



Australia and the U.S>

Citation

Healy, Kathleen. 2023. Australia and the U.S>. Master's thesis, Harvard University Division of Continuing Education.

Permanent link

<https://nrs.harvard.edu/URN-3:HUL.INSTREPOS:37374768>

Terms of Use

This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at <http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA>

Share Your Story

The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. [Submit a story](#).

[Accessibility](#)

Australia and the United States: Fighting Side by Side, Forever?

Kathleen Healy

A Thesis in the Field of International Relations
for the Degree of Master of Liberal Arts in Extension Studies

Harvard University

May 2023

Abstract

Australia and the United States have fought together in every major conflict since the 1918 Battle of Hamel. Politicians, military leaders, and citizens from both countries have long referred to this bilateral relationship as robust and vital. The 1951 ANZUS Treaty followed by decades of steadfast cooperation solidified a century of ‘mateship.’ Yet the last decade has seen a shifting balance of power across the Indo-Pacific. Has the alliance endured amidst new challenges? This thesis argues that diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic connectivity between these two countries have cemented an unbreakable alliance. National interests intersect more often than not, and Washington remains a steadfast partner for Canberra. This argument is based on an examination of the history of American and Australian military and security forces serving side by side throughout major conflicts as well as an investigation of the numerous diplomatic and economic agreements made over the last century.

Frontispiece



Map of Australia

Source: This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my sister.

She has always been by my side with encouragement, love, and support.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my Harvard thesis advisors, Dr. Michael Miner and Dr. Doug Bond, for their guidance, words of wisdom, and support of this thesis. They are outstanding professors and insightful thinkers in the field of International Relations. I was motivated to pursue this thesis after taking their classes.

I would also like to acknowledge the Traditional Owners of Country throughout Australia and recognize the continuing connection to lands, waters and communities, and pay my respects to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders, to their cultures, and to their Elders past and present.

Table of Contents

Frontispiece	iv
Dedication.....	v
Acknowledgments	vi
List of Figures.....	xii
List of Acronyms	xiii
Chapter I. Australia and the United States: Fighting Side by Side	1
Research Design and Methodology	3
Research Sources	3
Limitations.....	6
Chapter Organization.....	7
Findings	8
Future Direction.....	9
Summary.....	10
Chapter II. Historical Background: 1778-1913	12
Desire for Independence	13
Beginning of Economic Relations.....	14
The Influence of the U.S. Declaration of Independence	15
The Australian Versus the American Constitution.....	16
Moving Away from Britain and Towards America	18
The Need for Independent Information.....	18

The Great White Fleet	19
Kinship	20
Chapter III. World Wars I and II: 1914-1945.....	23
World War I.....	24
Britain Declares War and Dominions Follow	24
Australian Soldiers Recognized on Merit.....	26
Diggers and Doughboys in World War I.....	27
The Battle of Hamel	28
Validation of Friendship.....	29
Between the Two Wars	31
Beginning of Diplomatic Relations	31
Intelligence-Gathering Constrained.....	32
World War II	33
Australia and the U.S. in World War II.....	33
Australia Looks to America for Military Support	35
Chapter IV. Post World War II: 1946-1953	39
Diplomatic Relationships	39
Global Organizations.....	40
Australian and U.S. Initiatives.....	42
Intelligence Sharing.....	43
Five Eyes	44
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation.....	44
Intelligence Community	45

Korean War	46
New Treaties.....	46
Australia, New Zealand, and United States.....	47
ANZUS versus NATO	47
Chapter V. The Later Cold War Years: 1954-1991	52
Australia and the U.S. Lean Toward Each Other	52
The Vietnam War	53
American Chamber of Commerce.....	54
Pine Gap	55
New Zealand Leaves ANZUS	57
Australian-U.S. Ministerial Consultations	58
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation	59
Chapter VI. End of Cold War to the 9/11 Attack: 1992-2001.....	61
Presidents and Prime Ministers	62
Clinton and Howard	62
Bush and Howard	65
Australia’s Defence White Papers.....	66
Chapter VII. The Unbreakable Alliance: 2002-2022	68
Expansion of Alliances.....	68
Australia U.S. Free Trade Agreement	69
The Quad	70
Australia-Japan-U.S. Trilateral Leaders, Ministers and Soldiers	71
The United States Study Centre	72

Pivot to Asia-Pacific.....	73
U.S. Armed Forces in Northern Australia	73
Vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific	76
Widening Focus on Defense.....	77
Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment	78
New Military and Economic Alliances	79
Further Military Infrastructure Investment.....	79
Australia, United Kingdom, United States	80
Force Posture Initiatives	81
Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.....	82
Partners in the Blue Pacific	83
Minerals Supply Partnership	83
US-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.....	83
Chapter VIII. No Better Friend	86
China’s Rise in Power	87
The Dilemma	88
Choosing Sides	91
Public Opinion.....	92
Can Alliances Be Broken?.....	93
White House National Security Strategy Report.....	93
Chapter IX. Summary Analysis and Conclusion.....	95
Summary of Agreements	96
Conclusion.....	97

Appendix. Mateship Resolution	101
References	103

List of Figures

Figure 1. Australian and U.S. Intelligence Agencies Involved in Five Eyes	45
Figure 2. Comparison of ANZUS and NATO Articles	49
Figure 3. Pine Gap-controlled Orion SIGINT Satellite Stations	56
Figure 4. Timeline of Significant Australian Events Prior to 9/11	64
Figure 5. Timeline of the Highlights of U.S. Force Posture Initiative 2012-2021	75
Figure 6. Summary of Significant Australia-U.S. Initiatives and Agreements	97

List of Acronyms

AAA	American Australian Association
AmCham	American Chamber of Commerce
ADSCS	Australian Defence Satellite Communications Station
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, and United States Treaty
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASIO	Australia Secret Intelligence Organisation
AUKUS	Australia, United Kingdom, and United States Agreement
AUSFTA	Australia United States Free Trade Agreement
AUSMIN	Australia United States Ministerial Consultations
EAC	Enhanced Air Cooperation
FVEY	Five Eyes
FOIP	Free and Open Indo-Pacific
IPEF	Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Posterity
MSP	Minerals Security Partnership
MRF-D	United States Marine Rotational Force-Darwin
PBP	Partners in the Blue Pacific
QUAD	Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organization
SCIFiRE	Southern Cross Integrated Research Experiment
SDCF	Security and Defense Cooperation Forum
USFPI	United States Force Posture Agreement Initiatives
USSC	United States Study Centre

Chapter I.

Australia and the United States: Fighting Side by Side

Australia and the United States (U.S.) have fought side by side in every major war since the Battle of Hamel in World War I (WWI). During this military conflict on July 4, 1918, Americans fought alongside Australians in a pivotal attack against German soldiers on the Western Front under the direction of an Australian commander. Since then, the Australian forces have fought on the same side as the U.S. in every major conflict including World War II (WWII) and wars in Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf, Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Australia was the first country to support the U.S. immediately after 9/11 in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Based on this history and ongoing political rhetoric, one might assume that Australia and the U.S. will continue to fight as allies if either country is attacked.

Frequently quoted news articles, academic journals and books have described this Australia-U.S. relationship as close and stable since the Battle of Hamel. U.S. presidents and government leaders refer to Australians as best friends, allies, and partners in their speeches. Similarly, Australian prime ministers and other top-level government officials often use the term “mateship” to recognize the unwavering military support between the two countries in their speeches before, during, and after these wars. Australians generally use such a term in their common lexicon to describe a close relationship that goes beyond friendship. The term mateship implies long-lasting solidarity, collaboration, obligation, trust, respect, and unconditional assistance, especially in times of adversity.

When Australian and U.S. military and political leaders remind the public that their countries have fought side by side, as friends or mates, over the last 100 years, several questions emerge. What are the implications of this history? Are these leaders expecting their two countries to fight together again in the future? Is there a legal requirement that Australia and the U.S. must always go to war together? Does mateship mean they have a moral obligation to stand together in a military conflict?

The principal research question for this thesis is the following: **Is the United States a reliable security partner and military ally for Australia?** This thesis will argue past and present commitments alongside the historical record support the argument that the U.S. is a highly reliable security partner for Australia. This thesis investigates the history of American and Australian military and security forces serving side by side over the course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The thesis provides vital context for social, cultural, and political levels of connectivity. Second, this thesis will catalog Australian commitments to American defense efforts. Together, these two areas of inquiry support the hypothesis that the two countries' shared history, ideology, and national interests reinforce that the alliance is iron-clad.

Furthermore, the evidence supports a secondary argument that there is an extremely high probability the U.S. would come to the defense of Australia in the event of a future physical attack on its homeland. Admittedly, while the historical records help to answer the principal research question, it is impossible to prove a future condition that has not yet occurred. Nevertheless, the contention remains that it is highly probable the U.S. would come to the aid of Australia in any future conflict in the Indo-Pacific region. This secondary research question can help illuminate past and present conditions for any

reader interested in grappling with hypothetical scenarios or policy planning areas of their own focus, as it remains impossible to understand the present and future without consideration of the historical record.

Research Design and Methodology

To answer the main question of whether the United States is a reliable security partner and military ally for Australia, this paper explores the historical causes and effects of Australia and the U.S. fighting side by side in major wars as well as the significant agreements made between the two countries. The research design is qualitative. It relies on secondary sources to provide evidence of a close relationship between Australian and U.S. government officials, military leaders, and institutional organizations. The research does not include interviews of human subjects; therefore, permission from Harvard's Institutional Review Board was not required.

Research Sources

The causes and effects of the Australia-U.S. relationship presented in this thesis are the product of extensive research using a wide variety of sources. The research specifically focuses on the establishment of diplomatic, intelligence sharing, military, and economic relationships between the two countries. (Note that 'intelligence sharing' is substituted for 'information' for one of the traditional definitions of instruments of power.) Websites, published books, journal articles, memoirs, polls, media, and newspaper articles from both countries were searched for salient information. Social media websites were purposely excluded from the research.

Press releases, legislative documents, and signed treaties were obtained from the official U.S. government websites of the White House, Congress, Embassy, Department of Defense, Department of State, and Department of Commerce as well as from those of the Australian government websites of Parliament, Embassy, and Department of Defence, and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Each provided information on the relationships between Australia and the U.S. Additionally, information was obtained from the official websites of international organizations in which the two countries are members.

A search for peer-reviewed articles on the comity of the Australia-U.S. relationship revealed several, but not an abundance of published Australian and U.S. academic journals and books identifying salient issues. In *The Future of the United States-Australia Alliance* compiled by U.S. Research Fellow at Tufts University, Scott McDonald, and Australian Macquarie University, Professor Andrew Tan, scholars examined the strength of Australia-U.S. alliances in a threatened Indo-Pacific region. Other scholarly journal articles underscoring their relationship were filtered to look for pertinent causes and effects.

Important in developing this thesis was to obtain the Australian perspective and insight on its relationship with the U.S. and not solely the American perspective of it. To this end, the websites and publications of several Australian research organizations and educational institutions were investigated. The University of Sydney's United States Studies Centre's publication, *The Alliance at 70*, and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's publication, *ANZUS at 70: The Past, Present and Future of the Alliance*, were helpful to understand the trends, causes and effects of major events during several

specific timeframes. The Australian Election Study and the Lowy Institute recently published polls on Australians' opinions of the U.S. compared to their opinions of other countries. Websites for the Australian War Memorial and the Ministerial Library of a few Prime Ministers provided statements and letters from numerous military leaders, soldiers, and politicians. Their archived military records and documents offered insightful stories and quotes about Australia's and America's engagement on and off the battlefields.

The research included a search for published books by Australian authors. Des Ball's 1988 and 1989 writings on *Pine Gap* and the three-volume *Official History of ASIO*, written by Horner, Blaxland and Crawley provide some important details regarding intelligence sharing between the two countries. Hugh White, former Deputy Secretary for Strategy in Australia's Department of Defence and author of *How to Defend Australia*, examines whether Australia can defend itself and presents some of the shortfalls and challenges it faces without U.S. support. In addition, White's essay *Sleepwalk to War: Australia's Unthinking Alliance with America* questions whether Australia should count on the U.S. In *The Truth About China*, Australian journalist Bill Birtles sheds light on China's aggression toward Australia. Some consideration was given to Australian media coverage of government leader's statements on critical issues between China and the two countries.

The reader will become aware of certain words spelled differently in this thesis (i.e., defence vs. defense; organization vs. organisation). Every attempt was made to keep the words consistent with the most commonly used spelling by the source or institution in that country.

Limitations

This thesis summarizes the conditions that cemented the relationship between Australia and the U.S. by examining past and present interactions between them and the alliances they have put in place. It explores whether the U.S. might come to Australia's aid if it were attacked, but it is not predicting any imminent attack. Conceivably, any hostile country or terrorist group could attack Australia on its soil, waterways, islands, or military or publicly owned assets located inside or outside of Australian boundaries, or in cyberspace. This thesis, however, does not speculate where an attack on Australia might occur, how or what country might attack Australia, or any reasons why.

At the time of this writing, tensions exist between Australia and China over issues relating to Taiwan, the South China Seas, and other matters. Although news media, books and academic articles were explored for background on their existing tensions as part of this research, this thesis will not discuss in depth the accusations, bans, and trade sanctions that have arisen between Australia and China. Pundits and scholars may suggest that Australia is preparing for war with China or speculate that China will attack Australia. This thesis makes no assumptions or predictions to that effect. Various ministers from China and Australia met in late 2022 indicating a potential change in their trade relationship. Predicting the significance of any recent meetings or their impact is beyond the scope of this thesis question.

It is important to note that although New Zealand and Australia are geographically close to each other, New Zealand is a separate sovereign nation. If New Zealand were ever attacked, this thesis does not consider that provocation as an attack on Australia as well. Such consideration would also apply if Australia were to have any

alliance calling for its military support to New Zealand or if an attack on New Zealand resulted in collateral damage of Australian possessions or assets. Therefore, security alliances between Australia and New Zealand, and for that matter any other countries Australia may be a party to, are not considered in this thesis.

Chapter Organization

The history of Australia and the U.S. as independent nations compared to other countries is relatively short; consequently, their history of fighting side by side spans a brief period. The timeframe of significant events, including wars and important alliances, occurs between 1788 and 2022. This thesis presents historical research of this period in chronological order to understand the cause and effect of the events. The following chapters take into consideration the temporal order of major military conflicts and germane agreements that specifically involved the two countries.

Chapter II discusses events following the end of the American Revolution, its impetus for Britain to send convicts to Australia, and later its influence on Australia to seek its own independence. It examines the significant events occurring in the years between the federation of Australia and the start of WWI. Chapter III focuses on how WWI and WWII brought about soldiers from both countries fighting side by side.

Chapter IV looks at the timeframe post WWII, when Australian and U.S. troops fought together in the Korean War. It highlights the pivotal alliance agreement between Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. (ANZUS) that developed as a result of the perceived instability in the Pacific. Chapter V explores the later part of the Cold War era when Australia and the U.S. deployed troops to fight in the Vietnam War, shared secretive new technology, and established intelligence-gathering facilities in Australia.

Chapter VI discusses the relationship between presidents and prime ministers before 9/11 and after the U.S. declaration of the War on Terror.

Chapter VII summarizes the most recent alliances and agreements signaling that the Australia-U.S. alliance is stronger now than in the past. Chapter VIII identifies the dilemma that Australia currently faces as a close friend and ally of the U.S. while a major trading partner with China. It also provides the results of two Australian public opinion polls of the Australia-U.S. relationship. Chapter IX summarizes the key agreements and considers reasons why the U.S. may or may not provide aid to Australia in the case of a military conflict.

The Appendix contains a copy of *A Concurrent Resolution Recognizing 100 years of the United States-Australia Relationship –100 years of Mateship* passed by both the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives in 2018 in celebration of the 100th anniversary of the Battle of Hamel. In this resolution, Congress recognizes the term mateship, sums up the accumulation of connections between the two countries, and reaffirms the many multilateral agreements between these two countries. That Congress passed such a resolution infers that Australia can rely on the U.S. to come to its aid in a military conflict.

Findings

Beyond the history and ongoing political rhetoric, the U.S. has many reasons to come to the aid of Australia other than demonstrating its mateship. The U.S. and Australia have common national interests, are aligned as liberal democracies, and have strategic interests in keeping the Indo-Pacific region open and free for navigation. The evidence-based research provides three findings:

1. The U.S. needs to keep and protect its investment in the solid and strong diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic relationships that Australia and the U.S. have developed since the end of WWII. The U.S. also needs to protect the numerous Americans who work in embassies, businesses, scientific and research organizations, intelligence organizations, and military installations across Australia. The U.S. will not want to lose its physical military and intelligence-gathering assets and defense structures that it has built on Australian soil.
2. In recent years, the U.S. has signed several new trilateral and multilateral agreements to further signal its commitment to Australia's and other nations' security in the Indo-Pacific region. The most strategically important one is the trilateral AUKUS agreement where Australia, the U.K., and the U.S. collaborate on building expensive nuclear-powered submarines and developing cutting-edge technologies. This agreement exemplifies a serious U.S. commitment to Australia as a military partner and ally.
3. The U.S. will honor the ANZUS treaty and other agreements with Australia because both countries share concerns about China's rising power and aggressive threats in the Indo-Pacific region. All countries in this area have a vested interest in keeping the shipping lanes open in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The U.S. needs Australia to maintain the balance of power in this region.

Future Direction

Ideally, future studies will utilize sophisticated modeling tools, and perhaps artificial intelligence, to determine if any of the newer foreign policies referred to in this thesis have been successful in deterring hostile nations from physically attacking

Australia. It is too soon to tell if the most recent flurry of treaties and agreements with Australia have proactively deterred a military conflict in the Indo-Pacific region. Ample material awaits future students to analyze whether they did.

It would be interesting to research whether other more optimal deterrence options, such as annexing or declaring statehood, have united liberal democracies more efficiently than those U.S. and Australia alliances have accomplished to date.

The building blocks are currently in place for the U.S. to support Australia in case of attack. It is unknown, however, whether the American public would support any U.S. leadership decisions that could endanger U.S. soldiers fighting to protect 26 million Australians living halfway around the world. Future scholars might wish to conduct a survey of the U.S. public on this topic when public sentiment on the war in Ukraine is less likely to bias the results and more time has passed since the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.

Summary

What follows is an account of the causes and effects of major historic moments that brought Australia and the U.S. together as allies, mates, and partners. This thesis considers whether the U.S. must honor its agreements and alliances with Australia and come to its aid in case of an attack. The expectation is that the U.S. will do so to demonstrate to the world that it can be relied upon to stop hostile actions that threaten the peace and prosperity of liberal democracies. The reality is that the U.S. has already provided military aid to Australia and is increasing its support to keep the Indo-Pacific region stable and a rules-based international order in place.

It is hoped that this thesis contributes to a better understanding in the field of international relations of whether the long-standing Australia-U.S. alliance is effective in deterring war and provides more awareness of the deep connections these two countries have despite their geographical distances.

Chapter II.

Historical Background: 1778-1913

We hope these bonds may be drawn together closer and closer from generation to generation. We recognise you as brothers in language, brothers in common interest, and brothers in future development of our two countries, for the benefit of humanity and prosperity of their people.

—U.S. Admiral Sperry
*To greeters of the Great White Fleet
Melbourne, September 2, 1908*

America and Australia share a common heritage that began under English rule.

Early in the history of both countries, English kings sent explorers overseas to their shores to discover and claim new land for the British Crown. England established some of these colonies for trade; others for receiving convicts.

It is well known that Australia's origin is as a penal colony. It is perhaps less well known that, from 1617 up until the American Revolution, England also sent convicts to the east coast of America (Butler, 1896, p. 17). In 1768, England anticipated the possibility of American colonies revolting and was desperate to establish new colonies. Because of this, King George III commissioned Lieutenant James Cook to discover the "Great South Land." In 1770, Cook arrived on the east coast of Australia, claimed the land for the British Crown, and named it New South Wales (NSW).

After the thirteen American colonies declared independence in 1776, England was no longer able to send convicts to the east coast of America. England, needing a new location to house its exploding population of convicts, shipped them to the newly claimed land in Australia. The first fleet of new convicts arrived in Sydney in 1788. For the next

ten years, the British continued to push into other areas of Australia, forming new penal colonies in Tasmania, Queensland, and Victoria.

Another shared commonality of both countries is that subsequent immigrants came from other parts of Europe, China, and Russia. These immigrants were welcomed as needed laborers for the gold rush, whaling industry, and railroad construction. As their economies and communities blended, the descendants of the original immigrants shared a desire to move away from the governance of the British Empire. The founding fathers of Australia, however, approached the process of establishing its independence in a dramatically different way than the way the U.S. had achieved it. Australia learned important lessons from the U.S. and avoided the need to fight a war against England to establish its self-governance.

Desire for Independence

The American colonies were legendary for rejecting British rule and forming a new nation through a bloody warfare that began in 1775. Their objective was to establish an independent government where no one individual entity would have complete power over the rights of its citizens. Towards that end, the U.S. Constitution was designed to divide power between three main branches of government: the Executive Office, Congress and the Supreme Court. The Australians, influenced by American trade and suppressed by British rule for over a hundred years, eventually sought their own form of government in the likeness of the U.S. The American way of life became the model for the development of Australia's federation and fundamental independence.

Beginning of Economic Relations

U.S. merchant ships, Philadelphia and Hope, sailed into NSW in 1792 to become the first vessels to initiate commercial trade with Australia. The merchant marines primarily offered food and spirits to the recently arrived and cashless convicts. In exchange they took seal skins, furs, and sandalwood. These goods were then carried onboard to China for further trading profits. As this commerce grew, the British government attempted to legislate against this trade because it competed with the British-owned East India Company (Waterhouse, 1990, p. 13). Merchants from Boston and Philadelphia, however, ignored such attempts and continued to profit from trading with NSW (Levi, 1943, p. 360).

From 1832 to 1855, more American companies sent ships filled with goods from Massachusetts to New South Wales, Victoria, and Tasmania. At the start of the Australian gold rush in 1851, Americans started immigrating to Australia, bringing with them American innovations. Soon cities began to look more American than British:

By the late 1850's, Melbourne, like so many contemporary American cities, an almost instant metropolis, boasted American-style volunteer fire brigades and American watercarts, while well-to-do families traversed the city in American built buggies. At the same time, the city's solid architectural grandeur was strongly resemblant of San Francisco. Public transport systems in cities throughout Australia used American omnibuses, American cable trams and American street railways. (Waterhouse, 1990, p. 14)

By the end of the 1800s, two-way trade occurred on a regular basis. Australia exported coal and wool to San Francisco, using scheduled steamships that operated between their ports. Australians were hopeful that trade relationships with the Americans would lead to more benefits than they had with their more remotely located motherland:

In this period, too, the United States was seen not only as a model for emulation but as a potential saviour, for the decline of the British and the

emergence of Japanese power in the Pacific persuaded successive governments that threats to our security were increasing. (Waterhouse, 1990, p. 15)

Britain took a step back from the Pacific colonies when the Imperial Parliament passed the Federal Council of Australasia Act in 1885. It allowed the colonies of Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria, Western Australia, New Zealand and Fiji to meet to discuss strategies to circumvent France's aspirations to take over New Caledonia and New Hebrides, and Germany's intentions to take over New Guinea.

The Influence of the U.S. Declaration of Independence

In the late 1800s, the colonies of New South Wales, Tasmania, South Australia, Queensland, Victoria, and New Zealand agreed to form a similar federation like that of the U.S. with a foundation based on English common-law principles (Aroney, 2009, p. 2). Colony leaders looked to the U.S. for guidance on how to write a constitution that would unite the six British colonies into a federation. Harry Evans, former clerk of the Australian Senate, writes in *Papers on Parliament* that several Australians visited the U.S. before writing their own constitution:

The delegates were also not lacking in practical experience. Inglis Clark was not the only founder to visit America. Old Henry Parkes regaled the 1891 convention with an account of his visit to Washington in 1882 on a trade mission, during which he conversed with the President, the Secretary of State and congressional leaders, and was disgusted to discover the Senate meeting in closed session (a practice which it continued in relation to some business until 1929). At Sydney in 1897, Josiah Symon referred to his travels around the United States and his talks with American political figures. Kingston also referred to discussions he had while in America. (Evans, 2009, p. 72)

Ten years later in 1901, delegations from the six colonies met to finalize the Australian Constitution and establish Australia as an independent country with a national

parliament and a prime minister. The new federation was like that of the U.S. in that it achieved independence from Britain; however, it still gave the Royal King or Queen the ability to rule over it. This concession to create a constitutional monarchy gave Australia the ability to govern itself without waging war for its independence as the Americans had done.

The Australian Versus the American Constitution

Australia and the U.S. share many similarities in their founding governance documents that have allowed them both to operate as liberal democracies:

It is well known that the framers of the Australian Constitution drew extensively upon the United States constitution for many aspects of their creation. This is best demonstrated by the impressive list of the characteristics of the Australian Constitution drawn directly from the American model: the employment of special procedures, different from those applying to normal legislation, for consulting the people in establishing the Constitution and for amending it; the special legal status thereby given to the written constitution; the division of powers between the central and state governments; the prescription of the powers of the national government in the written constitution; the establishment of a constitutional court to interpret and enforce the constitution; the delegation of national legislative power to two elected houses of parliament of virtually equal competence, each representing the electors voting in different electorates and reflecting the geographically pluralistic character of the country. (Evans, 2009, p. 67)

Although Australia's federal executive power remained with the British Crown, as Aroney and Kincaid point out in their analysis *Comparing Australian and American Federal Jurisprudence*, the constitutions of Australia and the U.S. have the most in common regarding key economic aspects separating themselves from the British Empire:

Many of the most important powers conferred on the federal legislature are essentially the same, or very similar, to those in the United States: taxation; trade and commerce with other countries and among the states; borrowing money; naturalization; bankruptcy; coinage; weights and measures; postal services; copyrights and patents; and defense. The list of

powers in Australia is longer and more detailed, but the basic structure and logic are the same. (Aroney and Kincaid, 2017)

Like the U.S., the Australian Constitution has endured over time. It guarantees many rights and freedoms that its citizens will fight to preserve. Technically, however, Australia is still part of the Commonwealth and considers the reigning British Queen or King as its head of state. Parliament passed the *Australian Citizenship Amendment Bill* in 1993, no longer requiring citizens to pledge commitment to the Crown (Parliament of Australia, 1993). Ministers and members of Parliament, however, must still make an Oath of Office swearing allegiance to the sovereign. Members of the Australian armed services must also swear service to His or Her Majesty. This leaves a lingering doubt as to whether the U.S. would consider defending a country that makes its elected representatives and armed forces give allegiance to a monarch rather than a republic.

A movement has been underway in Australia since 1991 to hold a national referendum to alter the constitution and remove the monarchy. The Australian Republic Movement has prepared amendments to the constitution towards that end (Australian Republic Movement, 2020). In the 2022 Australian Federal Election Study, a poll showed that 54% of the people surveyed favored becoming a republic (Cameron, et al, 2022, p. 29). Since the passing of Queen Elizabeth in 2022, Australia and several Commonwealth countries now question whether to remain under the British monarchy. If Australian citizens voted to remove the monarchy as head of state, then the Australian Parliament would send their soldiers to fight for their own republic and not in the service of the Crown. Australia would then become a republic, and its government would be even more similar to that of the U.S.

Today, the citizens of both countries continue to have much in common. The majority have emigrated from countries outside the British Commonwealth and now represent a wide range of ethnicities and country origins. Regardless of the currently required oath of allegiance to the Crown, it is conceivable that a multi-cultural American Congress would be sympathetic with a multi-cultural Australian populace and support the authorization of military aid if Australia were attacked.

Moving Away from Britain and Towards America

As mentioned earlier, Australia had been concerned about the French taking over New Caledonia and Hebrides (now called Vanuatu) and the Germans, taking over New Guinea. If these islands, closest to the northern and western shores of Australia were under foreign control, Australia's access to waterways could be blocked and commercial trade threatened. Britain at that time, however, couldn't care less about these concerns. Britain focused more on political events closer to home in the northern hemisphere than on Australia's security. The British had already set up trade deals with Japan and eventually signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The two parties agreed to remain neutral if either country was at war and to support the other if involved in a war with more than one nation. Australia wanted no part of this alliance. The distrust that set in between Britain and Australia led Australia to become responsible for its own intelligence gathering and national security at the start of the Federation in 1901.

The Need for Independent Information

Despite its modest means and without any federally appointed independent agency, Australia set up its own human intelligence (HUMINT) using civilians and high-

ranking leaders to keep tabs on developments in and around the adjacent Pacific islands. Australia tasked its first spies to report on Japanese trade and shipbuilding when it became clear that Japan intended to attack Russia in 1904 (Fahey, 2018). Years later, when Japan took aggressive military action in the Pacific, the U.S. benefitted from Australia's HUMINT and, ultimately its signal intelligence (SIGINT).

The Great White Fleet

In theory, Australia did not have a navy at the start of the 20th century. It still depended on Britain for its marine defense. Britain, however, had withdrawn all its battle ships from the area by 1906 and relocated them to the North Sea. In 1908, the newly federalized Australian government sought a deeper connection with the U.S. to offset the burgeoning British alliance with Japan.

Australian Prime Minister Alfred Deakin, worried about increased Japanese aggression in the Pacific, requested that U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt send its Great White Fleet of 16 battleships to stop in Australian ports as part of its global tour. The Great White Fleet's objective was to demonstrate the U.S. Navy's military competence overseas. Knowing he would be denied, Deakin made this request without first seeking Britain's approval. Roosevelt agreed to send the Great White Fleet because the U.S. was also nervous about Japan's growing naval threat. In addition, Roosevelt was eager to show unity with Australia as further evidence of military ties to allies in other parts of the world.

Kinship

In August 1908, hundreds of thousands of excited Australians waved flags and played the Star Spangled Banner to greet the U.S. Great White Fleet. Under the command of Admiral Charles Sperry, the battleship Connecticut led the way into the Sydney and Melbourne harbors. The public's great enthusiasm for this U.S. military visit permeated the streets and attracted citizens from these two cities and elsewhere. Artwork, posters, and postcards memorialized this event, signifying the friendly relationship between the Australian public and the American visitors. Newspaper journalists gushed about the visit, validating the amity: "We in Australia have more constantly turned our eyes to America, for light and guidance than we have to the mother country" (The Age, 1908).

As the American sailors left Australia, Prime Minister Deakin wrote about the successful visit to the *Morning Post* on September 7, 1908 referring to the Americans as their cousins:

...their welcome by the masses of our people in both capitals seems to have surpassed in vigour even that of our official and well-to-do citizens who certainly spared neither their purses nor themselves in their endeavours to prove the sincerity of the greeting extended to our American cousins. (Deakin, 1908)

Another example of the demonstrable Australian outpouring for connections to the U.S. visitors is found in the lyrics of "*We've Got a Big Brother in America.*" It was written by journalist Dryblower Murphy in 1908 and repeatedly published in newspapers. The song captured the sentiment that the Americans were going to take care of the Australians as any big brother would (Murphy, 1908).

Historical accounts of this period describe America's Great White Fleet as more than a successful exhibition of the U.S. Navy. Richard Waterhouse writes in his journal

article, *The Beginning of Hegemony or a Confluence of Interests: The Australian-American Relationship, 1788-1908*:

By 1908, then the nature of the Australian-American relationship had undergone a fundamental transformation. Rather than treated as unwelcome intruders, Americans were now welcomed as members of the family, as ‘cousins.’ The nineteenth century Australian-American relationship was a complex one involving political, economic and cultural connections, and all of these shifted, all of them changed, during the course of this period. (Waterhouse, 1990, p. 13)

This event marked the dawning awareness that Australia might rely more confidently on the U.S. for military aid than it might have previously expected. The Great White Fleet visit positively impressed the half million Australians who witnessed its arrival into their ports. It also made an impression on the American servicemen who came onto the Australian shores. The American “cousins” found they had many things in common with their Australian kin, resulting in some sailors staying behind and not returning to the U.S.

While the Australian public felt exuberant about the Americans’ epic visit, this U.S. trip was not merely designed to further public relations. In anticipating potential war with Japan, the U.S. was also interested in determining what Australia might contribute to thwarting one. The U.S. sailors who came on shore during that trip gathered intelligence about access to Australian ports and waterways for potential defense purposes (Behm, 2022, p. 74).

In summary, the history of Australia and the U.S. reveals their common heritage as former British colonies that sought independence from Britain, albeit it in different ways. Early U.S. exports to Australia helped develop its communities to more closely resemble the American way of life. Australia looked to the U.S. for guidance to establish

itself as a self-determined nation. Today, both countries have a similar governance structure with one exception: Australia still recognizes the British Crown as head of state.

The Australians, successful in their desire to move peacefully away from British governance, looked to the U.S. to fill their gap in military support. The Great White Fleet visit became the foundation for building future diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic relationships. The commonalities of the two countries have not changed since the start of the 19th century. Since both are English-speaking liberal democracies with a Christian majority and common values enumerated in their respective constitutions, it is easy to understand the affinity, and the trust Australian-American soldiers would place in fighting side by side in the years to come.

Chapter III.

World Wars I and II: 1914-1945

Among other aspects of this battle which are worthy of mention is the fact that it was the first occasion in the war that the American troops fought in an offensive battle. The contingent of them who joined us acquitted themselves most gallantly and were ever after received by the Australians as blood brothers a fraternity which operated to great mutual advantage nearly three months later.

—General John Monash
Australian Victories in France
1918

Mr. Prime Minister, we two, you and I, will see this thing through together. We can do it and we will do it. You take care of the rear and I will handle the front.

—U.S. General MacArthur
To Prime Minister Curtin
Melbourne, March 1942

To better understand how mateship plays out between Australia and the U.S. during a military conflict, it is important to review Australia's involvement in the two world wars and how Australia's comity shifted away from Britain and toward the U.S. Many other aspects of these two wars bear discussion, but this thesis focuses exclusively on the pivotal touchpoints between Australia and the U.S. that caused their troops to unite in battle. In this thesis, it is important to frame the context in which the narrative of fighting side by side began. This chapter provides a review of the history behind the intersection of Australia and U.S. troops in World War I (WWI) and World War II (WWII).

World War I

Quotes abound about Australia and the U.S. fighting alongside each other since WWI. Many politicians, military leaders, and pundits refer to the Battle of Hamel in 1918 as the starting point for this claim. Indeed, it was a unique event. Formerly English colonies were fighting on foreign soil in a war that had no impact on their own countries' welfare. Additionally, U.S. troops fought not only together with the Australians, but also for the first time under the command of Australian leadership during this conflict. Their joint battle efforts initiated the forging of a bond between the two countries that remains strong today.

Britain Declares War and Dominions Follow

Britain's declaration of war against Germany in August 1914 expected Australia and other Commonwealth countries to fight in WWI as members of the British Empire. Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Newfoundland, and South Africa, although not geographically near Western Europe, all provided military support to the British forces. These dominions had their own independent forms of government, and none of them received any threats from Germany, nor declared war on Germany. Nonetheless, they all sent troops to fight against the Germans. According to military statistics, Australia punched above its weight by sending 17% of its population, more than any other Commonwealth country, to fight in this war. Tragically, Australia suffered the greatest losses of 19 % of its troops (Beaumont, 2014, pp. 399-400).

Australia did not conscript soldiers for this war. The soldiers who fought in WWI volunteered. One might assume that these men decided to enlist because they had emigrated from Britain, but most had not. Only 18% of them were born in Britain. They

joined as volunteers supposedly to show “imperial loyalty” to the British Empire. The public understood that Australia hung onto the British coattails for its own well-being.

According to Beaumont in *‘United We Have Fought’: Imperial Loyalty and the Australian War Effort*:

Australians had long known that their own security and economic prosperity were dependent on the global supremacy of Britain. Only the Royal Navy could keep open the sea lanes of communication on which Australia’s trade depended, and contain the ambitions of potentially hostile powers in the region. (Beaumont, 2014, p. 400)

In 1915, the British merged the Australian enlisted men in the war with the New Zealand soldiers to form the Australia New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) and sent the combined forces to battle on the shores of Turkey in Gallipoli. The campaign, however, was a huge British failure. Nevertheless, King George celebrated ANZAC for its efforts saying, “Tell the people of Australia ... [that] their heroes who died in Gallipoli... gave their lives for a supreme cause in gallant comradeship with the rest of my sailors and soldiers who fought and died with them” (Beaumont, 2014, p. 412).

According to Beaumont, this recognition of Australia as worthy soldiers is an important starting point for understanding Australian nationalism and, ironically, the genesis for its ultimate distancing from Britain. A story in the Sydney Morning Herald in May 1815 claimed that “These raw colonial troops in these desperate hours proved worthy to fight side by side with the heroes of Mōns, the Aisne, Ypres, and Neuve Chapelle” (Beaumont, 2014, p. 412).

Some Australian leaders used this rhetoric to build loyalty to Britain. The public, however, questioned such loyalty when citizens began to realize the mounting casualties of their fittest men fighting under British military leadership. By the end of 1917, the Australian public and its leaders questioned why they should be loyal to Britain.

Historical accounts indicate many political and press debates were held in Australia and in London over Australia's involvement in this war (Beaumont, 2014, p. 410).

Leaders and politicians from the dominions demanded to have a voice and to be more informed about the war effort. In 1917, the Imperial War Conference finally recognized that the dominions were "autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth with the right to an adequate voice in foreign policy and in foreign relations" (Beaumont, 2014, p. 408). This declaration marked the turning point for Australia to fully embrace its nationalism and edge even further away from British control.

Australian Soldiers Recognized on Merit

Between 1916 and 1918, Australian soldiers began strengthening their military prowess and capabilities, which then reversed the common British view of them as backward or untrained soldiers. Australian General Sir John Monash wrote in April 1918:

The British public is at last beginning to sit up and take notice, and from an attitude of cold and rather critical patronage towards Australians, and vague allusion to their "slack discipline" (forsooth), the people in England, the English troops and officers, and finally the War Office itself, are beginning to realize that the Australians are some of the best troops in the whole Empire, always to be relied upon, not merely to hold securely all ground but also to carry out every reasonable task set them. (Monash, 1934, p. 409)

In mid-1918, in recognition of the Australian contribution to the war effort, Monash received command of an independent Australia Corps. His appointment gave Australia status on the battlefield, as well as in the Imperial War Cabinet, as a separately identified nation. On May 31, 1918, Monash wrote in a letter:

But for all practical purposes, I am now the supreme Australian Commander, and thus, at long last, the Australian nation has achieved its ambition of having its own Commander-in Chief, a native born Australian – for the first time in history.

My command is more than two and a half times the size of the British Army under the Duke of Wellington, or of the French Army under Napoleon Bonaparte, at the Battle of Waterloo. (Monash, 1934, p. 409)

Monash's command appointment was an important event because it became the catalyst for Australians and Americans fighting side by side. This phrase has been repeated multiple times over the past 100 years.

Diggers and Doughboys in World War I

To create a sense of comradery among troops during WWI, soldiers often used slang words to describe themselves and others in WWI. "Diggers" and "doughboys" were the slang terms used to call the Australian and U.S. soldiers. Australian soldiers were called diggers in reference to their time spent digging for gold during the gold rush in Australia. The Americans were doughboys in reference to when they fought along the Rio Grande and were covered in white adobie soil dust. Both names culturally isolated them from the British soldiers and fostered their comradery. (National WWI Museum and Memorial, 2018).

When the doughboys first reported for duty in January 1918, they did not impress the Australian diggers. Australian Lieutenant James R. Armitage wrote in his memoir about their arrival into Southampton:

Meanwhile we amused ourselves watching a lot of very brand-new looking Yanks arriving with their extraordinary looking equipment. Some of the officers carried leather suitcases and umbrellas and looked more like commercial travelers than soldiers. (Armitage, 1918. p. 6)

Because the U.S. did not send troops over until the very end of the war, the American soldiers had not been trained for the type of heavy combat that the Australians had already endured fighting in Gallipoli and in European trenches. They were not

prepared to lead, let alone fight, in this type of war. U.S. General John Pershing attempted to keep his soldiers in the American Expeditionary Force under his command until they were ready for action, but in July 1918 another U.S. general offered Pershing's troops to Monash. Monash needed these newly deployed American troops for a planned attack on the Western Front. When Pershing heard of this, he ordered the immediate withdrawal of the inexperienced American soldiers (Yokelson, 2007, p. 17). Some of the doughboys felt committed to fighting with the diggers and found the order to withdraw disturbing. They wanted to disobey the U.S. command and stay with the diggers.

The Battle of Hamel

Monash insisted that the Americans soldiers stay to fight with the more experienced Australians in the infamous Battle of Hamel. Yokelson gives a full account of the disagreements between the American, Australian, and British generals regarding American's involvement in this battle in *We Have Found Each Other at Last: Americans and Australians at the Battle of Hamel in July 1918*. The battle is viewed as a major victory on the Western Front because of Monash's leadership of the American and Australian soldiers.

Ironically, the doughboys fought this battle in 1918 on the day that the U.S. celebrates its independence: 4th of July. Objectively the doughboys and diggers were supporting the very country from which their countries had earlier sought independence. The battle was also notable for being one of the few times in U.S. history when a foreign military commander issued orders to American troops to follow. Yokelson writes that "It would also be the first time that American and Australian soldiers operated together on a battlefield, initiating a coalition that remains strong today" (Yokelson, 2007, p. 17).

Immediately following his victory, Australian Commander Monash praised the American soldiers in a letter to U.S. General Bell, Commander of the 33rd Division on July 5, 1918:

My Dear General,

I desire to take the opportunity of tendering to you as the immediate commander, my earnest thanks for the assistance and services of the Four Companies of Infantry who participated in yesterday's brilliant operations. The dash, gallantry and efficiency of these American troops left nothing to be desired and my Australian soldiers speak in the highest terms in praise of them. That soldiers of the United States and Australia should have been associated for the first time in such close co-operation on the battlefield, is such an historic event of such significance that it will live forever in the annals of our respective Nations. (National WWI Museum and Memorial, 2018)

The doughboys and the diggers continued to fight together in further battles on the Western Front. Some were more successful than others. The battle on the Hindenburg Line in August and September 1918 resulted in heavy casualties. Unfortunately, Monash expected too much from the untrained Americans.

Validation of Friendship

That the two countries fought side by side was not the only factor that united them. The cultural similarity to their relationship also made them grow stronger together. Toward the end of the war, the Australians grew weary of the British standards of operations and felt militarily superior to them:

Antipathy toward the British, however, was something that both diggers and doughboys shared. As such it provided a powerful bonding agent. The Australian contempt for the British command and of the fighting qualities of the English was little concealed. A report by the Commanding General, 27th U.S. Division, distinguished between the attitudes of Australian officers and enlisted men toward their comrades-in-arms. The "diggers" were reported as manifesting an open and "intense criticism" that bordered on "bitterness" while the Australian officers were considered to have been

more circumspect in registering their dissatisfaction, expressing it informally. (Blair, 2001, p. 314)

Although free of British rule for over 150 years, the American soldiers still held disdain for the British military display of its superiority. Private L. Wolf of the 129th Infantry wrote “The English wanted to boss our command off the earth and so did the French – we got along with the other foreign countries” (quoted in Blair, 2001, p. 314).

Sergeant Merritt C. Pratt of the 131st Infantry also confirmed this view. He recalled English commanding officers insisting that the troops salute the British Sergeant-Majors, whom they intensely disliked, mirroring the legendary disinclination of Australians toward such military protocol. Pratt also "disliked the British soldier" and was happier serving with the Australians who he described as the best fighters he had ever seen (Blair, 2001, p. 314).

As trusted partners in incredibly bloody and intense battles, the soldiers of these two countries came to appreciate each other’s contributions in a war that was not on their home turf or for the benefit of their respective countries. One Australian company commander ended his report to his colonel: “United States troops are now classified as Diggers” (quoted in Bean, 1942, p. 333). U.S. Lieutenant Kenneth Gow of the 107th Regiment summed up the relationship best when he wrote in a letter that the Australians were "more like ourselves than any of the other allies" (Gow, 1920, p. 299).

Australian and American soldiers became legendary friends on the bloody battlefields of WWI and found they had more in common with each other than with their British counterparts. Their connections have been memorialized over the years with this often-repeated phrase “fighting side by side” as the beginning of mateship.

Between the Two Wars

When WWI ended with the Treaty of Versailles in 1918, the Australian and American soldiers returned to their home countries. Relationships between the two countries were quiescent for over 20 years until the Australians initiated new diplomatic and intelligence connections with the U.S.

Beginning of Diplomatic Relations

It took almost 40 years after Australia became a federation for the U.S. to formally recognize Australia as an independent nation. As the countries grew in relative world importance, they formalized bilateral diplomatic relations. On January 8, 1940, Australia and the U.S. agreed to establish bilateral relations by sending diplomats to each other's countries. Australia chose to locate its first legation in the U.S. rather than in the U.K. Then Prime Minister Alfred Menzies sent a cablegram to the British Embassy in Washington DC stating:

This is the first time that Australia has made a full diplomatic appointment to a foreign country and the event is therefore of great historic interest to us. We have for a long time felt that the problems which concern the nations surrounding the Pacific Ocean are of special and vital interest to Australia and that as an independent nation within the British family of nations we might quite reasonably expect to play an effective part in the development and strengthening of peaceful contacts between all the Pacific Powers.

... we feel that we have a great deal in common with the United States and that by closer contact with them we may contribute to a fuller understanding between the English-speaking peoples of the world and, through that fuller understanding, to the peace and well-being of the world.

... (Australia and the United States) have the same general idea of government; we attach the same supreme importance to the liberty of the individual; we have in common the conviction that the proper objective of governments is to forward the happiness of ordinary men and women, and

not merely of a chosen few. And we are better able to exchange our ideals by joint effort because we speak the same language and share the same literature. (Menzies, January 8, 1940)

Australian R.G. Casey set up this first legation in Washington, DC in March 1940, and the U.S. then established its first legation in Canberra in July 1940. Formal diplomatic relations provided for future collaboration both on and off the battlefield that proved fruitful for both countries, especially regarding matters in the Pacific.

Intelligence-Gathering Constrained

Australia had not established a formal intelligence agency between its formation of the Federation and WWI. During the war, Australia's navy and army had gathered some intelligence, but all were under the direction of the U.K. In 1916, Britain's Imperial Counter Espionage Bureau set up the Australian Special Intelligence Bureau (SIB) to work closely with the Australian police. In 1919, the SIB merged into a new Commonwealth Investigative Branch (CIB), but intelligence gathering was still inwardly focused and British controlled.

In 1931, the British legislature passed the Statute of Westminster, freeing Australia and the other dominions from British rule. Although Australia could pursue its own foreign policy, it still depended on Britain for intelligence coordination. Australia had gathered little to no higher-level intelligence work between the two world wars.

Thus by 1939, 23 years after the establishment of the Counter-Espionage Bureau in the First World War, Australia still did not have an effective, all-encompassing counterespionage or security service. (Horner, 2014. Vol. I. pp. 17-18)

World War II

Despite its soldiers' disillusionment fighting for the British during WWI and the fact that Australia was no longer under British rule, Australia continued to meet the expectations of its membership in the British Commonwealth. For the first time in its history, Australia conscripted troops to fight in WWII, supporting Britain's second declaration of war against Germany.

Australia and the U.S. in World War II

Numerous historical accounts and documents of WWII detail the relations and discussions between Australia, the U.S. and Britain. Barclay's (1977) journaled work, *Australia Looks to America: The Wartime Relationship, 1939-1942*, is one of them. He summarizes numerous closed-door deals, manipulations, and triangulations that occurred between Australian Prime Minister Curtin, British Prime Minister Churchill, and U.S. President Roosevelt before and during WWII. Some negotiations led to trust and others to mistrust. Three defining events foreshadowed the evolving Australia-U.S. relationship.

First, Australia reluctantly entered WWII in 1939. It agreed once again to send troops to Europe, not because Germany threatened its country, but because Australia still considered itself part of the British Commonwealth.

On September 3, 1939, the Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies made a radio broadcast three hours after the British declaration of war on Germany to say that 'in consequence of a persistence by Germany in her invasion of Poland, Great Britain has declared war upon her and ... as a result, Australia is also at war.' The statement of cause and effect was no longer accurate; but, as in August 1914, few Australians challenged this immediate and unreserved identification with the British cause. (Beaumont, 2014, p. 412)

In the fall of 1941, newly elected Australian Prime Minister Curtin knew that Japan was warmongering in the Pacific. Since Britain had focused exclusively on Germany's hostile actions, he also believed Britain would not provide any military support for his country or others in the Pacific. Curtin rightly distrusted Churchill's intentions: he viewed him as attempting to manipulate Roosevelt into supporting Britain's war efforts in Europe. Unbeknownst to Curtin, Churchill had already met privately with Roosevelt convincing the President to agree to a beat-Hitler-first war strategy.

Second, Australia declared war on Japan on December 8, 1941, one day after Japan bombed Pearl Harbor. For the first time in its history, Australia had independently declared war on another country. Curtin clearly communicated the urgent need for U.S. military support to deter Japanese aggression in the Pacific rather than for Britain's help to protect its national interests. Curtin wrote a poignant column to the *Melbourne Herald* on December 27, 1941, called *The Task Ahead*, that illustrates Australia turning away from Britain and toward the US:

Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free from any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.

We know the problems that the United Kingdom faces. We know the constant threat of invasion. We know the dangers of dispersal of strength, but we know, too, that Australia can go and Britain can still hold on.

We are, therefore, determined that Australia shall not go, and we shall devote all our energies towards the shaping of a plan, with the United States as its keystone, which will give to our country some confidence of being able to hold out until the tide of battle swings against our enemy.
(Curtin, 1941, p.10)

This speech marked a pivotal moment in Australia's move toward America and away from Britain. It opened the door for the Australian Parliament to finally adopt the

Statute of Westminster, allowing it to form its own defense and foreign policies instead of relying upon Britain. Since then, Australia's military relationship with Britain was replaced with a stronger relationship with America.

Third, Japan captured Britain's military base in Singapore in February 1942. Curtin blamed Britain for the fall of Singapore and for Japan's subsequent capture of tens of thousands of Australians as prisoners of war. Four days later, the Japanese bombed Darwin and other Australian towns. Curtin was adamant that Australia needed immediate American military support and leadership to fight the Japanese (Edwards, 2021, p. 19).

Australia Looks to America for Military Support

In a radio speech on March 14, 1942, Curtin implored the Americans, "You, as I have said, must be our leader. We will pull knee to knee with you for every ounce of our weight."

He then went on to warn them:

But I give you this warning: Australia is the last bastion between the West Coast of America and the Japanese. If Australia goes, the Americas are wide open. It is said that the Japanese will by-pass Australia and that they can be met and routed in India. I say to you that the saving of Australia is the saving of America's west coast. If you believe anything to the contrary then you delude yourselves. (Curtin, 1942)

It is no wonder that Australia greeted U.S. General Douglas MacArthur with welcomed relief when he appeared in Melbourne to take over as Supreme Commander of the South West Pacific region. Upon his arrival, newspapers quoted Curtin's gratitude for the military support:

"Our visitors speak like us, think like us, and fight like us, and therefore we can find a community of interest and comradeship with them that will be a firm basis when the supreme test of battle comes. There is in this country a feeling of deep gratitude to the President and people of USA for

this evidence we see around us of aid in terms of men and munitions to which the President recently referred in his report to the people.

...These forces are not only most heartening in their actuality, but in their expression of the spirit of fighting shoulder to shoulder that will give to the democracies the decisive strength in the Pacific and in all theatres of war.” (The Argus, 1942)

MacArthur and Curtin, often pictured together, leaned heavily on each other in support of their war strategies to fight the Japanese. They also trusted each other with information needed to fight the Japanese. When WWII broke out, the Combined Operations Centre, which still reported to the British War Cabinet, coordinated Australian intelligence with British naval, military, and air commands. When MacArthur took command of the Allied forces in the South West Pacific region, Australian intelligence changed dramatically. In *Australia’ First Spies*, Fahey (2018) claims that collecting HUMINT was incredibly difficult and required careful coordination. The two countries worked closely together with MacArthur’s staff to obtain enemy information under the umbrella of a newly formed Allied Intelligence Bureau in Australia.

The emergence of signals intelligence (SIGINT) was one of the most significant outcomes of this new arrangement with Australian and the U.S. joint efforts. A Fleet Radio Unit was sent up in Melbourne (FRUMEL) to oversee naval operations and report on them to a U.S. naval commander in Hawaii. Similarly, FRUMEL involved Australians working closely and in a remarkably trusted collaborative venture alongside U.S. counterparts. FRUMEL, with its own collection sites on naval assets at sea, contributed directly to the successes in the pivotal 1942 battles of the Coral Sea and Midway (Blaxland, 2021. p. 16).

After WWII, Australia and New Zealand doubted that Britain would give them any future military support. Their distrust for such support was revealed when the new Prime Minister, Ben Chifley, pointedly stated on August 9, 1945:

I take nothing away from the past glory of Mr. Churchill as the war leader of Britain and the Empire. But he made one fatal mistake— he allied himself with the people who stood for the old established order of things, with people who were not concerned with the common and ordinary man, with people who were more concerned to see that the privileged classes retained their privileges. (Churchill Erred, 1945, p. 3)

In short, Australia had received little in its relationship with Britain over many decades. When Britain needed Australia's troops to bolster its military support in a European war, the Australians sent its soldiers, even though those wars had no direct impact on its security or citizens. Britain, however, lost interest in supporting Australia when the country desperately needed more military power to defend itself in the Pacific. In contrast, the U.S. sent almost a million troops to Australia to support its battle against the Japanese during WWII. To this day, many older Australians believe that the U.S. saved Australia from a Japanese takeover.

WWII was catastrophic: it significantly and negatively impacted countries worldwide economically, politically, and militarily. More than 68 million civilians and military personnel died in the conflict. In its aftermath, tensions remained high between democracies and communist countries and it became clear that change was needed.

In summary, politicians have cited the date, July 4, 1918, numerous times as the emergence of the Australian-American mateship during the epic Battle of Hamel. Similarly, the Australian public and its leaders recognized and valued U.S. support when it was critically needed during WWII. They also realized that Britain did not prioritize Australia. Britain failed to protect Australia from Japan's attack on its country and

capture of its citizens. Consequently, the U.S. became firmly embedded as Australia's most reliable mate from that time forward.

Chapter IV.

Post World War II: 1946-1953

Please convey to those present an expression of the great satisfaction with which we have become parties to this historic pact. Your own constant labours did much to produce the result which has I am sure the warm approval of the overwhelming majority of the Australian people. The Pact is conceived in no spirit of hostility, on the contrary it embodies an enduring spirit of friendship and cooperation.

*—Prime Minister Robert Menzies
Cablegram sent at signing of ANZUS,
San Francisco, September 1, 1951*

After WWII ended, the need was great for liberal democratic countries to form strong diplomatic, intelligence, and military alliances among themselves to contain potential acts of aggression and deter future war. It was imperative that countries in Europe and the Pacific restore peace and also curtail the spread of communism within their own nations and abroad. As the world watched Europe rebuild cities and infrastructures, many global leaders understood the need to forge new global agreements supporting peace and prosperity. It became apparent that strong alliances were critical in the emerging new world order and Australia played a crucial role in many of them.

Diplomatic Relationships

Concerned that history might repeat itself, Australia was also keen to find opportunities to deepen its relationship with countries other than the U.K. This point was driven home when Britain told Australia and the other dominions at a meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth in 1946 to find their own way forward without its

support (United States Study Centre, 2021, p. 21). Australia wasted no time in developing new relationships and walked on to the world stage, participating in new opportunities to impact humanitarian, cultural, and economic efforts.

Global Organizations

Toward that end, Australia engaged in several global organizations that helped foster its reputation as an influential nation. One example was when Australia and the U.S. joined 50 other countries in 1945 as a founding member of the United Nations (UN). Its charter was to maintain international peace and security, develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination, and achieve international cooperation in solving international problems regarding economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian character.

Dr. H. V. Evatt, an Australian delegate to the UN, became President of the UN General Assembly in 1948. Under his leadership, the UN General Assembly created the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Eleanor Roosevelt, widow of former President Franklin D. Roosevelt, worked with Evatt in drafting the declaration (O'Neill, 2008). Although not a treaty, this declaration is considered part of international law. Australia became part of a larger group of nations committed to not repeating the mistakes made in the previous two world wars.

Another post WWII global expansion of the UN was the establishment of the International Monetary Fund to “promote growth and prosperity” and the World Bank to “aid economic development.” Australia was invited to join both in 1947. Australia also became a party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 which subsequently came under the umbrella of the World Trade Organisation in 1995.

Another Australian effort drew the world's focus to it by contributing to a significant cultural event: the Olympics. It began in 1947 when several men from Melbourne decided to make a bid to host the 1956 World Olympics. They convinced the International Olympic Committee to allow the Olympics to be held in the Southern Hemisphere for the first time. Press and television coverage claimed it was a huge success with two million people attending. Many attendees could not help noticing how similar Australia was to America:

The suggestion was that Australia had already fallen into the embrace of American way of culture and consumerism: if a visiting American felt it was like home, then perhaps Australia was already traveling swiftly away from the Empire and the Mother Country into the arms of someone else. (Richardson, 2019, pp.271-272)

This event had a unique impact on building international relationships in that Australia started the tradition of the athletes mixing together at the closing parade instead of walking with the athletes from their own country. This tradition continues today.

This would not be the last time for Australia to host the Olympics. Sydney hosted the games in 2000 with even greater success. The president of the Olympic committee claimed it was the best ever with 11,000 athletes representing 199 countries and 5.5 million tickets sold. Brisbane will host the games in 2032.

Another example of a global organization that Australia became involved in is the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). It was originally established in 1948 as the Organization for European Economic Co-operation to assist in the reconstruction of Europe. Obviously due to geography, Australia was not a founding partner. Australia joined it in 1960 when the organization was expanded and renamed. Appointed in June 2021, the current Secretary General is Mathias Cormann, an Australian.

Australian and U.S. Initiatives

Three diplomatic initiatives specifically developed the Australia-U.S. relationship after WWII. First was the concomitant upgrade of the two legations in Canberra and Washington, DC. In mid-1946, they became bona fide embassies, with each country selecting ambassadors and presenting them to the other to serve.

The diplomatic relationships between the two countries have grown in number and stature. Today, Australia has consulates in Chicago, Honolulu, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New York. The U.S. has consulates in Sydney, Perth, and Melbourne. Leaders of both embassies have high profiles and strong ties in the Asia-Pacific region. Currently, Caroline Kennedy is the U.S. Ambassador to Australia. Well-known as the daughter of former President John F. Kennedy, she previously served as the Ambassador to Japan from 2013-17. Kevin Rudd, former Australian Prime Minister, appointed in February 2023 as Australia's Ambassador to the U.S. Rudd, is fluent in Chinese, CEO of the Asia Society, Chair of the International Peace Institute and Senior Fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. He recently received a Doctorate from Oxford after writing his dissertation on China President Xi, and published a book titled, *The Avoidable War*.

The second initiative was created by foreign war correspondent, Keith Murdoch. He formed a US-based nonprofit organization in July 1946 to encourage American businesses and government leaders to take an interest in Australian businesses, politics, and culture. He, along with the president of the Australian Society, brought together distinguished leaders of U.S. corporations, including J.P. Morgan, Pan Am Airlines, and

the U.S. Post Office, to set up the American Australian Association (AAA) in New York (United States Study Centre, 2021, p. 26).

Today, the AAA hosts a wide range of events and galas featuring celebrities, defense leaders, and politicians. Over \$14 million has been awarded in scholarships to students, artists, and veterans to participate in their foreign exchange programs.

For the third initiative, the U.S. Ambassador to Australia and Australia's Minister for External Affairs signed the bilateral Fulbright treaty in 1949. It established a foreign exchange scholarship program to provide American and Australian postgraduate students and academic lecturers the opportunity to study in each other's countries. According to the Australian Fulbright website:

The Program was originally funded with an initial sum of U.S. \$5.8m, representing U.S. Government credits acquired in Australia from the sale of surplus war materials. This arrangement arose from the Lend-Lease Settlement Australia had signed in June 1946, agreeing on the terms of Australia's reimbursement of the U.S. for wartime transfer of tools, property and capital equipment, and by the U.S. Congress's passage of the Fulbright Act (an Amendment to the Surplus Property Act) on 1 August. (Fulbright Australia, 2022)

This program was the first official treaty between the two countries. Over 5000 Australians and Americans have participated in the Australia Fulbright program from 1949 through 2021.

Intelligence Sharing

Worried about the spread of communism, the U.K. and the U.S. signed the UKUSA Agreement in 1946 to share foreign intelligence gathered from high-frequency radio signals transmitted around the world. Although Australia had been a significant

contributor to this intelligence gathering effort during WWII, it was not part of the original UKUSA agreement since it was still viewed as a dominion of the UK.

Five Eyes

In 1948, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand joined this highly secretive agreement. These five countries updated the UKUSA agreement in the mid-1950s, and from then on it was called “Five Eyes” or FVEY. Any release of intelligence information is designated for viewing only by these five countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.K., and the U.S.

FVEY continues today with each party sharing modern surveillance over activities of China, Russia, North Korea, and other countries of interest. The alliance includes various espionage agencies from the five countries and, at times, other liberal democracies who choose to cooperate in sharing signals intelligence.

Australian Security Intelligence Organisation

Shortly after the formation of Five Eyes, Australia, the U.K., and the U.S. encountered challenges to the security of their intelligence sharing. SIGINT revealed a major security breach in 1948 involving Soviet Union espionage within Australia. The U.S. and the U.K. were reluctant to share information with Australia over their concern about communist agents in that country. Government officials from the three countries worked to determine who to trust and how to move forward while also expressing concern about the Soviet Union’s capability for developing atomic bombs.

As a result, then Prime Minister Chifley established a new agency, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), to restore trust and reorganize intelligence

gathering. Its mission was to identify and catch spies. Its officers worked closely with U.S. security agencies (CIA) and the Australian embassy in the U.S. (Horner, 2015).

Intelligence Community

Despite this highly guarded collaboration of top-secret information, several writers have published articles and books about the consortium. Many credited FVEY for its significance in avoiding a full-out war with the Soviet Union as well as for containing other hostile actions. Anthony Wells (2020) in his book, *Between Five Eyes: 50 Years of Intelligence Sharing*, points out how important relationships are to the intelligence community. FVEY is arguably the one of, if not the most, critical intelligence gathering system that the U.S. has in the world. Australia’s participation in it remains a key component of support for the CIA, the Pentagon and Capitol Hill.

Figure 1 shows FVEY includes at least ten Australian and U.S. agencies today.

AUSTRALIAN ORGANISATIONS	UNITED STATES AGENCIES
AU Defence Intelligence Organisation	US Defense Intelligence Agency
AU Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS)	US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
AU Signals Directorate (ASD)	US National Security Agency (NSA)
AU Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation	US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
AU Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)	US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Figure 1. Australian and U.S. Intelligence Agencies Involved in Five Eyes

Source: Adapted from United States Study Centre. (2021) The Alliance at 70, p. 59.

These trusted interrelationships between Australia and the U.S. intelligence community agencies have been responsible for speaking truth to power for over 70 years.

Korean War

The Korean War was the first of the proxy wars between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. On June 25, 1950, the North Koreans launched attacks on the South Koreans. Within two days, the U.S. deployed its army, navy, and air force to aid the Koreans south of the 38th parallel. The Soviets supported the Koreans to the north.

At this time, Australian Prime Minister Menzies and his Minister for External Affairs considered it important to show Australia's allegiance with the U.S. For that reason, Menzies committed similar troops to support the South Koreans three days later. Australia was the second country to send in its troops, and it marked the first time it joined a war effort independent of the U.K. The Australians had no reservations about U.S. General MacArthur taking over command of the United Nations' troops. For three years, the Australians and the Americans fought side by side in this difficult war (*Korean War 1950-53*, 2021).

New Treaties

In April 14, 1949, the U.S. and 11 other nations formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to provide collective defense security to the parties in the agreement. Australia and New Zealand were not included in this treaty since they were geographically located in the southern hemisphere and not within the area of the North Atlantic countries. Feeling left out of the NATO security agreement, Australia looked to the U.S. to find similar support.

Australia, New Zealand, and United States

Australia and New Zealand needed to forge a strong security alliance that would address each country's increasing fears that communism was spreading in East Asia and that the war in the Pacific was not yet over. Australia and New Zealand were eager to include the U.S. in this new agreement because of Churchill's prior public statements that the U.K. would not give military help to either country in their time of need. They wanted something similar to Article 5 of the NATO treaty that would guarantee U.S. military support if any of its members were attacked. Consequently, both countries sought President Harry Truman's help to negotiate a final peace treaty with Japan and to cooperate with them in security efforts. Truman agreed to a treaty somewhat similar to that of NATO's.

Thus, six years after WWII ended, and in the middle of the Korean War, Australia and the U.S. cemented its relationship even further by signing the Australia, New Zealand, United States Treaty (ANZUS) in San Francisco in September 1951. This alliance had deep significance for Australia. It was the first signed security treaty in Australia's history independent of Britain.

ANZUS versus NATO

It would be a mistake to assume that the ANZUS treaty provides the same security as the NATO treaty. Although ANZUS and NATO appear similar in that both ostensibly aim to cause the parties to rally to one another's defense, the operation of each treaty is distinguishable. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a legal analysis of the two treaties; however, upon closer examination, some differences and questions surface about what ANZUS and NATO provide to the parties. The ANZUS terms seem

to be equivocal and not as hard and fast as the terms in at least three articles of the NATO treaty.

First, Article III of ANZUS specifies the threatened area as the Pacific. The Pacific is generally referred to as an ocean with numerous islands, some of which belong to Australia. NATO specifies North America and Europe, which are considered land masses, not an oceanographic region. If Australian shores or possessions were to be attacked in the Indian Ocean, does ANZUS apply?

Second, ANZUS states an attack on any of the parties would be dangerous and they would act to meet the danger per their constitutional process. NATO states an armed attack on any of the parties would be considered an armed attack on all of them and they can individually or collectively use armed forces to defend themselves. Does ANZUS expect the parties to act with armed forces? Must the Crown, as head of state per Australia's constitution, approve the deployment of armed forces first?

Third, ANZUS specifies the parties' metropolitan territory, islands, armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific. NATO extends territory boundaries and covers areas in Europe where occupation forces are stationed. If Australia had stationed armed forces in another country outside of the Pacific that were attacked, does ANZUS apply?

To enhance the interoperability of NATO in 2014, Australia became an Enhanced Partner of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Following the world-wide concern over the war in Ukraine and tensions in China, newly elected Prime Minister Albanese was invited to attend the 2022 NATO summit in Spain. That representatives of three other non-NATO countries (Japan, New Zealand and South Korea) joined him suggests the heightened concern over a potential world war, possibly requiring NATO and these

Pacific rim countries involvement. In Figure 2, the italicized and bolded words highlight the differences in three articles of the two operating agreements.

ANZUS ARTICLE NO.	NATO ARTICLE NO.
<p style="text-align: center;">Article III</p> <p>The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened <i>in the Pacific</i>.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Article 4</p> <p>The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Article IV</p> <p>Each Party <i>recognizes</i> that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that <i>it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes</i>.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Article 5</p> <p>The Parties <i>agree</i> that an armed attack against one or more of them <i>in Europe or North America</i> shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, <i>if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised</i> by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, <i>such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force</i>, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Article V</p> <p>For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack <i>on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific</i>.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Article 6</p> <p>For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: <i>on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer</i>.</p>

Figure 2. Comparison of ANZUS and NATO Articles

Source: Adapted from the ANZUS (1951) and NATO (1949) treaties.

The ANZUS treaty is in place and is referred to often, but it does not compare to the imperatives that the NATO treaty requires of its parties. Some skeptics question the worthiness of ANZUS today. Allan Behm writes in *No Enemies No Friends*:

But ANZUS no longer has great strategic utility. It no longer underpins our security. Times have changed. The strategic circumstances that gave birth to ANZUS have changed. The United States has changed. Australia has changed. The treaty is an historical artifact, not a fundamental principle of national strategic policy. It is not, and cannot be the basis of Australia's strategic or defence planning. (Behm, 2022, pp. 92-93)

ANZUS remains today as the most influential agreement between Australia and the U.S. and the touchstone for numerous other agreements that developed later between the two countries. This treaty provides reassurance to Australia that the U.S. will provide military aid. There may be gaps in it, however, that lead one to wonder if the mateship rhetoric and the history of fighting side by side represent a moral obligation to defend one another as mates.

In summary, in the years after WWII, the two war-weary nations embraced each other with peace-seeking diplomatic, intelligence gathering, and military agreements. The key takeaway from this period is that Churchill's clear abandonment of the dominions motivated Australia to move on from U.K. dependence. Almost unilaterally, Australia transferred its expectations for security from the U.K. to the U.S.

The diplomatic initiatives that began then continue to thrive and have expanded in serving their purpose. They also unite Americans and Australians as visitors, scholars, artists, and business colleagues. Both countries sponsor numerous cultural, celebratory, and educational events, enabling cultural exchanges and lasting friendships.

This period also marked the start of the Cold War with Russia, where Australian and U.S. soldiers found themselves on Korean battlefields, fighting to support another

country in a proxy war. Through Five Eyes, Australia became a vital and trusted partner in the intelligence community, building security in the Pacific region.

The ANZUS treaty was created by the mutual desire of Australia and New Zealand to have an insurance policy against future war threats. It may be debatable whether Australia can rely on the U.S. for military aid per the terms of this 72-year-old agreement. On the other hand, the history of the U.S. having done so in the past, along with the interdependence of intelligence gathering and strong diplomatic relationships, points to the likelihood that the U.S. will provide military aid in the future.

Chapter V.

The Later Cold War Years: 1954-1991

But it does not take a war to bring Americans and Australians close together. We like each other. Friendships form quickly between us. We have many mutually beneficial links, our trade with each other, the investment that you make with us with your capital. We cooperate in many constructive international interests and causes.

...And so, sir, in the lonelier and perhaps even more disheartening moments which come to any national leader, I hope there will be a corner of your mind and heart which takes cheer from the fact that you have an admiring friend, a staunch friend that will be all the way with LBJ.

*—Prime Minister Holt
Address to President Johnson
Washington DC, June 29, 1966*

The South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was another attempt toward uniting Australia with other countries. Created in 1954 and modeled after NATO, the membership of SEATO included Australia, New Zealand, the U.S., France, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the U.K. For various reasons SEATO was considered a failure and was dissolved in 1977. Despite this failure, other major developments emerged from the basic tenets of ANZUS that have endured, making the case for why the U.S. is still allied with Australia today.

Australia and the U.S. Lean Toward Each Other

After the Korean War, Australian and American troops fought together again in another war on a distance land: Vietnam. They also found new opportunities to work together through business development and then later, secretly in space.

The Vietnam War

The Vietnam War was the second proxy war that engaged U.S. and Australian troops in battle together. According to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, the U.S. became officially involved in 1955 in Vietnam when President Eisenhower sent a small number of elite U.S. troops to train the South Vietnamese in its struggle to fight the North Vietnamese. Both Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lydon B. Johnson authorized buildup of U.S. military support to help South Vietnam during the '50s and '60s, increasing the number of U.S. troops sent there. In early 1965, about 50,000 U.S. troops served mainly as advisors to the South Vietnamese army. By the end of 1966, 500,000 U.S. troops were fighting in the country.

Australia also answered the call from South Vietnam leaders for military aid and entered the Vietnam War in 1962. As the U.S. sent in more troops in the mid '60s, President Johnson requested Australia's military help. Australia, in the spirit of the previously signed ANZUS treaty, complied. Both countries believed involvement in this war was critical to deter the spread of communism. Johnson then visited Australia in 1966 to solidify both countries' commitment and support for the war. It marked the first time a sitting President had visited Australia.

Both countries later shared another commonality regarding the Vietnam War. Public outcry and protests in the U.S. and Australia began to mount against the war in the late '60s. Men resisted being drafted into a war that seemed to have no upside for its citizens. Anti-war demonstrations, including some violent, increasingly escalated throughout both countries. President Richard Nixon, who had promised in his campaign for office to end the Vietnam War, initiated withdrawal of U.S. troops in the early '70s,

bringing about a significant decline in the Vietnam War efforts. By the middle of 1973, all Australian and U.S. troops withdrew from Vietnam (*Vietnam War 1962-75*. 2023).

American Chamber of Commerce

The U.S. economy was growing as the Vietnam War continued. U.S. companies looked to expand overseas, including to Australia. In an effort to support that growth, the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) was established in 1961 to “facilitate interaction, open up channels of communication, change thinking, and explore possibilities” between executives and employees of U.S. companies with offices in Australia and, likewise, Australian companies with offices in the U.S. (AmCham, 2022). Many of these companies have contracts with the Australian government. Premium corporate members include 3M, Bechtel, Boeing, G.E. Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon as well as several major U.S. accounting and law firms. AmCham is one of many examples of the strong U.S. and Australian economic relationships that developed and have endured over the years.

Today AmCham, with seven offices located in major Australian cities, coordinates member networking and speaker events within the country, conducts trade missions to the U.S., and provides advocacy work to support tax and trade issues in both countries. The Chamber’s Sydney-based headquarters recently supported economic and military connections when it held its second AmCham Alliance Awards Gala in November 2022. At the formal gala, CEO’s and political dignitaries awarded prize money to Australian and U.S. startup companies specifically working in the critical alliance industries of artificial intelligence, biotechnology, digital economy, energy and clean tech, quantum computing, and space.

Pine Gap

As the U.S. and Australia's defense departments, as well as the media, focused on the Vietnam War, both countries discussed a new joint treaty in 1963. The purpose of this treaty was to establish and install a Joint Defense Space Research Facility in the middle of Australia. The facility, located in Alice Springs in the Northern Territory, is known as Pine Gap. The treaty begins by referring to the ANZUS Treaty Article II to "jointly maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attacks" (ANZUS, 1951).

The Australians built this facility, and the CIA have operated it, to monitor SIGINT. This highly secret project was unknown to the public until 2005 (Wells, 2020) and supposedly not even to the Prime Minister in 1973. From the start and possibly to this day, this satellite ground station is capable of:

...sucking up like a vacuum cleaner a wide spectrum of telemetry signals, military, diplomatic and other communications and radar emissions and beaming them back down to the ground control station at Pine Gap. (Ball, 1988, p. 29)

Pine Gap is located in a desolate, isolated area with prohibited access to non-employees. Overhead pictures of the facility show the massive white domes that send and receive satellite information. Australia's hosting of this base for the U.S. since the '60s made them a close and, conceivably still to this day, irreplaceable partner in intelligence gathering.

The three Rhyolite satellites operational at the time were controlled from Pine Gap and together provided complete coverage of the Soviet Union (Ball, 1988, p. 19)

The Pine Gap treaty was updated in 1988 to replace the words "general defence research in the space field" with "a joint defence facility for intelligence purposes." The

CIA's responsibility for overseeing this facility was transferred to the U.S. National Reconnaissance Office. Desmond Ball, former Head of the Strategic Defence Studies Center at the Australian National University, offered detailed information about this facility in *Code 777: Australia and the U.S. Defense Communications System*. He made the case that Australia had given extensive support to the U.S. military without the ability to access some of the information for its own security measures (Ball, 1989).

Figure 3 shows Australia's unique geography as an ideal location to collect not only ingoing and outgoing transmissions of the former Soviet Union but also those of the entire Indo-Pacific region. This map reinforces the vital importance of Australia to SIGINT and to U.S. intelligence in collecting military information about China, Russia, North Korea, the Middle East, and Afghanistan.




Figure 3. Pine Gap-controlled Orion SIGINT Satellite Stations

Source: Ball et al., 2015, p 7.

Pine Gap was not the only joint Australia-U.S. military base built in Australia. In 1963, the Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt was constructed in Exmouth, Western Australia, to transmit very-low-frequency messages to U.S. and Australian navies. The station still operates today with sophisticated C-band radar and a space-surveillance telescope. The Australian Defence Satellite Communications Station (ADSCS) is another shared communication base in Kojarena, Western Australia. Built in the early '90s, it is also part of the U.S. SIGINT program.

Additionally, Australia's location in the Southern Hemisphere complements the U.S. space-exploring capabilities. This factor combined with Australia's expertise in radio technology has made the country a partner in NASA projects and with the newly formed U.S. Space Command.

New Zealand Leaves ANZUS

As the Cold War progressed, concerns arose among certain nations regarding the development, testing, and use of nuclear weapons. In 1959, a group in New Zealand founded the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and in 1963 petitioned the New Zealand government to create a "No Bombs South of the Line" policy. This disarmament movement spread to other Pacific Islands, including Australia. In 1985, New Zealand and 11 other island nations in the South Pacific signed the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty vote. The treaty banned nuclear weapons from being manufactured, tested, stationed, or used in specific areas in the South Pacific. These areas are collectively known as the SPNFZ. This treaty had major repercussions for the ANZUS alliance. New Zealand could no longer give access to any vessel, including U.S. Navy warships carrying nuclear weapons onboard, unless it could be determined otherwise. Since the

U.S. would not disclose such classified information for security reasons, the U.S. discontinued allowing its ships to enter the waters around New Zealand. Subsequently, in 1986, the U.S. released New Zealand from its obligations to be part of ANZUS, downgrading New Zealand from a U.S. ally to friend (Jennings, 2021, p.37).

Australia, on the other hand, was already deeply enmeshed in other U.S. security and intelligence relationships, as discussed above, and continued to honor the ANZUS treaty. The two countries exchanged letters affirming their agreement on the same day that New Zealand was excluded.

Australian-U.S. Ministerial Consultations

New Zealand's nuclear-free territorial action also eliminated the country as a participant in the ANZUS Council of Foreign Ministers. Consequently, a new group was formed, called the Australian-U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN). The Australian Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence meet annually with the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and other high-ranking officials. Since 1985, the purpose of these meetings, alternately held in each other countries, is to reinforce the bilateral military and security agreements already in place with ANZUS.

The Ministers release a Joint Communiqué following each AUSMIN meeting, consistently reaffirming their commitment to mutually stabilizing the Pacific region and beyond, including in 2010, the space domain. The joint statement released in 2022, perhaps the lengthiest one of all, identified areas of mutual commitment to the Indo-Pacific. Areas include climate, clean energy, environment, prosperity, innovation, resilient supply chains, defense and security, and technology. The statement shared that “the principals also decided to evolve their defense and security cooperation to ensure

they are equipped to deter aggression, counter coercion, and make space for sovereign decision making” (Joint Statement Australia–U.S. Ministerial Consultations AUSMIN, 2022).

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

A few years after the launch of AUSMIN, Prime Minister Bob Hawke started discussions in 1989 with other countries in the Asia-Pacific region interested in creating trade and investment agreements. Shortly thereafter, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was formed. Somewhat similar to AUSMIN, senior ministerial and heads of government meet annually in rotating locations to discuss economic issues facing the region and to support free and open trade among its members. The group has expanded from 12 countries bordering the Pacific to 21, including China and Russia (www.apec.org).

In summary, the diplomatic, military, and economic ties achieved through AmCham, Pine Gap and AUSMIN created during the later Cold War era were very much needed at that time to contain perceived threats of communism and to support the growth of their economies. These relationships have become even stronger today as security needs have changed and globalization has increased.

Pine Gap, as part of the Five Eyes intelligence network, is a vitally important U.S. top-secret military base and is still operational today. Global surveillance capabilities have increased in parallel with the advent of new technology on land and in outer space and cyberspace. The importance of safeguarding Pine Gap and Five Eyes should be considered a key reason for Australia to assume it can rely on the U.S.

AmCham and APEC are also important organizations for economic connections between the U.S., Australia, and other Pacific rim countries. High-level discussions held at AUSMIN annual meetings continue to reinforce Australia and U.S. commitments to maintain a stable rules-based international order in the Asia-Pacific region. All these cooperative efforts lead to the conclusion that the two countries have very strong alignments and common national interests.

Chapter VI.

End of Cold War to the 9/11 Attack: 1992-2001

Very good. I mean, we are very close friends. We covered just about everything you could cover in the time. We're going to continue over lunch to talk about some of the regional issues. And it's a great opportunity to reinforce what a deep friendship it is. And the President and I have a great similarity of views on many issues, and it's a great experience to be able to exchange them with somebody who holds the views he does.

*— Prime Minister Howard
Press conference with President Bush
Washington DC, September 10, 2001*

It is generally agreed that the Cold War ended in 1991 with the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.). According to the assessment of some historians, President Reagan and Soviet Union President Gorbachev had collaborated effectively to bring the Berlin wall down, reunite Germany, and reduce their respective countries' arsenals of warheads. Gorbachev resigned at the end of December 1991. Although communism was still the form of government in China, Korea, and Cuba, the fear of the U.S.S.R. spreading communism in Eastern Europe and beyond was no longer considered a viable threat.

A group of terrorists contesting Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia military occupations in the Middle East posed new threats to peace in the '90s. The history behind Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban, and the subsequent attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, this chapter focuses on the

importance of the relationships between Australia and U.S. leaders before, during, and after the 9/11 attacks and how they influenced military decisions.

Presidents and Prime Ministers

U.S. presidents and prime ministers from other countries often forge strong bonds of friendship during wartime. As mentioned previously, President Johnson and Prime Minister Holt were close friends during the Vietnam War. President George H.R. Bush and Prime Minister Hawke had a strong relationship during the Gulf War I in 1990-91 when their countries' troops fought together. In fact, when Bush arrived at the Australian Parliament at the end of 1991, he was visibly saddened when he saw his good friend Hawke sidelined at the meeting. Paul Keating had ousted Hawke as Prime Minister two weeks before Bush's planned diplomatic tour of Sydney, Canberra, and Melbourne (Harris, 2022).

Clinton and Howard

Not all U.S. president-prime minister relationships, however, have been congenial. For instance, Prime Minister John Howard and President Bill Clinton did not enjoy a close relationship. Clinton's behavior toward Howard was considered rude when Howard visited the White House in 1996. Clinton left Howard waiting in the rain for his scheduled meeting with the president and then gave him only 20 minutes to discuss trade imports (White, 2003).

Three years later in 1999, Howard, a brilliant strategist and forward-thinking leader, asked Clinton to help Australia keep East Timor's increasing unrest under control. Clinton gave less than what Howard wanted. When reporters asked Clinton at a press

conference on September 10, 1999, what level of support the U.S. was prepared to give to peacekeeping in East Timor, he dismissively replied:

I want the American people to know two things. No. 1, the Australians have made it clear that they, being the nearest military authority, intend to play the largest role and provide the lion's share of the effort there, and that many other countries have already agreed to contribute....

...So, this may be a question that you'll have to ask me again tomorrow and the next day and the next day, because I don't have a clear answer for you yet. (Clinton, 1999)

In a later Australian newspaper article, “The Howard Doctrine” phrase was coined, suggesting that Australia was the U.S. “deputy sheriff” in the Asia-Pacific region. Chinese media and analysts then used this terminology, citing it as Howard’s thinking behind a strategy that was pro-U.S. and anti-China (Minyue, 2005, p.113).

Hugh White, who served under Howard as Australia’s Department of Defence Deputy Secretary for Strategy from 1996-2001 and was the principal author of Australia’s 2000 Defence White Paper, has an interesting perspective on how Australia turned more toward the U.S. in the ‘90s. In his paper, *Mr. Howard goes to Washington: the U.S. and Australia in the Age of Terror*, White asserts there were several situations in which Australia managed the unrest in the Asia-Pacific region and supported U.S. foreign policy. His assertions support the idea that Australia was indeed the U.S. deputy sheriff.

Taken from Comparative Connections Journal, *Chronology of Australia-US/East Asia Relations, March 1996-September 2011*, Figure 4 shows a timeline of significant events that impacted Australia-U.S. during the period leading up to 9/11. The description of the events in the timeline underscores Australia’s reputation as the deputy sheriff.

March 11, 1996: John Howard elected prime minister, defeating Labor incumbent Paul Keating.

March 25, 1996: Taiwan Strait Crisis; PM Howard condemns China's intimidation of Taiwan's first democratic elections and supports dispatch of U.S. aircraft carriers to the region.

July 27, 1996: Joint Security Declaration is released at the annual Australian-United States Ministerial talks (AUSMIN). The "Sydney Statement" declares that, "[t]he Australia-United States security relationship, having proved its value for five decades, will remain a cornerstone of Asia Pacific security into the 21st century."

July 1997-1998: The Asian financial crisis cripples financial markets in the region. Australia contributes to IMF rescue packages for countries most effected, including Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand.

Aug. 28, 1997: Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade releases "In the National Interest," which states that "[t]here is no strategic relationship closer than that which Australia shares with the United States, whose strategic engagement and commitment underwrites the stability of East Asia."

May 21, 1998: Indonesia's President Suharto is forced to resign as an estimated 2,500 people are killed in riots across Jakarta.

Sept. 29, 1999: Following an interview between Prime Minister Howard and journalist Fred Benchley in *The Bulletin*, it is subsequently misreported that Australia is to adopt the role of America's "deputy sheriff" in its regional foreign policy.

Oct. 25, 1999: Australia leads a UN sanctioned International Force in East Timor and plays a key role in East Timor's movement toward independence in 2002.

Dec. 6, 2000: Australia's Department of Defence releases "Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force," which affirms that "Australia's undertakings in the ANZUS Treaty to support the United States are as important as the U.S. undertakings to support Australia."

Sept. 10, 2001: PM Howard meets with President Bush in Washington as part of the 50th anniversary celebrations of the ANZUS Treaty signed Sept. 1, 1951. The two leaders sign a joint statement reaffirming the strength and vitality of the bilateral relationship between the two countries.

Figure 4. Timeline of Significant Australian Events Prior to 9/11

Source: Adapted from *Chronologies. March 1996 -September 10, 2001. Comparative Connections*. <https://cc.pacforum.org/relations/australia-us-east-asia/?pt=date>

Bush and Howard

The US-Australia relationship grew closer when George W. Bush became president in 2001, and after the 9/11 event. Howard was in Washington, DC on that fatal day. He had met with Bush the day before the attacks to celebrate the 50th anniversary of ANZUS and to reaffirm the agreement. The government released the following joint statement that day:

The two leaders reaffirmed that the alliance is an alliance between two peoples, tied by bonds of law and language, united by a history of shared struggle and sacrifice in defense of freedom and democracy, and finding new strength in the challenges of a changing world.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that for fifty years, the friendship between the United States and Australia has advanced the cause of stability and security within the Asia-Pacific region and indeed throughout the world. The aspirations we have shared, for peace and prosperity for all, remain as firmly held as ever. (White House, 2001)

The next day Howard witnessed firsthand the smoke rising from the plane crash into the Pentagon. He announced to the world that Australia would be the first country to respond to the 9/11 attacks on the US. Six months later, Howard summed up the events of the day in a speech to the U.S. Congress:

ANZUS Treaty of 1951 pledged each country to come to the aid of the other if it were under attack.

And so it was that in a United States Air Force plane made available to me for my return to Australia on the 12th of September last year to enable me to return to Australia and high above the Pacific Ocean, I informed the United States Ambassador to Australia, Tom Schieffer, that it was our intention for the first time in the 50-year history of the ANZUS Treaty to invoke that treaty in response to the attack upon America.

America was under attack. Australia was immediately there to help. (Australian Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2002)

Of course, the U.S. quickly accepted Australia's support. Australia then joined the U.S. with the use of military force to counter terrorism in this "Global War on Terror"

(GWOT). According to Hugh White, Australia was credited for supporting the U.S.; however, Australia did not contribute as much to the effort as other countries had:

The scale of the military commitment was relatively small, the key element being a company-group sized contingent of Special Forces, and after they were withdrawn Australia declined to contribute to the multinational peacekeeping effort. Australia's military contribution to the first phase of the war on terror was substantial and significant, but hardly exceptional compared to those of many other countries. (White, 2003, p. 5)

One could argue that the initial contribution was small, as White suggests, due to Australia's concern over its ability to self-defend if it were to be attacked next, or perhaps it was still focused on supporting East Timor (without the U.S.). The Australians did add more to the military effort in later years and stayed with the Americans in Afghanistan until 2021 when both countries withdrew their troops.

Australia's Defence White Papers

If the situation had been reversed and Australia was the country bombed by terrorists in 2001, would the U.S. have invoked ANZUS? In the white paper *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence*, supposedly the Australian government thought it might be able to get some help from its U.S. friends but not to depend on it:

We believe that if Australia were attacked, the United States would provide substantial help, including with armed force. We would seek and welcome such help. But we will not depend on it to the extent of assuming that U.S. combat forces would be provided to make up for any deficiencies in our capabilities to defend our territory. (Parliament of Australia, 2000, p. 35-36)

The white paper lays out military assets and capabilities of the Australian Defence Force as of 2000. It is clear from this report that Australia needed to increase its defence budget if it hoped to be self-reliant. At the time the white paper was written, however,

Australia was not in a strong position to do so. Perhaps that is why Hugh White wrote in *Mr. Howard Goes to Washington: The U.S. and Australia in the Age of Terror* that Australia needed to come to terms with shaping its security strategy around the U.S. He also foresaw the possibility of the U.S. maintaining permanent military bases in Australia.

In summary, after the Cold War ended, many nations were in turmoil. It is fairly well known that terrorist attacks and several military conflicts occurred around the world in the '90s. Some involved the U.S. and Australia (i.e., the Gulf Wars, Iraq/Syria), while others did not.

ANZUS was originally created in 1951 to stop Japanese aggression and the spread of communism in the Pacific region by committing U.S. support to Australia and New Zealand, should there be an attack any of them. This treaty was later used in a different context when the U.S. was unexpectedly attacked in 2001. Australia invoked it for the very first time and joined the U.S. in a 20-year war on terror. Australian and U.S. armed forces were fighting side by side again.

Chapter VII.

The Unbreakable Alliance: 2002-2022

America has no better friend anywhere in the world than Australia.

—Prime Minister Howard
*Speech to U.S. Congress
Washington DC, June 6, 2002*

Our enduring interests in the region demand our enduring presence in the region. The United States is a Pacific power, and we are here to stay.

So let there be no doubt: In the Asia-Pacific in the 21st century, the United States of America is all in.

—President Obama
*Speech to Australia Parliament
Canberra, November 17, 2011*

The breadth and depth of the alliances among Australia, the U.S., and other countries suggest that all parties were seeking stronger economic and military connections in the region. The inclusion of other nations in some of these agreements point to the desire to jointly preserve their liberal democracies and to serve as a strong deterrent against China's or other nation's military aggressions.

Expansion of Alliances

Australia and U.S. leaders developed more agreements with each other over a 20-year period than it ever had before in their history. Australian prime ministers and U.S. presidents supported each other's countries by developing several bilateral, trilateral, quad lateral, and multilateral security, defense and economic agreements. These efforts

reinforced the central purpose of ANZUS and signaled their continuing partnership to the international community.

Australia U.S. Free Trade Agreement

In 2002, Prime Minister Howard visited Washington, DC to ask a favor of Congress. After recalling the memory of 9/11, he requested Congress for economic help to establish a free trade agreement by stating to the House of Representatives:

That will require close cooperation and collaboration between Australia and the United States within the WTO. American leadership will be crucial. May I respectfully express the hope that Congress gives the President full authority to negotiate new trade agreements.

At the same time, we in America and Australia have an historic opportunity to give even greater momentum to our bilateral economic relationship. That is why Australia has proposed the negotiation of a free trade agreement between our two countries. A comprehensive free trade agreement by boosting trade and investment between U.S. would add a stronger economic dimension to the very deep bilateral ties that are already there. (Congressional Record, 2002)

It took two more years, but by the middle of 2004 the two countries signed the Australia U.S. Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA). This agreement then allowed Australia to export almost 100% of its non-agricultural goods duty free and eliminate 67% of tariffs on agricultural products. Australian products could then go directly to U.S. federal and 31 state procurement markets. As of January 1, 2022, all AUSFTA goods are completely free of duty and merchandise processing fees.

Some Australians were initially not in favor of this complicated document. Post COVID, however, the U.S. has now become Australia's largest trading partner, providing an economic benefit for Australia. AUSFTA is a healthy bilateral trade and foreign direct

investment program. The Australian Government's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade states:

The United States is our largest two-way investment partner, with two-way investment stock reaching AUD\$1.8 trillion in 2020. The United States is by far the largest investor in Australia, with investment stock worth AUD\$1.053 billion at the end of 2021. Two-way trade stood at AUD\$68.2 billion in 2021. (Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2022)

All 50 U.S. states today have commercial relationships with Australia, importing and exporting a wide range of goods. U.S. companies employ over 300,000 Australians. Both countries work closely with corporations and educational institutions in science, health, and technology projects around the world. In addition, Australia and the U.S. are committed to working together for future space and technology developments (US Department of State, 2022).

The Quad

The Bush and Howard administrations continued to work together in 2004. They joined leaders from India and Japan by responding with humanitarian efforts after a devastating tsunami struck in the Indian Ocean that year. This collaboration continued to be positive. Three years later these four countries met to discuss a more permanent arrangement for a quadrilateral dialogue initiative, called the Quad. The purpose was to discuss issues that impacted the four democratic countries in their tangential regions, primarily security in the Indo-Pacific. China, however, viewed the formation of this group as a hostile threat to its country. Sensitive to China's concerns, Australia's Prime Minister Kevin Rudd pulled Australia out of the group a few years later. The group went dormant from 2008 to 2017.

When China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) began in 2014, leaders of the four countries considered bringing the group together again in response to concerns over China's expansion. In 2017, these leaders resurrected the Quad in the interest of supporting a "free and open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP). Media coverage of the group's meetings shows that some of the member states were reluctant to share the true mission of the Quad. In 2018, however, U.S. Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo bluntly said ahead of a Quad meeting:

As partners in this Quad, it is more critical now than ever that we collaborate to protect our people and partners from the CCP's exploitation, corruption and coercion. (quoted in Kuhn, 2020)

Representatives from the other countries, especially those from Australia, were not as forthcoming about anti-China intentions. Recent talks have expanded to discuss trade, cybersecurity, vaccines, climate change, infrastructure, and Ukraine (Cranston, 2021).

Australia-Japan-U.S. Trilateral Leaders, Ministers and Soldiers

Defense Ministers from Australia, Japan, and the U.S. officially met in 2006 under the umbrella of the Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD) in reaction to growing concern over China's rise in the Asia-Pacific region.

In a press conference, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also noted that the Asia-Pacific region was "in flux and change, first and foremost, because of a rising China" and that the United States, Japan, and Australia specifically had a "joint responsibility and obligation to try and produce conditions in which the rise of China will be a positive force" (quoted in Schoff, 2015, p.41).

The TSD led to the creation of the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF) in 2007 to further discussions and cooperation on stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region. Many initiatives have since grown out of the SDCF, including military training with Australia, Japan, and the U.S. armed forces.

During a G-20 meeting in November 2014, then President Barack Obama met with Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott and Japan Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in Brisbane and, sharing their respective concerns, committed to increasing their defense relationship. A few years later, Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force was deployed to Darwin in June 2017 for training with Australia and rotating U.S. armed forces in artillery, aviation, infantry, and combat exercises.

Australia and the U.S. defense leaders continue to work together with Japan's Minister of Defense in Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meetings (TDMM) to keep the Indo-Pacific free and open with specific concern over China's threats to stability in the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait (U.S. Department of Defense, 2022).

The United States Study Centre

Another diplomatic initiative that came from the Bush-Howard relationship was the founding in 2006 of the United States Study Centre (USSC). Created by the Australian government, the University of Sydney, and the American Australian Association, USSC is a university-based nonprofit research center with a \$25 million endowment. The USSC's mission is to analyze and study U.S. foreign policies, politics, and economics to enhance Australian's understanding of the relationship.

The Centre holds forums; invites scholars, business leaders and politicians to give presentations; and sponsors exchange programs for its students. The Centre publishes a wide range of research reports and journals on the US-Australia relationship, providing information that is often cited by the media.

Recently appointed CEO of the Centre, Dr. Michael Green (a former Asia policy advisor to George Bush) told the Sydney Herald on December 2022 that he now fully understands the term mateship. Green made an interesting statement regarding the evolving public perception about the Australia-U.S. security relationship: “When you asked Americans whether the alliance with Australia made America safer, typically 40 to 45 percent said yes. This year, that was almost two-thirds” (Hartcher, 2022).

Pivot to Asia-Pacific

Although the GWOT was still ongoing when Obama became president, he nevertheless started troop withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, Obama and his administration became aware of China’s increasing economic activity and its potential security risk. To return US’s attention back on Asia-Pacific, he called for a “strategic pivot.” In reaction to China’s rise, the Obama administration concentrated on “rebalancing” the Asia-Pacific region by installing U.S. military assets in Australia’s Northern Territory.

U.S. Armed Forces in Northern Australia

Toward that end in 2011, Obama and Australia Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced that the U.S. and Australia had entered into a new 25-year defense agreement. Building on the ANZUS treaty, the agreement calls for two military initiatives in the

Northern Territory of Australia. One initiative rotates U.S. Marines to train with the Australia Defence Force (MRF-D), and the other calls for the integration of the U.S. Air Force and the Royal Australian Air Force.

MRF-D, located at the Robertson Barracks Army Base and the Bradshaw Field Training Area in Darwin in the Northern Territory of Australia, welcomes U.S. Marines on a 6-month rotation. Two hundred U.S. Marines were initially sent there in 2012. In recent years, the U.S. has deployed approximately 2500 Marines to Darwin.

As an add-on to the MFR-D and AUSMIN, Australia and the U.S. signed the U.S. Force Posture Initiative (USFPI) in Sydney in 2014. This initiative extensively integrates the armed forces of both countries. The Enhance Air Cooperation (EAC) was added in 2017 to integrate Australian and U.S. air force capabilities through training, aircraft maintenance, and logistical support.

Figure 5 gives a timeline of the major agreements and increases in significant investments made over the 9-year period from 2012- 2021.

April-September 2012: MRF-D #1 ~200 United States Marine Corps (USMC) personnel and three exercises.

April-October 2014: MRF-D #3 more than quadruples to ~1,150 USMC battalion size. First Exercise Koolendong involving bi-lateral, high-end warfighting crisis response exercise. Force Posture Agreement signed, providing the legal authorization.

April-October 2015: MRF-D #4 ~USMC sees increased regional engagement through nine exercises, seven with partners. Key achievement is M777 Howitzer lift by MRF-D CH-53 Helicopters, enabling the certification of MRF-D pilots. MRF-D participates in Exercise Talisman Sabre for the first time.

April-October 2016: MRF-D #5 ~ 1,250 USMC, nine exercises, seven with regional partners, first deployment of USMC onto a RAN Landing Helicopter Dock and first involvement of MV-22 Ospreys.

January-February 2017: Australia and the US agree to share the costs of infrastructure investment in Northern Australia. The inaugural EAC in February 2017 with a squadron (12) of United States Air Force F-22 Raptors and ~200 personnel at RAAF Tindal.

April-October 2017: MRF-D #6 First combined Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief exercise. Defence talks with industry on future US-funded infrastructure projects.

April-October 2018: MRF-D #7 ~1,250 USMC. ADF and MRF-D assist the people of Darwin with Cyclone Marcus clean up. Second EAC. Aeromedical evacuation activity involving a United States Air Force medical team on a RAAF C-17A Globemaster. Local NT company, Sunbuild, wins US-funded contract at RAAF Darwin.

February-April 2019: Third EAC involving air-to-air refueling certification with USAF F-22 Raptors. Socio Economic Impact Report finds that USFPI enjoys community support and makes a positive contribution towards the Northern Territory economy. Indigenous company, Tiwi Partners, awarded contract for Modular Accommodation at RAAF Darwin.

April-October 2019: MRF-D #8 - Milestone of 2,500 US Marines achieved ahead of the 2020 target. First deployment of High Mobility Artillery Rocket System as part of Exercise Koolendong. Cross-servicing arrangement for the repair and maintenance of C-17A Globemaster transport aircraft.

October-November 2019: Local NT company, Sitzler, appointed Managing Contractor for the development of the NT Training Areas and Ranges Project. First US-funded infrastructure project (Aircraft Maintenance and Support Facility) program delivered.

May-September 2020: Icon SI Pty Ltd wins US-funded contract to build an earth-covered magazine facility at RAAF Tindal. MRF-D#9 proceeds with a modified deployment in COVID-19 environment, exemplifying strength of the Alliance. The RQ-21A Blackjack unmanned aerial vehicle is flown in Australia for the first time.

February-April 2021: MRF-D #10 confirmed. Government notes the ability for the MRF-D to go ahead in challenging circumstances is “testament to the endurance and adaptability of the Australia-US Alliance”. Prime Minister Morrison announces \$747million investment in NT Training Areas and Ranges.

Figure 5. Timeline of the Highlights of U.S. Force Posture Initiative 2012-2021

*Source: Adapted from Australian Government Defence. (2022)
<https://defence.gov.au/Initiatives/USFPI/Highlights.asp>*

Despite COVID-related quarantine requirements in 2021 and 2022, the MRF-D and EAC continued with U.S. armed forces participating in Exercise Talisman Sabre along with soldiers from Canada, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and the U.K. Australian and U.S. troops carried out increased exercises on land, air, and sea throughout both years. Both countries also invested in and constructed new facilities in Northern Australia (Australian Government Defense, U.S. Force Posture Initiatives). It is ironic that one of the key partners in these exercises and new alliances is Japan, the country that bombed this area in WWII and caused ANZUS to be created.

Vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

As the 21st century unfolded, the global economy spiraled up and down, sending Asian financial markets into the red. It became clearer to all that economic security was correlated to national security. The importance of having strong alliances became even more of a priority for both Australia and the U.S. as they anticipated challenges in maintaining security in the Indo-Pacific.

Even Australia's Defence White Paper had a much different tone in 2016. It now indicates that Australia needs to rely more deeply on the U.S.:

The United States will remain the pre-eminent global military power over the next two decades. It will continue to be Australia's most important strategic partner through our long-standing alliance, and the active presence of the United States will continue to underpin the stability of our region. The global strategic and economic weight of the United States will be essential to the continued stability of the rules-based global order on which Australia relies for our security and prosperity. The world will continue to look to the United States for leadership in global security affairs and to lead military coalitions that support international security and the rules-based global order. The United States is committed to sustaining and advancing its military superiority in the 21st century, including through its Defense Innovation Initiative.

The levels of security and stability we seek in the Indo-Pacific would not be achievable without the United States. The United States is committed to enhancing collaboration with its allies and partners. Australia will continue to work with the United States under the Australia, New Zealand and United States (ANZUS) Treaty to support the United States' strategy of focusing resources and attention towards the Indo-Pacific through its strategic rebalance, which includes strengthening its alliances and ties with countries in the Indo-Pacific. The rebalance demonstrates the commitment of the United States to the long-term security of the Indo-Pacific. (Australian Government Defence 2016, pp.41-42.)

Widening Focus on Defense

Many new initiatives were rolled out from 2017-2021 during President Donald Trump's term in office. Echoing Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2016, Trump used the term 'free and open Indo-Pacific'(FOIP) in November 2017 at the APEC CEO Summit and stated, "We have been friends, partners, and allies in the Indo-Pacific for a long, long time, and we will be friends, partners, and allies for a long time to come" (White House, 2017). His statement was a rallying cry to encourage sovereign independent countries in the Indo-Pacific region, not just the Asia-Pacific region, to cooperate in trade, investments and maritime activities.

In 2018, the U.S. Pacific Command was renamed the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to reflect the connection between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It integrates the U.S. Air Force, Army, Marine, and Navy forces to provide security and protect national interests in the Indo-Pacific region. This region encompasses 36 nations adjacent to, or within, the Pacific and Indian Oceans including Australia, mainland India, Mongolia, China, and the Antarctic. Trump's administration established the U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific and invested billions of dollars in the area with the U.S. Agency for International Development (Department of State, 2019).

Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment

Australia and the U.S. have been collaborating on building and testing hypersonic long-range missiles, jets, and related advanced technology equipment since 2007 in a program called Hypersonic International Flight Research (HIFiRE). The Departments of Defense for both countries signed a new agreement in late November 2020, called Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment (SCIFiRE). It increased expenditures to build and test Mach 5 long-range hypersonic strike missiles to be used on scramjets and various fighter aircraft (Australia Government Defence, 2020). Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon landed contracts to develop this missile for rollout sometime in the next few years. This collaboration established Australia's preeminence in hypersonic weaponry testing, as described in an excerpt from the Congressional Research Service:

Although the United States, Russia, and China possess the most advanced hypersonic weapons programs, a number of other countries—including Australia, India, France, Germany, South Korea, North Korea, and Japan—are also developing hypersonic weapons technology. Since 2007, the United States has collaborated with Australia on the Hypersonic International Flight Research Experimentation (HIFiRE) program to develop hypersonic technologies. The most recent HIFiRE test, successfully conducted in July 2017, explored the flight dynamics of a Mach 8 hypersonic glide vehicle, while previous tests explored scramjet engine technologies. HIFiRE's successor, the Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment (SCIFiRE) program, is to further develop hypersonic air-breathing technologies. SCIFiRE demonstration tests are expected by the mid-2020s. In addition to the Woomera Test Range facilities—one of the largest weapons test facilities in the world—Australia reportedly operates seven hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 30. (Sayler, 2023, p. 20)

In terms of the military cooperation between the U.S. and Australia, more significant agreements have been developed since President Trump left office. Armed

forces from both countries ramped up efforts to counteract China aggression in the South China Sea using the geographic area in Northern Australia as a base.

New Military and Economic Alliances

Shortly after Joe Biden became U.S. President in 2021, it was determined that the continued unified presence of armed forces in the Afghanistan region was no longer necessary. American and Australian troops were withdrawn, and Afghanistan fell to the Taliban in the following months. Many Australians and Americans felt less than sanguine about this two-decade-long operation. After the wind down of this war, one could opine that the public's view of the U.S. and the Australia fighting anywhere, side by side or not, is suspect.

Instead, Biden like Obama, turned his attention to the Indo-Pacific and made it clear to his administration that he would follow in former President Trump's footsteps to be tough on China. During the COVID global pandemic, the U.S. took steps to enact a series of agreements and strategic alliances all aimed at strengthening relationships with Australia and other liberal democracies in the Indo-Pacific region.

Further Military Infrastructure Investment

In 2021, the U.S. government reviewed the Department of Defense's global posture. The review called for new construction in Guam and Australia for further military defense activities. *Stars and Stripes* reported in a September 8, 2022 news article:

Major construction, funded by the U.S. and Australian governments, is underway in the northern port of Darwin, at Larrakeyah Defence Precinct

and at Royal Australian Air Force Bases Darwin and Tindal for facilities that will be used by the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.

The facilities will support U.S. and Australian forces training to defend chains of small islands that would likely be an arena for any future conflict with China, according to former Australian assistant defense secretary Ross Babbage. (Robson, 2022)

The article also claims Australia built new ramp space to accommodate six U.S. nuclear-capable B-52 bombers that were sent to Northern Australia in November 2022.

Australia, United Kingdom, United States

Seventy years after ANZUS was signed, Australia, the U.K., and the U.S. announced a new agreement on September 15, 2021: AUKUS. The agreement calls for “joint capabilities and interoperability” in “cyber, artificial intelligence, quantum computing and undersea capabilities” between all three countries, pulling in the U.K. to join its former colonies (White House, 2022, AUKUS Fact Sheet). The media has provided extensive coverage of this historic defense agreement. Some pundits and activists see it as counter to nonproliferation measures taken in the past.

Australian media reacted negatively when the agreement was announced and considered it controversial for two reasons. First, even though Australia is part of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ), the agreement helps Australia obtain nuclear-powered submarines. To be clear, these new submarines for Australia are nuclear-powered, not nuclear-armed, and not built in Australia. Nonetheless, the Australian public was upset about it, perhaps just as much as for the reason below.

Second, the U.S. replaced France in a deal that Australia had previously made. The prime minister of France was publicly outraged on hearing the news only a few hours before the announcement and blamed the Australian government for the way it had

handled the change. France's reaction was widely covered in Australia's news, accusing the Australian Prime Minister of mishandling the situation.

The new agreement also upset China that correctly saw it as a strategic move against it. Former Prime Minister Tony Abbott echoed this view when he said:

It's an important decision because it indicates that we are going to stand shoulder to shoulder with the United States and the United Kingdom in meeting the great strategic challenge of our time, which obviously, is China. (Dalzell, 2021)

Purportedly, the agreement is an extension of ANZUS, but it differs in that it aims to counter China's, not Japan's, aggression this time.

Force Posture Initiatives

Today, with the rotation of marines in Australia and the build-up of its military aircraft, missiles and submarines, a case could be made that U.S. military aid to Australia is already present. The most recent AUSMIN meeting held in Washington, D.C with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, Australia Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister for Defense Richard Marles bolsters this case. After the meeting, a joint statement was released covering a long list of topics emphasizing the U.S. decision to increase Australia's defense and security:

The principals decided to formalize the Enhanced Force Posture Cooperation announced in 2021 as 'Force Posture Initiatives' under the Force Posture Agreement. In doing so, these areas of cooperation—Enhanced Land Cooperation, Enhanced Maritime Cooperation, and the Combined Logistics, Sustainment, and Maintenance Enterprise—will sit alongside the existing initiatives that were announced in 2011. They affirmed that Australia and the United States would continue the rotational presence of U.S. capabilities in Australia, across air, land, and maritime domains. This would include U.S. Bomber Task Force rotations, fighters, and future rotations of U.S. Navy and U.S. Army capabilities. The principals decided to identify priority locations in Australia to support enhanced U.S. force posture with associated infrastructure, including

runway improvements, parking aprons, fuel infrastructure, explosive ordnance storage infrastructure, and facilities to support the workforce.

Recognizing logistics cooperation is a key line of effort for force posture cooperation, the principals decided to pre-position stores, munitions, and fuel in support of U.S. capabilities in Australia and to demonstrate logistics interoperability through joint exercises. To support Enhanced Air Cooperation, Australia and the United States committed to co-develop agile logistics at nominated airfields—including at bare bases in northern Australia—to support more responsive and resilient rotations of U.S. aircraft. Further, to strengthen U.S. land presence, the principals decided to expand locations for U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps forces, to enable exercises, activities, and further opportunities for regional engagement, including in the context of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief support to the region. (U.S. Dept of State, 2022)

This joint statement suggests that the U.S. will send more of its aircraft, equipment, and military assets to additional locations than currently exist in Australia to improve interoperability. Based on this statement, one could conclude that the U.S. Department is preparing to combine military forces and equipment for use in a potential armed conflict across air, land, and sea. Unclear is whether the U.S. is taking this action to defend Australia or to use Australia's unique location as a logistically convenient base to carry out military operations should the U.S. find itself in a future war, or both.

Indo-Pacific Economic Framework

President Biden also realized that the wider Indo-Pacific region needed more economic attention. Uniting 14 Indo-Pacific countries, which represent 40% of the world's GDP, is imperative to counter global supply chain interruptions, climate change issues, and the rise of China. On May 23, 2022, Australia joined the U.S. along with Brunei, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Posterity (IPEF). President Biden launched this partnership to strengthen business opportunities in

the Indo-Pacific region, support innovative technologies, and address supply chain issues (The White House, 2022, IPEF).

Partners in the Blue Pacific

In a nod toward supporting green initiatives, Australia, the U.S., Japan, New Zealand, and the U.K., also formed a new joint partnership in 2022, focusing on issues in the Pacific related to climate change, ocean sustainability, and development of island nations. Interestingly, the U.K., post-Brexit, agreed to join the Partners in the Blue Pacific agreement, given their geographical distance from the Pacific.

Minerals Supply Partnership

Another new economic partnership was announced in mid-2022 when Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, the U.K., and the European Commission agreed to the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP):

The goal of the MSP is to ensure that critical minerals are produced, processed, and recycled in a manner that supports the ability of countries to realize the full economic development benefit of their geological endowments. Demand for critical minerals, which are essential for clean energy and other technologies, is projected to expand significantly in the coming decades. The MSP will help catalyze investment from governments and the private sector for strategic opportunities —across the full value chain —that adhere to the highest environmental, social, and governance standards. (Department of State, June 14, 2022)

US-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

President Biden launched the US-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in November 2022 to prioritize cooperation among Indo-Pacific countries surrounding maritime, inter-connectivity, UN sustainable development goals, and the economy. Some

observers of the tension building up in this area may say that this new agreement was made in reaction to the new Chinese military installation on the Solomon Islands, a chain of islands near Australia's northeast shores and previously aligned politically and economically with Australia.

In summary, it is clear that Australia expects the U.S. to aid Australia if it were ever attacked, just as the Australians had done for the U.S. post 9/11. The supportive sentiments, formalized agreements, and strong democratic values expressed between these two countries may give hope to other liberal democracies in the Indo-Pacific region that the U.S. and Australia can mitigate any future negative consequences of China's rise in power. In addition, their enhanced alliances, shared intelligence, and compatible national interests may further economic decision making among other liberal democracies and discourage them from being tempted to join China's Belt and Road Initiative.

Of the many multilateral agreements Australia and the U.S. have signed over the last 20 years, the most strategic one is unequivocally the trilateral agreement AUKUS, which partners the U.S. with the U.K to provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines. Its implementation comes closest to answering the central question of this thesis. One could say the U.S. has definitively proven its reliability as a security partner and will continue to do so over time with other investments in military assets, troops and infrastructure as part of the AUKUS agreement.

Current political discourse, as well as comments from the White House and AUSMIN, indicate that the U.S. would support its best friend, Australia, in the Indo-

Pacific. The strategic and strong alliances forged between Australia and the U.S. over 100 years have underscored their unique symbiotic relationship militarily and economically.

Chapter VIII.

No Better Friend

In the last decade, there has been a tendency to separate economic security and strategic security. That thinking went something like this: “It doesn’t matter who you’re selling to, as long as they have the money. And it doesn’t matter who you buy from, so long as those goods are low-priced. Now, many are finding that these transactions often come with hidden costs. Recent events have shown starkly that economic security is national security.

Economic security is national security. And it’s not just about who has the money, it’s about who you trust. It’s about shared values. It’s about 100 years of mateship, in our case.

And we trust each other.

*—U.S. Ambassador Culvahouse
Speech to AmCham Building Prosperity
U.S. Embassy Canberra, July 21, 2020*

And Australia seeks a constructive relationship with China. We stand ready at any time, amongst all of my counterparts and colleagues, to resume dialogue. But we have also been open and clear and consistent about the fact that we are dealing with a number of challenges. We welcome the clear expressions of support from Washington as Australia works through those differences. It is hard to think of a truer expression of friendship.

*—Australian Foreign Minister Payne
Remarks to the Press
Washington DC, May 13, 2021*

Speculation in the news runs rampant about a potential war between China and the U.S. Some pundits believe it is inevitable for several reasons: disagreements over maritime boundaries in the South China Seas, Taiwan’s sovereignty issues, the source of COVID, treatment of the Uyghurs and other issues. News articles frequently report that China has the world’s fastest-growing economy, largest financial reserves, trade surplus,

purchasing power parity, navy, and expanding military bases. With these resources, China may likely see itself as a victor with a no-holds-barred approach to war. Media outlets have been quick to point out China's aggressive expansion throughout southeast Asia, Africa, Europe, South America, and the Arctic may soon be unstoppable.

China's Rise in Power

As China plans to change the world through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also known as One Belt One Road (OBOR), Australia and others are worried. Clive Hamilton in *Silent Invasion: China's Influence in Australia*, makes the case that the Chinese diaspora has already infiltrated Australia politics, invested in Australian businesses, and influenced government policies. China's institutions are not inclusive, but the opposite. As a result, the country threatens to upset the current international order under which the U.S. and other liberal nations thrive.

Eyck Freeman's eye-opening book, *One Belt One Road* (2021), details how China has been building relationships in key strategic locations for several years. Freyman articulates why the U.S and its allies should be worried about China's rise in power:

As China builds its capabilities and grows its international presence, it will become a desirable security and intelligence-sharing partner for many countries. It will also become a key merchant of arms, intelligence, and security technology for countries that do not get along with the U.S. and a power broker in the regions discussed in this book. (Freyman, 2021, p. 235)

Freyman lists 63 countries that were members of OBOR as of January 30, 2020. He offers three strategies to offset China's expansion: containing, hedging, and joining BRI. He suggests that the first two options are dependent on the U.S.'s ability to build strong alliances in a similar or more elevated way before it is too late. His other option is

akin to the “if you can’t beat them, then join them” adage. He notes that in Australia’s case, “the potential rewards for access to the Chinese market might not be worth the price of handing Beijing new tools for covert political influence” (Freyman, 2021, p. 230).

Elizabeth Economy points out that China’s BRI success is dependent on its economic and military strength:

Whether Xi is able to realize his ambition will depend on the interplay of many factors, such as the continued vitality of the Chinese economy and military and the support of other senior leaders and the Chinese people, on the one hand, and the ability of the world to continue to resist Chinese coercion and the capacity of the world’s democracies and others to articulate and pursue their own compelling vision of the world’s future, on the other. (Economy, 2021)

For this reason, Australian and U.S. leaders are eager to establish military and economic agreements with other Indo-Pacific countries that want to maintain their liberal democracies. Collectively, they want to halt China’s rise in power. Hugh White suggests however, in *How to Defend Australia* that America may not be up to the task of defending Australia and that it would be foolhardy to think that the U.S. can stabilize Asia-Pacific against China’s ambitions (White, 2019).

The Dilemma

Penny Wong, Australia’s then Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, gave a speech in May 2019 at the Lowy Institute, stating Australia’s national interests are “security, prosperity, a stable region anchored in the rule of law, and working constructively with international partners to deliver collective benefits” (Wong, 2019). These interests may be easier said than done given the tension with China.

Australia faces a dilemma concerning the potential threats from China’s rise in power. Australia has massive amounts of iron ore, coal, rare earth minerals, energy, and

other natural resources. China needs these resources to expand its manufacturing base and infrastructure within its country and around the world. China's demand for these and other exports and Australia's supply of them to China provide great economic benefit to Australia. In fact, as a result of their strong economic relationship, China was Australia's largest trading partner pre-sanctions and pre-COVID.

Like many relationships, however, the Australia-China one is complicated. In some ways, Australia has enabled China's rise in power by exporting iron ore, which is used to make steel and then used to build bridges, buildings, and military assets. As China expands its military capabilities, it poses a threat to Australia's best mate: the U.S. Some pundits suggest that Australia needs to choose between continuing its financial prosperity due to its economic relationship with China or keeping its military security with the U.S.

Australia recognizes the difficulties of being in the middle of these two superpowers. This is nothing new. Journalists and governments have been aware of this for several years. Wesley wrote *in Australia Faces a Changing Asia* in 2010:

So stable for six decades have been the basic patterns of regional order that Australian diplomacy in the region has coalesced around three verities: that Canberra's alliance with Washington is aligned with regional stability; that Australia's trade with US-aligned Asian economies contributes to regional resilience; and that multilateral institutions are capable of managing tensions and rivalries. (Wesley, 2010, p.231)

Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade now calls the relationship with China a "comprehensive strategic partnership" and acknowledges "in recent years the relationship has come under strain" (Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2022). The strain is heightened by Australia's alignment with the U.S. in its recent foreign policies toward China: banning Huawei's 5G network, criticizing

China's treatment of the Uyghurs, not participating in OBOR, blaming China for COVID, patrolling the South China Sea, and much more.

Over the last few years, China, in an effort to punish Australia for siding with the U.S., sanctioned and banned many Australian goods (coal, wine, food, animal and plant products, but not iron ore). These sanctions may not have worked according to the statements U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken made on February 10, 2022, to the *Sydney Morning Herald* and *The Age*:

China's trade sanctions on Australia have backfired, and by standing up to Beijing Australia "set an incredibly powerful example" for the world.

"I think China has lost more than Australia has in its efforts to squeeze Australia economically," Mr. Blinken said. Beijing would be "thinking twice about this in the future."

Mr. Blinken was keen to draw attention to "the flip side of the AUKUS coin, which is collaboration among us – and potentially other countries coming in – on other things that are going to be vital to our security and wellbeing, particularly collaboration on emerging technologies, on AI, on quantum, but also on supply chains and building more resilience there."

"That's also a part of AUKUS and that's going to make a profound difference to sustainable security for all our countries."

Clearly, Blinken's statement was directed to other Indo-Pacific countries by pointing out the benefits to them if they follow Australia's lead and choose to collaborate with the U.S. The same article in the *Sydney Morning Herald* went on to say that Australia suffered a major loss of revenue as a result of the sanctions:

Australian Treasurer Josh Frydenberg said in September that total exports to China in affected sectors "are estimated to have fallen by around \$5.4 billion over the year to the June quarter" but that exports of those goods to the rest of the world have increased by \$4.4 billion. The implied loss to affected Australian industries was \$1 billion over the year. (Hartcher, 2022, February 10)

A billion dollars is a significant amount of lost revenue. It is no surprise to see Australia reaching out to China at the end of 2022, attempting to restart trade. The question remains how will the U.S. react.

Choosing Sides

Australia may seem disloyal to the U.S. if its lucrative mining industry continues to export to China, enabling it to build up its naval ships and other infrastructure assets. Cutting off these exports could conceivably slow China's rise in power. Unfortunately, it would also reduce Australia's GDP and purchasing power, leading to a potentially lower quality of life for Australians. It is understandable that Australians are fearful of losing this significant stream of income if their country aligns with the U.S. instead of China. Decreasing or eliminating its vital resources to China might even provoke a war with China.

Australia has felt pressure to choose between its allegiance to the U.S. or to China's needs. Statements made in Canberra and Washington may indicate that the Australians have chosen to side with the U.S. That said, is Australia making the same mistake it did during WWII in assuming that Britain would take care of its country?

Journalist Hugh White reminds his readers:

Australia is no stranger to alliance failure, as Morrison should have recalled before talking of a "forever alliance" with the United Kingdom. Our first great alliance failed in 1941, at what was, until now, the most perilous moment of our history.

...What we should learn is the need to think a lot more carefully about the problems we face with China, how realistic it is to rely on America to solve them, and what we can do instead. (White, 2022, p. 4)

Without a crystal ball, Australia has a tough choice to make and one that may be influenced by public opinion.

Public Opinion

Results from the Australian Election Study 2022 indicate that when Australians were asked about defence links with the U.S., 73% of Australians polled trust that the U.S. will come to Australia's defence, and 86% believe that the ANZUS agreement with the U.S. is important (Cameron and McAllister, 2022, p.144). The same poll shows that 90% of Australians polled see China as a very likely or fairly likely security threat to Australia (Cameron and McAllister, 2022, p.139).

A 2022 Lowy Institute Poll further sheds light on the Australians' public sentiment toward the U.S. and China. This poll asked Australian adults which country is Australia's best friend in the world. Compared to a previous poll taken in 2019, the U.S. increased its popularity by 7% and scored 26% of the votes; while China had a 2% decline and scored only 1% of the vote.

Historically, however, countries do not build military alliances because they like each other. International relations experts teach that countries establish treaties and agreements because they perceive threats coming from some mutual adversary, and they believe the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Alliances establish a stronger foundation from which individual countries can defend themselves and make it more difficult for an adversary to attack the stand-alone country without repercussions from the other allies. This is clearly the strategy behind all the recent agreements made between Australia, the U.S., and other Indo-Pacific countries.

Can Alliances Be Broken?

It is safe to say that Australia expects that the U.S. would invoke ANZUS and come to its aid if it were ever attacked, just as Australia did for the U.S. after 9/11. It is not as clear that alliances can be depended upon, however, when it comes to military expectations. According to Morrow:

Alliances operate in the shadow of war. They are explicit records of the allies' expectations of action in the case of war, and they specify the conditions under which the obligations are activated. However, states cannot be made to live up to their obligations to their allies. Obligations must be self-enforcing to be effective in international politics. Other states must believe that a state will live up to its alliance commitments, and when tested, a state will do so only if it is in its interest at that time. This first point of the necessity of self-enforcement is well understood in the literature on alliances and more generally in international politics. Alliances are not sufficient for the elective assistance of other states. (Morrow, 2000, p.63)

Morrow may be correct in his assertions; except the facts in the case for the U.S. to come to the aid of Australia seem to counter his argument. The U.S. has much to lose diplomatically, militarily, economically as well as in intelligence gathering if Australia were ever attacked. Moreover, the U.S. would lose its reputation as the “leader of the free world,” and the underpinnings of democracies would fall apart. Speakers on behalf of the White House, the U.S. Department of State, Congress, and the military have all affirmed that the U.S. will come to Australia’s aid. The collective resolve to fight for, and with, Australia is already in place, figuratively and physically.

White House National Security Strategy Report

The White House National Security Strategy report released in October 2022 makes it even clearer that Australia can rely on the U.S. It makes several references

(highlighted in bold below) to maintaining the US's commitment to its allies in the Indo-Pacific region and in particular to Australia:

To solve the toughest problems the world faces, we need to produce dramatically greater levels of cooperation. The key to doing this is to recognize that the core of our inclusive coalition are those partners who most closely share our interests. America's treaty alliances with other democratic countries are foundational to our strategy and central to almost everything we do to make the world more peaceful and prosperous. Our NATO and **bilateral treaty allies should never doubt our will and capacity to stand with them against aggression and intimidation**. As we modernize our military and work to strengthen our democracy at home, we will call on our allies to do the same, including by investing in the type of capabilities and undertaking the planning necessary to bolster deterrence in an increasingly confrontational world.

...**Our AUKUS security partnership with Australia** and the United Kingdom promotes stability in the Indo-Pacific while deepening defense and technology integration. **We continue to deepen cooperation with the Five Eyes (with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom). The revitalized Quad, which brings the United States together with Japan, India, and Australia**, addresses regional challenges and has demonstrated its ability to deliver for the Indo-Pacific, combating COVID-19 and climate change, to deepening cybersecurity partnerships and promoting high standards for infrastructure and health security. Our intelligence relationships with our allies are a strategic asset that will increasingly factor in to our competition with our rivals, especially in technological competition.

...For 75 years, the United States has maintained a strong and consistent defense presence and will continue to meaningfully contribute to the region's stability and peace. **We reaffirm our iron-clad commitments to our Indo-Pacific treaty allies—Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand—and we will continue to modernize these alliances.** (National Security Strategy, 2022)

Based on this report, a realist would conclude that the White House is ready to come to the aid of Australia for ideological, not sentimental, reasons.

Chapter IX.

Summary Analysis and Conclusion

The United States has no better friend than Australia, and our longstanding alliance is a force for stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and around the globe.

*—Acting U.S. Secretary of State Shannon
Press Statement on Australia Day
Washington, DC, January 16, 2017*

The United States has no closer or more reliable ally than Australia. Our nations have stood together for a long, long time. And you can — we can rely on one another, and that's really a reassuring thing.

*—President Biden
Welcome to Prime Minister Morrison
Washington, DC, September 2, 2021*

The U.S.-Australia Alliance and partnership have never been stronger, or more vital to regional peace and prosperity.

*—Joint AUSMIN statement
Washington, DC, December 6, 2022*

International relations theory suggests that war breaks out when at least one of two rational actors believes the cost of war is less than the expected gains of war in terms of resources, territory, control, etc. The costs of a war today range from nuclear destruction to the loss of international norms that protect liberal democracies.

It is not possible to calculate what a hostile country might gain by attacking Australia or what it would cost the U.S. to provide military aid in such a conflict. It is possible to speculate that the U.S. has much to lose if another country were to attack parts of Australia or take it over. The U.S. would lose the ability to obtain critical intelligence

information about some of its adversaries and the unique geographical location from which to attack. If the U.S. were to lose these Australian benefits, it could weaken the U.S. ability to maintain its own national interests.

The Australia-U.S. leaders want the world to believe that their relationship is just as strong, if not more so, than when ANZUS was signed over 71 years ago. As discussed in previous chapters, this treaty originally provided for cooperation among three countries that were concerned about on-going Japanese aggression in the Pacific region after WWII. Since then, various leaders have reaffirmed their commitment to ANZUS, and new multi-lateral treaties and agreements have been created in an effort to deter military aggression in the Indo-Pacific region. The intent of these actions has been to ensure that the combined military and economic alliances are stronger than the strength of any hostile nation.

Summary of Agreements

Australia and the U.S. developed many bilateral and multilateral agreements, treaties, and partnerships after the end of WWII, the majority of which are military and occurred after Obama announced the U.S. pivot to Asia. The more recent agreements were intended to build inclusive political and economic agreements to strengthen and maintain the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region.

Figure 6 provides a summary of the numerous Australian-U.S. diplomatic (D), intelligence (I), military (M), and economic (E) initiatives and agreements discussed in previous chapters under respective columns.

YEAR	INITIATIVE OR AGREEMENT ESTABLISHED	D	I	M	E
1946	Embassies	✓			
1946	American Australian Association	✓			✓
1948	Five Eyes		✓		
1949	Fulbright Program	✓			
1951	ANZUS Treaty			✓	
1961	American Chamber of Commerce Australia	✓			✓
1963	Pine Gap		✓	✓	
1985	Australia U.S. Ministerial	✓		✓	
1989	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation			✓	✓
1993	Australian Defence Satellite Communication Station		✓		
2004	Australia U.S. Free Trade Agreement				✓
2004	Quadrilateral Security Agreement	✓		✓	
2006	Trilateral Security Dialogue	✓		✓	
2006	United States Studies Centre	✓			
2007	Security and Defense Cooperation Forum	✓	✓	✓	
2011	U.S. Marine Rotational Force-Darwin			✓	
2014	U.S. Force Posture Agreement Initiatives			✓	
2017	Free and Open Indo Pacific Strategy			✓	✓
2017	U.S. Enhanced Air Cooperation			✓	
2018	U.S. Indo-Pacific Command			✓	
2020	Southern Cross Integrated Research Experiment			✓	
2021	Australia United Kingdom United States security pact	✓	✓	✓	
2022	Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Posterity				✓
2022	Mineral Supply Partnership				✓
2022	US-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership	✓		✓	✓
2022	Pacific Blue Partners	✓		✓	✓

Figure 6. Summary of Significant Australia-U.S. Initiatives and Agreements

Source: Compiled from information in previous chapters.

Conclusion

The main conclusion of this thesis is that Australia can rely on the U.S. to be a reliable security partner and military ally. The relationship has been strong for over 100 years and continues to strengthen with new investments and agreements providing security interoperability on many fronts. As discussed in preceding chapters, the

preponderance of evidence suggests that the U.S. will honor its commitments to Australia, the most important of which are for the following reasons:

First, the U.S. military has a **long history** of aiding Australia militarily during its time of need. The Great White Fleet's visited Australia in 1908 as it had requested. The two countries have fought together side by side during the Battle of Hamel in WWI, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. During WWII, the U.S. sent almost a million U.S. troops to Australia to protect the country from Japanese invasion and sent U.S. General MacArthur to take joint command of the Australian and U.S. troops. Likewise, Australia volunteered to support the U.S. when declaring its Global War on Terror in 2021.

Second, the U.S. recognizes that Australia's **unique geographical location** in the South Pacific can be used as a strategic American asset. The review of literature is unequivocal that locating Pine Gap in the middle of Australia has benefitted the intelligence community at large. The information-gathering capabilities through this channel have been invaluable. In addition, Australia and the U.S. continue to support each other with experienced military personnel based out of key locations in Australia and throughout the adjacent waters, airways, and space.

Third, both countries are multi-cultural, independent nations with similar heritages, and constitutions that define themselves as **liberal democracies**. The ANZUS commitment of these countries to support one another militarily in an attack is viewed by both countries as an unbreakable alliance. Failure to uphold the treaty would have serious consequences to their reputation. The ANZUS treaty provided assurance that Australia and the U.S. could rely on one another, without U.K. support, against Japan. Now the spirit of the treaty is intended to combat the rise of China's aggression.

Fourth, the U.S. needs to keep and protect its solid and **strong investments** in the diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic relationships that Australia and the U.S. have developed with other countries in the Indo-Pacific region over the years. The recent proliferation of new agreements and treaties produced under President Biden's administration over the last two years should obviate the need for the U.S. to take any military actions to support Australia for at least the rest of Biden's term. These new tri-lateral, quad lateral, and multi-lateral agreements further signal U.S. commitment to Australia and to other nations' security in the Indo-Pacific region.

Lastly, the recent AUKUS agreements reinforce the ANZUS treaty and should be considered a tactical approach to counter **China's rise in power**. The U.S. sees Australia as a vital partner in maintaining a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region as both countries have become increasingly concerned about recent Chinese aggression in this geographic area. Australia is a key partner to the U.S. and vice versa in thwarting that aggression. Strengthening the relationship between these countries is a vital deterrence strategy to sustaining liberal democracies above and below the equator. More specifically, the U.S. must continue to cement its relationship with Australia because Australia is geographically near China, and there are many indicators that a war with China is impending. The U.S. already has military installations and intelligence-gathering resources throughout Australia to assist, should a war break out.

In summary, 100 years of Australian-U.S. mateship is a remarkable milestone. Their relationship reflects the trust and faith that many Australian and U.S. individuals have placed in each other, and for which some have given their lives in past wars. That the U.S. Congress formally recognized its mateship with Australia has not been an empty

gesture. The U.S. *Mateship Resolution* of 2018 (see Appendix) reflects the commitment to their long-term security relationship.

Global dynamics continue to be in constant flux; no one can predict the future. The buildup of close military relationships between Australia and the U.S. over the years has led to an overarching expectation that Australia can count on the U.S. for support in the future. To the question of whether the U.S. is a reliable security partner and military ally for Australia, based on the research conducted for this thesis, the answer is yes. The U.S. will honor its agreements with Australia and is already preparing to fight side by side with Australia should there be a need to do so in the future.

Appendix.

Mateship Resolution

115th CONGRESS
2d Session

S. CON. RES. 41

Recognizing 100 years of the United States-Australia relationship—100 years of Mateship.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

July 11, 2018

Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Recognizing 100 years of the United States-Australia relationship—100 years of Mateship.

Whereas United States and Australian troops first fought together in and won the Battle of Hamel on the Western Front in France on July 4, 1918, under the command of Australian General John Monash;

Whereas the hard-fought victory achieved by the combined forces at Hamel helped turn the tide of World War I;

Whereas Australia has fought together with the United States in every major conflict since 1918;

Whereas more than 100,000 Australian service members have given the ultimate sacrifice alongside their brothers and sisters in arms from the United States;

Whereas the United States and Australia officially established bilateral diplomatic relations on January 8, 1940;

Whereas the United States and Australia formalized their security alliance with the signing of the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty, done at San Francisco September 1, 1951 (commonly known as the ANZUS Treaty);

Whereas the ANZUS Treaty was invoked the first and only time in response to the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001;

Whereas the United States and Australia share information essential for security and defense through the Five Eyes intelligence alliance;

Whereas the Force Posture Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America, done at Sydney August 12, 2014, enables closer security and defense cooperation between the 2 allies;

Whereas the United States and Australia conduct diverse joint military exercises and training to enhance capabilities throughout the world, and Australia hosts United States Marines at bases in its Northern Territory;

Whereas the United States and Australia work closely in a number of international fora, including the Group of Twenty (G-20);

Whereas the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement, done at Washington May 18, 2004, came into effect on January 1, 2005;

Whereas the United States and Australia conduct \$65,000,000,000 in 2-way trade and have an investment relationship valued at \$1,100,000,000,000,

Whereas, July 4, 2018, marks the 100-year anniversary of the Battle of Hamel and serves as the date on which the United States and Australia celebrate the first 100 years of Mateship: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That Congress—

(1) commemorates the 100-year anniversary of the Battle of Hamel, forging the unique and enduring relationship between the United States and Australia;

(2) reaffirms the strong military alliance relationship between the United States and Australia; and

(3) supports continued diplomatic, security, and economic cooperation between the United States and Australia.

Passed the Senate July 10, 2018

References

- The Age*. (1908, September 2). No title. n.a. Melbourne, VIC: 1854 – 1954, p. 6.
<http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article202185864>
- American Chamber of Commerce Australia. (2022). *Membership benefits*. [Website]
Retrieved December 15, 2022.
https://www.amcham.com.au/web/Membership/Membership_Benefits/Web/Membership/Membership_Benefits.aspx?hkey=d67a14a7-a551-4d70-9573-4a36b421ee0c
- The Argus*. (1942, March 19). Australia asked for General MacArthur. Melbourne, VIC: 1848 – 1957, p.3. n.a. <http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article8238141>
- Armitage, J. R. (1918). *My war 1917-1918*. Australian War Memorial.
<https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C282653>
- Aroney, N. (2009). *The Constitution of a federal Commonwealth*. Cambridge University Press.
- Aroney, N. & Kincaid, J. (2017, March 12). Comparing Australian and American federal jurisprudence. *The Washington Post*.
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/05/12/comparing-australian-and-american-federal-jurisprudence/>
- Australian Government Defence. (2016). *2016 Defence white paper*.
<https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/defence-white-paper>
- Australian Government Defence. (2020, December 1). *Australia collaborates with the US to develop and test high speed long-range hypersonic weapons*. [Media release]
<https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2020-12-01/australia-collaborates-us-develop-and-test-high-speed-long-range-hypersonic-weapons>
- Australian Government Defence. (2022). *United States Force Posture Initiatives*.
<https://defence.gov.au/Initiatives/USFPI/Highlights.asp>
- Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2021, July12). *Australia-United States Foreign Trade Agreement*.
<https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/ausfta/australia-united-states-fta>

- Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2022, July). *China country brief*. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/china-country-brief>
- Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2022, December). *United States of America country brief*. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-america/united-states-of-america-country-brief>
- Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2022). *Joint Statement on Australia-U.S. Ministerial consultations (AUSMIN) 2022*. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/joint-statement-australia-us-ministerial-consultations-ausmin-2022>
- Australian Government Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. (2002, June 12). *Transcript of the Prime Minister the Hon John Howard MP address to joint meeting of the US. Congress*. <https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-12906>.
- Australian Republic Movement. (2020). *The Australian choice model: Proposed amendments to the Australian constitution*. <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b531a35b98a78268300cad6/t/624372e0f12eeb34a726870f/1648587491805/CAB+Australian+Republic+Constitution.pdf>
- Australian War Memorial. (updated 2021, June 2). *Korean War, 1950-53*. <https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/atwar/korea>
- Australian War Memorial. (updated 2023, January 10). *Vietnam War 1962-75*. <https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/event/vietnam>
- Ball, D. (1988). *Pine Gap: Australia and the U.S. geostationary signals intelligence Satellite Program*. Allen & Unwin.
- Ball, D. (1989). *Code 777: Australia and the U.S. Defense satellite communications system*. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies. Australian National University. (Canberra papers on strategy and defence no. 56.)
- Ball, D., Robinson, B., & Tanter, R. (2015, October 15). The SIGINT satellites of Pine Gap: Conception, development and in orbit. *Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability. Net Special Reports*. <https://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/PG-SIGINT-Satellites.pdf>
- Barclay, G. St. J. (1977). Australia looks to America: The wartime relationship, 1939-1942. *Pacific Historical Review*, 46(2), 251–271. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3637934>
- Bean, C. E. W. (1942). *Official history of Australia in the war of 1914-1918. Volume VI, Chapter IX – The Battle of Hamel* (pages 280-335) Australian War Memorial. <https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C1416794>

- Beaumont, J. (2014). Unitedly we have fought: Imperial loyalty and the Australian war effort. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 90(2), 397–412. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24538562>
- Behm, A. (2022). *No enemies no friends: Restoring Australia's global relevance*. Upswell.
- Birtles, B. (2021). *The truth about China*. Allen & Unwin.
- Blair, D. (2001, December). Diggers and doughboys: Australian and American troop interaction on the Western Front, 1918. *Journal of the Australian War Memorial*, 35. <https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/journal/j35/blair>
- Blaxland, J. (2016). *The protest years: The official history of ASIO, 1963-1975*. Allen & Unwin.
- Blaxland, J. (2021). Australia's intelligence foundations. In P. Walters (Ed.), *ANZUS at 70: The past, present and future of the alliance*. Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
- Butler, J. D. (1896). British convicts shipped to American colonies. *The American Historical Review*, 2(1), 12–33. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1833611>
- Cameron, S., Jackman, S., McAllister, I., & Sheppard, J. (2022, December 4). *Australian federal election study, 2022*. ADA Dataverse 2023. doi:10.26193/W3U2S3 <https://dataverse.ada.edu.au/file.xhtml?fileId=18011&version=2.1>
- Cameron, S., & McAllister, I. (2022, December). *Trends in Australian political opinion: Results from Australian election study 1987-2022*. <https://australianelectionstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/Trends-in-Australian-Political-Opinion-Results-from-the-Australian-Election-Study-1987-2022.pdf>
- Clinton, W. (1999, September 10). In Clinton's Words: East Timor, Waco, Clemency Offer, and Other Issues. *The New York Times*. p. A12. <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/10/world/fate-east-timor-clinton-s-words-east-timor-waco-clemency-offer-other-issues.html>
- Congressional Record. (2002, June 12). *Address by the Honorable John Howard, Prime Minister of Australia*. House Congressional Record vol. 148, no. 77. <https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/volume-148/issue-77/house-section/article/H3456-2>
- The Courier-Mail*. (1945, August 9). Churchill Erred, Says Chifley. Brisbane, Qld: 1933 - 1954), p. 3. n.a. <http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article50272884>

- Cranston, M. (2021, September 26). Joe Biden, Scott Morrison step up response to China's Belt and Road at Quad meeting. *Australian Financial Review*. <https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/quad-steps-up-response-to-china-s-belt-and-road-20210926-p58uu1>
- Curtin, J. (1941, December 27). The task ahead. *The Herald*. Melbourne, Vic: 1861 - 1954), p. 10. <http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article245352066>
- Curtin, J. (1942, March 14). Curtin's speech to America. [Speech Audio Recording]. Records of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. *John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library*. <https://john.curtin.edu.au/audio/00434.html>
- Dalzell, S. (2021, September 16). China condemns AUKUS pact, Tony Abbott flags a 'common danger', Kevin Rudd urges caution. *ABC Newspaper*. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-09-16/aukus-china-foreign-ministry-condemns-agreement-abbott-rudd/100468900>
- Deakin, A. (1908, September 7). From our special correspondent: Alfred Deakin's letters to the London Morning Post; Volume 8: 1908. The Commonwealth of Australia. Lord and Lady Northcote. *The Morning Post*. Sydney. Australian Parliamentary Library. <https://deakinslettersmorningpost.parliamentarylibrary.gov.au/letters/1908-09-07>
- Economy, E. C. (2021, December 8). Xi Jinping's new world order. *Foreign Affairs*, 101, (1). <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/xi-jinpings-new-world-order>
- Edwards, P. (2021). Curtin, MacArthur and the Pacific war. In P. Walters (Ed.), *ANZUS at 70: The past, present and future of the alliance*. Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
- Evans, H. (1998, December). The other metropolis: The Australian founders' knowledge of America. *The New Federalist*. No. 2. First published in Australia. Papers on Parliament No. 52. https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/senate/pubs/pops/pop52/11_the_other_metropolis.pdf
- Fahey, J. (2018). *Australia's first spies: The remarkable story of Australian intelligence operations, 1901-45*. Allen and Unwin.
- Freyman, E. (2021). *One belt one road*. Harvard University Asia Center.
- Fulbright Australia. (2022). *Annual Report for Fulbright Australia. Fiscal Year 2021*. https://issuu.com/australianamericanfulbright/docs/2021_annual_report_web
- Gow, K. (1920). *Letters of a soldier*. Herbert B. Covert.
- Hamilton, C. (2018). *Silent invasion: China's influence in Australia*. Hardie Grant Books.

- Harris, R. (2022, February 28). George Bush snr ‘choked up’ at sight of Bob Hawke on backbenches. *The Sydney Morning Herald*.
<https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/george-bush-snr-choked-up-at-sight-of-bob-hawke-on-backbenches-20220228-p5a0d0.html>
- Hartcher, P. (2022, December 12). US puts greater value on Australia as an ally than any time in decades. *The Sydney Morning Herald*.
<https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/us-puts-greater-value-on-australia-as-an-ally-than-any-time-in-decades-20221212-p5c5ix.html>
- Hartcher, P. (2022, February 10). Australia leads world on standing up to China, Blinken says. *The Sydney Morning Herald*. <https://www.smh.com.au/national/australia-leads-world-on-standing-up-to-china-blinken-says-20220210-p59vhd.html>
- Holt, H. (1966, June 29). *Exchange of remarks between President Johnson of the U.S. and Prime Minister Harold Holt of Australia at arrival ceremonies for the Prime Minister on the South Lawn of the White House*. Australian Government Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.
https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/original/00001339_0.pdf
- Horner, D. (2015). *The Spycatchers: The official history of ASIO- 1949-1963, Volume 1*. Allen & Unwin.
- H.R.1029 - 115th Congress, 2017-2018. (2018, July 25). *Reaffirming the United States-Australia diplomatic, security, and economic relationship*.
<https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-resolution/1029>
- Jennings, P. (2021). New Zealand and the ANZUS alliance. In P. Walters (Ed.), *ANZUS at 70: The past, present and future of the alliance*. pp.37-39. Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
- Kuhn, A. (2020, October 6). Pompeo rails against China at ‘Quad’ meeting with foreign ministers in Tokyo. *NPR*. <https://www.npr.org/2020/10/06/920683263/pompeo-rails-against-china-at-quad-meeting-with-foreign-ministers-in-tokyo>
- Levi, W. (1943, December 1). The Earliest Relations between the United States of America and Australia. *Pacific Historical Review*, 12(4), 351–361.<https://doi.org/10.2307/3634060>
- Lowy Institute. (2022). *Australia’s best friend in the world*. [Poll]
<https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/charts/australias-best-friend-world/>
- McDonald, S. D., & Tan, A. T. H. (Eds.). (2020). *The future of the United States - Australia Alliance: Evolving security strategy in the Indo-Pacific*. Routledge

- Menzies, R. G. (1940, January 8). *Prime Minister's Department to Mr. F. K. Officer, Australian Counsellor at U.K. Embassy in Washington*. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-03/7-prime-ministers-department-to-mr-f-k-officer-australian-counsellor-at-uk-embassy-in-washington>
- Menzies, R. G. (1951, September 1). *Cablegram from Menzies to Spender*. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-21/114-cablegram-from-menzies-to-spender1>
- Minyue, H. (2005, Spring/Summer). The Howard doctrine: An irritant to China. *The Journal Of East Asian Affairs*, 19(1), 113–142. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23257887>
- Monash, J. (1920). *The Australian victories in France*. Hutchinson & Co. <https://ia800701.us.archive.org/15/items/australianvictor00mona/australianvictor00mona.pdf>
- Monash, J. (1934). *War letters of General Monash: Volume 2, 4 March 1917–28 December 1918*. Australian War Museum. <https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/awm-media/collection/RCDIG0000570/bundled/RCDIG0000570.pdf>
- Morrow, J. D. (2000). Alliances: Why write them down? *Annual Review of Political Science* 2000 3:1, 63-83. <https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.63>
- Murphy, D. (1908). We've Got A Big Brother In America. [Song]. (Reprinted in 1942, February 22). *Sunday Times* (Perth, WA: 1902 - 1954), p. 2. <http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article59165718>
- National WWI Museum and Memorial. (2018, September 11-December 2). *Diggers and Doughboys: The Art of Allies 100 Years on*. Memory Hall. [Exhibition] <https://www.theworldwar.org/exhibitions/diggers-and-doughboys-art-allies-100-years>. Accessed October 15, 2022.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (1949, April 4). *The North Atlantic Treaty*. NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm
- O'Neill, P. (2008, November). Celebrating what it is to be human and free. *Evatt Journal*, Vol. 8, No. 4. <https://evatt.org.au/celebrating-what-it-is-to-be-human-and-free>
- Parliament of Australia. (1993, May 12). *Australian Citizenship Amendment Bill 1993*. https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/billsdgs/6E910/upload_binary/6E910.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22legislation/billsdgs/6E910%22

- Parliament of Australia. (1951, September 1). *Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty*.
https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Completed_Inquiries/jfadt/usrelations/appendixb.
- Parliament of Australia. (2000, December). *Defence 2000: Our future defence force (2000 Defence White paper)*.
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1516/DefendAust/2000
- Richardson, N. (2019). *1956: The year Australia welcomed the world*. Scribe.
- Robson, S. (2022 September 8). U.S. Military's footprint is expanding in northern Australia to meet a rising China. *Stars and Stripes*.
https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2022-09-08/australia-military-construction-projects-china-7251762.html
- S. Con.Res.41 -115th Congress. (2017-2018). (2018, July 10). *A concurrent resolution recognizing 100 years of the United States-Australia relationship –100 years of mateship*. <https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/volume-164/issue-115/senate-section/article/S4879-1?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22A+concurrent+resolution+recognizing+100+years+of+the+United+States-Australia+relationship+%5Cu2013100+years+of+Mateship%22%5D%7D&s=1&r=3>
- Sayler, K. M. (2023, January 10). Hypersonic weapons: Background and issues for Congress. *Congressional Research Service*.
<https://s.fas.org/crs/weapons/R45811.pdf>.
- Schoff, J. (2015). The evolution of US-Japan-Australia security cooperation: Prospects and challenges. *Stimson Center*, pp.37-49.
<http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep11008.8>
- U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Australia. (2021, June 16). *U.S.-Australia relations*.
<https://au.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/us-australia-relations/>
- United States Department of Defense. (2022, June 11). *United States-Japan-Australia Trilateral Defense Ministers meeting (TDMM 2022 Joint Vision Statement)*.
<https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3059885/united-states-japan-australia-trilateral-defense-ministers-meeting-tdmm-2022-jo/>
- United States Department of State. (2019, November 4). *A free and open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a shared vision*. <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf>

- United States Department of State. (2022, June 9). *U.S. relations with Australia*. <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-australia/>
- United States Department of State. (2022 June 14). *Minerals security partnership*. [Media Note]. <https://www.state.gov/minerals-security-partnership/>
- United States Department of State. (2022, December 6). *Joint statement on Australia-U.S. Ministerial consultations (AUSMIN) 2022*. <https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-australia-u-s-ministerial-consultations-ausmin-2022/>
- United States Study Centre. (Ed.). (2021, September 7). *The alliance at 70: The story of the alliance between Australia and the United States*. United States Study Centre.
- Waterhouse, R. (1990). The beginning of hegemony or a confluence of interests: The Australian-American relationship, 1788-1908. *Australasian Journal of American Studies*, 9(2), 12–19. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41053571>
- Wells, A. R. (2020). *Between Five Eyes: 50 years of intelligence sharing*. Casemate.
- Wesley, M. (2010, September 1). Australia faces a changing Asia. *Current History*; 109 (728): 227–231. doi: <https://doi-org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/10.1525/curh.2010.109.728.227>
- White, A. (2010, June 29). How a secret spy pact helped with the Cold War. *Time*. <http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2000262,00.html>
- White, H. (2003, July). Mr. Howard goes to Washington: The U.S. and Australia in the age of terror. *Comparative Connections Journal*, 5, (2).
- White, H. (2019). *How to defend Australia*. La Trobe University Press.
- White, H. (2022). Sleepwalk to war. *Quarterly Essay, Issue 86*, 1-93
- The White House. (2001, September 10). Joint Statement between the United States of America on the U.S.-Australia alliance. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-2001-09-17/pdf/WCPD-2001-09-17.pdf>
- The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. (2011, November 17). *Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament*. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament>
- The White House. (2017, November 10). *Remarks by President Trump at APEC CEO summit in Da Nang, Vietnam*. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-apec-ceo-summit-da-nang-vietnam/>

- The White House. (2021, September 21). *Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Morrison of Australia before bilateral meeting*. [Press Release]. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/09/21/remarks-by-president-biden-and-prime-minister-morrison-of-australia-before-bilateral-meeting/>
- The White House. (2022, April 5). *Implementation of the Australia-United Kingdom-United States partnership (AUKUS)*. [Fact sheet]. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/>
- The White House. (2022, May 23). *In Asia President Biden and a dozen Indo-Pacific partners launch the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity*. [Fact sheet]. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/fact-sheet-in-asia-president-biden-and-a-dozen-indo-pacific-partners-launch-the-indo-pacific-economic-framework-for-prosperity>
- The White House. (2022, October 12). *National Security Strategy*. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf>
- Wong, P. (2019, May 2). *Australian values, Australia's interests — Foreign policy under a shorten labor government*. [Speech recording]. Lowy Institute. <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/australian-values-australia-s-interests-foreign-policy-under-shorten-labor-government>
- Yockelson, M. (2007). We have found each other at last: Americans and Australians at the Battle of Hamel in July 1918. *Army History*, 65, 16–25. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26295269>