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Perceptions of Psychopathy and Defendant Controllability: Juror Decision-Making, Death Penalty Sentencing, and Courtroom Strategies

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A Thesis in the Field of Psychology

for the Degree of Master of Liberal Arts in Extension Studies

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Abstract

The purpose of this research study was to examine how juror sentencing decisions relate to perceptions of defendant psychopathy and perceptions of defendant controllability. It was predicted that perceptions of higher psychopathy would result in harsher sentencing decisions, that perceptions of higher controllability would result in more punitive sentencing decisions, and that there is a controllability and psychopathy interaction that would uniquely predict the most punitive juror sentencing decisions.

The present study assessed 387 mock juror participants on their perceptions about a criminal defendant's degree of psychopathy and controllability. Participants were then asked to make death penalty sentencing decisions. The final 2x2 factorial ANOVA analysis included 120 participants in four experimental conditions. Results showed that higher defendant psychopathy ratings significantly predicted a greater likelihood of imposing the death penalty over a life sentence. Higher defendant controllability scores also significantly predicted a greater likelihood of imposing the death penalty over a life sentence. Contrary to expectations, there was no significant interaction between psychopathy and controllability ratings on juror death penalty sentencing decisions.

This study provides new insights about more subtle factors that may influence juror decision-making, which have implications for the trial strategies of both prosecution and defense attorneys. A skillful and optimized courtroom presentation strategy may influence trial consequences, ultimately determining critical life and death consequences for the criminal defendant.

Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to my daughter Vivienne – my most ardent supporter and the biggest inspiration for my journey and accomplishments at Harvard University. Thank you for your unconditional love and support, and for always believing in me. I love you always and forever.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my thesis advisor Dr. Ronald Schouten for his wise and insightful guidance during the development of my thesis. I am also thankful to my research advisor Dr. Adrienne Tierney for her patience, helpful direction, and continuous support throughout my thesis journey. I want to acknowledge my family, friends, and closest allies who supported me and believed in me – you know who you are. Lastly, I am thankful to Harvard University for the opportunity to accomplish goals that I never believed were possible. I will forever cherish the memories of my many days and evenings on campus and around Harvard Square, the courses that expanded my intellectual horizons, the professors that opened my mind to new perspectives and unique ways to see the world, the campus special events and speakers that stimulated my mind, and the amazing members of the Harvard community I have met along the way.

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Chapter I.

Introduction

Juror biases against criminal defendants are seen at all stages of the judicial process, from guilt determination to sentencing (van Es et al., 2020). It is imperative to gain insights on potential factors that influence juror decision-making because they have implications for both prosecution and defense attorneys who must develop their best strategy during trial. Strategies that consider the subtleties of juror perceptions and judgments can influence juror decision-making in surprising and meaningful ways. Skillful courtroom presentation strategies potentially influence trial consequences, which ultimately determine critical life and death consequences for the criminal defendant.

Existing case law, anecdotal evidence, and forensic research suggest that the attribution of psychopathic characteristics or labels to criminal defendants can sway jury members to decide on harsher verdicts, more punitive sanctions (i.e., choosing the death penalty over life imprisonment) and longer judgments of sentencing length (Blais & Forth, 2014; Edens et al., 2005; Edens et al., 2013; Kelley et al., 2019). However, some studies are contradictory and suggest no significant impact of defendant psychopathy diagnosis on juror sentencing decisions (Berryessa & Wohlstetter, 2019; Filone et al., 2014; Mossière & Maeder, 2015). Furthermore, research has pointed to potentially important factors that may influence juror sentencing decisions such as recidivism (Cox et al., 2010) or behavioral control (van Es et al., 2020; Schweitzer & Saks, 2011; Schweitzer et al., 2011).

The conflict in research findings about psychopathy's role in sentencing decisions, along with the lack of research about controllability (i.e., control over one's actions) and its role in juror decision-making help to provide the impetus for this study's exploration. The goals of this study are to examine how perceptions of defendant psychopathy relate to death penalty sentencing decisions, how perceptions of controllability relate to death penalty sentencing decisions, and how both variables interact with each other to predict death penalty sentencing decisions for the defendant.

Hypotheses

The present study sought to address the gaps in forensic psychology research by exploring the possibility that perceptions of psychopathy have a measurable impact on death penalty sentencing decisions, that perceptions of defendant controllability significantly influence death penalty sentencing decisions in ways that cannot be adequately explained by a simple psychopathy diagnosis, and that the two variables may also interact together to uniquely predict sentencing outcomes. Specifically, this study was an experimental 2x2 Factorial ANOVA investigation that assessed 1. the main effect of perceived degree of defendant controllability on mock juror death penalty sentencing decisions, 2. the main effect of perceived degree of defendant psychopathy on mock juror death penalty sentencing decisions, and 3. the interaction effect between mock jurors' perceived degree of defendant controllability and perceived degree of defendant psychopathy on their death penalty sentencing decisions.

For my corollary baseline main effect analyses, I had two predictions. First, I predicted that jurors would have a higher likelihood of recommending the death penalty over a life imprisonment sentence when a defendant is perceived as having a higher

degree of psychopathy, compared to a defendant perceived as having a lower degree of psychopathy. As will be discussed in following sections, this main effect prediction is generally supported by past literature, although a few studies contradict the hypothesis that perceived degree of psychopathy has any measurable impact on sentencing decisions. Therefore, there is currently no clear consensus in the literature about whether the psychopathy label has a measurable effect on juror sentencing decisions. I predicted that the psychopathy label would have a detrimental effect on sentencing outcomes for the defendant, based on the reasoning that negative attitudes and beliefs surrounding the psychopathy diagnosis (e.g., lack of empathy or remorse, risk of recidivism) may be strong enough to persuade jurors that a psychopathic defendant is more deserving of harsher legal consequences than a non-psychopathic defendant, assuming that all other aspects of the case scenario are identical.

Second, I expected that jurors would have a higher likelihood of recommending the death penalty over a life imprisonment sentence for a defendant perceived as having a higher degree of controllability (i.e., high control over their actions during the criminal act). This hypothesis was partly based on research that suggests that perceptions of defendant controllability could be especially influential on juror outcomes such as decisions of guilt (Schweitzer & Saks, 2011; Schweitzer et al., 2011). My prediction was also based on Weiner's Attribution Theory, which suggests that perceptions of "controllable" traits of an individual will cause others to hold that person more responsible for their behaviors (i.e., higher causal responsibility, see Weiner, 1985; Weiner, 2006).

Attribution theory attempts to explain phenomenal causality (i.e., the reasons why an action, behavior, event, or outcome occurs) with attributions involving causal dimensions such as locus, stability, and controllability (Weiner, 1985). The dimension of controllability refers to whether the cause of an event, behavior, outcome, or action is perceived to be under the control or volition of the individual (Weiner, 1985). Thus, criminal defendants rated higher in controllability, whether they carry the psychopathy label or not, should be attributed greater causal responsibility as well as a greater degree of criminal responsibility. In other words, for my second hypothesis I expected that mock juror perceptions of defendant controllability may have some predictive value on sentencing recommendations, regardless of whether the defendant has a psychopathy diagnosis or has no disorder diagnosis. This prediction stems partly from the Attribution Theory (Weiner, 1985) which predicts more punitive judicial decisions for defendants judged to be higher in causal responsibility for their actions and implies a connection between causal and moral responsibility (Weiner, 2006). Aligning with the foundation of this theory, I expected that attributions of high defendant controllability would translate to judgments of causal responsibility and a corresponding legal responsibility, resulting in harsher sentencing decisions relating to death penalty imposition by jurors.

For the third prediction relating to an interaction effect, I hypothesized that perceptions of defendant controllability and degree of psychopathy would significantly interact to uniquely predict mock juror sentencing decisions. Since controllability is closely related to causal responsibility according to Weiner's (1985) Attribution Theory, I expect controllability ratings to be a strongly influential factor on sentencing decisions relating to responsibility (e.g., causal, moral, or criminal) that may not be adequately

explained by a psychopathy diagnosis alone. This prediction was also partly based on corollary research findings that suggest that perceptions of defendant controllability are influential on other types of juror outcomes such as decisions of guilt, in ways that are independent of diagnostic label (Schweitzer & Saks, 2011). Since psychopathy perceptions could also be expected to significantly predict sentencing outcomes based on some past research findings (Cox et al., 2013; Edens et al., 2005; Edens et al., 2013), I predicted an interaction effect between both variables similar to a compounding or exponential effect, swaying jurors to impose more punitive sentencing decisions compared to the effect of either variable alone. Specifically, I hypothesized that mock juror perceptions of high defendant psychopathy and high controllability would interact to predict an especially high likelihood of imposing the death penalty over a life sentence on the defendant. Correspondingly, mock juror perceptions of low defendant psychopathy and low controllability were expected to uniquely interact to predict an especially lenient and low likelihood of imposing the death penalty over a life sentence on the defendant.

Definition of Terms

Attribution Theory: The Attribution Theory was originally proposed by Weiner (1985) as a theory of motivation and achievement to explain how attributions of causal dimensions may affect successes or failures. Attribution theory has since been applied more broadly to explain phenomenal causality (i.e., the reasons why an action, behavior, event, or outcome occurs) in a variety of circumstances, with attributions classified along specific causal dimensions (Weiner, 1985; Weiner, 1991; Weiner, 2006). The three causal dimensions of the Attribution Theory are locus of control (internal vs. external), stability (i.e., change over time), and controllability (causes that an individual can control

vs. causes that the individual cannot control) (Weiner, 1985). In the present study, the Attribution Theory is applied to help explain how perceptions of defendant controllability may predict mock juror sentencing decisions, possibly due to their resulting judgments about causal responsibility or criminal responsibility.

Controllability: one of the three causal dimensions of Weiner's (1985) Attribution Theory. Controllability refers to whether the cause of an event, behavior, outcome, or action is perceived to be under the control of the individual, as opposed to being perceived as outside of the individual's volition or control (Weiner, 1985). Thus, the cause of an action perceived as the highest level in controllability will be seen as a cause that the individual can fully control, and the cause of an action perceived as the lowest level in controllability will be seen as a cause that the individual cannot control, according to the Attribution Theory (Weiner, 1985). Within the context of the present study, controllability was anticipated to be significantly predictive of mock juror sentencing decisions for the defendant. It was also expected that controllability would be closely intertwined with a psychopathy diagnosis to have uniquely predictive effects on juror sentencing decisions.

Death penalty: The death penalty is defined as the process of sentencing convicted offenders to death for capital offenses, and this term is closely related to capital punishment, which includes the enforcement of the death sentence (i.e., execution of the convicted offender who has been sentenced to death) (Hood, 2022; Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2022). The death penalty currently exists in about 27 states and in the federal criminal justice system (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2021), while it is currently suspended in seven of those states for various reasons. Capital offenses such as

first-degree murder are considered one of the most serious crime types, so perpetrators of capital offenses are considered eligible for the death penalty in jurisdictions where the death penalty is allowed.

Mental disorder: According to the DSM-5, or Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition, a mental disorder is defined as a "syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an individual's cognition, emotional regulation, or behavior that reflects dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying mental functioning" (5th ed.; DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The term mental disorder is similarly defined in the ICD-11, which also adds that "[t]hese disturbances are usually associated with distress or impairment in personal, family, social, educational, occupational, or other important areas of functioning" (11th ed.; ICD-11; World Health Organization, 2019). Mental disorders are often synonymously referred to as mental illnesses or psychiatric disorders, and are clinically diagnosed by a mental health professional, such as a clinical psychologist or a psychiatrist.

To put this term into perspective for my study, the DSM-5 definition of mental disorder "was developed to meet the needs of clinicians, public health professionals, and research investigators rather than all of the technical needs of the courts and legal professionals", and it is important to be aware that there is an "imperfect fit between the questions of ultimate concern to the law and the information contained in a clinical diagnosis" (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Thus, the term mental disorder is complex and imperfect, especially within the forensic psychiatry/psychology fields and in the courtroom. For example, the term psychopathy is sometimes referred to by the

general population, in popular culture, and in the courtroom as a mental disorder and having characteristics of a mental disorder, although psychopathy does not technically exist as a recognized mental disorder in the current DSM-5.

Psychopathy: a psychological concept defined by traits such as manipulativeness, callousness, failure to accept responsibility for one's own actions, lack of empathy, and lack of remorse (Cleckley, 1976; Hare, 2003). The concept of psychopathy is described in detail and measured in psychological research by the Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R) (Hare, 2003). The term psychopathy has a controversial history, and it currently does not exist as a recognized mental disorder in the DSM-5, although it is commonly referred to as a mental disorder and a psychological/psychiatric term by the general population and in popular culture, as well as in the forensic psychiatry/psychology fields (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Furthermore, psychopathy is also commonly accepted as a legal term that is intrinsically tied to psychology, psychiatry, and law (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Hare, 2013). Within the legal context, psychopathy is typically introduced as a mental health concept during trial by the prosecution or by the defense, despite its current exclusion from the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; DeMatteo et al., 2014b).

Background of the Problem

United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world with 2.1 million inmates nationwide, and it is estimated that more than half of them suffer from a mental illness (James & Glaze, 2006; Walmsley, 2013; World Prison Brief, 2022). This highlights the significant overrepresentation of mentally disordered individuals entangled in the American criminal justice system, compared to the general U.S. population

(Bronson & Berzofsky, 2017; Torrey et al., 2010). Considering these statistics, the implications of judicial bias against criminal defendants with mental disorders are potentially substantial and far-reaching, and they highlight an issue that is worthy of investigation.

Within the judicial system, criminal defendants labeled with mental disorders encounter inherent biases from judges, lawyers, probation officers, mental health clinicians, and jurors (Cox et al., 2016; Murrie et al., 2007; Murrie et al., 2005; Rockett et al., 2007). These biases are seen at all stages of the judicial process, from guilt determination to sentencing, and these biases relate to various mental disorder diagnoses such as antisocial personality disorder, psychopathy, or schizophrenia (van Es et al., 2020; Mossière & Maeder, 2015). The potential impact of disorder diagnosis on specific juror outcomes suggests complex patterns across psychological mental illness categories. For example, the influence of mental disorder diagnosis on sentencing decisions will undoubtedly vary depending on the mental disorder; a defendant described as psychopathic may cause a juror to give harsher sentencing recommendations, whereas a defendant described as schizophrenic may result in more lenient sentencing recommendations (van Es et al., 2020). Therefore, one needs to focus on a particular disorder diagnosis to isolate biasing effects on juror outcomes.

To narrow the focus of this study on juror sentencing decisions, I investigated the specific impact of the psychopathy diagnosis, since labels such as “psychopath” are historically associated with negative perceptions and connotations such as lack of empathy, lack of remorse, dangerousness, criminality, and recidivism (Angermeyer & Dietrich, 2006; Edens, 2004; van Es et al., 2020; Mossière & Maeder, 2015). These

negative associations exist not only in the public domain and in the media, but also in the mental health field and within the realm of law, alluding to the unique prejudicial impact of a psychopathy diagnosis within the courtroom (Angermeyer & Dietrich, 2006; Edens, 2004; van Es et al., 2020; Mossière & Maeder, 2015).

The present study focuses on the impact of juror perceptions on sentencing decisions, within the context of not only perceptions of psychopathy, but also perceptions of controllability. Controllability is a dimension that is part of Weiner's (1985) Attribution Theory, and it refers to whether the cause of an event, behavior, outcome, or action is perceived to be under the control of the individual, as opposed to being perceived as outside of the individual's volition or control. Controllability is theorized to also relate to measures of criminal responsibility as well as causal responsibility, which could be expected to influence sentencing decisions for a criminal defendant (Weiner, 1985, Weiner, 2006). There has been no past research directly examining the relationship between defendant controllability perceptions and juror death penalty sentencing recommendations.

In the following sections, I will first discuss the strategic role that psychopathy plays in the courtroom, and then delve into research relating to psychopathy and juror decision-making. Then, I will cover research and theory related to controllability and juror decision-making. Ultimately, I will provide the rationale for the following research questions: Do juror perceptions of a higher degree of defendant psychopathy result in harsher death penalty sentencing decisions for a criminal defendant? Do juror perceptions of a higher degree of defendant controllability result in more punitive death penalty

sentencing decisions by jurors? Do juror perceptions of psychopathy and controllability interact to uniquely predict death penalty sentencing decisions for the defendant?

Psychopathy in the Courtroom

Psychopathy is a unique and fascinating disorder to examine in forensic psychiatry and forensic psychology research because it functions as a double-edged sword: in the criminal justice system, psychopathy could serve as either an aggravating factor or a mitigating factor. On the one hand, a psychopathy diagnosis and supporting scientific evidence such as FMRI brain imaging are used together as a defense tactic to argue for leniency for the defendant. When using the psychopathy label accompanied by neurological evidence for a mitigating or exculpatory purpose, defense attorneys may argue that there is a biological basis for their disorder, that there is brain dysfunction, that the defendant is deserving of mercy, that the defendant should not be deemed culpable for their crimes, or that this biological basis should excuse them from harsher penalties such as the death penalty (Edens & Truong, 2022; Hare, 2013; Kansas v. Crane, 2002). For instance, defense attorneys have provided expert testimony to claim that elevated PCL-R (Psychopathy Checklist) scores may indicate a “diminishment of volitional capacity”, a “behavioral abnormality”, or a “deficit in response modulation” (In the Interest of J.M., 2006, pp. 522-523; Kansas v. Crane, 2002) to argue that their defendant is either not criminally responsible, or else is deserving of more lenient sanctions. Essentially, some of these defense arguments appear to hinge on the caveat that the defendant was incapable of controlling his or her actions during the commission of the crime (Edens & Truong, 2022).

On the other hand, because of the stigmatizing and socially undesirable nature of traits typically associated with psychopathic individuals, a psychopathy diagnosis appears to be more commonly used as a prosecution tool to prejudice jurors against a criminal defendant (DeMatteo et al., 2014a; DeMatteo et al., 2014b; Edens & Truong, 2022). From this perspective, a psychopathy diagnosis could be seen as a "moral judgment masquerading as a clinical diagnosis" (Blackburn, 1988, p. 511), which has potentially prejudicial effects in the courtroom. Specifically, prosecutors may introduce psychopathy into evidence to argue that a psychopathy diagnosis is a sign of future dangerousness, that the defendant is a threat to society, that he is a dangerous criminal who is incapable of remorse, that the defendant would be unresponsive to treatment and rehabilitation, that the defendant is unable to change, or that there is a higher likelihood of re-offense (DeMatteo et al., 2014a; DeMatteo et al., 2014b; DeMatteo & Edens, 2006; Edens & Truong, 2022; Walsh & Walsh, 2006). Generally, these arguments seem to suggest that psychopathic individuals are in control of their actions, should be deemed responsible for those offenses, and are capable of distinguishing between right and wrong – caveats that are supported by survey research of U.S. jurors (Smith et al., 2014).

Additionally, some prosecutors use high PCL-R (Psychopathy Checklist) scores to rebut defense evidence of other potentially mitigating mental disorders (Edens & Truong, 2022). That is, prosecutors can use the psychopathy diagnosis to convince jurors that the defendant has volitional control over his actions or that he has the capability of differentiating between right and wrong, and this can be done to rebut defense claims of a different, more serious mental disorder or claims of intellectual disability (Edens & Truong, 2022). For instance, psychopathy evidence can be used by the prosecution to

bolster claims that the criminal defendant is malingering another serious disorder such as schizophrenia, a result stemming from their psychopathic tendencies (DeMatteo & Edens, 2006; Edens & Truong, 2022; O'Brien & Wayland, 2013).

Indeed, in most U.S. jurisdictions a psychopathy diagnosis appears to act more as an aggravating factor rather than as a mitigating factor, at least during the guilt determination phase of trial (Hare, 1996; Hare, 1998). Specifically, use of a psychopathy label during criminal proceedings appears to prejudice against the defendant when jurors are contemplating criminal responsibility and possibly causes jurors to declare more guilty verdicts than not guilty verdicts (Edens & Truong, 2022). Because of this prejudice, it is rarer for defense attorneys to introduce psychopathy evidence in criminal trials (DeMatteo et al., 2014a; DeMatteo et al., 2014b).

Research on the impact of psychopathy labels on sentencing consequences is less established than research related to guilt determination, and therefore it is a worthwhile endeavor to explore how psychopathy ratings impact particular sentencing decisions made by jurors. Research literature surrounding this topic will be discussed in the following section.

Perceptions of Psychopathy and Sentencing Decisions of Jurors

Existing case law, anecdotal evidence, and forensic research support the claim that there is an inherent judicial bias against mentally disordered criminal defendants that sways jury members to decide on more punitive sanctions (i.e., death penalty vs. life imprisonment) and longer judgments of sentencing length for various disorders (Blais & Forth, 2014; Kelley et al., 2019; Mossière & Maeder, 2015; Rockett et al., 2007). There is a growing body of research in the forensic psychology field relating to the specific impact

of a psychopathy diagnosis (as opposed to other mental disorder diagnoses) on sentencing decisions such as sentence length or the choice between life imprisonment and the death penalty (Cox et al., 2013; Cox et al., 2010; Edens et al., 2005; Kelley et al., 2019).

Psychopathy is a concept measured and described in psychological research by the Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R), and it is defined by traits such as manipulativeness, callousness, failure to accept responsibility for one's own actions, lack of empathy, and lack of remorse (Cleckley, 1976; Hare, 2013). The term psychopathy has a controversial history, as it currently does not exist as a recognized mental disorder in the DSM-5, although it is commonly referred to as a mental disorder and a psychological/psychiatric term by the general population and in popular culture (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). Furthermore, psychopathy is also commonly accepted as a legal term that is intrinsically tied to psychology, psychiatry, and law (APA, 2013). Within the legal context, psychopathy is typically introduced as a mental health concept during trial by the prosecution or by the defense, despite its current exclusion from the DSM-5 (APA, 2013; DeMatteo et al., 2014a; DeMatteo et al., 2014b). Thus, psychopathy can be strategically used by both the prosecution or the defense team to help sway juror thought and sentiment, and to influence their guilt determination decisions or sentencing decisions. The baseline analyses for my study explored whether mock juror perceptions of a higher degree of defendant psychopathy could predict more punitive sentencing recommendations for them, and whether perceptions of a higher degree of defendant controllability could also predict harsher sentencing recommendations. My study additionally examined whether a defendant described as being both high in psychopathic features and high in controllability over their actions

would have some uniquely punitive predictive value on mock jurors' sentencing decisions. This interaction effect also has never been studied in past research.

Despite the differences in variables or research design among studies examining psychopathy diagnoses and mock juror outcomes, research generally supports the notion that a psychopathy label or psychopathic traits lead to harsher sentencing recommendations and more negative perceptions of the criminal defendant. For example, a meta-analysis conducted by Kelley et al. (2019) found that ratings of perceived psychopathy were associated with more death penalty verdicts and longer sentence length recommendations by jurors. Similarly, Edens et al. (2005) found that defendants described as psychopathic received harsher punishment decisions by mock jurors compared to defendants with no mental disorder diagnosis label. Specifically, psychopathic defendants were more often recommended the death penalty over life imprisonment, and they received longer sentences (Edens et al., 2005). The results of Edens et al. (2005) also suggest that certain factors associated with psychopathy, which did not necessarily have direct legal relevance, were contributing to harsher sentencing decisions since they found that ratings of the degree of perceived psychopathy were predictive of death sentence recommendations, independent of testimony condition. Similarly, a study by Edens et al. (2013) examined how perceptions of psychopathic traits affected death penalty sentence recommendations for capital defendants. They found that perceived psychopathic traits were strong predictors of death penalty recommendations. Specifically, psychopathy-associated traits relating to lack of remorse, grandiosity, and manipulativeness were found to be most influential on these recommendations. Like Edens et al. (2005), Edens et al. (2013) suggest that this influence may be independent of

forensic evidence pointing to a specific personality disorder. That is, the associated traits themselves appeared to be related to death penalty-related decisions, and not the label. Blais and Forth (2014) also concluded that a psychopathy diagnosis was related to more punitive decision-making. They discovered that mock jurors were more likely to find a defendant guilty when he was diagnosed as a psychopath, and they gave the psychopathic defendant significantly higher ratings of guilt compared to a defendant with no disorder label (Blais & Forth, 2014). Finally, Cox et al. (2013) also found support for the conclusion that traits of psychopathy were predictive of death penalty verdicts for capital murder trials. Together, these studies demonstrate that defendants labeled as psychopathic or associated with psychopathy characteristics tend to receive harsher penalties and sentencing recommendations by jurors.

Although there appears to be a general prejudicial impact of psychopathy diagnoses on juror outcomes, research findings are inconsistent. Despite most research concluding that there is a negative impact of psychopathy diagnosis on sentencing decisions, other studies contradict this conclusion and have found no measurable impact of psychopathy diagnosis on sentencing (Berryessa & Wohlstetter, 2019; Filone et al., 2014). For example, a study by Filone et al. (2014) concluded that there was no significant impact of personality disorder diagnostic label on incarceration or sentence length recommendations (Filone et al., 2014). In fact, mock jurors seemed to be more heavily influenced by crime type than by diagnoses such as psychopathy (Filone et al., 2014). This finding suggests that the diagnostic label plays a minor role in influencing juror sentencing decisions, which motivates my study to investigate how other types of perceptions may influence juror sentencing decisions, distinct from psychopathy labeling

effects. In another study, Berryessa and Wohlstetter (2019) conducted a meta-analysis of 22 studies to examine the labeling effects of psychopathy on perceptions about punishment outcomes. They found that any significant effect on punishment outcomes was attributed to the general impact of any disorder type diagnosis, and not specifically to psychopathy (Berryessa & Wohlstetter, 2019). In other words, the psychopathy label had just as much impact on punishment outcomes as any other type of disorder label. This leads to the question of whether other certain associated perceptions or judgments related to the psychopathy label might be stronger determinants of sentencing decision outcomes, compared to just the specific label or diagnosis of psychopathy. The Berryessa and Wohlstetter (2019) study differed significantly from the present study because they focused on psychopathy and punishment outcomes within the context of a larger body of research, while the current study considered and incorporated the variable of controllability in addition to psychopathy in a singular experimental design. My study further examined the interaction between controllability perceptions and psychopathy perceptions on sentencing outcomes, which has not yet been studied.

Why are there inconsistencies between studies on the influence of psychopathy traits or labels and juror sentencing decisions? These inconsistencies could be explained if we discovered another factor that influences juror sentencing decisions that cannot fully be explained by just the psychopathy label. This leads us to ask the next question: Which other variables can reliably predict juror decisions about sentencing for the defendant, beyond what the psychopathy diagnosis can predict? If we look at the research, some studies point to other potentially important factors that may impact juror outcomes in ways that a simple diagnostic label cannot adequately explain.

For example, in a study that found limited mental disorder diagnostic effect on juror outcomes, the authors theorized that there were differences in the way each sample cognitively rationalized their stance to arrive at the same or similar conclusions (Mossière & Maeder, 2015). Therefore, they speculated that type of disorder has a limited effect on juror decisions, and that there are unknown underlying factors related or unrelated to these diagnoses that could help explain why jurors decide on more lenient or more punitive penalties for the defendant.

Research by Cox et al. (2010) found that mock jurors were more likely to recommend the death penalty to defendants who exhibit a high likelihood of recidivism, regardless of whether the defendant was labeled with a psychopathy diagnosis or not. Although Cox et al. (2010) studied different independent variables compared to my study, both studies investigated the possibility that factors or correlates, separate from the psychopathy label, can influence juror sentencing decisions. Specifically, Cox et al.'s (2010) study emphasized how laypersons might interpret the terms "psychopath" and "psychopathy" differently to influence their perceptions and decisions in the legal sphere, rather than focusing on just the direct influence of the psychopathy label itself on sentencing.

Finally, van Es et al.'s (2020) literature review examined the impact of forensic mental health expert testimony on judicial decision-making. They found inconsistent results regarding juror decisions about sentence length and concluded that there were almost no direct effects found. However, the recommended length of sentence appeared to be affected by specific juror perceptions relating to behavioral control/controllability, risk of recidivism, and treatment amenability (van Es et al., 2020).

All these studies are noteworthy because their findings imply that diagnostic labeling effects do not tell the whole story when predicting juror sentencing decisions. Their research inspired my study to look at other factors such as controllability, rather than focusing on diagnostic labels as potentially influential factors on juror sentencing outcomes. A variable such as controllability could operate both independently and in conjunction with psychopathy labeling to impact sentencing decisions. This could help explain the inconsistent research findings about the effects of a psychopathy diagnosis on juror outcomes. That is, jurors' perceptions of degree of controllability, rather than just the degree of psychopathy, could be an important variable that provides a foundational basis upon which juror sentencing decisions are consciously or subconsciously based.

Perceptions of Defendant Controllability and Sentencing Decisions of Jurors

Controllability is a concept that has not been examined widely in juror decision-making research but is deeply rooted in theory. The Attribution Theory is a well-established model that attempts to explain phenomenal causality (i.e., the reasons why an action, behavior, event, or outcome occurs) with attributions involving causal dimensions such as locus, stability, and controllability (Weiner, 1985). The dimension of controllability refers to whether the cause of an event, behavior, outcome, or action is perceived to be under the control or volition of the individual (Weiner, 1985). According to the Attribution Theory, individuals who have personality traits that are considered more "controllable" are attributed more causal responsibility for their behaviors (Weiner, 1985). Perceptions about controllability are especially relevant to understanding punishment decisions not only because judgments of high controllability theoretically imply more personal responsibility, but also because corresponding emotions such as

anger or sympathy from the decision-maker can amplify their punishment decisions for an individual perceived as high in controllability (Graham et al., 1997; Weiner, 2006). Consistent with the Attribution Theory, the concept of controllability is theorized to elicit causal and moral responsibility judgments, and arguably also legal responsibility judgments from jurors (Graham et al., 1997; Weiner, 1985; Weiner, 2006). In addition to factors such as perceptions of recidivism, remorselessness, and other features associated with psychopathy, past research alludes to the possibility that perceptions of controllability could be especially influential on juror decision-making outcomes (Schweitzer & Saks, 2011). This makes intuitive sense as perceived controllability over one's actions may relate closely to beliefs about whether that individual is morally, causally, or legally accountable for their actions and thus deserving of harsher consequences.

Research on the relationship between controllability and sentencing decisions is less established. However, some research findings allude to the notion that controllability measures play a potentially important role in judicial decision-making. Incidental findings by Schweitzer and Saks (2011) found that the extent to which jurors perceived the defendant to be in control of his actions during the commission of a crime (i.e., controllability) primarily determined verdicts of guilt, regardless of the type of forensic expert testimony or the severity of the criminal offense. They concluded that the presence of any type of expert testimony was associated with lower levels of perceived defendant control, compared to the control condition where expert testimony was absent (Schweitzer & Saks, 2011). So, a key element of guilty verdicts in insanity defense cases was the degree to which the defendant was perceived to be in control of his actions

during the commission of the crime, no matter the type of forensic evidence – as long as some evidence was present. In fact, ratings of perceived defendant control were overwhelmingly predictive of verdicts of guilt, and the only significant predictor in their study.

Like Schweitzer and Saks (2011), the present study similarly explored the impact that juror perceptions of controllability have on juror outcome variables. However, there are several crucial differences between the present study and Schweitzer and Saks' (2011) study. Their study heavily focused on comparisons of neuroscientific evidence, while my study involved only forensic psychiatric testimony and not neuroscientific testimony. Schweitzer and Saks (2011) did not examine the psychopathy diagnosis, whereas perceived degree of psychopathy was an independent variable in the present study. They emphasized the insanity defense whereas my study does not.

Furthermore, Schweitzer and Saks (2011) studied questions of guilt (guilty vs. not guilty determinations) as the dependent variable, but my study focused on sentencing decision outcomes (likelihood of imposing the death penalty over a life sentence). That is, for my study the assumption of guilt has already been determined through a jury verdict or a guilty plea, and we are primarily interested in sentencing decisions made after guilt determination has already been established. The present study's particular focus on death penalty sentencing decisions as the dependent variable was a deliberate attempt to optimize my analysis because research is lacking on sentencing outcomes, especially in relation to psychopathy and controllability. Specific punishment outcomes (i.e., death penalty vs. life sentence decisions) were expected to have more subtle,

nuanced differences compared to juror decisions about whether a defendant is guilty or not guilty.

The following chapter outlines the research methodology for this study. Perceptions of defendant degree of psychopathy and perceptions of defendant degree of controllability were the independent variables of interest. The dependent variable was the likelihood of imposing the death penalty over a life sentence upon the defendant by mock jurors for a capital murder trial.

Chapter II.

Research Method

The following sections provide a detailed description of the Participants, Materials, Procedure, and Data Analysis Plan for this study.

Participants

After the study was approved by the Harvard University Area Institutional Review Board Committee on the Use of Human Subjects, participants were recruited for the study via two platforms, Qualtrics XM and Amazon Mechanical Turk. Qualtrics XM is an experience management software platform that enables the building of anonymous online surveys that can be disseminated to potential participants in a secure manner. For this study, a confidential, self-reported three-questionnaire survey was built using Qualtrics XM software, enabling secure and confidential data collection for the 387 participants. Surveys were administered to participants in this study using Qualtrics XM in conjunction with Amazon Mechanical Turk, and a nominal compensation was paid to eligible Mechanical Turk workers who completed the surveys. Amazon Mechanical Turk is a human intelligence crowdsourcing platform that was found to be a reliable and efficient way to gather a large, heterogeneous, and representative participant pool compared to traditional psychological research recruitment methods (e.g., college psychology study pools), while also producing high-quality data comparable to published psychological research (Buhrmester et al., 2011).

To be eligible for the study participants were asked to meet some standard United States juror eligibility requirements (i.e., U.S. citizenship, 18 years of age or older, reading/writing fluency in the English language, no felony convictions) in an effort to improve ecological validity and to replicate a typical U.S. jury population. Additionally, since U.S. jury members are typically required to be death-qualified for eligibility to serve on a jury, participants for this study were vetted in the same way. That is, they were asked about their attitudes and opinions regarding the death penalty, as well as their general willingness or unwillingness to potentially impose a death sentence in a capital case. Only participants who had more open-minded or unbiased death penalty attitudes were included in the study. This ensured that participants met typical death qualification standards, which is a mandatory requirement for serving on a U.S. jury for a capital murder trial.

Ultimately, 120 mock juror participants were included in the 2x2 factorial ANOVA design study, with 30 participants in each condition. There were 267 participants excluded from the study for various reasons, as detailed in the Data Analysis Plan section. The male (55.83%) and female (44.17%) participants ranged from 20 to 69 years of age. Participants were predominantly white (73.33%), while others indicated a racial and ethnic status of Asian/East Asian (9.02%), Black/African American (9.02%), Indian/East Indian/South Asian (3.33%), Hispanic or Latino (2.5%), Other (1.67%), or Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander (0.83%).

Materials

Before enabling participation in the study, a Letter of Informed Consent (see Appendix A) was reviewed by and agreed to by all eligible participants. After the

informed consent process was complete, all questionnaires were administered via Qualtrics XM. Data sets for the dependent variable (sentencing decision outcomes) and independent variables (perceived defendant psychopathy and perceived defendant controllability) were collected from the Mock Juror Perceptions and Sentencing Recommendations Questionnaire. For this questionnaire, results relating to juror perceptions about the defendant were gathered using a 100-point sliding scale which variously assessed perceptions of degree of controllability; degree of causal responsibility; degree of moral responsibility; and degree of criminal responsibility. A 100-point sliding scale was utilized to assess sentencing outcomes including participants' estimated likelihood of imposing a death penalty sentence over a life sentence, and a hypothetical minimum sentence length recommendation. Details about the questionnaires and case materials for this study are described below.

Preliminary Questionnaire

After recording some general demographic information (age, gender, and race/ethnic status) participants were asked about their personal views on the death penalty, and whether they would fairly consider the facts and evidence of a case before making any death penalty decisions (to ensure unbiased answers). Participants answering that they would be unwilling to implement the death penalty, or that they would invoke the death penalty inappropriately (e.g., they would impose the death penalty even if the defendant did not meet the statutory guidelines necessary for the death penalty) would not be considered death-qualified, as their attitudes/beliefs may interfere with their ability to render an impartial verdict or sentence. After a holistic review of questionnaire responses, participants who did not meet the standard for death qualification were

excluded from analyses, as any biases in attitudes or opinions would likely prohibit them from serving on a capital jury in a real trial. See Appendix B for the Preliminary Questionnaire, which is inspired by a questionnaire developed by Arnold (2017).

Case Scenario and Forensic Testimony Evidence

Participants were asked to read a brief fictional case scenario about a capital murder case in which a defendant committed first-degree murder. Each case vignette/forensic testimony excerpt was identical except the forensic expert's conclusions about the two manipulated variables, which were perceived defendant disorder diagnosis (high psychopathy vs. low psychopathy) and perceived degree of defendant controllability (high controllability vs. low controllability). At the end of the case scenario was a brief paragraph of expert testimony from a court appointed clinical psychiatrist regarding the defendant's mental illness diagnosis. The defendant was either described by the forensic expert as meeting the criteria for psychopathy or was described as having no mental disorder diagnosis. The defendant was also described by the forensic expert as having either high controllability over their actions or low controllability over their actions. Details about the defendant such as race and gender were excluded from the case vignettes to minimize confounds. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions (low psychopathy/low controllability; high psychopathy/low controllability; low psychopathy/high controllability; high psychopathy/high controllability) and then were asked to make sentencing recommendations (Appendix D), based on the information that their vignette provided. See Appendix C for the Case Materials and Forensic Testimony Evidence. The materials developed for the present study are partly inspired by questionnaires developed by Guy and Edens (2006) and Edens et al. (2004).

Mock Juror Perceptions and Sentencing Recommendations Questionnaire

This questionnaire assessed participants' perceptions about the defendant (i.e., degree of perceived defendant psychopathy, degree of defendant controllability; degree of moral responsibility; degree of causal responsibility; degree of criminal responsibility), and participants' sentencing recommendations for the defendant, including their likelihood of imposing the death penalty over a life sentence on the defendant. All perception assessments utilized a 100-point sliding scale. See Appendix D for the Mock Juror Perceptions and Sentencing Recommendations Questionnaire, which were inspired by those developed by Edens et al. (2004) and Arnold (2017).

Procedure

All materials for the current study were administered via Amazon Mechanical Turk in conjunction with Qualtrics XM. After signing a letter of informed consent (see Appendix A), participants completed the Preliminary Questionnaire (see Appendix B). They were then asked to read the corresponding Case Vignette/Forensic Testimony Evidence materials (see Appendix C). After reviewing the testimony evidence materials, participants completed the Sentencing Recommendations Questionnaire (see Appendix D) to assess items of interest such as perceptions of defendant degree of psychopathy, perceptions of defendant degree of controllability, and likelihood of imposing the death penalty over a life sentence upon the defendant from the case vignette. An optional anonymous commentary section was provided at the end of the questionnaire for participants to elaborate on their decision-making processes and their general thoughts about the study.

Data Analysis Plan

This study incorporates a 2 x 2 factorial ANOVA design with four independent variable conditions: low psychopathy/low controllability, high psychopathy/low controllability, low psychopathy/high controllability, high psychopathy/high controllability. The dependent variable chosen was a sentencing decision related to mock jurors' likelihood of imposing the death penalty over a life sentence on the defendant.

Participant responses from the Mock Juror Perceptions and Sentencing Recommendations questionnaire (see Appendix D) were analyzed to ensure that participants matched appropriately with their assigned condition before being included in the final sample. Participants were grouped accordingly into one of the four independent variable conditions (see above) after an analysis of questionnaire responses about their perceived degree of defendant psychopathy and controllability. Additionally, several attention and manipulation checks were incorporated into the questionnaires to ensure sound data. After a careful examination of each respondent's overall responses and data, 267 participants were excluded from analysis for various reasons including: failure of attention or manipulation checks, answer inconsistencies, unusually extreme or streamlined responses, inability to adequately assign the participant to any of the four experimental conditions, completion of the study in an unreasonably short period of time (e.g., 1 minute and 30 seconds or less), ineligibility for the study (i.e., they were not U.S. citizens; they were not fluent in the English language), completion of responses by a potential bot (as indicated and flagged by Qualtrics data analysis), completion of the study more than once (i.e., same location and IP address), failure to fully complete all of the questions in the survey, or failure of the death penalty eligibility requirement. Failure

of death penalty eligibility means that participants either indicated that they were completely or strongly against imposing the death penalty during a criminal trial, indicated that they were completely or strongly in favor of imposing the death penalty, or indicated that they would always vote either for or against the death penalty without considering the circumstances or evidence in the case. Ultimately, 120 participants were included in the data analysis procedure for this study, with 30 participants assigned to each of the four independent variable conditions.

Chapter III.

Results

The final study sample consisted of 120 English-speaking U.S. citizens living in the United States. Participants were predominantly male (55.83%) and Caucasian (73.33%), and they ranged in age between 20 and 69 years of age. A two-factor (2 x 2) Analysis of Variance was conducted to evaluate the effects of perceived defendant psychopathy and perceived defendant controllability on mock juror likelihood of imposing the death penalty over a life sentence. Refer to Table 1 for a summary of Descriptive Statistics relating to death penalty sentencing decisions as a function of perceived degree of psychopathy ratings and perceived degree of controllability ratings.

Table 1. Summary of Descriptive Statistics with Likelihood of Death Penalty Imposition as Dependent Variable

Descriptive Statistics

Dependent Variable: DPenalty

Psychopathy	Controllability	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Low	Low	31.93	22.592	30
	High	36.87	33.858	30
	Total	34.40	28.645	60
High	Low	37.83	28.904	30
	High	55.70	29.415	30
	Total	46.77	30.284	60
Total	Low	34.88	25.892	60
	High	46.28	32.847	60
	Total	40.58	30.001	120

Levene's test was not significant, $F(3, 116) = 1.82$, $p = .147$, indicating that the assumption of homogeneity of variance underlying the application of the two-way ANOVA was met, and equal variances are assumed. An alpha level of .05 was used to analyses. Data analysis revealed that there was a significant main effect of perceived psychopathy, a significant main effect of perceived controllability, and no interaction effects between measures of perceived psychopathy and perceived controllability on death penalty sentencing decision outcomes. Refer to Table 2 for a summary table that depicts the Tests of Between-Subjects Effects with likelihood of death penalty imposition as the dependent variable. Specifically, a 2x2 between-subjects analysis of variance revealed a significant main effect of psychopathy on likelihood of imposing the death penalty, $F(1, 116) = 5.466$, $MS_e = 839.38$, $p < .05$, $\omega^2 = .035$. The 2x2 ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of controllability on likelihood of imposing the death penalty, $F(1, 116) = 4.645$, $MS_e = 839.38$, $p < .05$, $\omega^2 = .028$. There was no finding of an interaction between psychopathy and controllability on likelihood of imposing the death penalty, $F(1, 116) = 1.495$, $MS_e = 839.38$, $p > .05$, $\omega^2 = .004$. Thus, the findings from this study only partly support my hypotheses, as I expected to see main effects of psychopathy and controllability, along with an interaction effect between psychopathy and controllability on sentencing outcomes. However, only main effects were found in this study. See Figure 1 for a visual representation that depicts the mean scores with error bars for mock juror likelihood of imposing the death penalty over a life sentence, as a function of psychopathy ratings and controllability ratings. This bar graph illustrates the lack of an interaction effect between perceived psychopathy and perceived controllability on death penalty sentencing outcomes.

Table 2. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects with Likelihood of Death Penalty Imposition as Dependent Variable

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: DPenalty

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	9741.367[a]	3	3247.122	3.868	.011
Intercept	197640.833	1	197640.833	235.461	<.001
Psychopathy	4588.033	1	4588.033	5.466	.021
Controllability	3898.800	1	3898.800	4.645	.033
Psychopathy * Controllability	1254.533	1	1254.533	1.495	.224
Error	97367.800	116	839.378		
Total	304750.000	120			
Corrected Total	107109.167	119			

a. R Squared = .091 (Adjusted R Squared = .067)



Figure 1. Bar Graph Depicting Likelihood of Death Penalty Imposition as a Function of Psychopathy Ratings and Controllability Ratings.

To explore the concept of causal responsibility in relation to the independent variables of psychopathy and controllability, additional corollary analyses were conducted on the data. Refer to Table 3 for a summary of Descriptive Statistics relating to causal responsibility ratings as a function of perceived degree of psychopathy ratings and perceived degree of controllability ratings.

Table 3. Summary of Descriptive Statistics with Degree of Causal Responsibility as Dependent Variable

Descriptive Statistics

Dependent Variable: CausalResp

Psychopathy	Controllability	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Low	Low	52.40	26.454	30
	High	72.07	27.582	30
	Total	62.23	28.570	60
High	Low	77.10	19.935	30
	High	81.67	27.799	30
	Total	79.38	24.093	60
Total	Low	64.75	26.352	60
	High	76.87	27.878	60
	Total	70.81	27.688	120

Corollary data analyses revealed that there was a significant main effect of perceived psychopathy, a significant main effect of perceived controllability, and no interaction effects between measures of perceived psychopathy and perceived controllability on causal responsibility. Refer to Table 4 for a summary depicting the Tests of Between-Subjects Effects with causal responsibility ratings as the dependent variable. Specifically, a 2x2 between-subjects analysis of variance revealed a very significant main effect of psychopathy on ratings of causal responsibility, $F(1, 116) = 13.416$, $MS_e = 657.69$, $p < .001$, $\omega^2 = .089$. The 2x2 ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of controllability on ratings of causal responsibility, $F(1, 116) = 6.697$, $MS_e = 657.69$, $p < .05$, $\omega^2 = .041$. There was no finding of an interaction between psychopathy and controllability on ratings of causal responsibility, $F(1, 116) = 2.6$, $MS_e = 657.69$, $p > .05$, $\omega^2 = .011$.

See Figure 2 for a visual representation that depicts the mean scores with error bars for causal responsibility ratings, as a function of psychopathy ratings and controllability ratings. This bar graph illustrates the lack of an interaction effect between perceived psychopathy and perceived controllability on causal responsibility scores.

Table 4. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects with Degree of Causal Responsibility as Dependent Variable

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: CausalResp

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	14938.158[a]	3	4979.386	7.571	<.001
Intercept	601658.408	1	601658.408	914.801	<.001
Psychopathy	8823.675	1	8823.675	13.416	<.001
Controllability	4404.408	1	4404.408	6.697	.011
Psychopathy * Controllability	1710.075	1	1710.075	2.600	.110
Error	76292.433	116	657.693		
Total	692889.000	120			
Corrected Total	91230.592	119			

a. R Squared = .164 (Adjusted R Squared = .142)



Figure 2. Bar Graph Depicting Degree of Causal Responsibility as a Function of Psychopathy Ratings and Controllability Ratings.

Chapter IV.

Discussion

The goals of this study were to examine how perceived degree of defendant psychopathy predicted juror death penalty sentencing decisions, how perceived degree of defendant controllability predicted juror death penalty sentencing decisions, and how the two variables of psychopathy and controllability interacted together to predict juror death penalty sentencing decisions. The results of the study revealed a main effect of psychopathy on sentencing decisions and a main effect of controllability on sentencing decisions, which were consistent with my hypotheses. However, contrary to my hypothesis of an interaction effect, statistical analyses revealed no interaction effect between psychopathy and controllability on sentencing decisions.

Consistent with some past research, the results of this study indicated that mock juror ratings of perceived higher defendant psychopathy led to a significantly higher likelihood of jurors imposing the death penalty on the criminal defendant, and that perceptions of lower defendant psychopathy resulted in a significantly lower likelihood of imposing the death penalty. Specifically, mock jurors were more likely to judge defendants with a high or very high degree of psychopathy as deserving of a harsher punishment, as results showed that mock jurors were significantly more likely to sentence the defendant to death rather than giving them a life sentence. Alternatively, when a defendant was perceived to possess a low or very low degree of psychopathy, mock jurors appeared significantly less likely to judge them as deserving of a harsher

punishment, as evidenced by their significantly lower likelihood of sentencing the defendant to death rather than giving them a life sentence. These results align with my hypotheses and are also consistent with a larger body of past research that suggests that psychopathy traits and labels are associated with harsher sentencing decisions by jurors (Edens et al., 2005; Edens et al., 2013; Kelley et al., 2019). Thus, juror perceptions of defendant psychopathy appear have a negative and stigmatizing effect, and result in jurors deeming a highly psychopathic defendant to be more deserving of harsher penalties such as a death penalty sentence, as opposed to a life sentence.

The results of this study also indicated that mock juror ratings of perceived defendant controllability had a significant effect on likelihood of jurors imposing the death penalty over a life sentence. When a defendant was perceived to have been higher in control or completely in control of their actions during their crime, mock jurors tended to judge them as deserving of a harsher punishment, as reflected in their significantly higher likelihood of sentencing the defendant to death rather than giving them a life sentence. Alternatively, when a defendant was perceived to have been lower in control or not at all in control of their actions during their crime, mock jurors were less likely to judge them as deserving of a harsher punishment, and this was seen because jurors had a significantly lower likelihood of sentencing the defendant to death rather than giving them a life sentence.

The controllability findings align with my hypotheses, which predicted that high controllability would be associated with harsher sentencing decisions and that low controllability would correspond to more lenient sentencing decisions. The results of this study reveal a pattern of judgments and decision-making consistent with research

exploring behavioral control (van Es et al., 2020; Schweitzer & Saks, 2011; Schweitzer et al., 2011). Research by Schweitzer and Saks (2011) suggested that the extent to which jurors perceived the defendant to have controllability over their actions primarily determined verdicts of guilt. That is, higher controllability was associated with a greater likelihood of giving more guilty verdicts. This aligns with my study's expectations and findings that controllability ratings are also significantly predictive of death penalty sentencing decisions, in ways similar to guilty verdict predictions. The results of this study also are consistent with the Attribution Theory (Weiner, 1985; Weiner, 2006), which predicts that perceived controllability elicits subconscious judgments about whether an individual is causally accountable for their actions, which may translate to legal accountability and criminal responsibility. These subconscious juror judgments would lead to beliefs that a defendant scoring higher in controllability deserves more punitive legal consequences or sentencing outcomes. This expected sentencing outcome was exactly what was discovered in this study.

My prediction of an interaction effect was not supported by the data for this study. There was no interaction effect found between psychopathy and controllability on juror likelihood of imposing the death penalty over a life sentence, contrary to my hypothesis. Results showed that the effect of controllability ratings on this sentencing outcome was not statistically different for participants in this study based on whether they were in the high psychopathy condition or the low psychopathy condition. Conversely, the effect of psychopathy ratings on likelihood of imposing the death penalty was not significantly different for participants in this study based on whether they were in the high controllability condition or the low controllability condition. Therefore, the effect of

psychopathy does not depend on controllability measures when looking at death penalty recommendations of jurors, nor does the effect of controllability depend on psychopathy measures when looking at the same outcomes. Instead, the results of the study indicated that ratings of perceived psychopathy and ratings of perceived controllability independently predicted more punitive sentencing outcomes on their own, but the ratings did not appear to operate together to predict uniquely or statistically higher likelihood of imposing harsher sentencing penalties. This was an interesting finding because it points to the possibility that the decision to impose a death penalty or life sentence upon a defendant may be a dichotomous one that either considers the defendant's degree of psychopathy or degree of controllability but does not take into account both factors together to create an enhanced or exponential effect on sentencing outcomes.

Additional corollary analyses revealed that there was a main effect of perceived defendant psychopathy on causal responsibility ratings, a main effect of perceived controllability ratings on causal responsibility ratings, and no interaction effect between psychopathy ratings and controllability ratings on causal responsibility ratings. That is, judgments of causal responsibility appear to mirror the results of the death penalty sentencing decisions when examining them in relation to perceived psychopathy and controllability.

First, higher ratings of perceived psychopathy led to greater attributions of defendant causal responsibility, and lower ratings of psychopathy corresponded to lower causal responsibility attributions. These findings could help explain why higher psychopathy ratings also lead to harsher death penalty sentencing decisions, because when a defendant is considered causally responsible for an outcome for which their act

was instrumental or necessary to the outcome, regardless of internal motives (Weiner, 1985), it would be a logical inference that this defendant should be held more accountable and therefore deserving of more punitive sanctions or sentencing.

Second, the corollary analysis also revealed that higher ratings of perceived controllability led to corresponding judgments of greater causal responsibility, which aligns with aspects of the Attribution Theory inferring that the higher controllability perceptions elicit greater causal and/or moral responsibility judgments, which then lead to greater legal responsibility and harsher legal consequences (Graham et al., 1997; Weiner, 1985; Weiner, 2006). That is, as predicted by theory the greater the defendant's perceived degree of controllability over their actions, the more likely jurors are to view the defendant as causally accountable for those actions.

The third finding of a lack of an interaction effect between psychopathy and controllability on causal responsibility also mirrors the results of the main investigation, as ratings of perceived psychopathy and ratings of perceived controllability seem to operate independently on their effects on causal responsibility, and these factors did not appear to operate together to predict statistically higher ratings of causal responsibility. Therefore, there would be no added benefit to emphasize and consider psychopathy and controllability together for causal responsibility attributions, since results revealed that judgments of causal responsibility did not statistically differ from each other whether perceptions of psychopathy and controllability were considered together or independently of one another. It was interesting to see that causal responsibility ratings reacted similarly to death penalty sentencing decisions when examining how they were influenced by perceptions of psychopathy and perceptions of controllability. These corollary findings

may prompt further investigation into the nature of the relationship between causal responsibility determinations and death penalty sentencing outcomes.

Overall, the results of this study indicate that perceptions of defendant psychopathy and perceptions of defendant controllability are statistically important factors considered by mock jurors (whether consciously or subconsciously) when making major decisions during the sentencing phase for capital murder trials. Mock jurors' decisions to opt for the death penalty over a life sentence could be a dichotomous decision, whereby the juror reaches that threshold either through 1. their belief that the defendant is psychopathic and more deserving of the death penalty, or 2. through their perception that the defendant had complete control over their actions and therefore should be held more criminally responsible for their crimes. The results of the study imply that jurors do not consider and incorporate both controllability and psychopathy perceptions holistically to make an especially punitive (or lenient) decision to impose the death penalty over a life sentence during a capital trial, nor does it lead to any special or enhanced effect on causal responsibility judgments upon the defendant.

This study explored how psychopathy evidence and juror perceptions of defendant controllability relate to defendant sentencing outcomes, and the results provide some clues on how trial strategies may be utilized by prosecution teams and defense teams to sway juror opinions and decisions in capital crime trials. Historically, research studies have shown some mixed results on whether psychopathy labels or traits have any statistically measurable impact on sentencing recommendations made by jurors. Other research has pointed to various factors that may play a role in swaying jurors' trial decisions during the guilt phase of a trial or influencing their decisions of sentencing

recommendations during the penalty phase. Factors that potentially influence death penalty sentence decisions, such as defendant controllability, had not yet been investigated in forensic psychology research until now.

This study also aimed to see how psychopathy label and defendant controllability relate to one another to potentially predict unique sentencing outcomes. Since previous research has never examined the connection between both psychopathy labels and controllability in relation to sentencing decisions, this study makes a new contribution to the literature. Additionally, this research study reveals the importance of perceived defendant controllability on jurors' perceptions and sentencing decision-making processes, which has never been examined in past forensic psychology research.

The findings from this study add to the body of research suggesting that a psychopathy label is significantly related to juror decisions, and in this case, on juror likelihood of imposing the death penalty to a criminal defendant in a murder trial. The study revealed a significant main effect of psychopathy ratings on mock juror likelihood of imposing the death penalty over a life sentence. Generally, this suggests that higher ratings of psychopathy are related to harsher death penalty sentencing decisions, and lower ratings of psychopathy are associated with more lenient death penalty sentencing decisions. The results are notable because past research has yielded mixed results about whether psychopathy labels influence decisions about sentencing, and this study further contributes to the body of research that suggests that there is indeed a statistically significant relationship between psychopathy label and juror sentencing decisions. That is, whether the criminal defendant is perceived as high or low in psychopathic traits plays a role in swaying jurors' decisions about whether they are more or less likely to impose

the death penalty on this defendant during a capital crime trial. Ratings of psychopathy were also related to causal responsibility attributions in similar ways, based on corollary analyses of the data. Ratings of a greater degree of defendant psychopathy were found to lead to higher attributions of causal responsibility. Conversely, when jurors rated a defendant as having a lower degree of defendant psychopathy, this led to corresponding judgments of lower causal responsibility.

This study revealed that another key to making sentencing decisions lies in jurors' perceptions about the defendant's degree of controllability, or control over their actions during the commission of the crime. Specifically, the higher the degree of perceived defendant controllability over their actions, the higher the likelihood that jurors would impose a harsher penalty such as the death penalty, over a more lenient penalty such as a life sentence. Alternatively, the lower the degree of perceived defendant controllability, the lower the likelihood that the juror would impose the death penalty rather than a life sentence onto the criminal defendant. These results are consistent with the Attribution Theory (Weiner, 1985; Weiner, 2006) which predicts that high controllability measures result in higher causal responsibility and harsher punishment outcomes. The results of this study also align with the incidental findings of Schweitzer and Saks (2011) that suggest that controllability measures are predictive of outcomes such as determination of guilt.

Ratings of controllability were also related to causal responsibility attributions in similar ways, based on the corollary analyses. Ratings of a greater degree of defendant controllability were found to lead to higher attributions of causal responsibility. Conversely, when jurors rated a defendant as having a lower degree of defendant

controllability, this led to corresponding judgments of lower causal responsibility. These results are consistent with the Attribution Theory (Weiner, 1985; Weiner, 2006), and provide valuable information to the prosecution team or to the defense team for capital crime cases who must strategize appropriately to sway the jurors towards a particular sentencing outcome during trial.

Overall, these findings have several implications for the strategic arguments of both the prosecution and defense teams during trial. On the prosecution side, a strategic focus on the defendant's degree of psychopathy and controllability may meaningfully influence jurors' decisions. Since this study found a main effect of psychopathy, it would make sense for the prosecution to emphasize the criminal defendant's psychopathic traits and characteristics in order to steer jurors towards harsher sentencing decisions, particularly those relating to the imposition of the death penalty over a life sentence. Alternatively, if the prosecution puts a stronger focus on the defendant's control over their actions during the commission of the crime, regardless of whether the defendant was labeled as psychopathic or not, this could sway jurors to recommend harsher sentencing recommendations. That is, an emphasis on heightened controllability of the defendant over their crimes could help to sway jurors to insist on a harsher sentencing outcome for the defendant, such as the death penalty over a life sentence. Corollary analyses also suggest that the prosecution place particular emphasis on higher psychopathy ratings or greater controllability to steer jurors to attribute higher causal responsibility to the defendant, which could in turn influence sentencing outcomes. According to the Attribution Theory (Weiner, 1985; Weiner, 2006), these judgments of causal responsibility have an influential effect on beliefs about whether the defendant is

deserving of more punitive sentencing consequences, further swaying the decision-making processes of jurors.

The results of this study also allude to strategic maneuvers for the defense team. Specifically, it may be prudent to downplay or offer alternative explanations for any psychopathic characteristics of the defendant when arguing for more lenient sentencing outcomes. This draws from the study's findings that perceptions of a low or very low degree of defendant psychopathy relate to more lenient sentencing penalties, compared to when the defendant is perceived to have a high or very high degree of psychopathy. Furthermore, since results suggest that perceptions of a low or very low degree of controllability are also related to more lenient sentencing decisions, it would be strategic to emphasize during trial that the defendant had a very low degree of control over their actions during the commission of their crime, regardless of whether the defendant was judged to be psychopathic or not. Alternatively, if any diagnosis of psychopathy was already brought to light during trial by prosecution, the defense might argue that the defendant's psychopathy had rendered their defendant unable to control himself or herself or their actions, and therefore deserving of a more merciful sentencing punishment. This strategy may prove effective, as the results from the study indicate that an emphasis on low or very low controllability would result in jurors being less likely to impose a death penalty over a life sentence on the defendant. Corollary analyses also suggest that a defense team that emphasizes low psychopathy or low controllability for their client may steer jurors towards attributions of lower causal responsibility.

The study's findings about interaction effects also have implications on trial strategy. Contradictory to my hypothesis, there was no interaction found between

psychopathy and controllability on juror sentencing decisions in this study. The lack of interaction effects found in this study suggests that placing emphasis on both the defendant's degree of psychopathy and controllability together would not result in a unique or substantially punitive nor lenient imposition of the death penalty over a life sentence. These factors (perceived degree of defendant psychopathy, perceived degree of defendant controllability over their actions) appear to operate independently of one another. This also appears to be true when considering causal responsibility as the outcome, based on corollary findings. Therefore, for both the prosecution and the defense team, there appears to be no added utility in focusing on both degree of psychopathy and degree of controllability together to further sway jurors' sentencing decisions towards or against the imposition of the death penalty on the defendant, or to further sway their judgements about the defendant's causal responsibility. Jurors possibly make a binary decision when deciding on the death penalty, that either hinges on perceptions about the defendant's degree of psychopathy or on their degree of controllability. They do not seem to take a holistic consideration of both perceptions together to make enhanced or uniquely punitive (or lenient) sentencing decisions or attributions about causal responsibility.

The optional anonymous participant commentary for this study revealed some surprisingly insightful comments, and encourages ongoing debate about topics such as psychopathy, mental illness, juror perceptions, sentencing of capital crime defendants, moral judgments, the death penalty, responsibility, free will, and intent/control. These complex topics are innately intertwined with one another, yet they can have substantially divergent effects on individual jurors. What one juror may consider of vital importance

when making sentencing decisions might not have the same effect on another juror, as each has their own life experiences, perceptions, thoughts, judgments, stereotypes, emotions, rationales, reasoning processes, and opinions that influence their own decisions. For example, one participant in a high psychopathy condition noted, "The Psychopathy diagnosis means to me that the defendant cannot be put to death. However, it also means he is very dangerous and should never have a chance at freedom ever again". However, another participant in the same high psychopathy condition had a different stance and chose to focus on controllability, stating "I think as long as the case evidence is strong enough, this is [an] open and shut [case] for a death sentence. This person has control of their actions and acted in a manner that is extremely dangerous to themselves and others. There is no reason to let them join the general public". Yet another participant's perspective was that "[i]f [the] defendant was treated and medicated for psychopathy, [they] could be eligible for monitored release", differing distinctly from the first two participants who opposed any freedom for the defendant. Another participant offered some especially insightful commentary on this topic:

> Seems a little more complex than 'years in prison' to solve the issue of people in this world who commit these types of acts. They are in need of psychological help and if they're willing to receive it our tax dollars [or] humanity are better served for the betterment of people. Killing someone because they killed someone is not moral nor humane, and just because the jury or judge makes that call doesn't make it any more justifiable.

This is just a window into some different perspectives relating to psychopathy and punishment, and there are undoubtedly many other differences in opinions on related

topics surrounding the issue. We must recognize that jurors are fundamentally biased regardless of the theoretical impartiality of the judicial process, due to the complexities of the human element and human nature within proceedings. Jurors may be especially vulnerable to being influenced and swayed by skilled and experienced members of a prosecution or defense team, if arguments appeal to the issues that matter the most to them, or if they touch an especially personal and sensitive topic. It is impossible to be completely unbiased and immune to the influence of others during trial and sentencing because we are humans, and humans are imperfect beings. This vulnerability of the human factor can be advantageous to trial lawyers who are finely tuned to aspects that have an impact on influencing each juror's thoughts, feelings, and decisions related to a criminal defendant. This study has contributed to the literature by revealing the importance of two important aspects that have an impact on juror decisions about imposition of the death penalty - juror perceptions of degree of defendant psychopathy, and perceptions of a defendant's degree of control over their actions.

Research Limitations

There are several limitations related to the procedure and design of this research study. The study utilized brief written crime scenario vignettes, which differed substantially from real-world courtroom presentation of trial data where lengthy in-person expert testimony and video evidence are often presented to the jury. The depth and breadth of information from a real-world trial cannot be sufficiently conveyed through a simple set of written materials presented in an online format, like those typically used for an experimental study of this nature. Actual trial materials are often lengthy and contain complex legal terminology. As one participant in the study

commented, “It’s hard to dish out the death penalty [or] not with such a small amount of information. If I was really giving my opinion, I'd need a lot more information on the defendant and his victim, and any other information pertinent to the case.” Although this participant made a good point, in research it is often impractical or inefficient to provide very lengthy materials to participants, who may choose not to participate in a study for that very reason. The original study questionnaire materials were lengthier, but were ultimately shortened for the sake of practicality purpose. As a result, external validity was sacrificed in order to preserve internal validity. The use of a simplified, truncated set of materials also allowed for greater efficiency when administering questionnaires for an experimental study. Nevertheless, the use of condensed materials in experimental studies to replicate courtroom documents and instructions remain a research limitation.

The study also did not include more comprehensive sentencing instructions to jurors, nor did it allow for deliberation of issues among mock jurors. Although these omissions allowed for more efficient use of time and resources for the study, this raises issues about the generalizability of the study’s findings to outcomes of actual jury trials; here, results are restricted to inferences about individual deliberation, rather than in the context of juries where individuals deliberate together to arrive at a conclusion cohesively. Including detailed jury instructions and group deliberation in the methodology of the study would more closely mirror the real jury process, although a balance must be maintained, as group deliberation and sentencing instruction procedures could be considered too time consuming and inefficient for a similar experimental research study.

The recruitment of participants using Amazon Mechanical Turk may not have been representative of a typical U.S. general population. An analysis by Ross et al. (2010) found that the nationality demographics of participants recruited by Amazon Mechanical Turk have gradually shifted and that most of them now come from India rather than from the United States. Additionally, Turk participants were also found to be significantly more highly educated (58% of Turk participants had graduated with college degrees) than the general U.S. population (Ross et al., 2010). Thus, their findings suggest that the participants in this study may be more highly educated and ethnically diverse than the typical juror in the United States.

This may have implications for the results of the present study. For example, if we assume that more educated individuals pay closer attention to factual details from the case rather than relying on their own judgments and biases about certain diagnoses, then results in the study may underestimate how much a disorder diagnosis may influence mock juror perceptions/judgments (Filone, 2014). Alternatively, more educated participants may be more informed about mental health diagnostic information, which could create more bias relating to certain diagnoses, and in turn could overestimate the influence of a disorder diagnosis on their perceptions/judgments. Since race/nationality could also create unique biases and stereotypes about mental disorders that could skew the results of this study, the study attempted to narrow the participant pool only to U.S. citizens living within the country who would be eligible to serve on a jury in America. This was done by requiring Amazon Mechanical Turk workers to be located/residing only within the United States, along with reminders in the research study recruitment

summary that study participants are required to be U.S. citizens and not otherwise disqualified from serving on a U.S. jury.

Ultimately, the use of participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk should still be considered a methodological strength, as this might be expected to increase the generalizability of the findings relative to other commonly used sample types in the forensic psychology field, such as an undergraduate college student population or death qualified jury members from a specific U.S. jurisdiction. The use of the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform also greatly increased efficiency in recruiting a large number of participants (387 total participants) in a short period of time.

Another limitation to this study related to the difficulty in finding a more robust and balanced sample size for each of the four experimental conditions. Since participants were expected to have their own perspectives, opinions, and judgments about the defendant and scenario, regardless of the condition to which they were assigned, a fair number of participants could not be comfortably assigned to any of the experimental conditions. For example, some participant responses placed them in a condition different from their assigned conditions relating to degree of psychopathy and degree of controllability, which theoretically should (but in practice did not) match with the forensic testimony condition they were presented with in the Case Scenario and Forensic Testimony Evidence synopsis. This phenomenon could be attributed to people's varying personal opinions and thoughts about issues such as the definition of psychopathy, definition of mental illness, criminal responsibility, the danger of letting psychopaths go free, details of the case scenario, or any number of human factors beyond the control of the experimental manipulation undertaken for this study. Ultimately, this inability to

place participants comfortably in any of the four experimental conditions contributed to the exclusion of a moderate number of respondents from the final study sample.

An additional limitation to this study was the need to exclude a significant number of respondents from this study due to relatively neutral or moderate ratings about degree of psychopathy or controllability, since they did not adequately fit into any of the four experimental conditions. For example, respondents who rated defendant degree of psychopathy or degree of controllability in the mid-range (i.e., responses between 40-60%) were ultimately not grouped into any of the four conditions. This is because these excluded participants could not be suitably or accurately assigned to the high psychopathy nor low psychopathy condition (or to the high controllability nor low controllability condition). Therefore, many respondents were required for this study in order to have an adequate sample size of participants for each condition. Furthermore, a large proportion of participants were excluded from the study for various reasons such as failure of attention or manipulation checks, answer inconsistencies, short study completion time, ineligibility for the study, indications of a potential bot, repeated respondents, or non-completion of all questionnaires. This higher response rejection rate could be attributed to factors such as the complexity of the subject matter and of the case scenarios, the length of the questionnaires, the presence of several manipulation and attention checks embedded into the questionnaires to detect any anomalies, or the quality of Amazon Mechanical Turk workers recruited for the study. Although the manipulation and attention checks were able to distinguish the good data from the bad data efficiently and successfully, it resulted in the exclusion of 266 out of the 387 total responses, or a 68.9% rejection rate of the participants for this study. This high rejection rate could be

considered both a methodological strength or a flaw, since time and resources were required to scrutinize the data properly to extricate the best data from the total responses for statistical analysis.

Future Directions

My study assessed various aspects of mock juror sentencing decisions, including likelihood of imposing the death penalty over a life sentence, likelihood of assigning a life sentence over the death penalty, and assigning a mandatory minimum number of years to serve in prison before eligibility of parole. Additionally, the study assessed judgments about moral responsibility, causal responsibility, and criminal responsibility. Ultimately, only one dependent variable (juror likelihood of imposing the death penalty over a life sentence) was closely examined for the purposes of this study, and a corollary analysis of causal responsibility as a dependent variable was also undertaken. Given more time and resources, I would have undertaken an analysis and discussion of additional variables and outcomes (e.g., moral responsibility, recommended years to be served for a life sentence) and their complex relationships with each other. Future investigations could replicate this study with a larger sample size and could include these additional dependent variables of interest.

Contrary to my hypothesis, the results of the study found no interaction effect of controllability perception and psychopathy perception, suggesting that these factors may independently influence juror death penalty decisions and causal responsibility attributions. Future studies could investigate whether the decision-making process is truly a binary one that considers either controllability or psychopathy, but not both together. Studies could also undergo a deeper analysis of jurors' reasoning behind their decisions

to impose the death penalty over a life sentence and could also examine whether a threshold for one of these perceptions is reached in the mind of the juror to increase their likelihood of choosing to impose the death penalty. For example, if the decision is dichotomous and jurors use the mental diagnosis path to decide on the death penalty, is this a result of the stigma attached to the psychopathy diagnosis? Is this decision related to the lack of empathy or remorse associated with psychopathic individuals? Is it based on the perception that the psychopathic defendant is untreatable and therefore at greater risk of reoffending? Is this fear of recidivism causing jurors to be more likely to opt for the death penalty over a life sentence? Or are there other reasons motivating this decision to opt for the death penalty over a life sentence? Alternatively, if jurors use the controllability path to opt for the death penalty, what is propelling this decision? Are defendants perceived to be completely in control of their actions judged as more morally responsible for their crime? Or is the decision related more to causal or criminal responsibility, or other reasons? Future studies could provide more clarification on the thoughts and reasoning process behind the death penalty sentencing decisions of jurors.

This study did not closely examine juror perspectives about the functions of punishment (i.e., retributive vs. utilitarian perspectives and goals), which may be an important factor to consider for studies examining jury sentencing decisions. A future follow-up study could examine how juror perspectives about punishment goals factor in with mock juror sentencing decisions to give this study some context. Another option would be to conduct a comprehensive qualitative study to examine punishment goals of jurors that could complement this study. The voluntary participant feedback solicited at the end of this study gave a glimpse of what a qualitative exploration of this topic could

divulge. Participants provided some surprisingly insightful and interesting perspectives on the functions of punishment, life sentences, the death penalty, and criminal responsibility - topics that seem worthwhile to explore further in the field of forensic psychology research.

Appendix A.

Letter of Informed Consent

Informed Consent Form

Key Information

The following is a summary of this research study to help you decide whether to participate. For more detailed information about this study, or to request a copy of this Informed Consent Form, please contact the principal researcher, Pamela Keay, at: pat124@g.harvard.edu.

We recommend that you complete the questionnaires in a quiet, comfortable setting using your laptop or computer. Please complete this survey only once.

Why am I being invited to take part in a research study?

We invite you to take part in a research study because we are looking for mock American jurors who would be eligible to serve on a typical U.S. jury (i.e., **U.S. citizens, 18 years of age or older, reading/writing fluency in the English language, no felony convictions**) to provide feedback relating to a fictional capital murder case and forensic testimony evidence.

What should I know about a research study?

• Your participation is completely voluntary, and you can choose not to participate.
• You can agree to take part, and later change your mind.
• Your refusal to participate will not be held against you, and it will not result in adverse consequences.
• You can ask questions before you decide to participate.

Why is this research being done?

This research study seeks to understand how jurors make sentencing decisions, and it examines factors that may be related to their decision-making. Past research has shown that a variety of juror factors (e.g., personality variables, gender, political affiliation, biases, etc.) can influence whether jurors think that the defendant is guilty or not. However, similar factors could also affect the sentencing decisions of jurors, such as how long a defendant should spend in prison, or whether they deserve the death penalty. The study aims to provide valuable information to both prosecution and defense attorneys for trial strategy, which may have important consequences to criminal defendants. The study could also provide a theoretical contribution to the fields of psychology, law, forensic psychiatry, and forensic psychology, and may have some impact on law and public policy. The knowledge gained from the study may also provide some practical benefit to jurors, judges, lawyers, health professionals, law experts, and members of the public.

How long will the research study last and what will I need to do?
Once the consent process is complete, we expect to take no longer than 5-10 minutes of your time. After you complete of a set of questionnaires accessible online via Amazon Mechanical Turk and Qualtrics, your participation will be fulfilled for this study. No further involvement will be required in the future. The questionnaires are described below:

- **Preliminary Questionnaire** (Demographic Information and Death Penalty Attitudes) (approximately 1 minute maximum – 5 questions total)
- **Case Material and Forensic Testimony Evidence** (approximately 3 minutes maximum; review only; no questions involved)
- **Mock Juror Perceptions and Sentencing Recommendations Questionnaire** (approximately 1-5 minutes maximum – 7 questions total)

Is there any way being in this study could be bad for me?
There is a minimal risk of psychological or emotional distress to some participants from the case materials or the questionnaires. This minimal risk may include mild emotional distress, sadness, or discomfort. However, the level of detail in the case materials will remain as low as possible to minimize any risk of psychological harm to participants.

Will being in this study help me in any way?
We cannot promise any benefits to you from your participation in this research. However, potential benefits may include gaining insight and knowledge about your decision-making processes and biases, as well as those of jurors during criminal trials.

If I take part in this research, how will my privacy be protected? What happens to the information you collect?
We will take all necessary steps to protect the privacy of all participants and to maintain confidentiality of data. Efforts will be made to limit the use and disclosure of your Personal Information, including research study records, to people who have a need to review this information. Additionally, any data that we collect from the questionnaires will be kept confidential, and we will ensure protection of data during all collection, storage, analysis, and reporting stages of the study. Your information that is collected will not be used or distributed for future research studies, even if all of your identifiers are removed.

Who can I talk to?
Feel free to ask the principal researcher, Pamela Keay, any questions about this study before you consent to participate, during the study, or after your participation has ended. If you have questions, concerns, or complaints, please contact the principal investigator at pat124@g.harvard.edu.

This research has been reviewed and approved by the Harvard University-Area Institutional Review Board ("IRB") (Protocol #IRB22-0248), but it has no formal affiliation or connection to the research.

Please indicate below that you have read the Informed Consent Form, and that you consent to participate in this research study. Remember that we are looking for mock American jurors that would be eligible to serve on a U.S. jury (i.e., U.S. citizens, 18 years of age or older, reading/writing fluency in the English language, and not strongly/completely opposed to the idea of giving the death penalty, and not strongly/completely in favor of imposing the death penalty).

If you do not wish to participate, please close your browser to ensure that no information will be recorded.

Appendix B.

Preliminary Questionnaire

Part 1 of 3: Preliminary Questionnaire (5 questions)

What is your age? (you must be 18 years of age or older)

Which gender do you most identify with?

O Male

O Female

O Other

Please indicate your race/ethnic status:

O White

O Black/African American

O Aboriginal/Native American/American Indian

O Indian/East Indian/South Asian

O Asian/East Asian

O Hispanic or Latino

O Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander

O Other

Death Penalty Attitudes

The death penalty is defined as the process of sentencing convicted offenders to death for capital offenses, and this term is closely related to capital punishment, which is the enforcement of the death sentence (i.e., execution of the convicted offender who has been sentenced to death) (Hood, 2022; Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2022). The death penalty currently exists in about 27 jurisdictions in the United States (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2021). Capital offenses such as first-degree murder are considered the most serious of crimes, and they are eligible for the death penalty in those jurisdictions.

Please answer the following questions relating to the death penalty, while assuming that you live in a U.S. jurisdiction that imposes the death penalty:

If you were a juror in a criminal proceeding, would you fairly consider the facts and evidence of a case before making any death penalty decisions, or would you automatically (in every case) vote the same way regarding the death penalty, regardless of the facts and evidence of the case? To be death-qualified for a jury (which is a requirement for this study), you should indicate that you would fairly consider the facts and evidence of a case before making any death penalty decisions.

O I would fairly consider the facts and evidence of a case before making any death penalty decisions.

O I would always automatically vote either in favor of the death penalty, or against the death penalty, without considering the circumstances or facts of the case. This automatic decision may be for personal, moral, religious, or other reasons, and not based on the evidence of a criminal case. I would be unfairly biased in my death penalty decisions.

On a scale of 1 (“completely or very strongly against) to 5 (“completely or very strongly in favor of”), how do you feel about the death penalty? To be death qualified for a jury (i.e., able to serve on a real jury) and eligible for this study, you should be neutral or only moderately against the death penalty.

O 1 - Completely or very strongly against the death penalty

O 2 - Somewhat to moderately against the death penalty

O 3 - Neutral - neither against nor in favor of the death penalty

O 4 - Somewhat to moderately in favor of the death penalty

O 5 - Completely or very strongly in favor of the death penalty

Appendix C.

Case Scenario and Forensic Testimony Evidence

(Note that participants were randomly assigned to 1 of the following 4 experimental conditions:)

Experimental Condition 1:

High Psychopathy, High Controllability Condition

Part 2 of 3: Case Scenario and Forensic Testimony Evidence (Read-only section)

Please review the following materials. You will NOT need to memorize any details. At the end of this section you will be asked to verify that you have read the materials:

Defendant Kelly was convicted of first-degree murder for the death of their former neighbor Ms. Johnson, who died of twelve stab wounds in a home during the early morning hours of June 23, 2017. The crime scene suggested a violent struggle, and Ms. Johnson was left on the living room floor in her home for five hours until she died from her injuries. Defendant Kelly confessed to the crime during trial, and stated that the motivation for the murder was due to a years-long feud between them, and an argument relating to a recent love triangle. Defendant Kelly was later found guilty of first-degree murder for the offense. Since there was already a confession and conviction, the jury must now decide on sentencing recommendations for Kelly.

Dr. Warner, a licensed clinical forensic psychiatrist from Southern California with 17 years experience, was hired by the prosecution to provide a forensic psychiatric evaluation of Defendant Kelly. Dr. Warner was provided with Defendant Kelly's:

- criminal history records
    - arrest reports
    - victim statements
    - pre-sentence investigation reports
- file information regarding Kelly's behavior while in prison
    - most recent parole evaluation
    - history of treatment participation while incarcerated
    - history of disciplinary misconduct while incarcerated

Dr. Warner reviewed all these documents carefully and also conducted an in-depth hours-long interview with Defendant Kelly. Two crucial components of the interview include the psychopathy assessment and the controllability assessment. Pay special attention to these assessments, detailed below.

Psychopathy Assessment

Following the record review and interview, Dr. Warner assessed Defendant Kelly for a psychopathy diagnosis, using both structured and unstructured assessment methods, including the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (Hare, 2003) as well as some self-report personality and psychopathology instruments (e.g., Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory; Personality Assessment Inventory). The Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) is a 20-item scale that was developed to assess whether someone has personality and behavioral traits consistent with

psychopathic personality disorder (Hare, 2003). Dr. Warner rated Defendant Kelly on the PCL-R, and diagnosed Kelly with psychopathic personality disorder, commenting that Kelly has certain psychological traits and behaviors that are consistent with this diagnosis. Psychopathy is a psychological concept defined by traits such as manipulativeness, callousness, failure to accept responsibility for one's own actions, lack of empathy, and lack of remorse (Cleckley, 1976; Hare, 2003). Someone who has a psychopathic personality disorder is characterized as:

- being superficially charming
- having a grandiose sense of self-worth
- being self-centered and egotistical
- being a pathological liar
- being conning and manipulative
- lacking remorse and guilt for his actions
- having "shallow emotions"
- being callous and lacking empathy for others
- failing to accept responsibility for their actions

Based on the review of records and assessment instruments, Dr. Warner's final assessment concluded that Defendant Kelly met the criteria for psychopathy, possessed a **high number of characteristics typical of psychopathy**, and would be considered a **highly psychopathic individual.**

Controllability Assessment

Defendant Kelly had a normal childhood and grew up in a loving home with both parents. A review of Defendant Kelly's family history showed no family history of mental disorders or psychopathy. Neuroimaging studies were also conducted. There appeared to be no explainable genetic, physiological, or environmental influences behind the actions of Defendant Kelly that led to the death of Ms. Johnson. Dr. Warner's corollary analysis indicated that Defendant Kelly scored **high in controllability** (i.e., high control over one's own actions). Therefore, when Ms. Johnson was killed, Defendant Kelly could be considered **fully in control of their actions**, the actions could be considered within the defendant's volition, and the criminal act could be perceived to be under Defendant Kelly's control at the time of the crime.

Please indicate that you have read the case scenario and forensic evidence.

O Yes, I have read the scenario and evidence.

Experimental Condition 2:

Low Psychopathy, High Controllability Condition

Part 2 of 3: Case Scenario and Forensic Testimony Evidence (Read-only section)

Please review the following materials. You will NOT need to memorize any details. At the end of this section you will be asked to verify that you have read the materials:

Defendant Kelly was convicted of first-degree murder for the death of their former neighbor Ms. Johnson, who died of twelve stab wounds in a home during the early morning hours of June 23, 2017. The crime scene suggested a violent struggle, and Ms. Johnson was left on the living room floor in her home for five hours until she died from her injuries. Defendant Kelly confessed to the crime during trial, and stated that the motivation for the murder was due to a years-long feud between them, and an argument relating to a recent love triangle. Defendant Kelly was later found guilty of first-degree murder for the offense. Since there was already a confession and conviction, the jury must now decide on sentencing recommendations for Kelly.

Dr. Warner, a licensed clinical forensic psychiatrist from Southern California with 17 years experience, was hired by the prosecution to provide a forensic psychiatric evaluation of Defendant Kelly. Dr. Warner was provided with Defendant Kelly's:

- criminal history records
- arrest reports
- victim statements

- pre-sentence investigation reports

- file information regarding Kelly's behavior while in prison

- most recent parole evaluation

- history of treatment participation while incarcerated

- history of disciplinary misconduct while incarcerated

Dr. Warner reviewed all these documents carefully and also conducted an in-depth hours-long interview with Defendant Kelly. Two crucial components of the interview include the psychopathy assessment and the controllability assessment. Pay special attention to these assessments, detailed below.

Psychopathy Assessment

Defendant Kelly was not diagnosed with any mental disorders at the time of the offense. Specifically, Dr. Warner characterized Kelly as:

• being in touch with reality (i.e., does not suffer from delusions or hallucinations)

• having the capacity to communicate effectively with others (e.g., normal thought and speech patterns)

• displaying appropriate and normal emotional reactions to life events

• feeling remorseful for the crime

• accepting responsibility for their actions

Dr. Warner also assessed Defendant Kelly for a psychopathy diagnosis, using both structured and unstructured assessment methods, including the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised

(Hare, 2003) as well as some self-report personality and psychopathology instruments (e.g., Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory; Personality Assessment Inventory). Dr. Warner concluded that Defendant Kelly did not meet the criteria for psychopathic personality disorder or a psychopathy diagnosis. Psychopathy is a psychological concept defined by traits such as manipulativeness, callousness, failure to accept responsibility for one's own actions, lack of empathy, and lack of remorse (Cleckley, 1976; Hare, 2003). The concept of psychopathy is described in detail and measured in psychological research by the Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R) (Hare, 2003). In Dr. Warner's opinion, Defendant Kelly appeared **norma**l, and **did not** possess characteristics typical of psychopathic individuals.

Controllability Assessment

Defendant Kelly had a normal childhood and grew up in a loving home with both parents. A review of Defendant Kelly's family history showed no family history of mental disorders or psychopathy. Neuroimaging studies were also conducted. There appeared to be no explainable genetic, physiological, or environmental influences behind the actions of Defendant Kelly that led to the death of Ms. Johnson. Dr. Warner's corollary analysis indicated that Defendant Kelly scored **high in controllability** (i.e., high control over one's own actions). Therefore, when Ms. Johnson was killed, Defendant Kelly could be considered **fully in control of their actions**, the actions could be considered highly within the defendant's volition, and the criminal act could be perceived to be under Defendant Kelly's control at the time of the crime.

Please indicate that you have read the case scenario and forensic evidence.

O Yes, I have read the scenario and evidence.

Experimental Condition 3:

High Psychopathy, Low Controllability Condition

Part 2 of 3: Case Scenario and Forensic Testimony Evidence (Read-only section)

Please review the following materials. You will NOT need to memorize any details. At the end of this section you will be asked to verify that you have read the materials:

Defendant Kelly was convicted of first-degree murder for the death of their former neighbor Ms. Johnson, who died of twelve stab wounds in a home during the early morning hours of June 23, 2017. The crime scene suggested a violent struggle, and Ms. Johnson was left on the living room floor in her home for five hours until she died from her injuries. Defendant Kelly confessed to the crime during trial, and stated that the motivation for the murder was due to a years-long feud between them, and an argument relating to a recent love triangle. Defendant Kelly was later found guilty of first-degree murder for the offense. Since there was already a confession and conviction, the jury must now decide on sentencing recommendations for Kelly.

Dr. Warner, a licensed clinical forensic psychiatrist from Southern California with 17 years experience, was hired by the prosecution to provide a forensic psychiatric evaluation of Defendant Kelly. Dr. Warner was provided with Defendant Kelly's:

- criminal history records

- arrest reports

- victim statements

- pre-sentence investigation reports

- file information regarding Kelly's behavior while in prison

- most recent parole evaluation

- history of treatment participation while incarcerated

- history of disciplinary misconduct while incarcerated

Dr. Warner reviewed all these documents carefully and also conducted an in-depth hours-long interview with Defendant Kelly. Two crucial components of the interview include the psychopathy assessment and the controllability assessment. Pay special attention to these assessments, detailed below.

Psychopathy Assessment

Following the record review and interview, Dr. Warner assessed Defendant Kelly for a psychopathy diagnosis, using both structured and unstructured assessment methods, including the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (Hare, 2003) as well as some self-report personality and psychopathology instruments (e.g., Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory; Personality Assessment Inventory). The Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) is a 20-item scale that was developed to assess whether someone has personality and behavioral traits consistent with psychopathic personality disorder (Hare, 2003). Dr. Warner rated Defendant Kelly on the PCL-R, and diagnosed Kelly with psychopathic personality disorder, commenting that Kelly has certain psychological traits and behaviors that are consistent with this diagnosis. Psychopathy is a psychological concept defined by traits such as manipulativeness, callousness, failure to accept

responsibility for one's own actions, lack of empathy, and lack of remorse (Cleckley, 1976; Hare, 2003). Someone who has a psychopathic personality disorder is characterized as:

- being superficially charming
- having a grandiose sense of self-worth
- being self-centered and egotistical
- being a pathological liar
- being conning and manipulative
- lacking remorse and guilt for his actions
- having "shallow emotions"
- being callous and lacking empathy for others
- failing to accept responsibility for their actions

Based on the review of records and assessment instruments, Dr. Warner's final assessment concluded that Defendant Kelly met the criteria for psychopathy, possessed a **high number of characteristics typical of psychopathy**, and would be considered a **highly psychopathic individual.**

Controllability Assessment

Defendant Kelly had a volatile childhood and grew up in an abusive household. A review of Defendant Kelly's family history showed some family history of mental illness, including antisocial personality disorder. Neuroimaging (brain scans) also showed some brain abnormalities and a slightly smaller than average brain size. There appeared to be some genetic, physiological, and environmental influences that may have contributed to the actions of

Defendant Kelly that led to the death of Ms. Johnson. Dr. Warner's corollary analysis indicated that Defendant Kelly scored **low in controllability** (i.e., low control over one's own actions). Therefore, the criminal act of murder that was committed by Defendant Kelly could be perceived as outside of their volition, and Defendant Kelly might be considered to have had very low control, or no control over their actions which led to Ms. Johnson's death.

Please indicate that you have read the case scenario and forensic evidence.

O Yes, I have read the scenario and evidence.

Experimental Condition 4:

Low Psychopathy, Low Controllability Condition

Part 2 of 3: Case Scenario and Forensic Testimony Evidence (Read-only section)

Please review the following materials. You will NOT need to memorize any details. At the end of this section you will be asked to verify that you have read the materials:

Defendant Kelly was convicted of first-degree murder for the death of their former neighbor Ms. Johnson, who died of twelve stab wounds in a home during the early morning hours of June 23, 2017. The crime scene suggested a violent struggle, and Ms. Johnson was left on the living room floor in her home for five hours until she died from her injuries. Defendant Kelly confessed to the crime during trial, and stated that the motivation for the murder was due to a years-long feud between them, and an argument relating to a recent love triangle. Defendant Kelly was later found guilty of first-degree murder for the offense. Since there was already a confession and conviction, the jury must now decide on sentencing recommendations for Kelly.

Dr. Warner, a licensed clinical forensic psychiatrist from Southern California with 17 years experience, was hired by the prosecution to provide a forensic psychiatric evaluation of Defendant Kelly. Dr. Warner was provided with Defendant Kelly's:

- criminal history records
- arrest reports
- victim statements

- pre-sentence investigation reports

- file information regarding Kelly's behavior while in prison

- most recent parole evaluation

- history of treatment participation while incarcerated

- history of disciplinary misconduct while incarcerated

Dr. Warner reviewed all these documents carefully and also conducted an in-depth hours-long interview with Defendant Kelly. Two crucial components of the interview include the psychopathy assessment and the controllability assessment. Pay special attention to these assessments, detailed below.

Psychopathy Assessment

Defendant Kelly was not diagnosed with any mental disorders at the time of the offense. Specifically, Dr. Warner characterized Kelly as:

• being in touch with reality (i.e., does not suffer from delusions or hallucinations)

• having the capacity to communicate effectively with others (e.g., normal thought and speech patterns)

• displaying appropriate and normal emotional reactions to life events

• feeling remorseful for the crime

• accepting responsibility for their actions

Dr. Warner also assessed Defendant Kelly for a psychopathy diagnosis, using both structured and unstructured assessment methods, including the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised

(Hare, 2003) as well as some self-report personality and psychopathology instruments (e.g., Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory; Personality Assessment Inventory). Dr. Warner concluded that Defendant Kelly did not meet the criteria for psychopathic personality disorder or a psychopathy diagnosis. Psychopathy is a psychological concept defined by traits such as manipulativeness, callousness, failure to accept responsibility for one's own actions, lack of empathy, and lack of remorse (Cleckley, 1976; Hare, 2003). The concept of psychopathy is described in detail and measured in psychological research by the Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R) (Hare, 2003). In Dr. Warner's opinion, Defendant Kelly appeared **normal** and **did not** possess characteristics typical of psychopathic individuals.

Controllability Assessment

Defendant Kelly had a volatile childhood and grew up in an abusive household. A review of Defendant Kelly's family history showed some family history of mental illness, including antisocial personality disorder. Neuroimaging (brain scans) also showed some brain abnormalities and a slightly smaller than average brain size. There appeared to be some genetic, physiological, and environmental influences that may have contributed to the actions of Defendant Kelly that led to the death of Ms. Johnson. Dr. Warner's corollary analysis indicated that Defendant Kelly scored **low in controllability** (i.e., low control over one's own actions). Therefore, the criminal act of murder that was committed by Defendant Kelly could be perceived as outside of their volition, and Defendant Kelly might be considered to have had very low control, or no control over their actions which led to Ms. Johnson's death.

Please indicate that you have read the case scenario and forensic evidence.

O Yes, I have read the scenario and evidence.

Appendix D.

Mock Juror Perceptions and Sentencing Recommendations Questionnaire

Part 3 of 3: Mock Juror Perceptions and Sentencing Recommendations Questionnaire (7 questions)

Imagine that you are a real juror in a capital murder trial. Please answer the following questions relating to your perceptions about the defendant. You may go back to read the case scenario and forensic testimony evidence if needed.

On a scale of 0 to 100, how would you rate the defendant's control over their actions at the time of the crime?

For example:

0 = not at all in control of their actions

25 = low level of control over their actions

50 = moderate level of control over their actions

75 = high level of control over their actions

100 = extremely or completely in control of their actions

On a scale of 0 to 100, how would you rate the defendant's degree of psychopathy?

For example:

0 = no psychopathy

25 = low degree of psychopathy

50 = moderate degree of psychopathy

75 = high degree of psychopathy

100 = extremely high degree of psychopathy

Moral responsibility relates to whether an individual (having a moral obligation) deserves praise, reward, blame, or punishment for either an action or an omission of a morally significant act (Klein, 2005). Thus, moral responsibility carries the implication of judgments from others (unlike causal responsibility, which does not include these judgments).

On a scale of 0 to 100, how would you rate the defendant's degree of moral responsibility for this crime?

For example:

0 = no moral responsibility whatsoever

25 = low degree of moral responsibility

50 = moderate degree of moral responsibility

75 = high degree of moral responsibility

100 = complete/extremely high degree of moral responsibility

Causal responsibility is when you consider an individual as causally responsible for an outcome for which their act was instrumental/necessary to the outcome, regardless of internal motives (Weiner, 1985). Thus, causal responsibility assigns responsibility but does not carry the implication of judgments such as praise or blame that moral responsibility does.

On a scale of 0 to 100, how would you rate the defendant's degree of causal responsibility for this crime?

For example:

0 = no causal responsibility whatsoever

25 = low degree of causal responsibility

50 = moderate degree of causal responsibility

75 = high degree of causal responsibility

100 = complete/extremely high degree of causal responsibility

Criminal responsibility occurs when an individual commits an illegal criminal act either with intention to perform the offense, with recklessness, or with negligence (American Law Institute, 1984). To show criminal responsibility, it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that you committed the crime, and that you intended to commit it. When an individual is criminally responsible, they should be held legally responsible for their unlawful criminal action (American Law Institute, 1984).

On a scale of 0 to 100, how would you rate the defendant's degree of criminal responsibility for this crime?

For example:

0 = no criminal responsibility whatsoever

25 = low degree of criminal responsibility

50 = moderate degree of criminal responsibility

75 = high degree of criminal responsibility

100 = complete/extremely high degree of criminal responsibility

Sentencing Recommendations

Sentencing Instructions

Imagine that you are a real juror in a capital murder jury trial. After presentation of the evidence and case materials, the trial judge submits the following instructions:

In making a sentencing determination in this case, the jury shall consider all information provided in the case summary, including evidence of the defendant's character and background, the circumstances of the offense, the personal moral culpability of the defendant, and all of the case materials in order to come to a conclusion that there is a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances to warrant that a sentence of life imprisonment be imposed rather than a death sentence. Mitigating evidence is evidence that a juror might regard as reducing the defendant's moral blameworthiness.

The jury could come to two conclusions as follows:

1) the circumstances warrant a life imprisonment sentence rather than a death sentence, which means that the court will sentence the defendant to **imprisonment for life**, or

2) the circumstances did not exist to warrant a sentence of life imprisonment, which means that the court will sentence the defendant to death (i.e., the **death penalty**).

Please answer the following questions about sentencing recommendations for Defendant Kelly in this trial:

On a scale of 0 to 100, what is the approximate likelihood that you would impose a sentence of life in prison (rather than the death penalty) for Defendant Kelly, based on all of the information you were provided about the case?

On a scale of 0 to 100, what is the approximate likelihood that you would impose the death penalty (rather than life in prison) for Defendant Kelly, based on all of the information you were provided about the case?

Let's assume that the jury recommended life in prison (and not the death penalty). How many years of their sentence do you think Defendant Kelly should minimally serve before being eligible for parole? Please use a whole number from 0 to 100.

Please feel free to give feedback, share comments, or express concerns about this study. This section is optional.

Be sure to go to the next page and submit your answers by pressing the -> button to fully complete the study.

Thank you for your time. Please note the following code. You will input the code through Amazon Mechanical Turk to indicate that you have completed the study. Then click the button on the bottom of the page to submit your answers.

SD-${e://Field/RandomID}

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