extremely attractive option as it meant cost savings for the newly formed republic in terms of military expenditure, which will be discussed later. The Roxas era was short-lived, and in 1949, Elpidio Quirino continued his legacy, having said in his speech at the Manila airport on August 7, 1949, that "there are many spiritual and moral ties that bind us to America."[124] Whatever those spiritual and moral ties may have meant, it was clear that the United States' security role in its former colony would remain, hence paving the way to the institutional development of the MDT that further entrenched the alliance of the two states.

The Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951

In the August of 1951, the MDT was officially signed, reaffirming the notion under Article IV in which "each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional

[123] H.B. Jacobini, "Main Patterns of Philippine Foreign Policy," *The Review of Politics* 23, no. 4 (1961): 514, https://www-jstor-org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/pdf/1405707.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Abeba51dc6c1dd6bf3db248aa69bc9086&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1.

[124] The Charge in the Philippines (Lockett) to the Secretary of State, "Document 420," August 8, 1949, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VII, Part 1, eds. John G. Reid (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1975). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v07p1/d420.

processes…," with Article V adding that an "armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific."[125] The existence of the MDT ensured a "security insurance" for the Philippines, serving as a cost-reducing and benefit increasing institution for the Philippine state. This, however, shaped the Philippine security institutions in which the guarantee resulted in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) having no need for a significant external defense force (e.g., a naval force capable of addressing existential threats).

In highlighting such Philippine dependency, by Ramon Magsaysay's regime in 1954, the Philippine Navy (PN) only had a minuscule force of "5 escort vehicles, 19 sub-chasers, 3 patrol craft, 7 amphibious craft, 13 auxiliary vessels and service craft, and 1 minesweeper" for external defense.[126] No frigates, destroyers, or submarines were mentioned as capable of deep-sea operations despite the islands being sandwiched by both the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. By December of 1965, under Diosdado Macapagal's last days in the presidency, the Philippine Navy only consisted of "23 small patrol ships, 2 minesweepers (MSC), and 6 landing ships (3LST/3 LSM)."[127] In a limited war, it was reported of only having the capability of "providing inter-island amphibious lift for one RCT [Regional Combat Team], operating coastal patrols of limited

[125] Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines; August 30, 1951. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp.
[126] National Security Council, "U.S. Policy Towards the Philippines," April 5, 1954, NSC 5413/1, Digital National Security Archive, 20. http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/dnsa/government-official-publications/u-s-policy-toward-philippines/docview/1679084442/sem-2?accountid=11311.
[127] United States Department of State, "National Policy Paper on the Republic of the Philippines – Part II," December 1, 1965, Digital National Security Archive, 114. http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/dnsa/government-official-publications/national-policy-paper-on-republic-philippines/docview/1679141805/sem-2?accountid=11311.

effectiveness, providing limited defense against submarines and conducting token mine warfare operations; it has a light capability to defend harbors and coastal installations."[128] While lack of financial capabilities and other factors almost likely contributed as well to the Philippine state's decision to form a miniscule Navy, the existence of the U.S. security guarantee may not be ignored. The existence of the MDT alleviated the need for such expenditure, which may not have been possible without the security guarantee, regardless of whether the Philippines could have afforded it.

The present state of the Philippine Navy in the modern era, according to Global Firepower, remained the same. As of April 23, 2023, the entire Philippine military only had 2 Frigates, 1 Corvette, 50 patrol vessels, plus 40 other types of perhaps less strategic naval assets,[129] a rather feeble naval force compared to those of China or Russia (although this may change with the current Philippine modernization program funded by the United States). This makes prominent the notion that the Philippine state remains dependent on the U.S. military today, especially with the security guarantee arrangement remaining unchanged in today's context under the continued existence of the MDT. Recently, U.S. President Joe Biden issued a warning against China after a People's Liberation Army (PLA) ship collided with a Philippine vessel on the West Philippine Sea, in which Biden noted in Washington on October 25, 2023, that "any attack on the Filipino aircraft, vessels, or armed forces will invoke our Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) with the Philippines."[130] With such a guarantee, it was unnecessary and illogical for the

[128] United States Department of State, "National Policy Paper on the Republic of the Philippines – Part II," 115.
[129] "2024 Philippines Military Strength," Global Firepower, January 9, 2024. https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=philippines.
[130] Joel Guinto, "South China Sea: Biden says US will Defend the Philippines if China Attacks," *BBC,* October 26, 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67224782; Pia Lee-Brago, "Biden: US Defense Commitment to Philippines is Ironclad," *Phil Star,* October 27, 2023.

Philippine state to spend colossal amounts of dollars on external defense equipment. In sum, it may be concluded that the existence of the MDT produced financial and material savings through the security guarantee for the Philippine state, putting the Philippines in a perennial state of dependency on the United States.

The MDT's conception came in light with a need for the United States' reaffirmation of commitment through institutionalized means in light of the growing Cold War and communist threat in the region, ensuring the clear interpretation of its security commitments as to deter communist actions against the Philippine state which would threaten the colonial bases. In other words, the MDT was not only meant to offer a security guarantee *quid* for the Philippine state but, first and foremost, essential in securing U.S. military assets and colonial bases in the Philippine islands. Therefore, as Truman assured Quirino in their meeting in Washington on February 4, 1950, "the United States and the Philippines regarded their security as mutually inter-dependent," adding that "the United States would not tolerate an armed attack upon the Philippines."[131] As the Central Intelligence Agency on an August 10, 1950 report put it, "the U.S. has promised to defend the Philippines in case of external attack, and tangible assurance of this intent is provided by the continued maintenance of U.S. and naval bases on the islands, by US military assistance to the Philippine Armed Forces, and by the present U.S. military commitment against Communist aggression in Asia."[132]

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https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2023/10/27/2306888/biden-us-defense-commitment-philippines-ironclad.

[131] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, "Document 804," February 4, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, eds. Neal H. Petersen, William Z. Slany, Charles S. Sampson, John P. Glennon, David W. Mabon, and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1970). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v06/d804.

[132] Central Intelligence Agency, "Prospects for the Stability in the Philippines," ORE 33-50, August 10, 1950, Digital National Security Archive, 8. http://search.proquest.com.ezp-

As stated by George E. Taylor in his 1964 book *The Philippines and the United States,* "it is difficult to imagine an attack on that country that would by-pass twenty-three American bases on the islands,"[133] arguing that the actual U.S. military presence in the Philippines acted as the physical "insurance" and "guarantee" in which the United States would be involved one way or the other in an external threat against the Philippines. As accentuated further in the National Security Council's (NSC) Staff Study in NSC 48/5, "the United States must continue for an indefinite period to assume responsibility for the external defense of the islands, to provide military and economic assistance, to take appropriate measures to assume the institution of necessary political, financial, economic and agricultural reforms, and in general to participate in the defense and administration of the country," further adding that the United States must "continue to assume responsibility for the external defense of the Islands and be prepared to commit the United States forces, if necessary, to prevent communist control of the Philippines."[134]

The JUSMAG

Such security guarantee was not limited to the MDT, which primarily addressed external threats. The existence of local communist insurgents showed the United States' active role in likewise guaranteeing Philippine internal security. According to a Central

prod1.hul.harvard.edu/dnsa/government-official-publications/prospects-stability-philippines-includes-map/docview/1679156800/sem-2?accountid=11311.

[133] George E. Taylor, *The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 148.

[134] The Executive Secretary, "A Report to the National Security Council by The Executive Secretary on United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia," NSC 48/5, May 17, 1951, Digital National Security Archive, 35. https://www.proquest.com/dnsa/docview/1679066643/1E2B23DB1F144CC8PQ/3?accountid=11311&sourcetype=Government%20&%20Official%20Publications.

Intelligence Agency (CIA) report in 1950, local communist insurgent forces known as the *Hukbalahap* (Huks) displayed the capability of "mounting several comparatively large-scale (300-500 men) coordinated attacks simultaneously against widely separated targets."[135] The United States' "active role" may be observed in the institutional presence of the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) whose function was to "teach and advise" Filipino forces,[136] as well as mediate U.S. military financial and material aid. The financial and material role of the JUSMAG shall be further discussed in the next section of this chapter. The JUSMAG, through the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Edward Lansdale, who became Philippine President Ramon Magsaysay's personal advisor,[137] specifically shaped the Philippine military's anti-insurgency campaign by infusing U.S. intelligence expertise within Philippine anti-guerilla units. Magsaysay himself was installed into public office with the aid of U.S. military advisors, including Major General Leland Hobbs, Chief of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Philippines (JUSMAG), who persuaded Magsaysay to accept Quirino's offer to be his Secretary of Defense prior to Magsaysay's presidency.[138]

In one instance, Lansdale partook in a rejuvenation campaign within the Philippine Armed Forces, which established intelligence schools and the Philippine Military Intelligence Corps.[139] These schools' graduates proved effective on the

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[135] Central Intelligence Agency, "Critical Situations in the Far East," ORE 58-50, October 12, 1950, Digital National Security Archive, 11. http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/dnsa/government-official-publications/critical-situations-far-east/docview/1679156779/sem-2?accountid=11311.
[136] Christopher Capozzola, *Bound by War: How the United States and the Philippines Built America's First Pacific Century.* (New York: Basic Books, 2020), 220.
[137] Lawrence M. Greenberg, *The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines – 1946 – 1955*. (Washington DC: Analysis Branch: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1986), 97. https://history.army.mil/books/coldwar/huk/ch5.htm
[138] Greenberg, *The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines – 1946 – 1955*, 80
[139] Greenberg, 96.

battlefield, providing vital intelligence which "erased Huk feelings of security even in their traditional strongholds around Mount Arayat, the Candaba Swamp, or in the Sierra Madre mountains."[140] Lansdale was well known for shaping the psychological warfare tactics used by the Philippine forces, including the use of superstition, such as the *vampira* (vampires) and ghosts, to break enemy morale.[141] At one time, he flew over the enemy squadrons, calling alleged traitors by name through intelligence gathered, resulting in three executions on the spot.[142] As accentuated in Major Lawrence M. Greenberg's analysis for the U.S. Army Center of Military History in 1986, "without American aid and assistance, the Magsaysay government [Philippines] would not have been able to defeat the Huk."[143]

Beyond the Cold War existence of the JUSMAG, the United States has also been an active participant in the post-Cold War counter-insurgency campaigns in the Philippines, mirroring the JUSMAG era. For instance, the U.S. Department of Defense sent about 1,200 U.S. troops to the Southern Philippines in 2002, including "190 special operation forces who would train the Philippine military in counterterrorism techniques and six hundred conventional troops to stiffen its fight against the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group on Basilan Islands," including U.S. Navy Seals, as part of the "War on Terror."[144] While the U.S. bases were already terminated in the context of 2002, the U.S. guarantee over Philippine security accentuates its continued vital role in U.S. strategic interests in

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[140] Greenberg, 123.
[141] Bart Barnes, "Edward Lansdale, Prototype for `Ugly American,' Dies," *The Washington Post*, Feb 24, 1987. http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/newspapers/edward-lansdale-prototype-ugly-american-dies/docview/306820193/se-2; Alfred McCoy, *Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State*. (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 378.
[142] McCoy, *Policing America's Empire,* 378.
[143] Greenberg, 1.
[144] McCoy, 551.

the region. The essence of the continued provision of U.S. security guarantee in the present day shall be further discussed in Chapter 5.

Compensatory Institutions

Beyond the cost savings produced by the institutional existence of the MDT, the United States' dependency on the Philippines also came with direct financial and material benefits provided to the Philippine state as an "incentive" and/or "compensation" for the continued U.S. strategic dependence on the Philippines. This, on the other hand, resulted in Philippine financial and material dependency on the United States. As Roxas mentioned on June 3, 1946, in his first State of the Nation address, the U.S. Congress' authorization for the U.S. military's cooperation "not only in the training of personnel but also in the transfer to the Philippine Army of ships, aircraft, arms, equipment, stores, and supplies"[145] were of strategic necessity for the Philippine security apparatus, adding that "we [Philippines] could not maintain an army or an offshore patrol without it."[146] As a result of such financial and material dependency, Roxas, on December 23, 1946, personally told McNutt that the Philippine government desired the maintenance of the U.S. colonial bases,[147] emphasizing a *quid pro quo* relationship between the U.S. "compensations" and the continuation of the colonial institutions.

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[145] President Roxas on First State of the Nation Address, June 3, 1946. https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1946/06/03/president-roxas-on-first-state-of-the-nation-address-june-3-1946/.

[146] Message of His Excellency Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines, to the Second Congress on the State of the Nation, June 3, 1946. https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1946/06/03/president-roxas-on-first-state-of-the-nation-address-june-3-1946/.

[147] The Ambassador in the Philippines (McNutt) to the Secretary of State, "Document 732," December 23, 1946, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1946, The Far East, Volume VIII, eds. John G. Reid, Herbert A. Fine, and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1971). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v08/d732.

The financial and material motivation of the Philippine state may also be understood by considering the context of the time. The destruction caused by the war specifically made the Philippines reliant on U.S. foreign aid, both military and economic, with the Census Office of the Philippines reporting an approximate total of $1.295 billion in damages in pre-war costs, while other sources reporting up to $5 billion.[148] By November of 1947, the Philippines were requesting for $9.440 million worth of military assistance to the United States for the fiscal year of 1948, covering subsistence, clothing, and fuel required by the Philippine Army.[149] This was more than half of the Philippines' total exports at that time, with an estimate of only $15 million in 1946.[150] The aforementioned request was in addition to another request of "the furnishing of arms, ammunition, equipment and supplies; certain aircraft and naval vessels, and instruction and training assistance by the Army and Navy of the United States"[151] under the Military Assistance Agreement (MAA) which was signed after the MBA. The Philippines were also in dire need of U.S. economic aid and war reparations from Japan, entrenching the islands further within the U.S. sphere of influence. In a meeting with McNutt, Roxas, for instance, raised the question of a $250 million reconstruction loan in addition to the United States' war damage compensation, which was planned to be $400 million at that

[148] Jose P. Apostol, "Some Effects on the War on the Philippines," Tenth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, September 1947, Tenth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Stratford-upon-Avon, England, (Manila: Philippine Council Institute of Pacific Relations). Harvard Yenching Library (W) DS686.3 A75.
[149] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs (Mill), "Document 903," November 13, 1947, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East, Volume VI, eds. John R. Reid and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1972). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v06/d903.
[150] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Lend-Lease and Surplus War Property (Fetter), "Document 664," May 14, 1946, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1946, The Far East, Volume VIII, eds. John G. Reid, Herbert A. Fine, and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1971). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v08/d664.
[151] Agreement on Military Assistance, Manila, 21 March 1947. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2155&context=ils.

time.[152] This was in comparison to again the Philippines' estimated export of only $15 million and imports of $150-250 million in 1946.[153] Additional $120 million for damaged public property and $100 million worth of surplus property were also arranged with the United States, bringing the total aid, excluding the loan, to about $620 million in war damage payments.[154] Given these, utilizing the United States' security dependency on the Philippine islands became especially important for the Philippine state in gaining financial and material benefits.

The JUSMAG likewise became an important institution in serving as the financial and material aid mediator between Washington and Manila, especially when it came to specialized Philippine requests pertaining to military arsenal. The JUSMAG's size was not of significance, only averaging 32 U.S. officers and 26 enlisted personnel in the fifties.[155] Nevertheless, the Philippines' request for "napalm bombs" from the United States in 1951, for instance, had to undergo a JUSMAG recommendation.[156] By

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[152] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Lend-Lease and Surplus War Property (Fetter), "Document 664," May 14, 1946, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1946, The Far East, Volume VIII, eds. John G. Reid, Herbert A. Fine, and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1971). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v08/d664.
[153] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Lend-Lease and Surplus War Property (Fetter), "Document 664," May 14, 1946, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1946, The Far East, Volume VIII, eds. John G. Reid, Herbert A. Fine, and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1971). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v08/d664.
[154] Alejandro M. Fernandez, *The Philippines and the United States: The Forging of New Relations,* (Quezon City: Philippine Union Catalog, 1977), 220.
[155] Greenberg, *The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines – 1946 – 1955*, 105.
[156] The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley), "Document 38," June 21, 1951, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2, eds. Paul Claussen, John P. Glennon, David W. Mabon, Neal H. Petersen, Carl N. Raether, and Fredrick Aandahl (Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1977). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v06p2/d38; Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Third Secretary of Embassy (Cuthell), "Document 39," July 9, 1951, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2, eds. Paul Claussen, John P. Glennon, David W. Mabon, Neal H. Petersen, Carl N. Raether, and Fredrick Aandahl (Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1977). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v06p2/d39; The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Secretary of State, "Document 41," July 27, 1951, *Foreign Relations of the United States*,

November 2, 1951, Myron M. Cowen, the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines with which the JUSMAG worked closely, sent a telegram to Dean Acheson informing him that the use of the United States' napalm bombs by the Philippine Air Force (PAF) would require the approval of the JUSMAG and will be stored in a U.S. military facility,[157] in which the Philippines agreed. It was noted further on November 9, 1951, that "it is the belief of the Department of State [U.S.] that the procedure should be amended to provide for consultation and agreement between the Chief of JUSMAG and the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission prior to the use of the napalm."[158]

In the year prior to the napalm agreement, the United States have supplied the Philippines "fifteen million rounds of small arms and mortar ammunition, several armored cars, light trucks, and thirty-four F-51 aircraft from Pacific and CONUS war surplus stock"[159] in just a span of three months (April to July). In the same year, the Philippines received "various types of small arms, machine guns, mortars, light artillery, wheeled cargo vehicles, and a few light and medium tanks."[160] In the context of 1954, the

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1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2, eds. Paul Claussen, John P. Glennon, David W. Mabon, Neal H. Petersen, Carl N. Raether, and Fredrick Aandahl (Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1977). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v06p2/d41; Memorandum by the Acting Director for International Security Affairs (Bell) to the Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense (Olmsted), "Document 58," November 9, 1951, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2, eds. Paul Claussen, John P. Glennon, David W. Mabon, Neal H. Petersen, Carl N. Raether, and Fredrick Aandahl (Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1977). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v06p2/d58.

[157] The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Secretary of State, "Document 56," November 2, 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2, eds. Paul Claussen, John P. Glennon, David W. Mabon, Neal H. Petersen, Carl N. Raether, and Fredrick Aandahl (Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1977). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v06p2/d56.

[158] Memorandum by the Acting Director for International Security Affairs (Bell) to the Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense (Olmsted), "Document 58," November 9, 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2, eds. Paul Claussen, John P. Glennon, David W. Mabon, Neal H. Petersen, Carl N. Raether, and Fredrick Aandahl (Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1977). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v06p2/d58.

[159] Greenberg, *The Hukbalahap Insurrection*, 106.

[160] Greenberg, 106.

estimated future value of U.S. military assistance to the Philippines totaled $87.2 million from the fiscal years of 1952 to 1957 and was estimated to have been valued at a total of $118 million after eight years of independence.[161] This figure does not include the economic aid and other war damage claims from the Second World War.

However, the vast array of weapons provided needed U.S. training, making the Philippine state further dependent on the United States. As Christopher Cappozola argued, the Philippine Armed Forces "grew accustomed" to U.S. arsenal, making the Philippine military dependent on the continued patronage of the U.S. for military supplies procurement.[162] By 1951, the JUSMAG launched a quota program for AFP personnel for military education in the United States,[163] in which many Philippine military officers and enlisted personnel went to school in the U.S. for military training. Back in the Philippines, JUSMAG, in the same year, likewise began training and equipping a Philippine airborne infantry company alongside the funnelling of "200 wheeled and light tracked vehicles that greatly increased their mobility."[164]

U.S. military education has been a significant part of the Philippine security apparatus, where Philippine officials with military backgrounds often find themselves having ties with U.S. military institutions one way or the other, even in the present day. This included President Ferdinand E. Marcos Sr. (1965-1986), whose military training came from the Reserve Officer's Training Corps during the Philippines' colonial era, and President Fidel Ramos (1992-1998), who graduated from West Point in 1950, among

[161] National Security Council, "U.S. Policy Towards the Philippines," April 5, 1954, NSC 5413/1, Digital National Security Archive, 8, 21. http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/dnsa/government-official-publications/u-s-policy-toward-philippines/docview/1679084442/sem-2?accountid=11311.
[162] Capozzola, *Bound by* War, 221.
[163] Greenberg, 106.
[164] Greenberg, 108.

other uncountable AFP officers and enlisted personnel who graduated from U.S. military programs in the U.S. mainland. So notable was the "U.S. education" in the AFP that Ramon Magsaysay, in his days as the Secretary of National Defense, lectured the Philippine General Staff to "forget everything you were taught at Ft. Leavenworth, Ft. Benning, and the Academy" for the sake of contextualizing AFP military strategy in the Philippines against the *Hukbalahap*.[165] Magsaysay, of course, was not anti-American in saying this. Rather, he highlighted the United States' heavy influence in the Philippines to the extent it needed "contextualization" in Philippine military operations.

By 1965, the U.S. compensation had to be intensified, giving birth to what U.S. officials coined as the "Philippine shopping list" for defense equipment. As Brands argued in his book *Bound to Empire*, the Macapagal administration, despite the possibility of a domestic nationalist backlash due to the increased American access to the bases in the Philippines, found solace through the "larger amounts of money than usual" that poured into the Philippine treasury as part of the U.S. "come and go,"[166] displaying the essentiality of the financial and material *quid pro quo* in exchange for the continuation of the U.S. bases. Such "shopping list" was specifically coined in a January 21, 1965 meeting between Philippine and U.S. government officials, attended by Philippine Secretary of Finance Rufino G. Hechanova and Philippine Ambassador to the United States Oscar Ledesma on the Philippine side, and Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton, Deputy Assistance Secretary of Defense Peter Solbert, Director of Far East Region Rear Admiral F. J. Blouin, USN, and Assistant to Director Captain D.T.

[165] Greenberg, 86.
[166] Brands, *Bound to Empire*, 282.

Neil, USN, on the U.S. side.[167] Part of Hechanova's shopping list included the allocation of funds for the purchase of "additional earth moving and road construction equipment" and "additional helicopters," in addition to "consumables" and "Philippine fuel requirements."[168]

The rise of Ferdinand Marcos Sr. in 1965 further exacerbated Philippine demands for financial compensation on the colonial bases. As Dean Rusk described the situation to U.S. President Johnson, "I have no doubt he [Marcos] will make every effort to parlay his visit and the troops for Vietnam into pretty tangible returns."[169] The CIA further noted Marcos Sr.'s nationalist sentiment and added that "he is also a strong nationalist and will seek greater equality for the Philippines in its dealings with the U.S., particularly those issues involving U.S. military bases and special U.S. economic privileges."[170] In short, "the use of the American bases in the Philippines required the cooperation of the government [Philippines], for better or worse currently in Marcos' hands."[171] By 1966, Marcos set forth his own version of "shopping list" which was far more expensive than Hechanova's. It included squadrons of F-5 fighter jets, engineering equipment, as well as "additional helicopters, light watercraft, harbor patrol crafts, and ships capable of operating in Southern waters."[172]

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[167] Memorandum of Conversation, "Document 303," January 21, 1965, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, eds. Edward C. Keefer and David S. Patterson (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2000). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v26/d303.
[168] Memorandum of Conversation, "Document 303," January 21, 1965, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, eds. Edward C. Keefer and David S. Patterson (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2000). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v26/d303.
[169] Brands, *Bound to Empire*, 284.
[170] Brands, 286.
[171] Brands, 300.
[172] United States Pacific Command, "Military Assistance Plan Funds and Engineer Construction Battalions," August 3, 1966, Telegram, Digital National Security Archive. http://search.proquest.com.ezp-

Despite the exacerbation, U.S. officials admitted that compliance with Marcos' demands was essential. As the 1966 U.S. National Policy Paper on the Republic of the Philippines highlighted, "the U.S. must determine the reasonable priority of its continued possession of military bases in the Philippines and deduce from this the reasonable cost it must be prepared and may be required to pay in terms of harmonizing its own requirements with Philippine attitudes and demands."[173] This was despite the fact that many admitted Marcos' "unrealistically large and expensive shopping list."[174] As the empirical data in Chapter 4 will show, letting go of the U.S. colonial bases in the context of the Cold War was far from possible, given the United States' dependency on the Philippines against its communist counterparts. This was despite the withdrawal of the United States in other parts of Southeast Asia, specifically Vietnam, under the "Nixon Doctrine," which aimed to reduce U.S. participation in Asia's regional security.[175]

While the Nixon Doctrine reduced the total number of U.S. troops in the Philippines from 28,300 as authorized in July 1969 to 22,000 by November 4, 1970, with further cuts of an additional 3,100 troops scheduled for 1971,[176] the withdrawal in

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prod1.hul.harvard.edu/dnsa/government-official-publications/military-assistance-plan-funds-engineer/docview/1679142650/sem-2?accountid=11311.

[173] United States Department of State, "National Policy Paper on Republic of the Philippines-Part I," December 1, 1965, Digital National Security Archive, 21. http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/dnsa/government-official-publications/national-policy-paper-on-republic-philippines/docview/1679152266/sem-2?accountid=11311.

[174] United States Pacific Command, Commander in Chief, "President Marcos Visit to Washington [Instructions to Discourage High Hopes for Fulfillment of Philippines Government's Shopping List]," August 13, 1966, CINCPAC to RUMFS/CHJUSMAGPHIL, Digital National Security Archive. http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/government-official-publications/president-marcos-visit-washington-instructions/docview/1679141534/se-2?accountid=11311.

[175] "The Nixon Doctrine, 1969," in *The Cold War through Documents: A Global History*, eds., Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 224-227, 226; Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*. (New York, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 708.

[176] United States Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, "Reduction of U.S. Presence in East Asia [U.S. Personnel Reductions in East Asia--Table, Cover Memo Attached]," November 4, 1970, Digital National Security Archive. http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/government-official-publications/reduction-u-s-presence-east-asia-personnel/docview/1679141159/se-2?accountid=11311.

Vietnam produced the opposite of what the Nixon Doctrine originally intended. While the doctrine intended "burden sharing" in the form of self-dependency for its allies in the Pacific, it instead triggered a Philippine backlash, which resulted in the United States paying $500 million in 1979 in exchange for continued U.S. military access. This was due to the notion in which the U.S. continued its strategic access to its colonial bases in the Philippines, causing the Philippine state to feel taken advantage of, with such a "burden sharing" deal being unfair without due compensation, as will be further discussed in Chapter 4.

By the eighties, détente collapsed and the requirement for financial/material compensation grew further. As mentioned earlier, the Soviets, by 1979, had established their military presence in Vietnam, actively competing with the U.S. Navy for supremacy on the seas. The eighties also saw another intensification of the Cold War, with Reagan's administration launching projects such as the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, also known as the "Star Wars." Business as usual, the United States dollars and military aid flooded the Philippines with U.S. officials recommending two forms of financial assistance: military and economic, with the military section allegedly focusing on "logistics, maintenance, training, equipment for mobility and communications, and civic action."[177] In economic terms, the United States contemplated adding (1) development assistance at $35-40 million annually, (2) strong effort to implement a new program of $40 million for the fiscal year of 1985 and $35 million in the fiscal year of 1986, (3)

[177] United States National Security Council, "United States Policy Towards the Philippines," February 20, 1985, National Security Decision Directive No. 163, Digital National Security Archive. http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/government-official-publications/united-states-policy-towards-philippines/docview/1679149447/se-2?accountid=11311.

increased Economic Support Funds, and (4) reduced sugar duty.[178] While such amounts seemed insignificant, it is important to know that these were mere additions to the already existing economic support that the United States was granting to the Philippines.

By the year 1983, Marcos Sr. obtained another $900 million commitment just as renegotiations for the U.S. colonial bases were to start again.[179] The commitment was spread over a five-year period with "$125 million in military assistance grants (MAP), $300 million in foreign military sales (via FMS loans), and $475 million in economic support (including grant budget) funds (ESF)."[180] This established U.S. financial commitment would hence be passed on to the Aquino government after the EDSA revolution in 1986. The financial compensation issue became essential for the survival of Aquino's administration, specifically, her standing with the Philippine military, whose concern was her "reputation for being able to receive sustained backing from the U.S."[181] So essential was the funding that the Aquino administration actively pushed for "larger sums" and "on more favorable terms," despite the fact that there was already four-year military assistance totaling $367.7 million under Marcos' original 1983 agreement.[182] All these were under the light that the U.S. bases' existence was scheduled to be renegotiated.

The financial compensation was not only vital in the Aquino administration's survival but also became the very life support of the Philippine state, especially with the

[178] United States National Security Council, "United States Policy Towards the Philippines," February 20, 1985, National Security Decision Directive No. 163, Digital National Security Archive. http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/government-official-publications/united-states-policy-towards-philippines/docview/1679149447/se-2?accountid=11311.
[179] Fred Greene, *The Philippine Bases: Negotiating for the Future*. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), 4.
[180] Greene, *The Philippine Bases: Negotiating for the Future*, 47.
[181] Greene, 51.
[182] Greene, 51.

economic decline that affected the previous Marcos administration. So vital was the 1983 agreement that the Philippine Commissioner Serafin Guingona stated that "if military assistance were to be cut off, much of our spending would go to the payment of foreign loans and to the budget of the military and little would be left for government services," given that the Philippine budget in 1985 was at $437 million, compared to the U.S. financial compensation of $475 million.[183] David Sycip, a respected spokesman of the Filipino business community, brought up the notion of raising the U.S. "rent" to $1 billion, claiming that it would "ease the pressure on the national government to generate additional revenue and investments" in a closed-door session of the Philippine Senate Foreign Relations Committee.[184] Hence, by the eighties, what seemed to have been a regular financial compensation turned into an active rent-seeking campaign.

The U.S. bases, however, would eventually close permanently in 1991 due to nationalistic and domestic factors, as shall be further discussed in Chapter 5. In brief, though, the closure of the U.S. bases resulted in the Philippines being "on the bottom of Washington's gift list" after five years, with U.S. military aid averaging only about $1.6 million per annum, pointing to the essentiality of U.S. bases in producing the financial/material compensation. Nevertheless, as Alfred McCoy argued, "yet even after the closure of Subic Bay and Clark Field in 1992, the Philippines remained a uniquely important strategic asset," with the Philippines being of geographic essentiality in containing China's growing military.[185] Hence, the closure of the U.S. bases neither

[183] A.R. Magno, "Cornucopia or Curse," in *Military Basing and the U.S./Soviet Military Assistance in Southeast Asia*, eds. George K. Tanham and Alvin H. Bernstein (New York: Crane Russak, 1989), 154.
[184] Magno, "Cornucopia or Curse," 154.
[185] Alfred McCoy, *Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of Surveillance State*. (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 514.

marked the U.S. military presence nor the financial/material compensation. By 2014, the EDCA emerged, which allowed for the continuation of U.S. military access in the Philippines, as discussed in the last chapter. Correlatedly, $1.14 billion were transferred to the Philippines in the form of "planes, ships, armored vehicles, small arms, and other military equipment" from 2015-2022, making it the "largest recipient of U.S. military assistance in the Indo-Pacific region"[186] immediately after the signing of EDCA.

Chapter Observations and Conclusion

This chapter supports the notion that the existence of the U.S. colonial institutions, with its by-product of U.S. dependency on the Philippine islands, resulted in a Philippine security dependency on the U.S. throughout post-colonial history, fostering a mutually reinforcing security reliance between the two states. As may be observed in the first section, the existence of the MDT institutionally increased the benefit for the Philippine state in remaining towards the same alliance trajectory with the U.S., deeming it irrational for the Philippine state to depend on other security means. This is attributed to the fact that the existence of the colonial institutions guaranteed Philippine security as a *quid* for its continuation, eliminating the need for the Philippine state to spend enormous funds for its external defense. This produced large cost savings for the Philippine state, perennially increasing the benefits of remaining towards the same trajectory of dependency on the United States. It may further be inferred that the non-existence of the colonial institutions would've plausibly and rationally decreased U.S.

[186] "Fact Sheet: U.S.-Philippines Defense and Security Partnership," U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, February 11, 2022, https://ph.usembassy.gov/fact-sheet-u-s-philippines-defense-and-security-partnership.

motivation in providing a security guarantee, increasing the probability of the Philippine states' dependency being threatened.

As may also be observed in the second section, the existence of financial and material *quid*, e.g., informal financial and material grants, produced real benefits for the Philippine state, which perennially increased the benefit of supporting the colonial bases' continuance, making the Philippine state more heavily dependent on their existence. It perennially decreased the Philippine state's military costs and increased its financial/material benefits, persisting up to the present day with the emergence of EDCA (as a replacement of the colonial bases) alongside the $1.14 billion *quid,* as mentioned earlier. In other words, the presence of the United States military in securing Philippine external security through the existence of the colonial bases allowed Filipinos to shift scarce resources from other political priorities, namely counter-insurgency, and shifting away from naval modernization,[187] making the Philippine state highly dependent on U.S. provisions. In sum, the existence of the colonial institutions acted as an important and necessary factor in fostering Philippine dependency on the U.S., turning the alliance into a mutually reinforcing security dependency.

[187] Alice D. Ba, "The Philippines Confronts a Post-American World: Geopolitical-Domestic-Institutional Intersections," *Asian Politics and Policy* 9, no. 4 (2017): 534.

Chapter IV.

Restricting Case 1: The Security Renegotiation of 1975-1979

While the previous two chapters dealt with the inference that the colonial institutions caused a mutual security dependency between the U.S. and the Philippines, this chapter presents the first case in supporting the notion that the existence of a mutually reinforcing security dependency made it less likely for the Philippines and the U.S. to be able to deviate from the existing alliance because of the existence of *restricting* effects. This chapter presents the case of the U.S.-Philippine negotiation of the colonial bases and alliance from 1975 to 1979 as evidence of how the mutually reinforcing security dependencies between the two states resulted in a *restricting* effect on both U.S. and Philippine decision-making in the Cold War context, shaping the renegotiating process and political actor incentives in the historical case of the U.S. – Philippine alliance renegotiation of 1975-1979. The case shows that the existence of such dependencies restricted deviant political actors from both states from shifting toward a different trajectory. This allowed a self-reinforcing sequence that led to institutional evolution, increasing the benefits of remaining on the same trajectory of alliance.

The U.S.-Philippine security renegotiations of 1975-1979 are often viewed as a by-product of the Fall of Vietnam in 1975 which witnessed the United States' total withdrawal from Vietnam, eventually leading to the collapse of South Vietnam and the victory of the communist regime. For instance, Gregory Winger argued that the Philippines, being "long dependent on the United States as the essential guarantor of

Philippine security," triggered an existential crisis after the Fall of Vietnam, which "forced Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos to question the wisdom of this arrangement."[188] Similarly, I argued previously in another study that "while the Philippines initially pursued self-reliance in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine, the Fall of Saigon in 1975 resulted in intensified Philippine efforts for self-reliance which was contrary to U.S. objectives."[189] While the focal point of Winger's and my previous research were the effects of the Fall of Saigon in 1975 and the self-dependency efforts of the Philippine state, this case study uses the security negotiations neither to explain the role of the Fall of Vietnam nor the Philippines' self-reliance efforts in detail, but rather show how the aforementioned mutual dependencies *restricted* both the Philippines and the United States from shifting the alliance towards a different trajectory, e.g., Philippine self-reliance and/or independent security policy which did not include the United States and vice versa, accentuating the entwinement of the United States and the Philippines towards the same security path-dependency.

This chapter provides historical background in the context of the historical narrative, namely the role of the Fall of Vietnam as a catalyst in triggering the Philippine renegotiation efforts. The second section continues the historical narrative by emphasizing the renegotiation process, showing how the existence of the dependencies caused the restriction in both states from being able to choose another trajectory, e.g., Philippine self-reliance and U.S. withdrawal of the colonial bases. The empirical data of

[188] Gregory H. Winger, "Reassurance and Revival the U.S.-Philippine Alliance in the Wake of the Vietnam War," *International History Review* 44, no. 2 (2022): 393, https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2021.1927799.
[189] John Carlo Seralbo, 2021, "Divergent reality of Détente era in the Far East under the Nixon Doctrine: Fall of Saigon, the South China Sea, and Philippine Efforts for Self-Reliance, 1975-1976," Term Paper, HIST1960, Harvard Summer School.

this case study was primarily obtained in the U.S. National Archive's *Central Foreign Policy Files* with thousands of telegram records from 1973 – 1979, allowing for an extensive and detailed process tracing for the purpose of this chapter. A portion of this paper is also an improvement of my original research (the author) in Dr. Serhii Plokhii's History of the Cold War (HIST1960) at Harvard Summer School, with the term paper titled "Divergent reality of Détente era in the Far East under the Nixon Doctrine: Fall of Saigon, the South China Sea, and Philippine Efforts for Self-Reliance, 1975-1976," dated August 02, 2021. Permission was obtained on November 6, 2021, via e-mail for the reusing of empirical data, contents, and sources. The final section of this chapter discusses the observations and conclusions made.

Nixon Doctrine and the Fall of Vietnam

By 1969, the United States felt the financial and physical toll of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. With the growing détente between the Soviet Union, China, and the United States, Richard Nixon, in the same year, announced the gradual U.S. withdrawal of troops in Southeast Asia, a phenomenon also referred to as the "Nixon Doctrine." As part of the package, Nixon stressed that the "Asian nations," referring to U.S. allies in the Far East, would have to deal with both their internal security and military defense except for the threat of nuclear weapons.[190] As Kissinger (U.S. Secretary of State) stated in his book *Diplomacy*, the Nixon Doctrine required allies to share the burden of their conventional non-nuclear defense.[191] By 1975, the world

[190] "The Nixon Doctrine, 1969," in *The Cold War through Documents: A Global History*, eds., Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 224-227, 226.

[191] Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*. (New York, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 708.

witnessed the United States' total withdrawal from Vietnam, eventually leading to the collapse of South Vietnam and victorious communist regime.

This withdrawal triggered negative reactions among U.S. allies in the Far East. For instance, Japan saw the Fall of Vietnam as analogous to the U.S. withdrawal in the entire Pacific region, urging Japan to reassess its security relations with the United States.[192] South Korea likewise felt betrayed after the United States broke the promise of a non-withdrawal in the country, triggering Park Chung Hee to initiate unrealistic and unreasonable rent-seeking demands either to delay or discourage U.S. withdrawal.[193] The Philippines was not spared, and by 1975, Marcos had initiated an aggressive effort to reassess its relations with the United States, pushing the U.S. for further "guarantees" and "rent." It is worth noting that all these countries have a defense treaty with the United States, with the commonality being a security dependency through a U.S. security guarantee.

Such sentiments did not come out of nowhere, with the demise of South Vietnam leading the Philippine state to ask the question, "Would the Philippines suffer the same fate as Vietnam?" The Philippine state had a legitimate reason for thinking such, especially with the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, deeming the South China Sea as the new front line of the Philippines against communism. For instance, the North Vietnamese Navy launched an offensive on Pugad Island (Southwest Cay) against remaining South Vietnamese forces by April 14, 1975, with the battle occurring only 1.6 miles south of

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[192] Yukinori Komine, "Whither a 'Resurgent Japan,' The Nixon Doctrine and Japan's Defense Buildup, 1969–1976," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 16, no. 3 (2014): 98, muse.jhu.edu/article/556077.
[193] Chou Lyong, "Reluctant Reconciliation: South Korea's Tentative Détente with North Korea in the Nixon Era, 1969–72," *Modern Asian Studies* 54, no. 1 (2020): 68-69. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X18000021.

Philippine military positions in Parola Island (Northeast Cay).[194] The PRC likewise took advantage of the opportunity, confirming North Vietnamese fears that the PRC would take advantage of the "fiasco in Vietnam" to launch pre-emptive strikes against North Vietnamese forces on the islands in the South China Sea.[195] Priorly, South Vietnamese and Chinese Navy vessels clashed over the Paracel islands before the fall of Saigon,[196] signifying Chinese resolve in their claim of the disputed area. Considering these events, it may be observed that the Fall of Vietnam led to the intensification of communist activities in the South China Sea.

This resulted in Philippine anxiety and insecurity, fearing that Philippine forces may be involved in Chinese or North Vietnamese military activities in the South China Sea.[197] Responding to the threat, the U.S. Navy Commander in Chief Pacific Command (CINCPAC) and AFP forces in the area were advised to remain in special alert status by April 16, 1975.[198] The Soviets complicated the problem with the growing Soviet Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok, especially in the light of Hanoi gaining Soviet support and

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[194] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "GOP concern over NVN incursion into Spratly area," April 24, 1975, MANILA 05250, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=9181&dt=2476&dl=1345.

[195] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "Disputed Territories in South China Sea," April 16, 1975, MANILA 04777, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=16076&dt=2476&dl=1345.

[196] Embassy Saigon to Department of State, "PRC/RVN confrontation in the Paracel Islands," January 20, 1974, SAIGON 00868, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=8216&dt=2474&dl=1345.

[197] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "Disputed Territories in South China Sea," April 16, 1975, MANILA 04777, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=16076&dt=2476&dl=1345.

[198] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "Disputed Territories in South China Sea," April 16, 1975, MANILA 04777, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=16076&dt=2476&dl=1345.

increasing tensions between Soviet and PRC relations.[199] Pravada, for instance, at one time claimed in an article that the incident on Paracel Islands in 1974 equated as a form of Chinese expansionism,[200] condemning the PRC and its objectives in the region. For the Philippines, the Soviet threat was just as important, fearing that without the U.S. 7th fleet, the Philippines remained exposed to the communist existential threat in the region.[201]

Philippine anxiety and insecurity was further exacerbated with Gerald Ford's decision not to include the Philippines in his foreign policy speech on April 10, 1975,[202] a speech in which purpose was to review U.S. foreign relations worldwide, especially Australian, New Zealand, Singaporean, and Indonesian security concerns succeeding the U.S. withdrawal.[203] Ford further stressed the importance of South Korea and Japan in being the 'cornerstone' of stability in the Pacific region,[204] not mentioning the Philippines and the U.S. bases on the islands. The U.S. Ambassador in Manila, William H. Sullivan, complained and demanded an explanation for the exclusion of the Philippines despite the presence of the colonial bases in addition to Voice of America (VOA) installations that

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[199] Lee Lai To "China, the USA and the South China Sea Conflicts." Security Dialogue 34, no. 1 (March 2003): 28, https://doi.org/10.1177/09670106030341004.

[200] Embassy Moscow to Department of State, "Pravda Accuses China of Expansionism in Asia," March 1, 1974, MOSCOW 03023, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=54404&dt=2474&dl=1345.

[201] Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, January 5, 1973, 3:30 p.m., "Document 314," January 5, 1973, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1969-1976, Volume E-12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973-1976, eds. Bradley Lynn Coleman, David Goldman, Davis Nickles, and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 2010). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12/d314.

[202] Department of State to Embassy Manila, "US/Philippine Security Arrangements," April 16, 1975, STATE 087428, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=10103&dt=2476&dl=1345.

[203] "April 10, 1975: Address on U.S. Foreign Policy," University of Virginia Miller Center (University of Virginia, 2017), https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/april-10-1975-address-us-foreign-policy.

[204] "April 10, 1975: Address on U.S. Foreign Policy," University of Virginia Miller Center (University of Virginia, 2017), https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/april-10-1975-address-us-foreign-policy.

serviced the entire Far East, which was vital for U.S. information warfare in the area.[205] Adding to the problem further, Ford's policy on the South China Sea under his "Pacific Doctrine" became limited to the preservation of regional peace and stability than the original "defense perimeter" as seen in the fifties,[206] signifying a downplay in U.S. commitment in the region under détente, with the assumption that the United States would be able to ease relations with communist powers. Of course, this would be false as the eighties have seen Cold War intensification yet again under Reagan's "Star Wars." The United States' downplaying of U.S. commitment, even within the United States, has been seen as a reversion to isolationism and total withdrawal in Asia.[207] Marcos feared that such a Pacific Doctrine would undermine Philippine security concerns in the South China Sea, fearing a non-U.S. response to an attack on Philippine assets.[208]

The South China Sea's proximity to the Philippines made it especially vital for Philippine security interests, with them once being utilized by the Japanese to stage an offensive on the Philippines.[209] The Filipinos, especially Marcos, viewed the South China

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[205] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "Philippines 'Reassessing' Security Arrangements with U.S.," April 14, 1975, MANILA 04661, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=10113&dt=2476&dl=1345.

[206] US Del Secretary in Bohemian to Embassy Manila, "Philippine Base Negotiations: Answers to questions submitted by Romualdez June 21," July 30, 1976, SECTO 19023, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=151723&dt=2082&dl=1345.

[207] "Pacific Doctrine," The New York Times Archives, December 9, 1975, https://www.nytimes.com/1975/12/09/archives/pacific-doctrine.html.

[208] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "Philippines 'Reassessing' Security Arrangements with U.S.," April 14, 1975, MANILA 04661, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=10113&dt=2476&dl=1345; Ferdinand Marcos: A Discussion, November 17, 1977, Firing Line broadcast records, Hoover Institution Library & Archives, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/6482/ferdinand-marcos-a-discussion.

[209] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "Philippine Reaction to Chinese seizure of Paracels," January 22, 1974, MANILA 00775, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=353&dt=2474&dl=1345.

Sea as a buffer against external threats,[210] in which the seas would have been a preferable front line in a hypothetical battle compared to the Philippine metropolitan areas. The South China Sea likewise had strategic economic value for the Philippines. It contained petroleum,[211] a necessary commodity for the Philippine economy, especially as it had the potential to reduce the islands' reliance on crude oil imports from the Middle East, making up 95% of the Philippines' oil imports by 1974.[212]

Renegotiation Onset: 1975

Marcos Sr. responded to the situation by calling for a reassessment of the U.S.-Philippine security alliance, including but not limited to topics such as the future of the colonial bases and clarification of U.S. commitment to Philippine defense. It was announced at a dinner party for Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu on April 15, 1975, and further reiterated three days later in the Philippine Defense College.[213] By May 13, the news spread like wildfire with all major newspapers in the Philippines headlining the Philippine reassessment of its security relations with the United States in their news

[210] Ferdinand Marcos: A Discussion, November 17, 1977, Firing Line broadcast records, Hoover Institution Library & Archives, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/6482/ferdinand-marcos-a-discussion.
[211] Mark J. Valencia, "The South China Sea: Prospects for Marine Regionalism," *Marine Policy* 2, no.2 (1978): 90. https://doi.org/10.1016/0308-597X(78)90002-7.
[212] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "RP/PRC Trade Agreement Promises Oil for the Lamps of the Philippines," September 30, 1974, MANILA 1167, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=195846&dt=2474&dl=1345.
[213] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "GOP "Reassessing Security arrangements," April 15, 1975, MANILA 04707, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=2938&dt=2476&dl=1345; Embassy Manila to Department of State, "President Marcos announces review of US/RP defense relations," April 15,1975, MANILA 04738, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=10108&dt=2476&dl=1345.

articles in light of U.S. "abandonment of Cambodia and Viet-nam."[214] Marcos Sr. started by questioning the "automaticity" of the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty, comparing the MDT to NATO's Article V, in which "any armed attack against one or more parties shall be considered an attack to them all."[215] Romulo likewise iterated that the MDT was "not mutual" in accordance with Philippine satisfactions, perceiving that the United States would not engage with any threat if it did not endanger U.S. troops in the Philippines.[216] The U.S. Embassy in Manila relayed Philippine sentiments to Washington in a telegram stating that "the Philippine leaders are upset at the U.S. failure to save South Vietnam and Cambodia from communism" and that "they now realize they cannot count on an automatic U.S . defense commitment in spite of their 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty."[217]

As may be observed, Marcos' response was geared towards the notion that the Philippines already depended on the United States for its external security, thus triggering a negative reaction upon the suspicion of a U.S. withdrawal in the Pacific, which may threaten Philippine national security. Hence, such reassessment may be seen not as an attempt to break away from the alliance but rather as a reaction to seeking affirmation from the United States whether its security commitment to the Philippines remained.

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[214] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "Philippines 'Reassessing' Security Arrangements with U.S.," April 14, 1975, MANILA 04661, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=10113&dt=2476&dl=1345.
[215] "The NATO Alliance, 1949," in *The Cold War through Documents: A Global History*, eds. Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 66-70, 68.
[216] "The NATO Alliance, 1949," in *The Cold War through Documents: A Global History*, eds. Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 66-70, 68.
[217] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "Base Negotiations," August 9, 1975, MANILA 10986, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=39595&dt=2476&dl=1345.

Marcos' affirmation-seeking strategy was twofold. First, he wanted to seek U.S. reaffirmation of their security guarantee under the MDT. Second and alternatively, he wanted the provision of large U.S. financial and military aid to compensate for the potentially reduced U.S. security guarantee after the Fall of Vietnam. For Marcos Sr., the proposition was that either the United States guarantee Philippine security on the South China Sea under the MDT or the U.S. provide extremely large amounts of financial and material aid, making the Philippine military capable without the presence of a U.S. security guarantee under the MDT. One way or the other, Philippine dependency on the United States was to remain.

The existence of the colonial bases, alongside its strategic value to the U.S., gave Marcos Sr. leverage in his renegotiation stance. As the U.S. Department of State reiterated in a telegram to the U.S. Embassy in Manila on August 21, 1975, the Philippines were of strategic value for the United States and was important for the "rest of Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the sea and air lanes leading thereto," adding that the United States therefore "wish to maintain our [United States] base and operating rights in the Philippines (especially at Subic Bay/Cubi complex and Clark AB)."[218] This was in line with the dependency effect accentuated in Chapter 2. The prior existence of the colonial bases was specifically important as it *restricted* the United States from deviating away from the alliance, forcing it to consider Marcos' demands instead seriously, regardless of how "unrealistic" they were, as will be shown later.

[218] Department of State to Embassy Manila, "Military Base Negotiations," August 21, 1975, STATE 198711, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=39562&dt=2476&dl=1345.

Manila commenced the negotiations by urging the United States to reiterate the "(a) practical value of the U.S. Military bases here [Philippines], (b) whether U.S. policy at this time requires U.S. to continue to maintain bases, (c) what U.S. can provide the country [Philippines] by way of military aid according to text of military assistance agreement and how agreement itself can be readjusted in light of the new situation in SEA [South East Asia]."[219] Marcos focused on the financial and material aspects of *quid* early on in the negotiation process, leaving the issue of U.S. security guarantee at a later date. On the other hand, the United States anticipated that the reassessment would likely involve the U.S. colonial bases. William Sullivan, the U.S. Ambassador to Manila, anticipated the Philippine demand for a financial and material *quid* vis-à-vis the colonial bases and in a telegram on February 18, 1975, he warned that the question of "how much rent would the GOP [Philippines] be likely to ask as quid pro quo for U.S. base rights in the Philippines" would have to be addressed, stating that throughout history, there has always been a "quiet, acknowledged, implicit" linkage between the U.S. base rights and the U.S. military assistance.[220] On March 25, 1975, Sullivan clarified what he meant by adding and stressing that "security assistance or an equivalent thereof is the implicit quid pro quo for U.S. access to, and free use of, its military bases in the Philippines, one of the major objectives of U.S. foreign policy toward the Government of the Philippines."[221]

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[219] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "President Marcos on GOP Foreign Defense Policy," July 11, 1975, MANILA 09556, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=145746&dt=2476&dl=1345.

[220] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "U.S. Base Rights and Quid Pro Quo," February 18, 1975, MANILA 02055, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=97571&dt=2476&dl=1345.

[221] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "Security Assistance and Objectives and Guidelines, FY 1977-80: An Assessment," March 25, 1975, MANILA 03746, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 -

On July 10, 1975, however, Marcos included the other side of the *quid*, asking Washington for clarification through the U.S. Embassy in Manila on three areas: "(a) retaliatory clause in the Mutual Defense Pact, (b) Utilization of Bases, and (c) the Possibility of aid under Military Assistance Agreement."[222] The retaliatory clause specifically referred to the question of whether the United States would aid Philippine forces under the MDT at the disputed areas in the South China Sea if there were to be hostilities, possibly with the People's Republic of China, another claimant to the disputed territories, as accentuated by a later telegram in 1976.[223] This was especially in light of Marcos placing Philippine military units on the disputed Spratly Islands, hoping that hostilities in the area would trigger the U.S. security guarantee of the Philippines. Now the game began, with Marcos' proposal being (1) either the U.S. produce satisfactory quid through the U.S. security guarantee or (2) compensate it with U.S. financial or material aid, with the existence of the colonial bases being held hostage.

Renegotiation Intensification: 1976

As 1976 began, Sullivan again stressed in a telegram to the Secretary of State's office that "grant assistance is the implicit quid pro quo for U.S. use of military facilities in the Philippines" and that "a paramount U.S. policy objective in the Philippines is

12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=198985&dt=2476&dl=1345.

[222] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "President Marcos on GOP Foreign Defense Policy," July 11, 1975, MANILA 09556, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=145746&dt=2476&dl=1345

[223] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "Philippine Interest in Spratleys," January 12, 1976, MANILA 00571, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=120444&dt=2082&dl=1345.

continued access to these strategically important locations."[224] He further iterated the existence of a positive correlation between the U.S. financial assistance levels and U.S. access to its colonial bases, inferring that "as grant assistance levels have diminished and now show signs of disappearing together, the GOP [Philippines] has been reevaluating the entire security assistance picture, including the arrangements governing our use of military facilities in the Philippines."[225] For the United States, the objective was to focus on the financial aspect of *quid* rather than extending the security guarantee on the South China Sea. As Sullivan added on February 11, 1976, the financial compensations aspect, the "primary vehicle for the 'quid pro quo' we [United States] are unable to deliver through straight rent, MAP, or other form of fixed annual payment,"[226] was the "bread and butter" that the Philippine government expects from the U.S. in exchange for the continuation of the colonial bases.

On April 12, 1976, the renegotiations in Washington D.C officially began and were headed by Henry Kissinger and Carlos P. Romulo,[227] marking the beginning of a long and painful negotiation process between the two countries. In the meeting, Kissinger

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[224] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "FY77 Military Security Assistance," January 30, 1976, MANILA 01607, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=119288&dt=2082&dl=1345.

[225] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "FY77 Military Security Assistance," January 30, 1976, MANILA 01607, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=119288&dt=2082&dl=1345.

[226] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "Military Base Negotiations," February 11, 1976, MANILA 02117, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=103008&dt=2082&dl=1345.

[227] Department of State to Embassy Manila, "Military Base Negotiations CINCPAC for POLAD," April 12, 1976, STATE 088117, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=25474&dt=2082&dl=1345; Gregory H. Winger, "Reassurance and Revival the U.S.-Philippine Alliance in the Wake of the Vietnam War," *International History Review* 44, no. 2 (2022): 399, https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2021.1927799.

explicitly stated the U.S. negotiating position in which while "the U.S. opposes the concept of paying rent for the bases," the United States was "prepared to look for some sort of security assistance package, and that should be subject of negotiations,"[228] leaning more towards a financial *quid* as mentioned earlier. Carlos P, Romulo, on the other hand, kept the Philippine negotiating position hidden, stating generally that "the Philippines felt it should be compensated for permitting the U.S. to use the bases."[229] By July 3, 1976, however, as Sullivan stated in his telegram to Washington, "the Filipinos have submitted extortionate draft of military base agreement and continue to drag their heels in telling us what they expected in a way of quid pro quo."[230] The Philippine strategy was to put pressure on the United States by threatening the existence of the U.S. colonial bases under the MBA to make the price tag of the bases higher. The pressure primarily came from technicalities, such as the question of control over the U.S. colonial bases. For instance, the Philippine Ambassador to the United States, Edwardo Romualdez, in the negotiating session of July 6, 1976, expressed that "arrangements might be possible to allow continued U.S. use of Wallace and San Migual [sic], but only if these facilities were under the full control of the Philippines."[231] Wallace Air Station and the U.S. base

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[228] Department of State to Embassy Manila, "Military Base Negotiations," April 16, 1976, STATE 093275, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=16975&dt=2082&dl=1345.

[229] Department of State to Embassy Manila, "Military Base Negotiations," April 16, 1976, STATE 093275, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=16975&dt=2082&dl=1345.

[230] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "Philippine Base Negotiations," July 3, 1976, MANILA 09671, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=151590&dt=2082&dl=1345.

[231] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "Philippine Base Negotiations: Official Summary Record 7/6/76," July 8, 1976, MANILA 09918, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=151570&dt=2082&dl=1345.

at San Miguel were an "integral part" of the major U.S. bases in the Philippines, namely Subic and Clark,[232] despite Wallace and San Miguel being smaller in nature. While Romualdez expressly stated that the Philippines does not desire to hamper U.S. operations in the Philippines,[233] it sought the diminishment of U.S. control unless perhaps a satisfactory *quid* could be negotiated.

While there was no exact dollar price yet in the context of July 1976, the Philippines gave an unrealistic "shopping list" a few days after Sullivan's comment. The "shopping list" consisted of most of the United States' advanced weaponry and arsenal geared toward external defense.[234] It included, but was not limited to, destroyer escorts with full missile capability, missile boats, F-5 air superiority planes, long-range anti-air missiles such as the Hawk and Nike Hercules Missile Systems, as well as modern radar equipment.[235] Romualdez likewise reiterated the question of U.S. commitment on the South China Sea on the July 3 meeting, asking "what the U.S. response would be in the event of an emergency in the Reed Bank Area, which the Philippines views as part of its continental shelf."[236] For the first time, the Philippines accentuated their stand on the *quid*

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[232] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "Philippine Base Negotiations: Official Summary Record 7/6/76," July 8, 1976, MANILA 09918, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=151570&dt=2082&dl=1345.

[233] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "Philippine Base Negotiations: Official Summary Record 7/6/76," July 8, 1976, MANILA 09918, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=151570&dt=2082&dl=1345.

[234] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "Philippine Base Negotiations: AFP Modernization Plan," July 8, 1976, MANILA 09916, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=151566&dt=2082&dl=1345.

[235] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "Philippine Base Negotiations: AFP Modernization Plan," July 8, 1976, MANILA 09916, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=151566&dt=2082&dl=1345.

[236] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "Philippine Base Negotiations: Official Summary Record 7/3/76," July 6, 1976, MANILA 09703, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979,

in relation to the MDT, suggesting that the Philippines desired an extension of the U.S. security guarantee as a *quid* besides the financial compensation for U.S. access in the Philippines. Sullivan was quick to realize the Philippines' needs, stating in a telegram to Washington that "it is my general assessment that Phils, at their highest levels, would be prepared to call off their excessive 'sovereignty' demands if there is a good 'quid' in the form of 'defense support' and if we make a decent effort to give them the essential attributes and appurtenances of sovereignty."[237] This defense support, of course, meant the reinterpretation of the MDT to include the South China Sea issue. For the Philippines, the notion of a U.S. security guarantee for Philippine forces in the South China Sea was as important as financial compensation. The Philippines went as far as stating that "its territorial sovereignty include the Reed Bank Area and that the latter area is therefore encompassed within the territorial integrity sought to be Mutually defensed from external armed attack within the contemplation of Article III of the RP-U.S. mutual defense treaty."[238] On July 29, 1976, General Romeo Espino, Chief of Staff of the AFP, sought the "precise definition of U.S. obligations under Mutual Defense Treaty" in a Mutual Defense Board meeting with U.S. counterparts.[239]

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documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=152454&dt=2082&dl=1345.

[237] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "Philippine Base Negotiations: Assessment – Fourth Week," July 10, 1976, MANILA 10026, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=151544&dt=2082&dl=1345.

[238] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "U.S. Obligations under Mutual Defense Treaty, July 29, 1976, MANILA 11209, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=151177&dt=2082&dl=1345.

[239] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "U.S. Obligations under Mutual Defense Treaty, July 29, 1976, MANILA 11209, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=151177&dt=2082&dl=1345.

In other words, the Philippines' renegotiation strategy was to extend the U.S. security guarantee to the disputed territories as a *quid* to the continued U.S. access to its colonial bases in the Philippines. As Sullivan highlighted in his telegram to Washington on August 2, 1976, the Philippines were looking for "maximum insurance" from the United States, realizing that the Philippines were "flirting with danger" with their placement of troops and oil drilling exercises on the South China Sea.[240] The United States, however, did not want to give concessions on the South China Sea and stood firm with its statement earlier on a July 3, 1976, Mutual Defense board meeting that external forces on the South China Sea did not pose a threat to the colonial bases in the Philippines and/or the Philippine mainland and therefore was insufficient to justify U.S. military actions if Philippine forces were attacked on the islands.[241] In other words, the U.S. did not want to extend its security guarantee under the premise that it did not threaten its security interests, as if the premise was self-serving.

Such a position was unacceptable to Marcos. On August 6, 1976, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Charles Wesley Robinson, visited the Philippines and met with the Philippine President. Marcos relayed to Robinson that "progress on military bases negotiations was directly related to satisfactory U.S. response" on the question of whether the United States would guarantee the security of the Philippines if there were to be an

[240] Embassy Manila to Embassy Canaberra, "U.S. Defense Commitment to the Philippines," August 2, 1976, MANILA 11355, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=52690&dt=2082&dl=1345.
[241] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "U.S. Obligations under Mutual Defense Treaty," July 29, 1976, MANILA 11209, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=151177&dt=2082&dl=1345.

"attack" on the disputed territories in the South China Sea.[242] Marcos specifically stressed that he requires an affirmation from the highest level of authority in the United States, presumably Ford himself, pertaining to the specific response of the United States "in the event of an attack against the Philippines, including flag vessels specifically in connection with Reed Bank" where the Philippines maintain claim.[243] This incident led Washington to conclude that "the less we [United States] satisfy Marcos on the extent and automaticity of our commitment, the more he will demand in monetary compensation for the bases."[244]

The National Security Council agreed with this analysis and perceived that Marcos was utilizing the issue of financial compensation as a tool to pressure the United States into supporting the Philippine security interests in the South China Sea, realizing that "the quid pro quo may be agreeing to support their claims in the South China Sea against the PRC and Vietnam in exchange for a free hand in use of the bases."[245] Marcos' game, hence, was to first test whether the United States would produce a satisfactory *quid* through a security guarantee before naming the dollar price for the continued U.S.

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[242] Department of State to US. Del. Secretary, "Marcos-Robinson Meeting August 6, 1976," August 6, 1976, STATE 195292, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=51086&dt=2082&dl=1345.

[243] Department of State to US. Del. Secretary, "Private Meeting with President Marcos," August 6, 1976, STATE 195382, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=58678&dt=2082&dl=1345.

[244] Department of State to US. Del. Secretary, "Briefing Memorandum: Philippine Aide Memoire on the US Commitment," August 8, 1976, STATE 196878, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=51098&dt=2082&dl=1345.

[245] Thomas J. Barnes to Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), "Document 349," August 6, 1976, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1969-1976, Volume E-12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973-1976, eds. Bradley Lynn Coleman, David Goldman, Davis Nickles, and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 2010). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12/d349.

military access to the Philippines. His rationale was that if the United States could not provide a security guarantee, then the Philippines would have to ask for an increase in financial support to achieve its "self-reliance" plan in relation to the issue in the South China Sea.[246] Indeed, Marcos ordered his officials to "not proceed" with the MBA negotiations until the United States presented a clear stand on the South China Sea commitment.[247] However, such a tactic led to a stalemate, with the United States refusing to make a move on the South China Sea issue.

In keeping the negotiations moving forward, Gerald Ford initially offered $64 – 100 million per year for five years, where no more than $40 million is grant and the remaining in the form of credits. [248] The Philippines, however, was insistent that the security guarantee on the South China Sea under the MDT first be clarified and declined to take the offer.[249] About a month later, the Philippines demanded $500 million for the

[246] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "President Marcos on Self-Reliance," September 22, 1976, MANILA 14528, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=321940&dt=2082&dl=1345.
[247] Gregory H. Winger, "Reassurance and Revival the U.S.-Philippine Alliance in the Wake of the Vietnam War," *The International History Review* 44 no.2 (2022): 401.
[248] Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford, Washington, "Document 353," undated, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1969-1976, Volume E-12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973-1976, eds. Bradley Lynn Coleman, David Goldman, Davis Nickles, and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 2010), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12/d353; Winger, "Reassurance and Revival the U.S.-Philippine Alliance in the Wake of the Vietnam War," 402, https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2021.1927799.
[249] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "Philippine Base Negotiations: Secretary's Meeting with Romulo," September 11, 1976, STATE 225445, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=346628&dt=2082&dl=1345.

year,[250] an offering which Kissinger stated in his meeting with Romulo in New York on October 6, 1976, as "unrealistic" and added that "we're not a bazaar."[251]

Ford decided to break the stalemate again at a luncheon Kissinger hosted for Romulo on October 30, 1976, Kissinger offered $900 million over a five-year period ($180 million per year) in comparison to the Philippine demand of $500 million for the first year.[252] Romulo responded with an aide-memoire on November 23, 1976, also rejecting Kissinger's $900 million offer, and instead stressed that the Philippines would need $2 billion USD for a period of 5 years,[253] averaging $400 million a year in comparison to Kissinger's offer of $180 million per year. Romulo further reiterated that the aid be 75% grants and 25% credits, as opposed to the U.S. offer of 40% grants and 60% credits.[254] Romulo in the same aide-memoire then proceeded with insisting again the clarification of U.S. security commitments and guarantee to defend the Philippines against "external aggression" under the MDT,[255] obviously referring also on the South China Sea.

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[250] Telegram 250861 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines, October 8, 1976, 1609Z., "Document 354," October 8, 1976, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1969-1976, Volume E-12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973-1976, eds. Bradley Lynn Coleman, David Goldman, Davis Nickles, and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 2010), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12/d354.

[251] Winger, 402; Telegram 250861 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines, October 8, 1976, 1609Z., "Document 354," October 8, 1976, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1969-1976, Volume E-12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973-1976, eds. Bradley Lynn Coleman, David Goldman, Davis Nickles, and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 2010), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12/d354.

[252] Department of State to Embassy Manila, "Philippine Base Negotiations: Secretary's Luncheon with Romulo," October 30, 1976, STATE 267580, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=308232&dt=2082&dl=1345.

[253] Department of State to Embassy Manila, "Philippine Base Negotiations: November 23 Aide-Memoire," November 23, 1976, STATE 287342, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=276535&dt=2082&dl=1345.

[254] Department of State to Embassy Manila, "Philippine Base Negotiations: November 23 Aide-Memoire," November 23, 1976, STATE 287342.

[255] Department of State to Embassy Manila, "Philippine Base Negotiations: November 23 Aide-Memoire," November 23, 1976, STATE 287342.

Kissinger refused clarifying U.S. commitments and likewise declined Romulo's request of $2 billion.[256] In their last meeting at Mexico City on December 1, 1976, Kissinger offered the final amount of $1 billion, equally divided between economic and military aid.[257] Marcos Sr. counter-offered that the $1 billion only be for the military aid, an offer in which the United States found unacceptable and asked Romulo to deal with the upcoming Carter administration instead.[258]

The Renegotiation Stalemates: 1977-1978

The Carter administration inherited the negotiation stalemate from the previous year, causing a brief pause of the U.S. colonial bases negotiations, which was not revived until April of 1977 when Richard Holbrooke, the new Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, met with Marcos Sr. in a private yacht.[259] Holbrooke started by downplaying the value of the U.S. colonial bases, stating that détente reduced the need for a strong military bastion in the Pacific, given that relations with the Soviet Union and China improved.[260] The downplaying was a mere negotiation tactic; however, within the U.S. government, it was agreed that the bases remained necessary. In 1977, an interagency group, also referred to as the "Presidential Review Committee," was established to evaluate the Philippine Base Negotiations and how they affected both the

[256] Department of State to Embassy Manila, "Philippine Base Negotiations: November 23 Aide-Memoire," November 24, 1976, STATE 287549, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=276530&dt=2082&dl=1345.
[257] Department of State to Embassy Manila, "Philippine Base Negotiations: November 23 Aide-Memoire," November 24, 1976, STATE 287549.
[258] Department of State to US Del Secretary, "Philippine Base Negotiations (Action Memorandum)," December 8, 1976, STATE 298011, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=67666&dt=2082&dl=1345.
[259] Winger, "Reassurance and Revival the U.S.-Philippine Alliance in the Wake of the Vietnam War," 404.
[260] Winger, 404.

United States and the Philippines.[261] Their study admitted and confirmed that the colonial bases remained of utmost strategic value and necessity to the United States, summarizing that the bases allowed:

> (1) A continuous naval presence in the Western Pacific and occasionally in the Indian Ocean with surge augmentation; (2) Naval contingency capability in the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and East African waters; (3) A high state of readiness of existing Pacific forces; (4) Land and sea – based tactical air assets – both fighters and airlift – and the ability to redeploy those assets rapidly anywhere in-theater; (5) Strategic and tactical logistic support during contingencies, with current planning for such contingencies focusing on Korea and Taiwan; (6) Comprehensive support for all forces in-theater, including communications, intelligence, logistics, maintenance, training and personnel requirements; and (7) major war reserve materiel storage.[262]

In turn, such capabilities contributed at a global scale to the United States as the colonial bases "act as a symbol of US military and political power in an area of obvious concern to the Soviet Union and the PRC" and "demonstrate the potential of the United States to both sides [the Soviet Union and PRC] in their continuing conflict, and may contribute to reducing potential pressure on the PRC to respond to Soviet military superiority."[263] They also "provide unique communications and signal intelligence facilities of importance to US national and strategic nuclear interests and strategic targets" and provide the United States general strategic advantage through a boost in military capabilities in the event of a war with the Soviet Union or Soviet-PRC

[261] Winger, 404.
[262] Study Prepared by the Interagency Group on Philippine Base Negotiations, "Document 293," March 7, 1977, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1977-1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific, eds., David P. Nickles, Melissa Jane Taylor, and Adam M. Howard (United States Government Printing Office, 2017), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v22/d293.
[263] Study Prepared by the Interagency Group on Philippine Base Negotiations, "Document 293," March 7, 1977.

hostilities.[264] At a regional level, the colonial bases were also essential as Japan saw the presence of the colonial bases as connected to the United States' security guarantee on their side, with the bases being "vital to the protection of their sea lines of communication to their sources of oil" and a "symbol in an area where they [Japan] have a large and growing stake."[265] Furthermore, they contributed to the "psychological well-being of all non-communist countries" in the sense that the colonial bases in the Philippines ensured constraint of Soviet and Chinese interest in the region by creating "uncertainty in the minds of potential aggressors."[266] Lastly, they functioned as a deterrence to the PRC in taking offensive actions against Taiwan, serving as a "major tool in defeating hostile PRC action against Taiwan" and providing support in case of conflict in Korea.[267]

They were also unlikely to be replaced, given the limited political space available in the region, showing the role of the early filling of political space through the colonial institutions during the colonial era in establishing the dependencies early in history. As the group concluded, finding alternate host countries in an immediate manner "would be politically difficult or unfeasible," and even if it were possible, their "substantially higher operating cost would usually result, and procurement of extra ships would be necessary to maintain capabilities."[268] Financially, a total withdrawal of the U.S. bases in the Philippines would cost over $5 billion dollars for relocation plus an annual increase of

[264] Study Prepared by the Interagency Group on Philippine Base Negotiations, "Document 293," March 7, 1977.
[265] Study Prepared by the Interagency Group on Philippine Base Negotiations, "Document 293," March 7, 1977.
[266] Study Prepared by the Interagency Group on Philippine Base Negotiations, "Document 293," March 7, 1977.
[267] Study Prepared by the Interagency Group on Philippine Base Negotiations, "Document 293," March 7, 1977.
[268] Study Prepared by the Interagency Group on Philippine Base Negotiations, "Document 293," March 7, 1977.

$340 million in operating costs in 1977 U.S. dollars.[269] This is a significantly higher figure than Marcos' demands of $1 billion in military aid. In sum, the United States' dependency on the Philippines through the colonial institutions *restricted* the U.S. from choosing other alternatives, e.g., non-cooperation with the Philippine state which may result in the forfeiting of U.S. military privileges in the colonial bases.

U.S. officials, however, knew the mutuality of such strategic dependency and that the Philippines likewise remained dependent on the bilateral institutions, as discussed in Chapter 3. With such mutuality in consideration, the interagency group reported that the Philippines may not easily break the alliance without serious domestic political backlash, especially given that the Philippine military remained dependent on the United States as its sole military hardware supplier, in which the Philippines "cannot maintain its armed forces without our continuing military cooperation."[270] The presence of the colonial bases was also interconnected with Marcos' relationship with other Southeast Asian countries, with the removal of the bases causing a regional backlash due to the "nervousness" it would cause to others, such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore.[271] Breaking away from the U.S. would also mean sacrificing the potential financial and material aid under the renegotiations. Lastly and most importantly, Marcos still expected the United States to affirm its role as the "ultimate guarantor of the Philippine security against outside powers,"[272] as institutionalized within the MDT and the presence of the colonial bases,

[269] Study Prepared by the Interagency Group on Philippine Base Negotiations, "Document 293," March 7, 1977.
[270] Study Prepared by the Interagency Group on Philippine Base Negotiations, "Document 293," March 7, 1977.
[271] Study Prepared by the Interagency Group on Philippine Base Negotiations, "Document 293," March 7, 1977.
[272] Study Prepared by the Interagency Group on Philippine Base Negotiations, "Document 293," March 7, 1977.

making it expensive to abruptly end the alliance. In this case, it may also be observed that the presence of the mutual dependency *restricted* the Philippine state from deviating very far, preventing it from exerting exorbitant pressure on the U.S. vis-à-vis the colonial bases, else it risks losing the financial and security benefits which the U.S. provided. In a 1978 conversation with U.S. Vice President Walter Mondale, Marcos admitted that the colonial bases remained strategic to the Philippines and offered assurances that American operations will not be hampered,"[273] *restricting* the option of turning the closure threat into a reality.

Going back to the Holbrooke issue, Marcos' stance on the *quid* nevertheless remained the same, formulating the equation of: "the more credible the security assurances the U.S. can offer, the less military assistance the Philippines will require" in a meeting with Holbrooke in September 1977.[274] Marcos further iterated to put it the other way where "the extent to which U.S. security arrangements cannot be assured, the more the GOP [Philippines] must become self-reliant, i.e., in effect must look to the U.S. to help provide the means by which the Philippines can defend itself."[275] What Marcos was looking for was not the scrapping of the alliance, but the opposite of it. In other words, he was looking for a security guarantee, unless the United States agree to his "unrealistic" financial/material request. Hence, when Carter offered a five-year package of $380 – 450 million a few months ago in March 1977, Marcos declined the offer.[276]

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[273] Winger, 406.
[274] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "Holbrooke-Marcos Discussions: An Assessment and Guideline," September 26, 1977, MANILA 15267, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=222596&dt=2532&dl=1629; Winger, 406.
[275] Embassy Manila to Department of State, "Holbrooke-Marcos Discussions: An Assessment and Guideline," September 26, 1977, MANILA 15267; Winger, 406.
[276] Winger, 405.

The negotiations went into another "haggling" stalemate, with serious agreements only being revived after Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawaii visited the Philippines in late October of 1978 after informing the State Department of his plan to discuss the base negotiations with Marcos Sr. personally.[277]

The Renegotiations End Game: 1978-1979

By October 21, 1979, Marcos felt "fed up" and threatened to talk to the Soviets.[278] This, of course, was a bluff given the aforementioned Philippine dependency. Inouye's visit was nevertheless successful, being able to revive the negotiations by suggesting to Marcos that he would persuade Carter to produce a public letter stating his intent to "make the best effort" to deliver a satisfactory financial *quid*.[279] Carter agreed, and on November 27, 1979, he sent a personal letter to Marcos stating that "my administration will use its best efforts each year to secure the appropriations from Congress needed to fund the compensation package," which Marcos accepted with the condition that $50 million be added, which was granted.[280] Marcos Sr., however, clarified on December 20, 1978, what the U.S. commitment was to the South China Sea.[281] In ending the negotiations, the Carter administration's *quid* package also included the inclusion of the South China Sea under its security guarantee of the Philippines,[282] indicating that "an attack on Philippine Armed Forces, Public Vessels or Aircraft in the Pacific would not

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[277] Winger, 407.
[278] Embassy Manila to CINCPAC Honolulu, "Reflections on Marcos, Imelda, and US-RP Relations," October 21, 1978, MANILA 18793, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=260297&dt=2694&dl=2009.
[279] Winger, 408.
[280] Winger, 408.
[281] Winger, 408.
[282] Winger, 408.

have to occur within the metropolitan territory of the Philippines or islands under its jurisdiction in the Pacific in order to come within the definition of Pacific Area in Article V,"[283] effectively deeming that an attack on Philippine assets on the South China Sea would trigger U.S. security commitments, hence leading the United States towards the trajectory of guaranteeing Philippine security on the South China Sea and perennially increasing the benefit which the MDT provided for the Philippine state.[284]

Chapter Observations and Conclusion

It may be observed that the existence of the dependencies *restricted* either state from making extreme demands, which would have increased the likelihood of a shift towards a different alliance trajectory. Specifically, it may be observed that the structural constraints (*restricting* effect) produced by the existence of the institutions caused the emergence of the stalemate scenarios and eventual agreement between the United States and the Philippines for the continuation of the colonial bases rather than their dissolvement during the renegotiation process. As may be observed in the renegotiation case, the United States and the Philippines remained dependent on the colonial bases, producing an effect in which neither party had the option (at least rationally) of threatening each other of closing down the colonial institutions. For the United States, as mentioned earlier, the Philippine islands remained a strategic necessity for U.S. national

[283] Department of State to Embassy Manila, "Vance-Romulo Letter," January 6, 1979, STATE 004453, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, documenting the period ca. 1973 - 12/31/1979 - Record Group 59, The National Archives, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=125714&dt=2776&dl=2169; Winger, 408.

[284] As discussed earlier, Articles IV and V of the MDT states that U.S. commitments shall be triggered in the event of an armed attack on Philippine "metropolitan areas" or island territories under its jurisdiction, but did not specify whether U.S. commitments would also cover an "attack" outside of immediate Philippine jurisdiction.

security. The closure of the colonial bases would not just mean the loss of a United States bastion in the Pacific but would also force the incurring of $5 billion in immediate expenses plus an additional $340 million yearly, figures much higher than what the Philippines demanded in the negotiation process.[285] For the Philippines, on the other hand, the closure of the colonial bases would mean losing its security and life support, with the colonial bases being a vital institution in manifesting U.S. commitments under the MDT. In short, the mutuality of dependency as produced by the colonial institutions and its by-products prohibited both parties from taking drastic steps away from the current trajectory of an alliance as manifested in the colonial bases. Figure 8 summarizes the bargaining limitations each of the parties faced.

United States	Philippines
Dependency on the colonial bases and MBA for its national security and regional objective in the Far East.	Dependency on the colonial bases, MBA, and MDT for its own external security. Dependency on U.S. financial and material aid (rent).

Figure 8. U.S. and Philippine Bargaining Limitations.

A summary of the dependencies that the United States and the Philippines encountered during the renegotiation process, which served as a deterrent to shifting towards a different political trajectory.

[285] Study Prepared by the Interagency Group on Philippine Base Negotiations, "Document 293," March 7, 1977, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1977-1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific, eds., David P. Nickles, Melissa Jane Taylor, and Adam M. Howard (United States Government Printing Office, 2017), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v22/d293.

In game theory terms, the colonial institutions and their by-products produced a greater cost to the non-cooperation of both parties option through the mutuality of the dependencies it created. In other words, the cost of a mutual non-cooperation was magnified in which losses incurred in an agreement of either party to the other's demands, e.g., the U.S. giving in to the Philippines' demands or vice versa, became of minimal cost if compared to the consequences of a non-cooperation between the two parties which would result in the closure of the bases. The game then, as may be observed in the case, was in essence predetermined, where the logic was: either the United States increase the benefits brought by the colonial bases or suffer its closure; the U.S. will not support closure due to high cost; therefore, the U.S. will increase benefits (either *a* or *b*, not *b,* therefore *a*). Likewise, for the Philippines, the game was that either the Philippines accepted the U.S. offer pertaining to the colonial bases or suffered its closure; the Philippines could not afford to close the colonial bases. Therefore, the Philippines will accept the United States' terms (either *a* or *b*, not *b,* therefore *a*). While this sounds like a false dichotomy, such a dilemma situation was indeed the true case and, hence, not a fallacy. The long stalemates, as accentuated in the historical narrative above, show the non-existence of alternative options than the ones presented in the dilemma. Such explains the *restricting* effect in which the presence of the colonial institutions and its produced dependencies almost seemingly predetermined the alliance to continue forward.

Chapter V.

Restricting Effect in the Post-Colonial Context

This chapter continues to show that the existence of a mutually reinforcing mutual security dependency made it less likely for the Philippine state to be able to deviate from the existing alliance because of the existence of *restricting* effects, as may be observed in the two post-Cold War cases, namely (1) the 1991 Philippine Senate's Closure of the U.S. colonial bases, and (2) Duterte's Anti-American foreign policy. In essence, this chapter argues that the existence of the mutually reinforcing security dependency between the United States and the Philippines prevented a permanent and total divergence from the alliance in times when political actor-specific external variables, e.g., nationalism in the case of the 1991 senate, and Duterte's anti-American populism, were displaying non-cooperative behaviour. Within the cases, this chapter shows that the presence of large set-up costs, i.e., the cost related to shifting trajectories, exists in acting as a *restricting* effect, with them being traced back to the existence of the colonial institutions and their resulting dependencies throughout history.

Restricting Case 2: The 1991 Closure

The aftermath of the People Power Revolution, also known as the EDSA Revolution, saw constitutional reforms within the Philippine state, including the vesting of significant power to the Philippine Senate in having the "sole authority" to ratify international treaties and international agreements through a two-thirds majority vote,

including the colonial bases.[286] While Corazon Aquino and her successor, Fidel V. Ramos, remained a strong supporter of the colonial bases' existence and continuation, political actors with nationalistic sentiments were able to secure positions within the senate, lobbying for a more "self-reliant" Philippines.[287] By 1991, these senators succeeded in voting to close down the colonial bases almost a century after the initial landing of the United States at Subic Bay, hence ending the existence of the last U.S. colonial institution in the Philippines. The closure of the bases, however, was puzzling, given the Philippines' dependency on the United States for the *quid* that the existence of the bases gave. Indeed, until July 1991, the Philippines was requesting compensation of $825 million for a seven-year period.[288] There are various explanations for why such events happen.

Andrew Yeo, for instance, argues that a lack of consensus within the Philippine state on its post-Cold War security relations with the United States caused the closure of the bases. In contrast, Jae-Jeok Park argues that divergent strategic objectives and unwillingness to reach a compromise pertaining to post-Cold War arrangements were the cause.[289] Scholars from a realist point of view who argue for China's existential threats in the revival of the post-Cold War alliance also indirectly suggest that the removal of the communist threat in the early post-Cold War era contributed to the lack of motivation for a continued alliance, for the realist perspective places emphasis on the notion of a threat's

[286] Joseph A. Gagliano, *Alliance Decision-Making in the South China Sea: Between Allied and Alone*. (New York: Routledge, 2019), 62.
[287] Andrew Yeo, *Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests*. (New York: Cambridge University Press: 2011), 44.
[288] Yeo, *Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests*, 49.
[289] Jae-Jeok Park, "A Comparative Case Study of the U.S.-Philippines Alliance in the 1990s and the U.S.-South Korea Alliance between 1998 and 2008," *Asian Survey* 51, no. 2 (2011): 268-289, DOI: AS.2011.51.2.268.

existence in the formation of alliances. These include scholars such as William J. Barnds, as discussed in the introductory chapter of this paper.

While the eruption of Mount Pinatubo did contribute to the eventual closure of Clark Air Force Base in Luzon, the United States, in the context of 1991, was unwilling to let go of its most important base: Subic Naval Base.[290] This made sense as Subic Bay included Cubi Point, a military airport capable of hosting the most advanced American fighter jets. In essence, the United States' unwillingness to move back to Clark after the volcano eruption was not a case of U.S. diminishment of dependency on the Philippines. On the contrary, the United States made great efforts to keep the bases. In fact, the United States made great efforts to restore operations at Subic Bay after the eruption immediately and within two weeks, Cubi Point (Subic's Naval Air Station) was back in limited operation.[291] By the end of September 1991, all evacuees were back in Subic Bay.[292] As the U.S. implied, technological development allowed the U.S. to ignore Clark, "but Subic is a different matter… there is nothing like it in this part of the world."[293]

While various other plausible reasons exist for the cause of the closure, such are beyond the scope of this paper. This section instead focuses on the role of the colonial institutions' legacy in forming a *restricting* effect, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, observing *how* the presence of the mutual dependencies caused by the original colonial institutions throughout history, alongside the original colonial institutions' institutional by-products, e.g., the MDT, redirected the Philippine state to a security dependency on the United States succeeding the closure of the colonial bases. There were

[290] Anderson, *Subic Bay: From Magellan to Pinatubo,* 335.
[291] Anderson, 320.
[292] Anderson, 320.
[293] Anderson, 335.

two ways in which the colonial institutions' legacy shaped the alliance after the closure of the U.S. bases. First, the Philippines remained dependent on the American financial and material aid which was produced by the U.S. military's existence in the Philippines, explaining the Philippines' failure in its modernization program and hence the revival of the alliance in 1999, allowing U.S. military presence in the Philippines under the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) that resulted in the resuscitation of the American financial and material military aid. Second, the existence of the MDT acted as an "insurance" against the extremity of external threats, increasing the real benefits of remaining under the U.S. umbrella and hence perennially increasing the value of a U.S. military presence further. The details are discussed further below. It is important to note that these two phenomena were decided under the light that it would have been tremendously expensive to fund a self-reliant program, with the Philippines having to start from the very beginning, from purchasing new ammunition to expensive fighter jets without U.S. financial and material aid. As shown in the earlier chapters, the Philippines relied on the United States to fund its own military. This explains the phenomena below.

Large Set-up Costs, the VFA, and U.S. Financial Aid

The aftermath of the colonial bases' closure was followed by a strong reaction against political actors within the Philippine state, reverting back to its traditional dependency on the United States. Domestically speaking, the closure of the U.S. bases resulted in an adverse reaction amongst Philippine elites in the congress, with the senate's vision for "self-reliance" cutting down the overall budget of the Philippine elites in the congress who were more inclined to "concentrate on the acquisition of the requirements for their electoral success – public works projects and patronage – while being

apprehensive of the military by subjecting defense budgets to minutest scrutiny."[294] This leads back to the colonial era where the Philippine elites in the National Assembly thought that "money ought not be squandered on the army but could be spent on more constructive projects,"[295] especially given the United States' military presence in the Philippines that traditionally allowed tremendous cost-savings for the Philippine state. The Philippines has a long history of elitism within its congress,[296] with about 145 out of 199 representatives in 1992 being individuals whose lineage may be traced to the 19th-century *illustrados* and *mestizo* families, which have maintained power throughout several generations.[297] For these political actors, the increased military expenditure means threatening their budgets for the maintenance of their familial regimes. Therefore, as Renato De Castro stated, "if they see that increasing the defense spending will threaten their interests and will be detrimental to the country's long term economic development, they might just rely on a more powerful state and limit the country's defense budget."[298] This was especially with the fact that the senate's proposal being too "financially unrealistic" in the congress' eyes, with a self-reliant program after decades of dependency on the United States being too expensive (large setup costs) to start from scratch especially without U.S. financial and material aid after the colonial bases' closure.

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[294] Renato Cruz De Castro, "Congressional Intervention in Philippine Post-Cold War Defense Policy, 1991-2003," *Philippine Political Science Journal* 25, no.48 (2004), 82, https://doi.org/10.1080/01154451.2004.9754258.
[295] De Castro, p. 82 – 83.
[296] Alfred McCoy, "Preface: The Philippine Oligarch at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century," in *An Anarchy of Families: State and Families in the Philippines*, ed. Alfred W. McCoy (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2009).
[297] De Castro, "Congressional Intervention in Philippine Post-Cold War Defense Policy, 1991-2003," 82.
[298] De Castro, "Congressional Intervention in Philippine Post-Cold War Defense Policy, 1991-2003," 81.

The Philippine Congress hence blocked the majority of the state's military modernization plans. For instance, they rejected the Armed Forces of the Philippines' (AFP) request for US$13.24 billion (in 1996 exchange rates) in 1995, and only allowed for US$6.62 billion (in 1996 exchange rates), forcing the AFP to sell one of its bases, Fort Bonifacio, in which the AFP would get about 35% of the sales to fund its own modernization program.[299] With the lack of funds combined with the inflation of the time, the AFP suspended its objective of acquiring a squadron of multi-role fighters and naval vessels, focusing instead on small-arms purchases for internal threats.[300] By 1997, the Philippine military hardware was "rotting away," with U.S.-made military hardware deteriorating, it being dependent on American spare parts, logistics, and technical expertise, forcing the Philippine government to maintain the obsolete equipment which previously relied heavily on U.S. maintenance.[301]

The budget deficit and the decaying state of the Philippine state, combined with the non-presence of the traditional security institutions which guaranteed Philippine security in China's opportunistic actions on the South China Sea, such as when China captured the Mischief Reef in 1995 after the U.S. bases' closure,[302] led Philippine political actors to revert back to dependency on the United States. By 1998, pro-American President Fidel V. Ramos, a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, took the situational opportunity and negotiated for the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which would allow the stationing of U.S. military personnel in Philippine bases at

[299] De Castro, "Congressional Intervention in Philippine Post-Cold War Defense Policy, 1991-2003," 90.
[300] De Castro, "Congressional Intervention in Philippine Post-Cold War Defense Policy, 1991-2003," 90-91.
[301] De Castro, "Congressional Intervention in Philippine Post-Cold War Defense Policy, 1991-2003," 93.
[302] Leszek Buszynski, "Realism, Institutionalism, and Philippine Security," *Asian Survey,* 42, no. 3 (2022): 488, https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2002.42.3.483

a temporary basis. Of course, the VFA had to undergo approval from the Philippine Senate. The United States sent Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Commanding Admiral Joseph Prueher in the U.S. Pacific Command to relay the message that the U.S. promised more "aid" if the Philippine senators would ratify the VFA.[303] The senators who voted for the closure of the colonial bases, including Senators Juan Ponce Enrile and Aquilino Pimentel, expressed a change of heart and voted for the ratification of the VFA.[304]

Senator Juan Ponce Enrille, who once wanted to scrap the U.S.-Philippine alliance and sign a nonaggression treaty with the PRC and the Soviet Union, recalled later that the United States was "probably the only viable security umbrella and certainty the only one we [The Philippines] can count on today in the event of need."[305] Enrile voted yes for the resurrection of the U.S. military presence in the Philippines through the VFA, which was passed in 1999 under President Joseph Estrada, who voted against the bases in his senatorial days. Immediately after the passing of the VFA, the Philippines requested military assistance.[306] A small amount of $1 million and an 82-footer U.S. Coast Guard Cutter was given to the Philippines the following year.[307]

For the United States, the passing of the VFA was a "win" situation, given that they have not given up requesting military access to the Philippines despite the closure of the colonial bases, signifying the United States' perennial dependency on the Philippines for its objectives in the Far East. For instance, the United States requested "supplying,

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[303] Park, "A Comparative Case Study of the U.S.-Philippines Alliance in the 1990s and the U.S.-South Korea Alliance between 1998 and 2008," 280
[304] Buszynski, "Realism, Institutionalism, and Philippine Security," 497.
[305] De Castro, "Congressional Intervention in Philippine Post-Cold War Defense Policy, 1991-2003," 94.
[306] Jing Dong Yuan, *China-ASEAN Relations: Perspectives, Prospects and Implications for U.S. Interests*. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006).
[307] De Castro, "Congressional Intervention in Philippine Post-Cold War Defense Policy, 1991-2003," 93.

refueling, repairing, and storing of military units, and the use of 'certain services' provided by the Philippine military for its own military needs" in 1994,[308] when the Philippines was on the verge of an identity crisis in terms of how to fund its "self-reliance" program. Indeed, the United States saw the Philippines as of utmost strategic importance for it perceived that only the Philippines had the "sole location with the requisite mix of geography and goodwill to allow semipermanent American bases for ready force projection against countries in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea."[309] This "goodwill," on the other hand, may be traced to the dependencies that the colonial institutions caused, first and foremost, as shown in the previous chapters.

The mutual dependency's continuation, now powered by the VFA, immediately manifested after the signing. By January 2002, the United States sent 1,200 troops to the Southern Philippines, including U.S. Navy Seals, to combat Islamic insurgents as part of its own War on Terror,[310] resonating the JUSMAG era of the Huk campaign under Lansdale. The U.S. military presence in the Southern Philippines benefited the Philippines and the U.S. For the former, the U.S. military presence again meant cost savings on its counter-insurgency expenditures. For the latter, it ensured an effective warfare against Islamic extremists, which the U.S. deemed as adversaries after the events of September 11, 2001. As part of the package, the United States promised a projected $4.6 billion in long-term military aid (compared to $1.6 million per year after the bases' closure) to equip the Philippine military with mortars, small arms, thirty UH-1H helicopters, and a naval vessel.[311] From 2002-2009, about $520 million in military aid

[308] Park, 278.
[309] McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, 514.
[310] McCoy, *Policing America's Empire,* 511.
[311] McCoy, *Policing America's Empire,* 511.

was received by the Philippines. [312]Albeit significantly smaller than what it used to receive when the colonial bases existed, the case shows the revival of the compensatory institutions akin to what was discussed in Chapter 3.

By 2002, the Philippines also signed the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement, which allowed the U.S. military to "pre-position operational equipment in the Philippines,"[313] signifying the continued path of mutual dependency between the two states. The AFP remained supportive of the U.S. presence, with them seeing the United States as their "arms pipeline."[314] This trend would continue until Duterte's case, which will be discussed later. In the end, it may be observed that the mutual dependencies that the colonial institutions and their by-products caused bound the United States and the Philippines together, serving as a *restricting* effect in leading the Philippine state towards a different trajectory, e.g., self-reliance.

The MDT and U.S. Security Guarantee

On the other hand, the Philippine Congress' dependency on the U.S. was made possible by the U.S. security guarantee as institutionalized within the MDT. As discussed in the previous chapters, the MDT ensured the United States' security umbrella over the Philippines in which its Article IV states that "each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes…," further adding in Article V that "for the purpose of Article

[312] McCoy, *Policing America's Empire,* 511.
[313] McCoy, *Policing America's Empire,* 512.
[314] Peter Bacho, "U.S. – Philippine Relations in Transition: The Issue of the Bases," *Asian Survey* 28, no.6 (1988): 650 – 660, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2644658.

IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific."[315] Without the MDT, all else being equal, there wouldn't have been any institutionalized and legalized assurance for a U.S. security guarantee in the first place, making it less likely that the Philippine Congress would have a valid reason to its electorate to withhold funds for self-reliance without a credible alternative.

In this case, the necessity of the MDT's prior existence may be observed, with the institution's presence shaping the possible set of options the Philippine Congress could take prior to the Philippine Congress' final decision. In turn, the non-existence of the MDT increases the probability of the Philippine Congress taking a different trajectory, given that they wouldn't have had justification for withholding military self-reliance funds without a credible alternative. Indeed, the non-existence of the MDT as a security guarantee may have justified the Senate's self-reliance program, especially in the electorate's minds, if there were no viable alternative options. The perennial presence of the MDT, therefore, may be viewed as an "early filling of political space," in line with Paul Pierson's argument in which the timing of an institution's conception is essential in setting up early advantages, making latecomers "severely disadvantaged" in replacing the path-dependent trajectory.[316] In sum, the MDT *restricted* the Philippine state from shifting towards another political path, besides its already existent dependency on the United States throughout history.

[315] Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, August 30, 1951. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp
[316] Pierson, *Politics in* Time, 71-74.

Effects in the Benigno Aquino III Era

The Philippine Congress' decision to depend on the United States, on the other hand, shaped the nature of the Philippines' political options at a later time, *restricting* other possible alliance/security options available for Benigno Aquino III in light of the increased Chinese incursions on South China. Specifically, the Philippine Congress' dependency on the United States for the island's external security produced the same issue pertaining to the Philippine military: a non-capable Philippine Navy and Air Force for external threat deterrence. Akin to the state of the Philippine Navy and Air Force's situation during the Cold War, the strong dependency on the U.S. security guarantee, as powered by the MDT and U.S. military presence, shifted the Philippine government's budgetary focus on internal rather than external military capabilities, leaving the Philippines without a self-reliant military capability capable of deterring external threats without entwinement to the U.S. security apparatus in the Far East. This is combined with the fact that it would have been tremendously expensive for the Philippine state to establish a self-reliant military force immediately, given the high setup costs, as discussed earlier. These restraints' manifestations may be observed in the case of the 2012 Scarborough Shoal Incident.

On April 8, 2012, a stand-off between the Philippines and China was triggered, with a Philippine Navy vessel spotting Chinese fishermen in close proximity to Philippine territorial waters.[317] By April 10, the Philippine Navy vessel *BRP Gregorio Del Pilar* boarded the Chinese vessel for inspection, discovering "large amounts of

[317] Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Zack Cooper, John Schaus, and Jake Douglas, "Counter-Coercion Series: Scarborough Shoal Standoff," *Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative*, May 22, 2017, https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-scarborough-standoff/.

illegally collected coral, giant clams and live sharks inside the first boat."[318] Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario stressed that the Chinese vessel has been "engaging in illegal finishing and harvesting of endangered marine species."[319] Later in the day, two Chinese Maritime Surveillance (CMS) vessels responded in the area, starting a stand-off with the Philippine Navy vessel.[320] Refer to Figure 9 for a map of Scarborough Shoal, also known as Panatag Shoal in the Philippines, where the standoff occurred. The situation was demilitarized by Manila on April 12, replacing the *BRP Gregorio Del Pilar* with coast guard vessels, but negotiations broke down by the evening of April 13 when the Chinese ambassador insisted that the Philippines withdraw its vessel first, a demand in which Manila refused.[321] In response, Manila changed its stance from diplomacy to "maximizing the benefits" of the MDT, with Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert Del Rosario and Philippine Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin flying to Washington to meet with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta on April 30, 2012, to discuss the situation.[322]

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[318] "Scarborough shoal standoff: A timeline," *Inquirer*, May 9, 2012, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/36003/scarborough-shoal-standoff-a-historicaltimeline.
[319] "Scarborough shoal standoff: A timeline," *Inquirer*, May 9, 2012, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/36003/scarborough-shoal-standoff-a-historicaltimeline; Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Zack Cooper, John Schaus, and Jake Douglas, "Counter-Coercion Series: Scarborough Shoal Standoff," *Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative*, May 22, 2017, https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-scarborough-standoff/.
[320] Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Zack Cooper, John Schaus, and Jake Douglas, "Counter-Coercion Series: Scarborough Shoal Standoff," *Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative*, May 22, 2017, https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-scarborough-standoff/.
[321] Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Zack Cooper, John Schaus, and Jake Douglas, "Counter-Coercion Series: Scarborough Shoal Standoff," *Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative*, May 22, 2017, https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-scarborough-standoff/.
[322] Jerry E. Esplanda, "Philippines to seek US help in dealing with China over Spratlys issue – DFA," *Inquirer*, April 26, 2012, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/34857/philippines-to-seek-us-help-in-dealing-with-china-over-spratlys-issue-dfa.



Figure 9. South China Sea Map.

Congressional Research Service, Maritime Territorial Disputes Involving China (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, February 5, 2024, 48, Figure A-1. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42784.

While the Philippines received military financial aid from the United States after its decision to continue towards the alliance, the Philippine state decided to focus on its internal capabilities rather than establishing an independent and self-dependent military force capable of the developing situation in the South China Sea, in line with its tradition

of dependency to the U.S. throughout history. As may be seen in Figure 10, Philippine security priorities leaned heavily towards the Philippine Army (PA) as opposed to the Navy (PN) and Air Force (PAF), highlighting the state's focus on addressing internal rather than external threats. Considering the realist-oriented security dilemma theory, which states that an increase in one state's security should trigger fear in another state and hence an increase in their security likewise, the Philippines logically should have increased its PN and PAF budget as a response to the growing Chinese threat in the region. However, history shows that the Aquino administration has chosen a path contrary to the realist theory.

As may be observed again in Figure 10, the Philippine budgetary priority on the PA remained on the increase from 2012-2016, while the PN and PAF increased only in small increments despite the significant increase in external threat, signifying the Philippines' continued priority in addressing internal threats. While the Philippine state did also have the Republic Act (RA) 10,349, which was also known as the AFP Modernization Program, its allocated budget was insufficient for "modernizing" the Philippine Navy and Air Force, with the program instead acting as an "equalizer" than a "modernizer."[323] In total, the RA 10,349 funds for the PN and PAF was only PHP38.8 billion, divided equally from 2013-2017,[324] adding an average of PHP3.8 billion per year to the PN and PAF budget respectively, as laid out in Figure 10, a rather insignificant amount for a self-reliance modernization program. In the end, no strong efforts for

[323] Julio Amador S., Deryk Matthew Baladjay, and Sheena Valenzuela, "Modernizing or Equalizing? Defence Budget and Military Modernization in the Philippines, 2010 – 2020," D*efence Studies* 22, no.3 (2022): 312, https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2030713.
[324] Amador, Baladjay, and Valenzuela, "Modernizing or Equalizing? Defence Budget and Military Modernization in the Philippines, 2010 – 2020," 312.

modernization existed in the Philippine state vis-à-vis its external defense capabilities. Akin to the cases earlier, the Benigno Aquino III regime was *restricted* by the fact that it would have been very expensive to establish an independent and self-reliant military force from scratch in the light of a perennially more cost-effective alternative. As Renato Cruz De Castro argued, the Philippine territorial defense buildup would have been very expensive to implement as the Philippines had to "start from scratch,"[325] making the probability of the Benigno Aquino III regime choosing dependency on the United States more likely.

[325] Renato Cruz De Castro, "Abstract of the Geopolitics of the Philippine-U.S. 2014 EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement): Projecting American Airpower into the Dragon's Lair," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 28, no. 4 (2016): 492.



Figure 10. AFP Budget 2011-2020.

Julio S. Amador, Deryk Matthew Baladjay, and Sheena Valenzuela, AFP's defense budget allotment from 2011-2020, excluding R.A. 10,349 funds ("Modernizing or Equalizing? Defence Budget and Military Modernization in the Philippines, 2010 – 2020," Defence Studies 22 (3): 299–326. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2030713.), 309, Figure 2. The authors sourced the figures from data provided by the Philippine Department of Budget and Management, The Republic of the Philippines National Expenditure Program 2011 – 2020.

Therefore, instead of significantly increasing the Philippine Navy and Air Force budget using state funds, Benigno Aquino III decided to utilize the existing alliance institutions, i.e., the MDT and the VFA, as a trump card in dealing with the Chinese existential threat. The utilization of the existing alliance institutions, however, meant that the alliance had to be institutionally reverted to the Cold War context, in which real U.S. military presence and the U.S. security guarantee be reaffirmed. Benigno Aquino III, therefore, sought U.S. affirmation in several ways. First, he sought clarification from the United States pertaining to its security commitments on the South China Sea. As may be recalled in the previous chapter, the United States affirmed in 1979 that it would include the South China Sea in its interpretation of the MDT's coverage, accentuating the causal

role of the colonial bases and the dependencies of that time in shaping the Philippine foreign policy of the 21st century. Specifically, the United States'1979 affirmation which affirmed coverage of the South China Sea, it being a by-product of the MBA negotiations of that time in which the colonial bases had a major influence, allowed Philippine foreign policy to utilize the MDT's coverage of the disputed territories in its 21st century competition with China. To be clear, the MDT did not state with "automaticity" that it would cover the South China Sea. However, less formal institutions, such as the commitments in the seventies, made it more beneficial to continue towards the same trajectory, given that assurances were previously made, albeit informally.

Second, Benigno Aquino III renegotiated the establishment of the EDCA in 2014, which further institutionalized the U.S. military presence in the Philippines. While the VFA allowed U.S. military presence in the Philippines, the EDCA further entrenched U.S. access to Philippine bases. As Associate Justice Antonio Carpio has stated, "without the EDCA, the MDT remains a toothless paper tiger" and further added that "with the EDCA, the MDT acquires a real and ready firepower to deter any armed aggression against Philippine public vessels or aircrafts operating in the West Philippine Sea [South China Sea]."[326] As argued by Dr. Clarita Carlos (Marcos Jr.'s National Security Adviser from 2022 – 2023) on February 15, 2021, the EDCA, alongside the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the United States and the Philippines, serves as the "leg" of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 after the colonial bases were closed,[327] indicating that

[326] "Supreme Court's decision on EDCA," *Rappler*, January 15, 2016, https://www.rappler.com/nation/119210-full-text-supreme-court-decision-edca/.
[327] ABS-CBN News, "Duterte told to go after Mutual Defense Treaty if he wants reset of PH-US relations | TeleRadyo," YouTube video, 14:55, February 21, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GpG3Ll-7bmk&list=PL8okkqYpWSlqTtDBbBQlw2FxENHsHdBKh&index=3.

the EDCA functioned as an institutional evolution of the U.S. bases and the MBA and hence reviving the Cold War security arrangement between the U.S. and the Philippines in this new form of "quasi-bases."

In turn, the Philippines again saw itself on the top of Washington's gift list, with $1.14 billion being transferred to the Philippines in the form of "planes, ships, armored vehicles, small arms, and other military equipment" from 2015-2022, making the Philippines the "largest recipient of U.S. military assistance in the Indo-Pacific region"[328] immediately after the signing of EDCA as accentuated in Chapter 2. This allowed Aquino to continue the "life support" of the Philippine military, therefore keeping the dependency on the United States in arming the AFP. This U.S. financial and material aid was specifically designed to increase "interoperability and engagement with the United States,"[329] meaning increased dependency on the United States for Philippine military operations, especially those external in nature.

For the United States, the EDCA was of strategic importance, with it allowing for the usage of the Philippines as a "staging point" for U.S. military personnel in relation to its present competition against the PRC, including U.S. security interests in the South China Sea and Taiwan. The EDCA allows U.S. air assets to apply the "checkered flag" model in which "tactical air formations based in the United States can be deployed for training in military facilities in Northeast and South East Asia," meaning that "more U.S. fighters, bombers and mobility crews can move out of the U.S. mainland to the Pacific

[328] "Fact Sheet: U.S.-Philippines Defense and Security Partnership," U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, February 11, 2022, https://ph.usembassy.gov/fact-sheet-u-s-philippines-defense-and-security-partnership.
[329] U.S. – Philippines Alliance: Deepening the Security and Trade Partnership: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred and Twelfth Congress, Second Session. February 7, 2012, (Washinton: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012). https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.cbhear/fdsysamru0001&i=1.

and not just to South Korea and Japan, but also to permanent assignments in Guam and temporary missions in the Philippines."[330] It also allows the pre-positioning of equipment and the presence of forward-deployed U.S. forces. The strategic geographical positioning of the Philippines likewise deems it a key focus regarding the Chinese threat against Taiwan.[331] The most northernmost island of Itbayat is less than 100 miles from Taiwan, allowing for a "quick troop response in a war with China."[332]

These aforementioned military capabilities are only more vital in light of the PLA's activities on the South China Sea, with the PLA reinforcing islands in the area, adding to a "network of Chinese anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities intended to keep U.S. military forces outside the first island chain (and thus away from China's mainland and Taiwan)"[333] which complicates the United States' ability to intervene militarily in a Taiwan conflict as well as fulfil its treaty obligations with Japan, Philippines, and South Korea.[334] U.S. strategic access to the Philippines, therefore, equates to increased deterrence and denial of PLA military assets in the Taiwan and South China Sea area through sustained proximate U.S. military presence in the event of conflict. In short, the U.S. likewise leaned dependent on the Philippines.

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[330] Renato Cruz De Castro, "Abstract of the Geopolitics of the Philippine-U.S. 2014 EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement): Projecting American Airpower into the Dragon's Lair," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 28, no. 4, December 2016, 485-508, p. 499.
[331] Lien Yi-ting, "Philippines has strategic importance to Taiwan," *Taipei Times*, May 8, 2023, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2023/05/08/2003799352.
[332] Katie Rogers, "Biden Meets Marcos in Washington Amid Tensions With China," *The New York Times*, May 1, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/01/us/politics/biden-marcos-philippines-china.html.
[333] Congressional Research Service, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress, February 5, 2024, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2024). https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42784.
[334] Congressional Research Service, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress, February 5, 2024, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2024). https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42784.

In the end, there are several observations which may be observed in the Benigno Aquino III case. First, it may be seen that the *restricting* effects during the nineties, after the closure of the colonial bases, were temporally significant in leading the Philippine foreign policy alignment towards the United States at a later dispensation. The Philippine Congress' decision to maintain dependency on the United States instead of self-reliance specifically made the set-up costs (initial investment expenditures) for establishing independent Philippine external defense capabilities for the Benigno Aquino III administration very high, preventing such a path from being logically undertaken. Second, it may also be observed that the self-reinforcing sequence which led the MDT towards the trajectory of covering the South China Sea back in the seventies, as discussed in the previous chapter, likewise perennially increased the benefit of the Philippines in remaining towards the same trajectory of dependency towards the United States. In sum, it may be observed that the by-products of colonial institutions, namely the mutually reinforcing security dependencies and self-reinforcing sequences that they created, *restricted* the Philippines from shifting towards another political path in the context of such a post-Cold War era. This manifested in the Benigno Aquino III era, where previous institutional arrangements and effects restricted decision-making.

Restricting Case 3: The Rodrigo Duterte Era

The third case of a *restricting* effect example in the history of the alliance may be found in Rodrigo Duterte's populist regime, explaining the failed attempt to shift Philippine foreign policy away from the United States. As a background, Philippine politics shifted in 2016 with the emergence of Duterte's populist and anti-American rhetoric, combined with his vulgar and surprising comments about rape and religion. This

section presents a case in which the existence of the aforementioned institutions, namely the MDT, VFA, and the EDCA (institutions which are by-products of the U.S. colonial institutions as stated in the earlier chapters), *restricted* Duterte's "independent foreign policy," explaining the alliance's persistence in such era. Such restriction may be explained by high set-up costs and domestic political backlash, each tied to the dependencies that emerged throughout history.

Large Set-Up Costs and Dependency Constraints

Duterte's populist regime, despite his anti-American rhetoric, was limited by the fact that institutions such as the MDT, the VFA, and the EDCA, alongside the dependencies which came with it, set up an expensive cost for the self-reliance alternative. As may be seen in the historical narratives presented in the previous chapters, the long-time existence of the MDT shaped the nature of the AFP, which is internal rather than external, making it extremely dependent on U.S. forces. For instance, the Philippine military's lack of anti-air capability shows the notion that Philippine infantry and armoured units in a hypothetical battle against external threats are dependent on U.S. air superiority and ground anti-air units, else being exposed to enemy air strikes without defense, showing the United States military's essentiality in complementing the AFP. Duterte himself admitted that the Philippines did not have the military capability to challenge the PRC in the South China Sea.[335]

[335] Renato Cruz De Castro, "The Philippines-U.S. Alliance and 21st Century U.S. Grand strategy in the Indo-Pacific region: from the Obama Administration to the Biden Administration," *Defense Studies* 22 no.3, (2022): 423, https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2073224.

These large set-up costs and dependency effects *restricted* the Duterte administration in limiting its possible actions against the United States, with the regime being only able to employ rent-seeking strategies at best, bluffing withdrawal from the alliance in gaining greater concessions from the United States without having the actual ability to halt the security relationship altogether without suffering the Philippine national defense. This rent-seeking stance may be observed throughout the Duterte regime; such was when Duterte's key political ally and Presidential spokesperson, Harry Roque, during his break from public office on July 17, 2019, urged for clarification on what an "armed attack" under the MDT means,[336] arguing that the Scarborough Shoal incident of 2012 should have been constituted as an "armed attack"[337] and suggested that the MDT was "useless" due to its vague interpretation. This was in consideration of Duterte "invoking" the MDT, asking the United States to "gather their Seventh Fleet in front of China" in retaliation for the Recto Bank incident in June 2019 when a Chinese vessel rammed a Philippine fishing boat, where Duterte also claimed he would join the U.S. 7th fleet alongside his political critics.[338] What Roque really wanted was for the United States to clarify its security commitments, akin to the case of the 1975-1979 renegotiations.

As the scholar Jiyun Kih stated, "Manila appears to be more involved in raising the game of defection,"[339] akin to the case of 1975-1979 renegotiations in Chapter 4 in

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[336] ABS-CBN News, "Invoking PH-US mutual defense treaty 'sarcastic but with legal basis' - Roque | ANC," YouTube video, 5:28, July 17, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F1kt7MNZhzs.
[337] ABS-CBN News, "Invoking PH-US mutual defense treaty 'sarcastic but with legal basis' - Roque | ANC," YouTube video, 5:28, July 17, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F1kt7MNZhzs.
[338] "'Invoking' defense pact, Duterte calls on US to send fleet to China," *Phil Star*, July 17, 2019, https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2019/07/17/1935488/invoking-defense-pact-duterte-calls-us-send-fleet-china.
[339] Jiyun Kih, "Lessened allied dependence, policy tradeoffs, and undermining autonomy: focusing on the US-ROK and US-Philippines alliances," *The Pacific Review* 36, no. 3 (2021): 552–80. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2021.1996450.

which the Philippine government under Marcos Sr. threatened the closure of the U.S. colonial bases. This was despite the incapability of actually doing so without threatening Philippine national security. Much like the case of Marcos Sr. in Chapter 4, Duterte did not have the option of choosing the alternate option of self-reliance without the United States. Indeed, the Philippines, in the context of the 2019 Duterte regime, was the "weakest military power in the Asia-Pacific, only allocated 0.8 percent of its GDP for its military."[340] The unavailability of a credible self-reliance alternative and large-set up costs, which was unfeasible for the Philippine state, led the regime to seek greater concessions from the U.S. instead. While it is still unknown whether Duterte really intended to break away from the United States if the situation permitted, or if he was legitimately using the threats as bluffs to gain greater commitments from the United States, one clear thing is that the existence of the institutions *restricted* the real possibility of such breaking away possible without severe consequences to the Duterte administration.

Dependency and Domestic Political Backlash

The theory of Institutional affinity dictates that "personnel who participate in alliance activities will continue to support the alliance after their immediate roles have ended and will work with similarly inclined officials within a national government's own institutions to actively promote the alliance from within the government."[341] Gregory Winger's research in 2021 clearly highlights this in the case of the Duterte era, where key

[340] Jiyun Kih, "Lessened allied dependence, policy tradeoffs, and undermining autonomy: focusing on the US-ROK and US-Philippines alliances," 19.
[341] Winger, "Alliance Embeddedness: Rodrigo Duterte and the Resilience of the US-Philippine Alliance," 3

political actors such as former Philippine President Fidel Ramos and Duterte's Secretary of Defense Delfin Lorenzana, who both had close affinity with the United States, "shielded the partnership from the worst of Duterte's barbs and identified a way forward for the alliance."[342] For instance, Lorenzana dispelled Duterte's prejudice against the U.S.–Philippine alliance waging a "dedicated campaign in public and private to explain both what the assistance the United States was providing" in the context of the Philippines' counter-insurgency efforts in the Southern Philippines.[343]

As Yamazaki Amane and Osawa Suguru argued, the Duterte regime was not free from domestic pressure from his administrative team, opposition groups, or public opinion.[344] On the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018, US Defense Secretary James N. Mattis and Philippine Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana discussed the US-Philippines alliance and their defense cooperation in depth.[345] Likewise, the former Philippine President Ramos "rebuked his protégé Duterte and assailed Duterte's mistreatment of the U.S. alliance," further quoting Ramos' question: "are we throwing away decades of military partnership, tactical proficiency, compatible weaponry, predictable logistics and soldier-to-soldier camaraderie just like that?"[346]

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[342] Winger "Alliance Embeddedness: Rodrigo Duterte and the Resilience of the US-Philippine Alliance," 15

[343] Winger "Alliance Embeddedness: Rodrigo Duterte and the Resilience of the US-Philippine Alliance," 10.

[344] Amane Yamazaki and Suguru Osawa, "Asymmetry Theory and China–Philippines Relations with the South China Sea as a Case," *East Asia* (Piscataway, N.J.) 38, no.4 (2021): 333–52, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-021-09370-1.

[345] Amane and Suguru, "Asymmetry Theory and China-Philippines Relations with the South China Sea as a Case," 345.

[346] Winger, "Alliance Embeddedness: Rodrigo Duterte and the Resilience of the US – Philippine Alliance," 10

As Luke Lischin argued, "ties between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the U.S. armed forces are deeply ingrained, contributing to the alliance's embeddedness as a bilateral institution with a distinct identity. Due to this embeddedness, senior Philippine defense officials have been able to advance pro-U.S. views that conflict with Duterte's foreign policy ambitions."[347] This was especially the case when the United States remained the top patron in supplying the Philippines with financial and material aid in which the U.S. disbursed approximately $1.3 billion in economic and military aid to the Philippines from 2016 to 2019, with annual disbursements fluctuating from $451 million in 2016 to $236 million in 2017, to $275 million in 2018, to $365 million in 2019.[348] Besides the financial and material aid, the United States likewise reaffirmed its commitment to guaranteeing Philippine security under the MDT, including the South China Sea. Such was the case, for instance, when U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Manila to attend a press briefing with Philippine Foreign Secretary Locsin in March 2019, where Pompeo iterated that the MDT may be applied to "any attack on Philippine military equipment in the South China Sea."[349]

While some might counter-argue that Delfin and Ramos' actions show the validity of political actor-centric explanations, which argue that political actors serve as the primary cause of the persistence of the alliance,[350] it is important to note that these political actors were bound by the very effects of the colonial institutions which existed.

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[347] Luke Lischin, "The Future of the U.S.-Philippines Alliance: Declining Democracy and Prospects for U.S.-Philippine Relations after Duterte," *Asia Policy* 17, no.1 (2022): 142, https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0009.
[348] Luke Lischin, "The Future of the U.S.-Philippines Alliance: Declining Democracy and Prospects for U.S.-Philippine Relations after Duterte,"138.
[349] Amane and Suguru, "Asymmetry Theory and China-Philippines Relations with the South China Sea as a Case," 345.
[350] This is especially true because the case of Ramos and Delfin was presented as a prime example of a political-actor-centric explanation in the introductory part.

Both political actors trace themselves to the educational by-products of U.S. colonialism, namely the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), where Delfin graduated, and the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, where Ramos graduated. As could be recalled from Chapter 3, one of the by-products of the U.S. colonial institutions and the financial/material *quid* it provided post-Philippine independence was the "U.S. education" in the AFP in which Ramon Magsaysay in his days as the Secretary of National Defense lectured the Philippine General Staff to "forget everything you were taught at Ft. Leavenworth, Ft. Benning, and the Academy," implying the big influence of these educational institutions in shaping the rationale and motivation of Philippine state actors within the military.[351]

Ramos was specifically "handpicked" by JUSMAG (a by-product institution of the U.S. colonial institutions as discussed in Chapter 3) alongside other talented Filipinos, to be sent to the USMA as a plebe in 1946, showing the role of U.S. colonialism in the formation of political actors loyal to the United States.[352] The PMA isn't that different from West Point as the Philippine academy curriculum was patterned after the curriculum of its American counterpart at West Point,[353] and its faculty was run by loyal Filipino veterans who were once under the guidance and leadership of the United States. Even without these political actors, however, the large set-up costs and dependency constraints stated earlier in the last sub-section would have still existed, acting as a strong barrier against any alternative political actor who would attempt to lead the alliance towards a different trajectory.

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[351] Greenberg, *The Hukbalahap Insurrection,* 86.
[352] Capozzola, *Bound by War*, 221.
[353] "History, Traditions and General Information," The Philippine Military Academy, accessed March 13, 2024, https://www.pma.edu.ph/about.php.

Given the continued role of the U.S. dependency on the Philippine islands, as well as the *quid* patterns that reflect the Cold War context as accentuated in Chapter 3, the Philippine state remained dependent on the United States, which made it politically costly for Duterte in shifting towards a divergent trajectory, emulating the failure of the Philippine senate's attempt in shifting away from the United States. As Colonel Medel Agular, the Philippine Armed Forces spokesperson, stated, the MDT "is one of the pillars of our [Philippine] national security."[354] Removing it would mean a political backlash from the Philippine military, other political actors, and the public. In sum, it may be observed that the existence of the MDT during the Duterte era functioned as a buffer against his anti-American populist sentiments, ironically himself being urged to utilize the MDT for greater benefit extraction.

Effects in the Marcos Jr. Era

The restriction effect, as manifested in the Duterte era, allowed Marcos Jr., a pro-American political actor, to layer the alliance with additional institutions which would entrench the alliance further, akin to how the restricting effect during the Philippine senate's failure allowed Benigno Aquino III in conceiving the EDCA at a later dispensation. In other words, these series of failures, as caused by the *restricting* effects, shaped the political space for the succeeding dispensations, predetermining the political environment of each. For instance, the failure of Duterte to scrap the VFA allowed Marcos Jr. to negotiate for the additional EDCA sites, institutions in which the VFA was

[354] John Eric Mendoza, "PH, US mark 72nd anniversary of Mutual Defense Treaty," *Inquirer*, August 30, 2023, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/218488/fwd-ph-us-marks-72nd-anniversary-of-mutual-defense-treaty.

of necessity as it allowed U.S. presence in the islands. Without the VFA in a counter-factual scenario, Marcos Jr. wouldn't have been able to renegotiate for the EDCA, "opening" other trajectories without the institutions in a counter-factual world.

Hence, it may be inferred that the existence of the colonial institutions' by-products, namely the VFA and MDT, alongside the mutually reinforcing security dependencies associated with them, was essential and necessary in allowing the alliance to continue towards the same trajectory. Indeed, the failure of Duterte's anti-American sentiments within the Philippine state saw the revival of security negotiations with the United States afterwards during the Marcos Jr. era, with U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken reaffirming the United States' commitment to the MDT during his state visit to the Philippines on August of 2022, a few weeks after Marcos' inauguration and a few days after China launched military live drills amidst Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan.[355]

By November of 2022, discussions between the United States and the Philippines were publicized, with U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris visiting the Philippines. As the Philippine Speaker of the House of Representatives commented in the midst of the Harris visit, "I am confident that President Marcos will assess any possible new security arrangements with Washington with our national interest as the paramount consideration and consistent with his foreign policy of being 'friend to all and enemy to none."[356] He further added that the visit "could also help advance the Philippines' continuing efforts to

[355] Anthony Esguerra, "Blinken Touts 'Extraordinary, Important' Relationship with Philippines Amid Taiwan Tension," August 6, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/blinken-touts-extraordinary-important-relationship-with-philippines-amid-taiwan-tension-/6689529.html.
[356] Filane Mikee Cervantes, "Harris' PH visit to bolster security, economic ties with US," *Philippine News Agency*, November 21, 2022, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1189095.

modernize the armed forces" according to the Philippine News Agency, suggesting the comeback of the Philippine "shopping list" which could be seen throughout the history of the U.S. – Philippine alliance.[357] Harris' visit to the Philippines came with a strong opposition to Beijing's politics. An encounter between the Philippines and China emerged two days before she visited, with alleged Chinese rocket debris being retrieved by a Philippine vessel, only for a Chinese Coast Guard vessel to "forcefully" retrieve it.[358] When Harris met with Ferdinand Marcos Jr. a few days after, she reiterated that the United States has an "unwavering commitment" to aid and defend Philippine vessels on the South China Sea under the MDT in the event the Philippines be "attacked."[359] Much like how Benigno Aquino III inherited a Philippine state dependent on the U.S., which allowed him to push for the conception of the EDCA, Marcos Jr. likewise inherited a Philippine state which was dependent on the U.S. allowing his pro-American policy to manifest without structural constraints compared to if the Duterte regime, for instance, succeeded in scrapping the alliance altogether.

This continuation of the alliance towards mutual dependency, in turn, allowed the Marcos Jr. regime to initiate a self-reinforcing sequence in which the alliance became further entrenched. By 2023, an agreement between the Marcos administration to expand U.S. access under EDCA was reached, adding four additional bases for U.S. utilization. The sites include Philippine Naval Base Camilo Osias in Santa Ana, Cagayan; Camp

[357] Filane Mikee Cervantes, "Harris' PH visit to bolster security, economic ties with US," *Philippine News Agency*, November 21, 2022, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1189095.
[358] Jason Gutierrez, "In Philippines, Harries Promises Support and Denounces China," *The New York Times*, November 22, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/22/world/asia/kamala-harris-philippines.html?searchResultPosition=1.
[359] Jason Gutierrez, "In Philippines, Harries Promises Support and Denounces China," *The New York Times*, November 22, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/22/world/asia/kamala-harris-philippines.html?searchResultPosition=1.

Melchor Dela Cruz in Isabela; Balabac Island in Palawan; and Lal-lo Airport in Cagayan.[360] Of course, this self-reinforcing sequence also included an increased U.S. dependency on the Philippines. As Aries Arugay, the chairman of the University of the Philippines' political science department, commented, an expansion of military cooperation between the Philippines and the United States would not surprise him because of the Philippines' "proximity to Taiwan," further commenting that the U.S. bases in Okinawa "is too far" in aiding a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.[361] Arugay was not wrong. As the U.S. Department of State stressed in its Integrated Country Strategy for the Philippines dated March 21, 2022, the Philippines remained vital in directly supporting the United States' 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, which aim was the "security of the American people" and the promotion an "equitable distribution of power to deter and prevent adversaries from directly threatening the United States and our allies."[362]

Such U.S. dependency came with the traditional *quid* as usual, highly emulating the Cold War context. It also triggered a positive feedback loop, which further increased the benefits for the Philippine state in remaining on the same trajectory. In terms of the security guarantee, Marcos Jr. got the *quid* that his father wanted but never got: a formally institutionalized U.S. security guarantee covering the South China Sea. The institutionalized agreement came in the form of the "United States and the Republic of

[360] "Philippines, U.S. Announce Locations of Four New EDCA Sites," U.S. Department of Defense, April 3, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3349257/philippines-us-announce-locations-of-four-new-edca-sites/.
[361] Jason Gutierrez, "In Philippines, Harries Promises Support and Denounces China," *The New York Times*, November 22, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/22/world/asia/kamala-harris-philippines.html?searchResultPosition=1.
[362] United States Department of State, "Integrated Country Strategy: Philippines," March 21, 2022, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/ICS_EAP_Philippines_Public.pdf.

the Philippines Defense Guidelines" on May 3, 2023, stating in a written understanding that "an armed attack in the Pacific, to include anywhere in the South China Sea, on either Philippine or U.S. armed forces – which includes both nations' Coast Guards – aircraft, or public vessels, would invoke mutual defense commitments under Article IV and Article V of the MDT."[363] As Biden noted in his meeting with Marcos Jr. in Washington on May 1, 2023, "the United States also remains ironclad in our commitment to the defense of the Philippines, including the South China Sea, and we will continue to support the Philippines' military modernization."[364]

What remains now is the interpretation of what an "armed attack" is. Regarding financial and material quid, the EDCA negotiations resulted in further U.S. financial commitment. The United States intended to "expand funding on top of the $82 million" the U.S. already allocated toward infrastructure investments at the EDCA sites.[365] The Philippines today is also the highest recipient of U.S. military aid in the Indo-Pacific, with $1.14 billion having transferred to the Philippines from 2015 to 2022 in the form of "planes, ships, armored vehicles, small arms, and other military equipment," making it the "largest recipient of U.S. military assistance in the Indo-Pacific region."[366]

In summary, the non-continuation of the alliance in a counterfactual world would have produced a completely different set of choices that political actors in the Marcos Jr.

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[363] The United States and the Republic of the Philippines Defense Guidelines, May 3, 2023, https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/03/2003214357/-1/-1/0/THE-UNITED-STATES-AND-THE-REPUBLIC-OF-THE-PHILIPPINES-BILATERAL-DEFENSE-GUIDELINES.PDF.
[364] Katie Rogers, "Biden Meets Marcos in Washington Amid Tensions With China," The New York Times, May 1, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/01/us/politics/biden-marcos-philippines-china.html.
[365] "Philippines, U.S. Announce Locations of Four New EDCA Sites," U.S. Department of Defense, April 3, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3349257/philippines-us-announce-locations-of-four-new-edca-sites/.
[366] "Fact Sheet: U.S.-Philippines Defense and Security Partnership," U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, February 11, 2022, https://ph.usembassy.gov/fact-sheet-u-s-philippines-defense-and-security-partnership.

era could make despite the existing pro-American stance. Nevertheless, the failure of the Duterte regime to shift towards a different trajectory, as explained by the *restricting* effect and the role of the colonial institutions' legacy, allowed for the natural revitalization of the alliance in the context of the Marcos Jr. era. This, in turn, institutionalized the alliance further, clarifying the coverage of the MDT on top of the additional financial and material aid it brought, thus further increasing the benefit provided to the Philippine state and further incentivizing political actors to maintain the same trajectory of alliance with the United States. To this end, it may be observed that the alliance has transformed from a post-colonial security relation to a powerful geopolitical weapon that the Philippine state could utilize to address its maritime disputes outside its immediate territory, showing the continued causal effect of U.S. colonialism in today's context.

Chapter Observations and Conclusion

As may be observed in both cases presented in this chapter, the perennial existence of the mutually reinforcing security dependency between the U.S. and the Philippines *restricted* both the Philippine Senate in the context of 1991 and Rodrigo Duterte in the context of 2016 from shifting the alliance towards a different political trajectory. This supports the claim that the existence of the dependencies, as may be traced from the colonial institutions, restricted the post-Cold War Philippine state and its actors from leaving the alliance. Such *restriction* may specifically be explained by the notion that the existent dependencies allowed for a negative reaction among various political actors within the Philippine state, preventing "deviants" such as the Philippine senate in 1991 and Rodrigo Duterte in 2016, from scrapping the alliance and the

dependencies alongside it in a total manner. These deviants also faced large set-up costs, as established by the presence of the dependencies, which made it harder for them to lead the alliance towards another path. As may be observed, the existence of the dependencies in each case meant an AFP geared towards the United States for external defense, making it very difficult, if not impossible, to immediately shift Philippine foreign policy away from the United States and "start from scratch" without serious security and political consequences.

Chapter VI.

Conclusion

This research concludes that the early existence of the U.S. colonial institutions, namely the Treaty of Paris, and Treaty of Washington, alongside the physical presence of the U.S. colonial bases in the Philippines, caused a mutually reinforcing security dependency between the Philippine and U.S. states, explaining the persistence of the U.S.-Philippine security alliance throughout history. As may be observed in the second and third chapters, the colonial institutions during the colonial era produced both the continuation of U.S. dependency through the strategic value which the U.S. colonial bases gave and the conception of Philippine dependency on the U.S. through the *quid* institutions in which the continued U.S. military existence gave. This bounded the United States and the Philippines towards a trajectory of mutual security dependency throughout history, powered by the changes in cost and benefits which the colonial institutions fostered.

The fourth and fifth chapters, on the other hand, show how such mutual security dependency acted as a causal mechanism, specifically through its *restricting* effect, in explaining the failure of Marcos Sr., the Philippine Senate in 1991, and Duterte in 2016 in permanently cutting reliance on the U.S. in relation to Philippine national security. In game theory terms, the existence of the colonial institutions, its by-product institutions, and the dependencies which came along with it increased the cost of non-cooperation, predetermining outcomes toward cooperation and, hence, the persistence of the alliance.

In the case of Marcos Sr. from 1975 to 1979, the existence of the colonial bases as a security guarantee made it unlikely for Marcos Sr. to be able to threaten the continuation of the colonial bases seriously, and unlikely for the U.S. to seriously implement its "Pacific Doctrine." In the case of the Philippine Senate in 1991, a successful attempt to shift the relations away from the U.S. caused a significant backlash within the Philippine Congress, powered by dependency on U.S. financial and material aid, alongside the U.S. security guarantee under the MDT, resulting in the forced reversion of the Philippines back to dependency towards the United States. The Duterte regime likewise faced *restricting* effects via political backlash within the Philippine state and high set-up costs, which were established by the long-term dependency of the Philippine state on the U.S.

Collectively, the research provides a new explanation of how the U.S.-Philippine alliance persisted outside of the traditional political actor and threat-centric explanations available in the present scholarship. Again, this research does not dismiss the importance of political actors and threats. Rather, it also shows the importance of institutions, through a slow-moving process throughout time, in predetermining the alliance towards persistence and discouraging deviants from deviating. Given the multivariate nature of causality in the political realm, however, it is important to note that such predeterminism is probabilistic in nature, meaning that the existence of the U.S. colonial institutions did not "lock" or make it impossible for other political paths to emerge. Rather, the existence of the colonial institutions made it more likely for political actors within to choose one path over the other and discourage political deviants from deviating, explaining the persistence of the alliance.

The research, however, is not without limitations. First, the archival materials are highly from the perspective of the United States. This is because highly available archival materials are primarily located in U.S. archives such as the National Archives and the State Department's Office of the Historian. The availability of Philippine sources may change how history may be interpreted and may either enforce or refute the claims of this thesis. Therefore, there should be a re-examination of the cases when sources from the Philippine perspective would be available in the future.

Second, this research only focuses on a single country, which may be an inherent limitation of historical institutionalist inferences where some "only explain the current case."[367] While some single-country case examinations may do great work in theory building, this thesis may benefit from a comparative setting, e.g., a comparison between the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan, all of which have defense treaties with the United States, given that it could also provide a wide array of data across countries and administrations, further supporting the building of generalizable theories.

Third, the claims of this research may benefit from future hypothesis testing, which includes counterfactual analyses. This is under the assumption that if the causal inferences made in this research are true, then the non-existence of the study variables should also produce variations in outcomes, all else being equal. For instance, future scholars may test the hypothesis that (1) the early existence of U.S. colonial institutions makes the development of a mutually reinforcing security dependency between the United States and the Philippines more likely, with the counterfactual hypothesis that (2)

[367] Daniel J. Galvin, "Qualitative Methods and American Political Development," in *The Oxford Handbook of American Political Development*, eds. Richard Valelly, Suzanne Mettler, and Robert Lieberman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 213-215.

the non-existence of the U.S. colonial institutions makes it less likely for a mutually reinforcing security dependency to occur, in order to examine the relationship between the studied variables further. So far, this research has not been able to do such counterfactual analyses because *descriptive inferences* rely primarily on the interpretation of available historical data, without available empirical data in producing counterfactuals. This is where comparative analyses, as discussed earlier, may come into play.

Despite the limitations, this thesis makes several theoretical contributions to present scholarship beyond the immediate thesis of this research. The first greater theoretical contribution of this case is that it partially addresses Wallace's question of *how* the institutionalization of U.S. bases affects the military strategy of a client state in the broader topic of the effects of institutionalization within alliances?[368] This thesis shows that the existence of foreign bases shifts client states' military strategy towards alignment on the mission of the foreign bases. As shown, for example, in the cases, the Philippine Armed Forces' mission shifted from external to internal defense of the U.S. bases within the Philippines, hence gearing it more towards counter-insurgency operations than naval operations outside of its territorial waters.

The second greater theoretical contribution of this thesis is in the theory of path-dependency in historical institutionalist literature. As may be observed, the thesis presents a case of a path-dependent process through a self-reinforcing sequence where "initial moves in a particular direction encourage further movement along the same path" and overtime, "the road not chosen" becomes an "increasingly distant, increasingly

[368] Geoffrey P. R. Wallace, "Alliances, Institutional Design, and the Determinants of Military Strategy," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25, no. 3 (2008): 240, https://doi.org/10.1080/07388940802218978.

unreachable alternative."[369] As James Mahoney, Khairunnisa Mohamedali, and Cristopher Ngyuen, further stated, "each step in particular makes it more likely that a unit will continue to follow that same direction."[370] This can be seen in the aftermath of the *restricting* effects, as discussed in the fourth and fifth chapters. In the case of Marcos Sr.'s case in 1975 – 1979, highly institutionalized alliance mechanisms, i.e., the MBA (for U.S. strategic reliance) and the MDT (quid pro quo), contributed to further institutionalization of the alliance, with Marcos Sr. evolving the MDT (quid pro quo) to cover the South China Sea using the MBA (U.S. strategic reliance) as leverage. Marcos Jr., on the other hand, after several decades, was able to repeat the pattern by utilizing the already existing U.S. strategic reliance, now through EDCA, to further entrench the MDT through the U.S. – Philippines Bilateral Guidelines of 2023, providing a formally institutionalized reassurance from the United States and thus increasing the MDT's value through time. Both perennially and incrementally increased the benefit for the Philippine state in remaining towards the trajectory of dependency on the U.S., making it increasingly unlikely in each step for the current trajectory to change.

This thesis's third greater theoretical contribution is that it supports the importance of timing and sequencing in studying causality in politics. As Paul Pierson argued, "in these path-dependent processes, *when* an event occurs may be crucial," with it being "because early parts of a sequence matter much more than later parts, an event that happens 'too late' may have no effect, although it might have been of great consequence

[369] Paul Pierson, "Not Just What, but *When*: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes," *Studies in American Political Development*, 14, no.1 (2000): 75.
[370] James Mahoney, Khairunnisa Mohamedali, and Cristopher Nguyen, "Causality and Time in Historical Institutionalism," in *The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism,* eds. Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti, and Adam Sheingate (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press: 2016), 71 – 88.

if the timing had been different."[371] This is due to the notion in which the political realm, as Pierson argues, is mired with "filling up" of "political space."[372] As may be observed in Chapters 2 and 3, the early filling of the power vacuum in the Philippines by the United States during the colonial era mattered in securing political space in the Far East in later dispensations, e.g., the Cold War. Specifically, the early entrenchment of U.S. security institutions in the Philippines, i.e., the colonial bases, contributed to an increased benefit both for the United States and the Philippines in remaining with the alliance early on, preventing other "latecomers" from influencing Philippine alignment away from the U.S. during crucial developments such as the Philippine independence.

This thesis's fourth greater theoretical contribution is that it supports the notion that political causalities can be long-term processes, spanning decades and through various mechanisms for a causal relationship to manifest fully.[373] As Pierson argues, "many important social processes take a long time – sometimes an extremely long time – to unfold."[374] While this may seem obvious enough, Pierson points out the reality of contemporary scholarship in that many fail to acknowledge such long causal processes and instead focus on "individual strategic action," which has become a "central vantage point for framing questions and answers about social life."[375] This thesis focuses on long-term causalities by shifting away from the focus on political-actor-centric explanations to long-term institutional effects.

[371] Pierson, *Politics in Time,* 44.
[372] Pierson, *Politics in Time,* 73.
[373] Pierson, *Politics in Time,* 79.
[374] Pierson, *Politics in Time,* 79.
[375] Pierson, *Politics in Time,* 79.

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