The Impact of German Nationalism on the Willingness to Integrate and Assimilate Foreigners in Germany

The Impact of German Nationalism on the Willingness to Integrate and Assimilate Foreigners in Germany

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Abstract

Owing to its complex nature and historical variety, German nationalism is a subject that has been meticulously researched. Yet few researchers considered its possible connection to older and even contemporary issues that continue to divide Germans socially and politically. Integration and acculturation are among the most publicly discussed issues that policymakers and German society tend to neglect. Some scholars believe that the failure of integration resulted in problems such as growing xenophobia and neo-Nazism as part of the ever-developing multiculturalism in Germany. Others feel that Islamophobia and even foreigners themselves must be held accountable for the development of parallel societies and the overall stagnation in immigration policies. While these opinions are undeniably factual, they remain disconnected from one another, thus acting as small pieces of a very complex puzzle.

This thesis focuses on connecting the single puzzle pieces to reexamine and reconsider the relatively short but extensive evolution of German nationalism concerning migration, multiculturalism, Islamophobia, xenophobia, and ethnic exclusivism. This research aims to evaluate if Germans continue to preserve their nationalistic and mono-ethnic tendencies or if citizenship and immigration reforms positively impact their willingness to tolerate and integrate foreigners into German society.

Acknowledgments

This thesis is dedicated to my family, who have given me endless strength throughout my studies at Harvard and elsewhere. If not for them, I would likely never have had the opportunity to study abroad.

I would also like to acknowledge my close friends and classmates who encouraged me along the way—I am sure they know who they are.

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Chapter I

Introduction

Intercontinental migration to Europe was a somewhat new phenomenon throughout the twentieth century, although intra-continental migration grew steadily following the devastating world wars that displaced or killed millions of people. During the two separate German countries, East Germany's socialism significantly constrained globalization and mass migration until the 1989 reunification—although, in the 1950s, West Germany's support for democracy and open borders witnessed the most significant influx of so-called *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers).

The history of the *Gastarbeiter* program dates to the early 1870s, when a shortage of domestic workers set off a search for workers among Prussian Poles.[1] Some 80 years later, yet another lack of workers culminated in a similar pursuit of workers from Turkey and other countries. Over the years, hundreds of thousands of workers have collectively embarked on a journey to rebuild the German economy—a process that lasted much longer than initially estimated. While foreigners slowly but surely acclimated themselves due to the possibility of legally reuniting with their families in Germany, Germans stubbornly refused any chance of integrating these workers and their families into society. Such stubbornness resulted from values and norms implied in German nationalism and the kind of importance it plays in the lives of Germans. Also, German

[1] Peter O'Brien, "German-Polish Migration: The Elusive Search for a German Nation-State," *International Migration Review* 26, no. 2 (1992): 377-378.

nationalism has close ties to the German core culture, a product of a mono-ethnic understanding of multiculturalism. Perhaps a radical transformation that stirred the longevity of German core culture occurred in the early 2000s. Such transformation allowed the introduction of legislation that applied the *jus soli* principle[2], which significantly eased the legal avenue for naturalization. Nevertheless, did such social transformation change German society's perception of integration?

In this thesis, I will argue that while the German core culture beside cultural and racial differences between Germans and minorities resulted in a dwindling willingness to integrate foreigners, other aspects, such as social and political transformations alongside German nationalism and parallel societies could have also harmed the willingness to integrate minorities in Germany.

During the late 1800s, Prussian Poles began relocating to the Ruhr region and slowly adjusted to everyday life. At the same time, society in the newly unified Germany struggled to take in the idea of ethnic nationalism, i.e., autonomy, sovereignty, and ethnocratic political structure. Symbolic features such as common language, culture, and religion were present, but attaining ethnic exclusivism became a difficult task that quickly triggered anti-Polish antagonism.

The explosion of German xenophobia rested in the ambiguous nature of Poles, who were simultaneously trying to acculturate into the dominant culture while injecting their culture through political representation and social organizations into almost every sphere of life. Consequently, the initial domestic dissatisfaction and subsequent xenophobia forced the German government to implement some drastic measures. These

[2] Birthright citizenship.

aimed to prevent any avenues for Polish culture, norms, and traditions to "stain" German *Leitkultur* (core culture).

However, even with these restrictions in place, Germans failed to provoke an exodus of Poles until the Polish state was recreated after World War I. Only then did many of the Ruhr Poles decide to emigrate back to their homeland. Before long, Germany entered yet another era of identity crisis during the Weimar democracy. Although the Weimar Republic lasted only a decade, the devastation of World War II and the accompanying racial purification campaign during the Third Reich caused large-scale destruction and another shortage of domestic workers.

To ameliorate the situation, in the late 1950s, West German authorities invited Turkish and other foreign workers to work in Germany as a temporary solution for the reconstruction of the country. Though, in the early 1970s, the West German federal government even began providing financial incentives in addition to the passage of the 1974 family reunification law that allowed workers to legally reunite with their families in Germany.[3] Although the federal government tried to mold society to allow for the inclusion and assimilation of foreigners, those workers still had no legal possibility of becoming German citizens.

Foreigners that remained then played a significant societal and political role in shaping the future of German society. Yet, even after the 1989 unification, German society did not become multiethnic, nor did the political climate allow for the inclusion of foreigners. This issue was the reality of *kein Einwanderungsland*—a proclamation that

[3] Ibrahim Sirkeci, "Revisiting the Turkish Migration to Germany after Forty Years," *Siirtolaisuus-Migration* 2 (2002): 15.

Germany must remain free of immigrants.[4] Such a statement prolonged the hostility and xenophobia already rising with the influx of Prussian Poles. Almost 100 years later, renewed xenophobia has now transformed into anti-Turkish hysteria. In fact, strong anti-Turkish sentiment did not begin with the 1989 unification; it had been growing since the economic downfall brought on by the 1973 world oil crisis. Renewed anxiety that acculturation would once again stain German identity and widespread fear of losing employment allowed racial hatred and neo-Nazism to flourish in eastern parts of Germany. As a result, while Turks still waited for changes in the outdated German citizenship laws so they could become citizens, on the other hand, the so-called *Ausländer-freie Zonen* propaganda now translated into physical violence against Turkish communities.[5]

Following the 1989 reunification, Turks and other minorities became potential targets not only for violent xenophobic behavior among the impecunious Germans but also the 1990s racial politics sparked the same acculturation issues that were present during the earlier influx of Polish workers. Moreover, during the Christian Socialist Union rule era, the *Republikaner* agenda—based on anti-immigration policies—often manipulated Germans to believe that Islamic and Muslim immigrants posed a social threat to society.

At the turn of the 21st century, the Social Democratic Party rested its agenda on providing societal reforms to gain voter support among minorities. Consequently,

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[4] Kathrin Prümm, "Die Rechte türkischer Migranten in Deutschland," *Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development* 2 (2003): 4.

[5] L. Philip Martin, "Germany: Reluctant Land of Migration," *American Institute for Contemporary German Studies: The Johns Hopkins University—German Issues* 21 (2011): 26.

Germany eventually broke free from the image of *kein Einwanderungsland* established by the Christian Socialist Union—a step toward significantly easing the naturalization process for foreigners. Over the next decade, Turks and other minorities could finally consider the possibility of becoming German citizens while broader educational and financial opportunities were offered to their children as well.[6] Even though the political climate changed significantly, minorities still lacked social recognition due to German unwillingness to consider them part of society.

The significance of such integration struggles lies in understanding the impact of German nationalism throughout and after the period of reforms to citizenship and asylum laws. While German society retreated considerably from its xenophobic tendencies in the early 2000s, its nationalistic inclinations did not simply disappear. Quite the contrary, xenophobic violence often results from a reduced tendency among immigrants to participate in integration efforts fully. Instead, Turks closed themselves to their communities where they could rely on their norms, values, traditions, and language. Such a step only further prolonged German hatred of the Turks.

With the momentum of the 2015 European migrant crisis, the European Union found itself facing near-anarchy. Nationalistic and xenophobic tendencies reemerged in Germany and elsewhere in Europe as a unified, negative voice against migration. For instance, the countries of the Visegrad Four[7] projected the strongest sentiment to remove migrants from Europe's Intra-free Schengen zone. The political preferences of most Germans mirrored those of the Visegrad Four, although the official political response to

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[6] Faruk Şen, "The Historical Situation of Turkish Migrants in Germany," *Immigrants & Minorities* 22 no. 2-3 (2003): 213-214.

[7] Visegrad Four: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.

the crisis was not as dramatic. German Chancellor Angela Markel responded with an optimistic outlook for the quota system.[8] Opposition to Merkel's approach came from far-right parties such as Orban's Fidesz party in Hungary and the Kurz government in Austria, which received at least 20% of the votes at the height of the migrant crisis in Europe.[9] These results were a significant signal that the European Union was on the course to become all-round nationalistic and strictly against the settlement of migrants in Europe, whether they be asylum seekers or economic migrants.

In recent literature, the subject of German Turks and the immigration of Turkish guest workers constitute a large body of work that divides according to the beliefs that scholars feel are responsible for the failed integration of German Turks into German society. Scholars view the failed acculturation in two ways: some believe that the Turkish diaspora should be held responsible;[10] others view German willingness to integrate with others as the main reason for societal separation.[11] The third body of scholars sees factors

[8] Andrew Geddes, and Peter Scholten, *The Politics of Migration & Immigration in Europe* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2016), 80-83.

[9] Adam LeBor, "How Hungary's Prime Minister Turned from Young Liberal into Refugee Bashing Autocrat," *Intercept*, 11 September 2015.

[10] See, for example: A. Kaya, "Transnational citizenship: German-Turks and liberalizing citizenship regimes," *Citizenship Studies* 16, no. 2 (2012): 153-172; S. Koydemir, "Acculturation and subjective well-being: The case of Turkish ethnic youth in Germany," *Journal of Youth Studies* 16, no. 4 (2013): 460–473; A. Drever, "Separate Spaces, Separate Outcomes? Neighbourhood Impacts on Minorities in Germany," *Urban Studies* 41, no. 8 (2004): 1423-1439.

[11] C. Ramm, "The Muslim Makers: How Germany 'Islamizes' Turkish Immigrants," *Interventions* 12, no. 2 (2010): 183-197; C. Mueller, "Integrating Turkish communities: A German Dilemma," *Population Research and Policy Review* 25 (2006): 419–441; Stefan Manz, "Constructing a Normative National Identity: The *Leitkultur* Debate in Germany, 2000/2001," *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 25, no. 5-6 (2004): 481-496; G. Yurdakul, and Anna C. Korteweg, "Boundary regimes and the gendered racialized production of Muslim masculinities: Cases from Canada and Germany," *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies* 19, no. 1 (2020): 39-54.

such as ethnocentrism,[12] political or societal conflicts that intersect with xenophobia,[13] and even religious differences or Islamophobia[14] as possible drivers toward the developing a parallel society. However, they eventually come short of tying most if not all these problems to German nationalism, which because of its nature, stalls the integration process and often results in the development of a parallel society. This thesis contributes to extant scholarship by framing German nationalism as the main issue, complemented by historical facts and events that Prussian Poles, Turkish foreign workers, and post-Syrian civil crisis asylum seekers endured.

Such evaluation reveals two potential hypotheses:

1. The period of immigration and citizenship reforms significantly reduced German nationalistic tendencies to tolerate and integrate other cultures into society *or*
2. German nationalism has been so deeply rooted in the minds of ethnic Germans that changes to the citizenship scheme would not alter their view that other cultures are a possible threat to the German core culture.

I hypothesize that although immigration and citizenship reforms significantly reduced the burden of naturalization and the process of obtaining German citizenship,

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[12] A. Zick, U. Wagner, R. Van Dick, and T. Petzel, "Acculturation and prejudice in Germany: Majority and minority perspective," *Journal of Social Issues* 5, no. 3 (2001): 541–557. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-4537.00228.

[13] D. Smith, "Cruelty of the worst kind: Religious slaughter, xenophobia, and the German greens," *Central European History* 40, no. 1 (2007): 89-115; Ruth Mandel, Ruth. **"**'Fortress Europe' and the foreigners within: Germany's Turks,**"** in *The Anthropology of Europe*, C. Shore, V.A. Goddard, and J.R. Llobera (eds.) (London: Routledge, 2021), 113-124.

[14] G. Yurdakul, and Ahmet Yükleyen, "Islam, Conflict, and Integration: Turkish Religious Associations in Germany," *Turkish Studies* 10, no. 2 (2009): 217-231; Mia Fischer, and K. Mohrman, "Multicultural integration in Germany: Race, religion, and the Mesut Özil controversy," *Journal of International and Intercultural Communication* 14, no. 3 (2021): 202-220; Çetin Çelik, '"Having a German passport will not make me German': Reactive ethnicity and oppositional identity among disadvantaged male Turkish second-generation youth in Germany," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 38, no. 9 (2015): 1646-1662.

German citizens still take pride in the ethnic and cultural accomplishments of Otto von Bismarck even today. Chancellor Bismarck became the first ever to unite all ethnic Germans under the umbrella of shared norms, values, and traditions. Several decades later, Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party attained a similar degree of ethnic unity through racial purification. However, the Nazis' racial hygiene represented an extreme form of German nationalism, resulting in a large-scale human experiment that eventually led to massive genocide. Although eugenics was massively criticized and deemed unscientific in the post-Nazi era, a nationalistic sense of superiority slowly reemerged among Germans. Even some 70 years later, Germans remain intolerant of others. The fact that Turkish immigrants have lived in Germany for almost 50 years and that their level of societal integration remains dismal begs another question: at what point and why did integration fail? The tepid willingness of Germans to view Turks and other foreigners as equal citizens, coupled with differences in religion, traditions, and cultures, offers only a partial answer.

Beyond that, even political changes and societal reforms could not resolve the question of integration. A review of the literature reveals that few studies consider German nationalism as a theoretical framework; instead, they focus on single issues such as Islamophobia (contemporary works) or xenophobia (older works).[15] Nonetheless, the natural progression of German nationalism, although very limited in terms of significant divergence from its initial concept, has been shaped by other aspects that, to me, are substantial enough to be considered in order to conceptualize its relationship to assumptions and facts when contemplating its significance on the willingness of Germans

[15] Note that the authors engaged in subjects of Islamophobia and xenophobia are already listed in footnotes 12 and 13.

to integrate others. Thus, fusing German nationalism with other historical, cultural, and societal ramifications could offer a complete response. What became apparent is that until Germans can be more willing to accept others, Turks and other foreigners will continue to feel unwelcome and remain living in a parallel society.

To further stipulate the same point, during the 1871 and 1989 unifications, Poles and Turks (respectively) were often perceived as a threat to the concepts of democracy, human rights, and parallel societies that constituted much of the German core culture. They were viewed as societies that could not assimilate and accept the core values rooted in *Leitkultur*. In the 1890s, Germans already felt the threat of a Polish cultural invasion. Later, in the 1980s, Turks posed the same cultural threat, culminating in vicious neo-Nazi attacks against the Turks in Germany. Although newly formed societal reforms eased the naturalization process and significantly lowered violence throughout the early 2000s, the rising nationalist tide during the European migration crisis further prolonged Germany's century-long negative sentiment toward minorities.

Research Methods

The research itself is a multi-step approach that analyzes the effects of German nationalism on the perceptions that German society held and now holds against foreigners. Most of the evaluation will focus on the Turkish and Polish diasporas to better demarcate these effects. In the second chapter, I justify the significance of German nationalism and then establish a historical framework to show under what conditions the first foreign workers were recruited. In chapters three and four, I assess two time periods—from the 1940s to 2000, and from 2001 to 2010—to determine the importance

of the role that German nationalism played in halting the integration and assimilation processes. Chapter five examines the period between 2011 and 2021, focusing on the outbreak of the so-called “Arab Spring,” which resulted in a migrant crisis in Europe. Beyond these ramifications, the two hypotheses will be tested to give a perception of what to expect in a similar future scenario.

As with any other work of similar scope, the groundwork of this thesis will rest on the main theoretical framework that applies to either of the hypotheses. In this sense, German nationalism becomes a unique variable because it can either complement the first or second hypothesis with the addition of each of the chapters that will seek to justify and explain any critical sub-theoretical frameworks. With the use of largely qualitative research through the evaluation of primary (speeches) and secondary sources (news sources, specific book chapters, and published journals and essays), the analysis rests on concluding which of the hypothesis is not only relevant to the post-2015 and current integration progress in Germany but also applicable to future events that will resemble cultural and integration struggles between domestic and foreign population.

By using nationalism to pinpoint societal, political, and economic measures that prevent integration, the case of Germany could also be used to evaluate a similar scenario where integration and assimilation remain stagnant. Moreover, nationalism will be thoroughly discussed in the second chapter using a combination of prior and more recent literature from authors and scholars that solely focus on the topic. Each following chapter will utilize supporting arguments and critical phrases that tie into the notion of how German nationalism could be preventing Germans from accepting other cultures.

Ultimately, interviews would be beneficial for this kind of research. Unfortunately, I was unable to conduct interviews for several reasons. First, most interviewees' primary language would be German or Turkish, of which I have no knowledge; English could perhaps have been used. Second, most of the research for this thesis was completed during the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, travel restrictions prevented me from traveling and conducting one-on-one interviews abroad. Third, there are already several studies published online that fit the scope of my research and include interviews. For these reasons, I did not undertake any interviews myself. However, I will utilize studies that are published online. In terms of data, a combination of voting records, population statistics, opinion polls published by the German government, and European databases and scholars will be consulted to justify the number of foreigners in Germany during a specific period and to identify and express public opinions.

Research Limitations

Beyond that, three relevant challenges might impact my research process. First, searching for sources in a language other than English might be difficult as I cannot read German and Turkish languages. However, I will use all means possible to obtain relevant sections or even full-text translations. Second, I might be unable to obtain literature that has not yet been digitalized due to restrictions during the COVID-19 pandemic or if a library is unwilling to make a digital copy of the text. The third limitation is the time scope of this work, which means that any relevant literature published beyond the submission date will not be included.

Chapter II

History of the *Gastarbeiter* Program

To conceptualize the theoretical framework of my hypothesis, it is necessary to examine why German nationalism played such a significant role in the difficulties that foreigners experienced in Germany. Each chapter presents its own set of historical conceptualities—along with the political, economic, and societal frameworks of that era—providing one piece of the puzzle that completes the entire picture of why nationalist tendencies were such a barrier to normalizing the lives of foreigners.

Generally, nationalism is rooted in ideology and/or political preferences that emphasize: (a) a nation's uniqueness (often associated with xenophobia); (b) societal superiority; (c) national interests; (d) policies that promote internal interests; (e) a battle against foreign domination to defend the defined cultural and social group; (f) awareness and a sense of belonging to a particular culture; and (g) a set of beliefs and symbols that express identification with a particular community.[16]

One of the most influential and extensively published authors on nationalism is Anthony Smith. He believes that the ideology of nationalism rests on maintaining the autonomy, unity, and single yet unique identity of a nation and not the state. For him, only the nation possesses a unique history and ability to project a legitimate source of political and social power. Hence, a nation-state that bonds together all the components

[16] Karel Žaloudek, *Encyklopedie politiky* (Prague, Czechia: Libri (1995), 511.

of history, identity, and legitimacy becomes the primary focus of a national movement seeking to fulfill the desired destiny and interests.[17]

Walker Connor agrees with Smith on the notion of 'nationality as a movement' that can only be achieved if all the necessary components bond together. However, Connor also sees the essence of a nationalistic movement as being rooted in society's social and psychological qualities. Connor argues that the nation's nationalistic tendencies do not prevail on their own; instead, society must come to terms with its exceptionalism and become self-aware of its unique ethnicity.[18] Connor does not define any inclusion of minorities and thus misses out on the opportunity to explain what effect they could have on developing the nation's identity.

Authors John Breuilly and Benedict Anderson believe that minorities occupy a unique yet separate position within the community. They view minorities as components that could prevent the state from attaining its national identity—which ties in with views held by the Nazi Party.[19]

Ernest Gellner believes that nationalism not only rests on the history of the nation and the uniqueness of its population but also on its attempt to develop a homogenous literary and industrial society. His idea rests on the ideology of Marxism, which measured a nation's power on its industrial output and the homogeneity of its society

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[17] Anthony Smith, "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity," *International Affairs* 68, no. 1 (1992): 61-63; Anthony Smith, "Opening Statement: Nations and Their Pasts," *Nations and Nationalism* 2, no. 3 (1996): 360-363.

[18] Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 92, 103.

[19] Lotte Jensen, *The Roots of Nationalism* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2016), 12.

through employment.[20] Gellner's view of nationalism was most visible during the years of German separation, especially so in East Germany. However, Gellner also believed that nationalism could not arise in pre-industrial societies—a belief that was abhorrent to Otto von Bismarck's efforts that preceded the widespread industrialization of Germany.

Clearly, pre-1871 German history cannot be erased. But after the 1871 unification, Germans redefined their sense of belonging and how they remembered their past. That reevaluation of the past, considering what was German and how the national identity should develop, remained an important question. It first developed into a collective societal idea of *Heimat* or homeland/territory specifically constructed to provide identity and safety for the community. It also became an organized and structured social reality created through local, regional, and national community symbols to give a sense of belonging.[21] Specific cultural and emotional aspects rooted in *Heimat* allowed German nationalism to develop from its selective memory.

The sense of belonging was further solidified throughout the period of selective German nationalism under Bismarck. Bismarck viewed nationalism as a way where society must conform to the liberal order. He also saw a need to conquer smaller Germanic nations to enforce his policies, presuming that all Germanic populations were equal, as he outlined in his 1862 speech:

> The position of Prussia in Germany will not be determined by its liberalism but by its power. Prussia must concentrate its strength and hold

[20] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 73, 128.

[21] W. Claus-Christian Szejnmann, "A Sense of *Heimat* Opened Up During the War. German Soldiers and *Heimat* Abroad," in *Heimat, Region, and Empire: Spatial Identities under National Socialism*, W. Claus-Christian Szejnmann and Maiken Umbach (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 117.

> it for the favorable moment, which has already come and gone several times. Since the treaties of Vienna, our frontiers have been ill-designed for a healthy body politic. Not through speeches and majority decisions will the great questions of the day be decided—that was the great mistake of 1848 and 1849—but by iron (*eisen*) and blood (*blut*).[22]

To fulfill his vision, Bismarck unleashed his efforts on Austria and Prussia as part of *Kulturkampf*—a political, cultural, and social struggle between the Catholic Church, Prussia, and Germany. In the years following, with the desire to mold the all-rounded nationalistic society even further, Bismarck passed several laws restricting the freedom of the Catholic Church. These laws aimed to prohibit political abuse by the pulpits, limit the activities of the Jesuit order, introduce state supervision of schools, and abolish all monasteries in Prussia.[23] In the mid-1870s, Bismarck took further steps to terminate all state support for the Catholic Church. The cleansing of German society was also aimed against Prussian Poles through forcible suppression of Polish culture, education, and religion, as well as the need to gradually eliminate a "primitive" Slavic culture.

Nationalism was not confined solely to the German Empire at that time. The era of Stalin's Great Purge was based on ethnic cleansing, resulting in the execution of thousands of Poles and Jews.[24] Lithuanians and Ukrainians were also developing their national identities in the late 1920s and early 1930s, resulting in further persecution of

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[22] Otto von Bismarck, "Blood and Iron." Speech to a meeting of the budget commission of the Prussian Parliament, September 30, 1862. Available at https://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=250

[23] Bedřich Lowenstein, *Otto von Bismarck* (Prague, Czechia: Svoboda, 1968.), 242; Lenka Macholánová, *Otto von Bismarck jako politik a iniciátor zákonů proti socialistům a tvůrce "Kulturního boje,"* (Brno, Czechia: Univerzity Jana Evangelisty Purkyně v Brně, 1987), 57.

[24] Piotr Wróbel, "The Seeds of Violence. The Brutalization of an East European Region, 1917–1921," *Journal of Modern European History* 1, no. 1 (2003): 148.

Poles on their territories. As a result, Poles faced brutal repressions and massive assassinations with more than 100,000 deaths.[25]

At the same time, with the establishment of the Weimar Republic, a new nationality law was passed to specify the boundaries of the ethno-racial group that would form the German *Volk* (population). The law excluded all minorities from German society and served as a basis for the later introduction of German citizenship laws after German reunification in 1990. In the early 1930s, the government of the Greater Germanic Reich began emphasizing the renewed importance of *Heimat* through a massive propaganda effort.

The Nazis began to concentrate their efforts on strengthening the sense of belonging to further clarify and solidify their definition of what constituted German identity. Nationalism was no longer built on measures that excluded minorities but rather on a policy of racial hygiene or purification. The policy rested on the assumption of a superior or master Aryan race, which Adolf Hitler referred to in his book *Mein Kampf*. However, he was not the first; the philosophy was pioneered by German eugenicist Alfred Ploetz, who was concerned by the increasing number of physically or mentally disabled Germans. Since the Nazis were eagerly vested in eugenics, they viewed the problem of racial degeneration as highly important.[26] Consequently, developing a pure race through rules and laws that stripped Jews and Gypsies of their citizenship and the strict prevention of intermarriages between Aryans and other races allowed the Nazis to

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[25] Wróbel, *Seeds of Violence*, 126-129; Michael Ellman,"Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932-33 Revisited," *Europe-Asia Studies* 59, no. 4 (2007): 686.

[26] Peter Longerich, *Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010), 30.

ensure that future leaders of the Reich came from this so-called "master race." Thus, German nationalism characterized the struggle to protect its people—that is, those who carried an Aryan passport—as defined in the words of Hitler:

> What you have inherited you must earn before you can own. The most precious possession in this world, however, is your own people! And for these people and for the sake of these people, we will struggle, and we will fight! And never slacken, and never weaken and never lose faith, and never despair, long live our movement! Long live our German people! Long live our German Reich![27]

Such sentimentality resulted in the further narrowing of nationalist tendencies, enabling racism to become an integral part, which unleashed a never-before-seen level of terror. Anyone deemed subhuman—the so-called *Untermenschen* in German society—was excluded and removed. Even today, a quietly restrained form of racial nationalism (neo-Nazism) still upholds the nationalistic movement in Germany.

After the Second World War, the occupying forces divided Germany into two political spheres. The desire for both the Eastern and Western spheres was to reconstruct their own *Heimat* while erasing the label of Nazism. West Germany became a model of liberal democracy, which meant utterly removing any nationalist tendencies.

This positive approach was reflected in the initial support and solidarity with foreign workers. However, as the number of foreign workers and asylum seekers grew, the West German government introduced limits for foreigners that satisfied the ever-growing German nationalistic tendencies.[28] On the other side of the Berlin Wall, East German socialists molded their society to become homogeneous and nationalistic in a

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[27] Adolf Hitler, "No Retreat, No Surrender; That is German law!" transcript of speech delivered in Munich, Germany, 18 July 1930.

[28] Axel Goodbody,"*Heimat*'s Environmental Turn," Paper presented at Conference on "Species, Space, and the Imagination of the Global," Bloomington, Indiana (2011), 2-4.

socialist way. Their sense of *Heimat* took a different route: society remained cohesive, and the importance of belonging was ideologized through socialist values of collectivism.[29] In this sense, the structural net of socialism that prevented individuals from devaluing socialist values was indirectly responsible for its integrity. A sense of belonging was further rooted in the assumption of economic, social, and political equality. Society would work collectively toward intended goals that would then be translated into collective goods for everyone. Therefore, if society did not remain cohesive and did not work collectively, the sense of belonging and homeland would break apart.

East and West Germany entered the 1990 unification with their prejudices. On the one hand, West Germans viewed themselves as exceptional because they benefited from a highly developed infrastructure and a relatively stable economy and market. They viewed East Germans as a lethargic population and a country with marginal infrastructure and only modest technological contributions. On the other hand, East Germans perceived West Germans as obsessed with money, arrogant, and self-centered, espousing the opposite of the principles of equality and strong social community.[30]

While the federal government tried to secure the eastern parts of the country economically and socially, East Germans felt annexed and discriminated against. They were plunged into a quasi-immigrant position, which forced them to forfeit their sense of *Heimat* while also witnessing the devaluation of their culture since they were forced to a

[29] Goodbody,"*Heimat*'s Environmental Turn."

[30] Cameron Abadi, "The Berlin Fall: Germany's Great Skeptic Looks Back in Scorn on 20 Years of Reunification," *Foreign Policy*, 21 July 2009.

democratic and liberal lifestyle.[31] Meanwhile, West Germans enjoyed superior employment positions, even in the East. Economically, the federal government had to artificially boost the entire Eastern economic sector as waves of inequality and poverty hampered future developments.

Owing to enormous dissatisfaction among East German youth, incidents of racism and violence continued to increase. A massive wave of discontent amongst East Germans soon culminated in terror against Turkish minorities in the early 1990s.[32] The political party, Alternative for Germany (AfD) managed to successfully revive this kind of youth movement during the European migrant crisis a few years later.

As the 21st century began, the federal government realized how daunting the future might be and, in response, passed multiple laws to ease the integration of non-German citizens into German society. As tensions began to relax, Germans and minorities began to coexist peacefully throughout the early 2000s. It was not until the events of the 2015 European migrant crisis that the nationalistic German tendencies began reappearing. The AfD rallied massive public support, thus, acquiring considerable political momentum before the 2015 state elections. Other events, such as the 2016 New Year's sexual assaults in Germany and the Paris and Brussels attacks allegedly carried out by Islamic State terrorists, renewed societal xenophobia. These events directly increased AfD's support amongst neo-Nazi supporters, triggering a massive collective surge of animosity against Muslims in Europe.[33]

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[31] Georg Sturm, "Populismus und Klimaschutz Der AfD-Klimadiskurs," *Soziologie Magazin* (2017): 75.

[32] Sturm, "Populismus," 88.

[33] Robert Grimm, "The Rise of the German Eurosceptic Party Alternative für Deutschland, Between Ordoliberal Critique and Popular Anxiety," *International Political Science Review* 36 (2015): 270.

To begin deconstructing German nationalism and its effects on German society, the remainder of this chapter focuses on the initial stage of Bismarck's definition of a belonging and unified culture. The chapter begins with the recruitment of Polish mine workers and their social advancement as the German Empire began to experience a higher intensity of industrialization. While German industrialists welcomed the prospect of employing cheap, mobile workers, a corresponding fear of losing employment began to spread among domestic workers, and the first hints of xenophobia appeared.

Moreover, the political climate changed, making it more difficult for Poles to integrate into German society. The period of the *Kulturkampf* unleashed an extensive program of anti-Polish propaganda, which Poles tried to overcome by creating their associations to protect every sphere of their lives. But the situation was further exacerbated by constant efforts to mold the German identity accompanied by a rising tide of nationalism. German authorities resorted to creating laws to exterminate Polish identity from the German Empire to further preserve German identity. For instance, the Polish language was banned; the *Reichsvereinsgesetz* (Reich Association Law) was passed, giving German authorities the ability to closely supervise political and social associations and their activities. Although German authorities hoped that these restrictions would force the exodus of some of the 800,000 Ruhr-Poles, in fact, large waves of emigration did not unfold until the beginning of the First World War.[34]

[34] Elke Hauschildt, and Brian D. Urquhart, "Polish Migrant Culture in Imperial Germany," *New German Critique* 46 (1989): 157.

Initial Immigration

During the late 19th century, the German Empire entered an economic upswing, also referred to as the *Gründerzeit* era. After an initial period of the first industrialization efforts, the German Empire experienced a mild economic recession in the mid-19th century. Although the downturn only lasted for a few years, the financial situation did not improve until significant economic capital flowed from southern Europe.[35] Only then did the industrialization upsurge allow the Ruhr region to become the center for entrepreneurs. Several heavy industries reopened, allowing the mining industry to become a significant part of the industry. The ever-growing industrial sector also required an extensive expansion of the current infrastructure. The demand for new shipping ports and railroads also meant greater demand for German workers. However, German authorities soon realized that with the current outlook of the economic growth and the need to significantly improve the infrastructure, the Ruhr region workers simply could not satisfy the enormous demand for the workforce.

At first, a prominent inner migration of workers from North Rhine-Westphalia helped meet the demand for workers in the Ruhr region. However, in the early 1870s, the German authorities had to take drastic measures. For the first time, Prussian workers (also called Poles or Pollacks) had been invited to settle temporarily for work.[36] Since Prussia was a part of the German Empire, there were no significant requirements for the entry of any Prussian into the country. Initially, Poles arriving from eastern Prussia were

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[35] Michaela Bachem-Rehm, "A Forgotten Chapter of Regional Social History: The Polish Immigrants to the Ruhr, 1870–1939," in *The Economies of Urban Diversity* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 95.

[36] Bachem-Rehm, "A Forgotten Chapter," 97.

especially welcomed in areas that tended to develop into larger industrial centers as the economy and population grew at a fast pace. Later, the influx became widespread, and Poles from other Prussia regions arrived.

The demand for workers and employment was not one-sided. The introduction of the threshing machine meant that Prussian agriculture entered a steep decline, and many Prussians were left jobless.[37] Furthermore, the extensive political restrictions introduced by the German government in Prussia and Austria solidified the decision for many to emigrate for work. Initially, drastic measures were taken in Prussia to restrict Polish culture and contain nationalist sentiment. Later, relative political freedom among Austrian Poles was also limited to prevent the already apparent peasant populism.[38]

These waves of restrictions, combined with the decline of Prussian agriculture, meant that most Poles decided to emigrate to secure decent livelihoods, hoping to return to their homelands later. Although most Poles possessed only limited skills related to agricultural work, most farm owners and industrialists of the Ruhr region were eager to acquire any form of cheap and mobile workers.

However, while the economy and industrialists profited greatly from the influx of these workers, the scarcity of housing was an immediate problem. Since Poles were underpaid, they could not afford any reasonable accommodation, so many lived in shared and overcrowded houses. Living conditions were dismal, with no sanitation or freshwater. But the country could not be faulted for the poor living conditions or scarcity of housing as the influx of Poles unfolded quickly. To ameliorate the situation, the largest

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[37] Bachem-Rehm, "A Forgotten Chapter," 96.

[38] Brian McCook, "Migration and Settlement," in *The Borders of Integration* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2011), 18.

Ruhr factories established a system of company housing which became the first choice for many Poles as it provided more amenities than daily rent.

Companies also established a recruiting system that handled issues concerning the ever-growing number of job seekers and the lack of housing.[39] With this system, foreign workers became more and more dependent on the companies since any violation of company rules would usually result in expulsion from company housing and dormitories.

Xenophobia and the Persecution of Poles

As with any massive migration, the influx of Polish workers into Germany triggered fears among native Germans. For the first time, the country had a relatively decent outlook for liberalism to flourish and a promising rise to become a political, economic, and societal stronghold, with nation-state building processes that allowed the German identity to develop as well. The citizens' fears translated into societal and cultural debates involving the definition of who could be considered German.

Beyond that, the first Chancellor of Germany, Otto von Bismarck, veered these debates into a large-scale political and religious conflict, known as *Kulturkampf*, between the Prussian and German states and the Catholic Church, which further extended these fears to labels of "insiders" and "outsiders" in society.[40] As one of the largest minorities before the First World War, the Polish integration into German society and *Leitkultur* remained a continuing question.

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[39] Brian McCook, "Divided Hearts, Divided Faith," in *The Borders of Integration* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2011), 103, 110.

[40] Brian McCook, "Breaking Barriers," in *The Borders of Integration* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2011), 55.

Most of the Poles who settled in the Ruhr era were of West Slavic origin and belonged to the rural population. Their customs and traditions were firmly rooted in regional and local contexts based on longstanding hierarchies, rules, and rituals. The rather specific folk religiosity determined their moral concepts and values as well as their actions and thinking, thus constituting one of the decisive factors of their future social awareness. Yet, despite all these limitations, or perhaps because of them, the German *Leitkultur* began experiencing turmoil in the social and cultural environment. Cultural stereotypes, misunderstandings of local contexts and conditions, and general misconceptions about Poles drove the rise in both nationalism and xenophobia amongst Germans.

Turbulence in religious spheres also began to divide Polish communities because of advancements in the recruitment system. On the one hand, Protestant industrialists sought workers from Protestant East Prussia. On the other hand, Catholic industrialists were seeking their workers from the Catholic areas of West Prussia.[41] Thus by prioritizing the religion of the workforce, factories could then establish a homogeneous and easily controllable flow of workers.

Soon, however, anti-Polish hysteria led to outrage among local workers who became vocal about two issues. One of the initial problems was the perception of uncontrolled influx and employment of workers who could potentially displace the local workforce and cause them to lose their jobs. Indeed, due to the massive number of Polish workers, who worked primarily in the mining industry, there was a change in the demographics and intergroup relations, which led to resentment among workers.

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[41] Andreas Schlieper, *150 Jahre Ruhrgebiet. Ein Kapitel deutscher Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (Düsseldorf, Germany: Schwann, 1986), 54.

Consequently, German authorities resorted to regulations that would restrict access and possible employment advancement for working Poles.[42] However, with the expansion of the mining industry, more and more employment opportunities were created, which helped local workers find better employment. Thus, the problem of uncontrolled immigration did not prove to be true.

What was indeed true, however, was the reduction of wages. On the one hand, Poles were willing to work for lower wages, so industrialists still preferred such cheap workforce. Consequently, local workers became vocal about Poles undercutting the quality of several jobs, including mining. Most local miners found the presence of what they saw as unqualified workers to be an affront because their profession had always been held in high esteem. Previously, mining also provided great privileges, such as an indemnity from serving in the military.[43]

The agenda of Germanization became a considerable part of the *Kulturkampf* since Bismarck feared that soon enough, Poles would create a small state within the country.[44] Thus, the Ministry of Trade and Industry aimed to lead a Germanization campaign and control the adherence to strict rules and regulations. Foremost among these was knowledge of the German language, which became mandatory in the mining industry. In 1899, the government passed a Bergpolizeiverordnung order, which required all Polish workers seeking employment in the mining industry to demonstrate sufficient knowledge of the German language.[45] Together with outrage over low wages and the loss

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[42] McCook, "Breaking Barriers," 68.

[43] Bachem-Rehm, "A Forgotten Chapter," 97.

[44] McCook, "Divided Hearts, Divided Faith," 101.

[45] McCook, "Breaking Barriers," 57-58.

of employment, the significant societal differences enabled the growth of prejudice and rejection aimed at immigrant workers. However, foreign workers were not at fault since the problem was rooted in the industrialists' appetite for cheap and mobile workers.

The outrage of local workers focused mainly on the Ruhr-Poles because of the belief that they were unable to conform to German *Leitkultur*. Many Polish immigrants spoke no German, which only further added to their ethnic rejection. In the early years, it was mostly young men arriving in the Ruhr whose lack of discipline and disobedience of rules sparked displeasure among the largely Catholic workforce in the Ruhr. These young men were often accused of immoral behavior and a lack of character.

The timing could not have been worse, since the *Kulturkampf* was becoming a large-scale conflict that fueled anti-Polish propaganda and sentiment in Germany. To overcome the prejudices rooted in societal differences while wanting to join German society by bridging the language gap and ethnicity through religion, Poles resorted to establishing their own Polish Catholic workers' association. While Germans agreed with the idea of German Catholic workers' associations, led by local priests, many Poles saw these associations as highly deficient.

Consequently, in 1877, *Jedność* became the first Polish Catholic workers' association in Dortmund.[46] The model under which the association operated closely resembled the system of the German Catholic workers' associations. There were several provisions that the association could assist with. First, there was moral support that provided guidance and protection for Polish workers. Second, material, and financial support was given in the event of job loss or death-related troubles. Lastly, the

[46] Bachem-Rehm, "A Forgotten Chapter," 99.

association provided a place for socializing via events that often had an educational nature in the form of lectures. After the initial success of *Jedność*, many more Polish Catholic workers' associations were established, and by the end of the 19th century, some 70 associations served about 8,000 members.[47] During the years of *Jedność*, most of German society perceived these associations as highly helpful in bridging some of the societal gaps through their shared Catholic identity. The relatively low number of Polish workers in the mid-1880s and the shared perception of socialism as a common enemy also allowed easier coexistence.

The situation began to turn during the mid-1890s when the number of Polish workers soared, and *Jedność* and other associations expressed a desire for Polish priests. A massive campaign resulted in partial success in 1884 when Joseph Szotowski became the first Polish priest appointed full-time for the Ruhr region. A year later, Franz Liss became the successor, which caused a stir in the relationship between German and Polish Catholics.[48] Despite being German, Liss wanted to improve conditions for Polish workers and aid their integration into German society, so he assisted greatly in creating the Polish newspaper *Wiarus Polski* .[49] The newspaper aimed to curb regionalism and lessened the social-democratic influence, which for many, resulted in endless hopelessness and subordination to Germans. While such a step gave Polish workers tools to fight for their emancipation, Liss' objectives became an enormous obstacle for both the German state

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[47] Leo Lucassen, "Poles and Turks in the German Ruhr Area: Similarities and Differences," in *Paths of Integration: Migrants in Western Europe (1880–2004)* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 38.

[48] McCook, "Divided Hearts, Divided Faith," 106.

[49] Dorota Praszałowicz, "Polish Berlin: Differences and Similarities with Poles in the Ruhr Area, 1860–920," in *Paths of Integration: Migrants in Western Europe (1880-2004)* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 147.

and the Catholic Church. Liss ran the Polish newspaper until his removal from the Ruhr diocese in 1894.[50]

The relatively short but significant period of the *Wiarus Polski* newspaper caused further discrimination by the German authorities against Poles. The series of acts adopted at the beginning of the 20th century severely limited the freedoms of the Ruhr-Poles. For instance, the language paragraph out ruled almost any possibility of using the Polish language in a public setting. The 1904 amendment to the Settlement Act (1886) and the constant financial weakening of Poles through the Colonization Commission, allowed for forcible expropriation of many Poles.[51] Consequently, not only was land taken from them, but they were also forbidden to purchase land in the eastern parts of Prussia upon their return. The success of the *Wiarus Polski* newspaper also had to be curbed, which meant that the ban on the use of the Polish language soon reached religious circles. Since the German authorities could not understand Polish, they justified such prevention to lessen the instances of violence against German authorities.

Although the German authorities steadily increased their crackdown efforts, Poles did not idly sit by; they resorted to creating even more associations that centered around their Pan-Slavic norms and values. As German nationalism rapidly developed, so did modern Pan-Slavism, which rested on the notion of uniting Slavs worldwide via their common language, folklore, and culture. For instance, the *Sokół* gymnastic society and the first-ever Polish singing club were among the foremost to venture beyond religious activities. To gain more societal representation, Poles also established associations, such

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[50] Bachem-Rehm, "A Forgotten Chapter," 101.

[51] Brian McCook, "Challenging State and Society," in *The Borders of Integration* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2011), 132.

as *Verband der Polen in Deutschland*, which focused on a political agenda, and the *Polnische Berufsvereinigung ZZP*, which fought for equal employment rights and opportunities.[52] In the early 1900s, most Poles still worked in mines with very little recognition, and the *Polnische Berufsvereinigung ZZP* helped organize significant strikes that ameliorated this situation to some extent.

Integration Efforts and an Independent Poland

For the Poles, each new association was deemed a political association that could potentially interfere with the political outlook held by the German authorities. At the same time, the authorities began supervising any political efforts of Poles in the Ruhr region. However, Polish efforts to integrate into German society began to take a different turn at the turn of the century. Polish women no longer endured social pressure to restrict their activities to the private and domestic spheres of households. As more women settled permanently and became acclimated to the social environment of the Ruhr, their appetite for socializing grew. Signs of increased self-confidence resulted in the possibility of employment in either agriculture or textile-based industry alongside their German counterparts. And even though Prussian women were legally barred from participating in any association, they found partial success in Polish associations even during the era of increased government intervention.[53]

In the early 1900s, an increasing number of Polish women began emphasizing women's leadership in the Polish community, especially in relation to maintaining the

[52] Hauschildt and Urquhart, "Polish Migrant Culture," 162.

[53] Hauschildt and Urquhart, "Polish Migrant Culture," 167.

community's Polish consciousness. More Polish women regularly visited German Catholic organizations for women, which offered social contact and acquaintance with the German-speaking women. Soon enough, Polish women began establishing their own Catholic organizations for women. The German authorities found these efforts to be provocative, and such clubs had to disband on the grounds that women could not form or participate in political associations. To the dismay of local authorities, the passage of the *Reichsvereinsgesetz* by the supreme court the following year reversed that decision. The new law permitted Polish women, for the first time, to legally organize associations in which politics could be debated and discussed. After the *Reichsvereinsgesetz*, many politically oriented women's associations proliferated before the First World War.[54]

The pressure for societal and political recognition of Poles came to an end as many of the Ruhr-Poles had to join the military after the events that led to the outbreak of the First World War. On the Western front, the United Kingdom perceived Germany's efforts to build a massive naval and submarine fleet as a direct threat to its imperial interests. On the Eastern front, the rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Russia culminated in the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand d'Este in Sarajevo. Consequently, Serbia declared war on Austria-Hungary, and soon after that, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France joined the battle.

As many Ruhr Poles fought in the war, numerous Polish associations saw a decline in the number of members, which resulted in a diminished strength to continue the fight for recognition. The First World War came to an end in 1918, which led to the division of Europe under the so-called Versailles system.

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[54] McCook, "Challenging State and Society," 125-126, 137-139.

Following the division of Europe, an independent second Polish Republic was established almost immediately. In a mood of general euphoria and the prospect of losing the restraint of German authorities, some 500,000 Ruhr-Poles decided to leave Germany.[55] However, many who made that decision faced an underdeveloped and unindustrialized Poland. Poland's economic and societal devastation was due to several factors, such as Kulturkampf, financial exploitation, monetary instability, and the Great Depression of the late 1920s. Additionally, land reform was unsuccessful, industrialization was years away, and large-scale unemployment remained a significant social problem to overcome. Furthermore, upon their return, Ruhr-Poles often faced hostility and rejection from local Prussian Poles, who feared that the returnees would soon take over limited employment availability.

Nationalistic Future?

The above analysis of Polish immigration began optimistically during the mid-1850s economic recession because of a swift financial injection that allowed Germany to enter a period of rapid industrialization. The Ruhr industrialists were among the first to establish large factories, however, the authorities soon realized that the supply of domestic workers fell far short of the enormous demand for workers. So they resorted to recruiting Prussian Poles, who at the same time were eager to find any work since the Prussian political downfall had caused a scarcity of employment. As a result, many Poles were pleased to work in German mines.

[55] Bachem-Rehm. A Forgotten Chapter: 103.

In the early 1870s, Germany unified into the German Empire, with Bismarck appointed as the Chancellor. Bismarck believed that the time to solidify German identity had arrived, causing a drastic change in the political situation. Bismarck introduced many changes that resulted in battles with the Catholic Church as a part of the Kulturkampf. At the same time, many domestic workers became fearful the entire industry would degrade, and wages would decline since Polish migrant workers were still eager to work anywhere at significantly lower wages. These fears soon materialized into anti-Polish hysteria under the umbrella of the Kulturkampf struggle.

At the beginning of the 19th century, the German authorities continued Bismarck's nationalistic agenda via several laws that significantly restricted the Poles' daily lives. The most significant law barred the use of the Polish language in Germany. In response, Poles created associations, such as Jedność, to represent them during this era of political struggles. But even with these restrictive laws and the accompanying suppression of Polish culture, German nationalism did not prevail, and Poles remained in the country. What caused a mass exodus of the Ruhr-Poles was the creation of the second Polish Republic. The country emerged as part of the Treaty of Versailles and the continuous Paris negotiations until 1923.

The treaty required Germany to take full responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War and to pay enormous war reparations. Germans began to believe that such Dolchstoßlegende (a stab-in-the-back myth) was constructed before the war by Novemberverbrecher (November criminals) following the signing of the armistice and later through the demilitarization of the German army. Germans also believed that Germany did not lose the First World War on the battleground, but rather Marxists, Jews,

and Bolsheviks were responsible for orchestrating the nation's betrayal and humiliation.[56] The stab-in-the-back myth later became the trump card of early Nazi propaganda, portraying leaders of the Weimar Republic as anti-German, which in turn promoted the growth of German nationalism, the rise of Nazism, and the subsequent need for another wave of foreign workers as discussed in the following chapter.

[56] Robert Gerwarth, "The Central European Counter-Revolution: Paramilitary Violence in Germany, Austria and Hungary after the Great War," *Past & Present* 200, no. 1 (2008): 181.

Chapter III

The Era of the New *Gastarbeiter* Program

Following the exodus of Polish foreign workers in the early 1920s, less than 100 years later, an influx of Turkish asylum seekers caused the reemergence of xenophobia. Oksana Yakushko argues that in its most basic form, xenophobia relates to a fear of immigrants. She also states that such fear is often a byproduct of political, cultural, and economic hardships.[57]

In terms of social reasons that drive domestic populations toward xenophobic behavior, Max Steinhardt believes that even if immigrants assimilate themselves culturally, the domestic population does not automatically take acculturation for granted; hence, discrimination prevails in many cases. Steinhardt adds that immigrants are often the scapegoats in connection with political hardships or economic downfall, which causes increasing hatred in the domestic population.[58] Moreover, initial fear and later xenophobic behavior multiply when large numbers of immigrants or asylum seekers enter a country within a short period of time. Xenophobia may even begin from despair or existential threats to the lowest classes of society. Analyses performed by John Winterdyk and Georgios Antonopoulos found that negativism toward immigrants might stem from either a social change (demographic fluctuations) or an economic change

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[57] Oksana Yakushko, "Understanding the Roots and Consequences of Negative Attitudes Toward Immigrants," *Counseling Psychologist* 37, no. 1 (2009): 49-50.

[58] Max Steinhardt, "The Impact of Xenophobic Violence on the Integration of Immigrants," *Institute of Labor Economics*: 7 (2018): 15, 25.

(massive unemployment).[59] Hence, xenophobia is a combination of egocentric or nationalistic behavior (which, in the case of Germany, has a solid historical basis as Germans believe that their core culture is indeed a superior one) and a political, social, or economic impulse (such as the world oil crisis or influx of asylum seekers) that form anti-immigrant sentiments. German authorities passed a proposal to curb the number of xenophobic crimes in the 1990s by instituting higher penalties; however, xenophobic instances only increased during that time.

To outline the events that led to the reemergence of xenophobia in the 1990s, this chapter initially focuses on the causes that led to the shortage of workers during the West German economic miracle. To compensate for the high demand, recruitment of workers from abroad began. First, in 1955 from Italy, then from Spain and Greece, and eventually from Turkey.[60] As most came from impoverished regions, the fast-growing German economy offered these workers a better future. For some time, German employers (and society to some extent) welcomed foreigners with open arms as the number of foreign workers increased. By 1962, some 13,000 Turkish workers worked in Germany; 10 years later, the number had grown to 800,000 (see Figure 1).[61]

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[59] Albrecht, Hans-Jörg. 2008. "Germany," in *Racist Victimization*, Burlington, VT: Ashgate: 127-8.

[60] Oezcan, Veysel. 2004. "Germany: Immigration in Transition," *Social Science Centre Berlin*.

[61] Yurdakul, Gökce. 2009. *From Guest workers into Muslims: Turkish Immigrant Associations in Germany*, Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Press: 31.



Figure 1. Number of Turkish Workers in Germany, 1955-1972.

Source: Yurdakul, 2009: 31.

In 1973, the economic boom ended, and several reforms impacted the influx of foreigners into Germany. However, until the reunification of East and West Germany, German law did offer a permanent residency for Turks in Germany. Nevertheless, economic incentives provided by the German federal government made it attractive for many foreigners to continue arriving. As family members and asylum seekers arrived in large numbers, xenophobic tendencies reappeared, resulting in large-scale violence against the Turks by the end of the 20th century.

Devastated Europe and the Economic Miracle

In the late 1930s, Europe was on the brink of another war. Some of the causes of the Second World War, merely 20 years after the First World War, lay in the dissatisfaction of states and their populations with the outcomes of the previous war. Furthermore, imperial ambitions and other motives such as renewed aggression could readily be found in Germany and Italy. The defeated German Empire (or its successor, the Weimar Republic) was forced by the Treaty of Versailles to give up a significant part of its pre-war territory in favor of victorious France and war-restored Poland. Germany was allowed to maintain only limited military forces and had to commit to immense war reparation payments. The somewhat stable but erratic era of the Weimar Republic democracy was long gone, and the National Socialist Party was on the rise. The predisposition toward democratic failure in Weimar was sealed by enormous hyperinflation, and when coupled with heavy reparations debt, democracy had only slim prospects of survival in Germany.

The inability of the democratic political parties to form a stable governing coalition forced President Hindenburg to appoint Heinrich Brüning as chancellor in March 1930.[62] Brüning replaced parliamentary democracy with a more authoritarian form of government. Still, his efforts to halt the escalating economic crisis failed, giving Adolf Hitler the possibility of coalescing social support behind his plans to create a pan-German racial state. The etymology represented expansionist imperialism, signified by the slogan *Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer* (one people, one Reich, one leader), which strived to establish a Greater Germanic Reich through the occupation of various regions and

[62] John Wheeler-Bennett, "The End of the Weimar Republic," *Foreign Affairs* 50, no. 2 (1972): 358.

countries.[63] The plan known as *Heim ins Reich* (Back Home to the Reich) consisted of resurrecting, recreating, enlarging, and forming a vastly superior territory of the Holy Roman Empire (First Reich) and the German Empire (Second Reich). Unlike the previous Reichs, the Third Reich was to be highly nationalist and ethnocentric in order to create a living space for Aryans through military endeavors and racial cleansing.[64]

The country's economic upheaval in the early 1930s and already-expanding expansionist tendencies resulted in Hitler's rise as the leader of the National Socialists, who promised to abolish the despised Treaty of Versailles and to gradually secure adequate living space in the eastern regions. Early in 1933, Hitler was appointed as Reich Chancellor, a victory that enabled him to carry out a relatively quick Nazi revolution within a few months. In 1935, the conscription mandate accelerated the resumption of the *Wehrmacht* (the German army), and the annexation of Saarland followed shortly.

In complete contradiction to the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Locarno, Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland in March 1936.[65] That surge and momentum allowed Hitler to pressure Czechoslovakia into giving up territory inhabited by Sudeten Germans. Provoked by such a demand, the Sudeten German Party organized a coup. Although the Czechoslovak army suppressed the coup, in September 1938, units of the Sudeten German Freikorps began an attack on Czechoslovakia.[66]

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[63] Erin Hochman, "Ein Volk, ein Reich, eine Republik: Großdeutsch Nationalism and Democratic Politics in the Weimar and First Austrian Republics," *German History* 32, no. 1 (2014): 29, 34.

[64] Hochman, "*Ein Volk*," 29, 35, 49.

[65] P. Anthony Adamthwaite, *The Making of the Second World War* (New York: Routledge, 1977), 50-54.

[66] Ian Kershaw, *Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis* (New York: Norton, 2001), 155-157.

With Nazi Germany's enormous and abrupt efforts to seize Czechoslovakia and Poland, mounting tensions narrowed any possibility of diplomatic talks. Most influential European nations could not comprehend Hitler's intentions; thus, joint action was the only way to prevent further aggression from Nazi Germany. Outraged by the aggression against the second Czechoslovak Republic and threats against Poland over Gdansk, the British and the French vowed to support Polish independence and security.[67] The Second World War officially began in September 1939 with an attack on Poland.

After the outbreak of the war, the aggressors, especially the military forces of Germany and Japan, achieved significant victories on all fronts quite quickly. The situation did not change until 1941-1942 when the Soviet army resisted the German onslaught just before entering Moscow. That battle foreshadowed a turn in the war in favor of the USSR and the Allies (Great Britain and the U.S.). The Battle of Stalingrad in 1943 marked a major turning point. The Allied Big Four stopped German campaigns in North Africa in 1942-1943 and conquered Sicily in 1943. The Red Army pushed back toward Germany, conquering its satellites in Eastern, Southern, and Central Europe.

In 1944, Allied troops began Operation Overlord in Normandy, intending to liberate France, which Germany had occupied since 1940.[68] The D-Day campaign changed the course of the war as the Allies now also pushed from the south to seize the Nazi occupation. The Battle of Berlin was one of the last battles on the Eastern Front, and Berlin capitulated on May 2, 1945, only two days after Hitler's suicide. Battles continued northwest and southwest of the city until May 8, when German troops finally signed an

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[67] Kershaw, "Hitler," 161-162.

[68] J. Richard Evans, *The Third Reich at War* (London: Penguin, 2009), 453.

unconditional surrender.[69] A timeline of Hitler's rise, and the beginning and demise of the war, is illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2. The Nazi Party and World War II Timeline.

Source: thesis author

The Second World War marked one of the greatest tragedies in human history, not only due to the 60 million victims but also due to its character and cruelty. Germany was utterly devastated not only materially but exhausted socially as well. The constant air bombing destroyed most of the larger German cities with important industrial areas. Trade flows in all regions were profoundly disrupted, and millions of people ended up in refugee camps set up by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and other

[69] Evans, *Third Reich*, 675-677.

organizations. Millions of German soldiers died, which meant that the country had significant problems finding sufficient manpower to rebuild the devastated country. Although most smaller towns and villages suffered much less damage, the destruction of infrastructure economically isolated these areas.

The situation proved too difficult for European states to rectify, as most nations that took part in the war were also economically and materially exhausted. Among the Allies, the United States and Canada were the only nations left untouched or economically prosperous following the war. To help restore stability in Europe, the United States promised financial and material aid worth $5 billion to 16 European countries as part of the Marshall Plan. The Plan was officially adopted by the U.S. Congress on April 3, 1948, to rebuild Europe. Due to fears of possible control over its satellites, the USSR rejected any form of aid, with the result that the plan was limited to Western European countries.[70] With such an economic injection, Germany[71] began its economic recovery—the process of *Wirtschaftswunder* (an economic miracle).

The economic recovery began with a monetary reform in 1948, which ended barter and black marketeering.[72] Although materials and food were readily available in Germany, large industries had insufficient capital for broad investment and further development. The situation began to improve, albeit slowly, as opportunities to finance

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[70] Geoffrey Roberts, "Moscow and the Marshall Plan: Politics, Ideology and the Onset of the Cold War, 1947," *Europe-Asia Studies* 46, no. 8 (1994): 1373.

[71] Note that all references to Germany in this chapter refer specifically to West Germany until the German reunification in 1990.

[72] James C. Van Hook, *The Creation of the Social Market Economy, 1945-1947* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 3, 6.

investments with equity emerged. With the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in the late 1940s, the economic pace began to pick up.

Economic growth was also evident in the fact that the real income of the average working-class family exceeded pre-war levels. The number of unemployed declined rapidly, and since the demand for workers was high, Germany began to seek guest workers from abroad once again. However, the number of workers from the former Eastern regions could no longer satisfy the immense demand.

Trial Phase of Foreign Worker Programs

The first wave of Turkish foreign workers migrating to Germany began prior to the Turkish-German recruitment agreement in the late 1950s.[73] Initially, when the recruitment project was in its experimental stage, it focused primarily on talented graduates of Turkish universities to help them expand their education and skills. It became desirable for many young Turks because they could seek advancement within Turkish companies after completing the program. These projects were most often implemented in a semi-official or private way by the given individuals or institutions, which strived for an improvement in their current living situations. The initial recruitment project began in 1957, shortly after the Institute for World Economy in Kiel showed interest in offering extended education to young Turks.[74]

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[73] David Horrocks, and Eva Kolinsky, *Turkish Culture in German Society Today* (Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1996), 78-81.

[74] Karin Hunn, *Nächstes Jahr kehren wir zurück: die Geschichte der türkischen "Gastarbeiter" in der Bundesrepublik* (Göttingen, Germany: Wallstein, 2005), 35-36.

However, most interns felt that returning to Turkey would be unpleasant, so they settled permanently in Germany. Due to the high demand for workers, most were able to find employment in the shipbuilding industries near Bremen and Lübeck. Despite the initial failures of this exchange project, more Turkish graduates arrived the same year and began working at the Ford automobile manufacturing plant near Cologne.

Further attempts took place until the mid-1960s, although to a lesser extent. While the first attempts were not satisfactory, they were essential for the further development of guest workers' migration from Turkey. Many German employers were convinced that Turkish workers might change the course of the entire German industry. Due to the high interest shown by the young Turks, the German government chose not to oppose this idea and thus, started discussing an official exchange program with Turkey.

After a year of continuous negotiations, the answer came in October 1961. The two governments eventually signed a bilateral recruitment agreement in Bad Godesberg.[75] It was the fourth agreement for the economically booming Germany, preceded by agreements with Italy in 1955 and with Greece and Spain in 1960. Other agreements were signed with Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia in later years. These agreements allowed Germany to find cheap, mobile, yet unskilled foreign workers legally to satisfy the demand for workers. Such workers were the most useful for Germany in that they filled the so-called "not reserved employment" positions,[76] which typically paid low wages accompanied by a demanding workload. But Turks and other migrant workers undertook these positions with grace because they valued any

[75] Sema Dayi, "50 Jahre Deutsch-türkisches Anwerbeabkommen, 5 Arbeitsblätter als Kopiervorlage," *Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung* (2011): 2-3.

[76] Such positions required little or no prior working experience, e.g., agriculture or construction.

opportunity to secure decent employment. Furthermore, they could also secure their families financially at home by having stable employment. After the initial and successful phase of the first Turkish workers in Germany, many others also decided to leave Turkey to pursue work.

Employment contracts stipulated that all workers must return to their homeland after a certain period and exchange their jobs with new candidates. Most foreign workers were contractually allowed to work for only one year. The only exception to this rule was given to Turkish workers, who were allowed to stay for up to two years.[77] However, this exception ended in 1964. Nevertheless, the constant exchange schedule became a hassle for German employers. The expense and time invested in training proved to be problematic, so many employers resorted to illegal recruitment practices that did not require the assistance of the German Recruitment Commission. The recruitment process was quite simple. Already employed workers were given authority to seek new recruits, which also became the reason to rethink the entire recruitment procedure by the German authorities.[78] Until then, the illegal avenue to recruit newcomers proved essential for employers since training could be done alongside current workers. Thus, productivity and efficiency increased while the company's expenditures decreased.

Between 1966 and 1967, Germany experienced its first economic crisis since World War II. The crisis itself had only mild consequences for the economy, but German society perceived it more dramatically than the actual reality. A slight rise in

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[77] Klaus Bade, *Evropa v pohybu: evropské migrace dvou staletí* (Prague, Czechia: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny (2005): 316-317.

[78] Verena McRae, *Die Gastarbeiter: Daten, Fakten, Probleme* (Beck, Germany: Beck'sche Schwarze Reihe, 1980): 15-16.

unemployment caused fear and insecurity among German citizens. They feared that foreign workers would take their jobs, thus, German citizens demanded that the foreign workers return home. During the entire economic crisis, half a million foreign workers eventually returned home, of which some 40,000 were Turks.[79] During this period, the recruitment process from each of the bilaterally signed countries was suspended; despite the restriction, many German industries continued to hire Turkish workers illegally. A year later, the economic situation improved, stimulating an even more significant demand for Turkish workers. To put that into perspective, some 200,000 Turkish workers arrived in Germany legally, along with another 40,000 to 60,000 that chose illegal entry.[80]

Family Reunification Period

During the early 1970s, more than 300,000 Turkish workers already worked in Germany, while some 100,000 immigrated annually in the following years.[81] During this time, most of German society viewed the foreign workers' program as highly successful despite previous negativity. Subsequently, many politicians voted to extend work permits from annual renewability to five years. Most notably, if it were not for employers' satisfaction in bringing more Turkish workers on board, extensions of work permits would most likely not have been debated at all.

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[79] Hunn, *Gastarbeiter,* 192-194. Note that the information was first published by Karin Hunn in *Nächstes Jahr kehren wir zurück: die Geschichte der türkischen "Gastarbeiter" in der Bundesrepublik.* The same scenario applies for any further references of Hunn.

[80] Hunn, *Gastarbeiter,* 207.

[81] Ulrich Herbert, *A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 1880-1980* (Munich: Beck. 2001): 220-222; Heinz Fassmann, and Ahmet İçduygu, "Turks in Europe: Migration Flows, Migrant Stocks and Demographic Structure," *European Review* 21 (2013): 351. Note that according to the authors, immigration data was published by the United Nations Refugee Agency.

In 1971, the German government passed a law enabling all legal foreigners employed for more than five years to obtain a special work extension for another five years.[82] Such an improvement made it easier for foreigners to settle permanently and even bring their families. However, the short-sightedness of this decision became apparent after November 1973, when the German government paused any further recruitment efforts due to the world oil crisis. Most larger Western European countries forced an exodus of migrants because of the economic downturn. But because Germany did not suffer substantial economic losses, the German government did not force migrants out of the country. Thus, when faced with the decision of whether to stay in Germany or leave, many Turks decided to remain. The possibility of ever returning to Germany was very slim. As a result, within a few months, there was an upsurge of Turkish residents with permanent residence and an increase in the number of family members arriving in Germany.

In 1974, the family reunification process was legalized in Article 19 of the European Social Charter,[83] which guaranteed the right of migrant workers and their family members to protection and assistance in select European countries. It is essential to mention that while some European states chose to exclude the immigration of children and spouses, Germany pursued a completely different path. Instead, it provided allowances to encourage the arrival of Turkish migrant children and adolescents. In January 1975, the federal government even introduced a law that reduced the amount of

[82] Herbert, *History of Foreign Labor*, 224-226.

[83] Gökce Yurdakul, *From Guest Workers into Muslims: Turkish Immigrant Associations in Germany* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2009), 31-32.

allowance for families who left any children behind.[84] With such measures in place, the German government strived for complete family reunification. The future, however, was unclear, especially how well the integration efforts would succeed and what would be the reaction of Germans to the ever-growing Turkish population. As a result of the now legal avenue for family reunification, the Turkish minority grew by roughly one million more migrants throughout the 1970s.

Cementing the permanency of foreigners in Germany was possible due to a reform of the Aliens Act (1965) ratified in October of 1978. The ratification allowed foreigners to obtain an unlimited work permit after satisfying Germany's five-year period of employment. After eight years, if a person was well integrated into economic and social life, the law required him/her to obtain a residence permit.[85] As the number of foreigners continued to increase in Germany, a decision was made to establish a Commission for the Integration of Foreign Workers and Family Members in 1978. Its main task was to ensure a permanent integration of migrants into German society. In the view of the German government, the office promised a new approach to reduce cultural differences between Germans and migrants.

Since immigration remained fast-paced, German society, in general, became concerned about the possible emergence of a small state within the country. Their fears extended to the possibility that Turks would simply refuse any integration aid given by the German government. In September 1979, the so-called Kühn Memorandum tried to deal with the situation. It focused on the future integration of second-and third-generation

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[84] Hunn, *Gastarbeiter*, 374-375

[85] Douglas Klusmeyer, "Aliens, Immigrants, and Citizens: The Politics of Inclusion in the Federal Republic of Germany," *Daedalus* 122, no. 3 (1993): 97-98.

Turks and other migrants.[86] According to Commissioner Heinz Kühn, an emphasis must be placed on the integration of the youngest foreign immigrants into the pre-school and primary school systems along with their German peers. For older immigrants, Kühn demanded the right to vote and some major changes in immigration laws. However, the success of the Kühn Memorandum rested on a massive economic injection from the federal government to cover additional teachers and courses, job-creation opportunities, and other integration measures. Kühn justified his idea by stating that if these measures are not introduced as soon as possible, the unwillingness to integrate could lead to societal dissatisfaction and an inability to support the state budget due to giving out immense social benefits.[87]

Period of Restrictions and the Influx of Asylum Seekers

Throughout the 1980s and into the mid-1990s, Turkish asylum seekers began arriving in even larger numbers. The reason was due mainly to a third military coup in the independent Turkish Republic since its founding in 1923. This coup took place in September 1980 and banned all political parties, trade unions, associations, and foundations in Turkey. Thus, in the following years, the number of Turkish asylum seekers soared rapidly from the low 20,000s.[88]

This time, the German government responded in an entirely different fashion than previously. The new policy was to dissuade newcomers via threats, worsening of living

[86] Klusmeyer. "Aliens," 90-91.

[87] Klusmeyer. "Aliens," 90-91.

[88] Klusmeyer. "Aliens," 98. Note that the information concerning Turkish asylum seekers was first published by Gugel Günther in Ausländer, Aussiedler, Übersiedler, Fremdenfeindlichkeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.

conditions, and/or ramping up the expulsion process if an applicant was rejected for any reason. The former welcome culture shifted to a closed society that treated all migrants as unwelcomed guests. Most newcomers were immediately placed into migration camps; others were temporarily banned from seeking employment. Those who did work faced significant employment restrictions that were put in place in 1980.[89] Inevitably, since migrants were banned from work, German society now viewed asylum seekers as a burden on the social system. And ominously, the first instances of xenophobia appeared because of the social movement that supported racial intolerance, which translated into numerous aggressive attacks on the migration camps.[90]

A year later, the federal government imposed a one-year work ban for all asylum seekers except those from Eastern Bloc countries. In August, the government approved the so-called "waiting law" for workers, which extended the restriction to two years (except for Eastern Bloc states). Early in 1987, worker restrictions went beyond since Turkish applicants could not work for five years from the date of arrival, and those from Eastern Bloc countries for one year.[91] These tight restrictions were removed in 1991, however, employment opportunities were primarily reserved for domestic jobseekers to reduce their fear of losing decent employment.

Despite the expectations to reduce the number of asylum seekers and prevent a massive number of newborns in Germany, these measures did not help in the long run. The number of asylum seekers grew rapidly in the second half of the 1980s. Turkish

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[89] Klusmeyer. "Aliens," 95.

[90] Herbert, "A History of Foreign Labor," 265-266.

[91] Dietrich Thränhardt, "Die Arbeitsintegration von Flüchtlingen in Deutschland," *Bertelsmann Stiftung*, 26 May 2015*:* 12-13.

Gastarbeiter and their families once again benefited from child allowances as opposed to immigrants from other regions who received social benefits in the form of allocations for food or hygiene products.[92]

Because of societal outrage toward asylum seekers, the federal government considered implementing a regulation that would motivate asylum seekers to return home. Even though only a small number of first-generation Turks would ever consider leaving, the federal government went forward, and in 1983, proposed a law that would promote the willingness of foreigners to return to their native country. The law was officially ratified later that year but was effective for only one year. The provision was to have the ability of financial support if a foreign worker lost his/her job due employer's bankruptcy.[93] However, this law did not apply to any employed Turks. Instead, they were given a financial incentive to leave Germany and to be compensated for each minor child, husband, or wife who decided to return with them. Additionally, all outgoing workers were reimbursed the exact amount contributed to their retirement pension before leaving and satisfying several other conditions. It also meant waiving the right to be compensated with any additional monthly retirement pay. Additionally, these workers had to commit to leaving Germany permanently with their entire families within four weeks after signature. Between 1983 and 1984, approximately 300,000 foreigners left Germany, of which about 200,000 were Turks.[94]

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[92] Thränhardt, "Die Arbeitsintegration von Flüchtlingen," 13.

[93] Herbert, "A History of Foreign Labor in Germany," 253.

[94] Herbert, "A History of Foreign Labor in Germany," 255.

However, while some workers left, many more arrived in Germany. This imbalance resulted in the formation of two opposing political camps in the second half of the 1980s. On the one hand, interest groups such as church or employers' unions primarily sought to strengthen the legal status of migrants already in the country and improve their conditions for integration. At the same time, these unions did not support the idea of family reunification. The opposition was led by the Free Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Union of Germany, which argued that the legal status should be adjusted to only include certain groups of foreigners.[95] Both camps agreed that the total number of foreigners must be further reduced.

The battle between these two camps rested upon a further revision of the Aliens Act (1965), which the Ministry of Interior surprisingly approved in 1987; however, both camps eventually rejected this revision. The revision was divided into two sections: the first one dealt with the integration of all migrants who migrated prior to 1973, thus aimed primarily at foreign workers. The second section dealt with the Residence Act, a measure to restrict family reunification in Germany. The revision introduced a law stating that foreigners could bring their spouses only after completing eight years of residence in Germany while having a residence permit. In such a case, children and juveniles had to be at least 6 years old and no older than 15, and the decision had to be thoroughly discussed with German authorities in advance. Furthermore, any individual receiving unemployment benefits for more than a year could be expulsed from the country. Thus,

[95] Ursula Münch, *Asylpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Entwicklung und Alternativen* (Opladen, Germany: Leske & Budrich, 1993): 103-104.

the revision favored single applicants while those who had ambitions to reunite with their families had a reduced chance of extending their residence permits.[96]

Both camps refused to ratify the 1987 revision, so in 1988 a new revision was presented at Tutzing. This time, the unions demanded that the integration process follows certain legal aspects: for instance, incorporation of long-term residence spanning at least two generations, and legal protection against deportation. The federal government did not agree with these demands, and rounds of discussions continued. Later in the same year, a compromise was agreed upon. The 1988 revision proposed that all asylum seekers who had lived in Germany for more than eight years were legally entitled to obtain an unlimited residence permit for the entire family. In addition, second-generation foreigners were granted the right to integrate, and the condition proposing a one-year trial marriage, which had hitherto applied to all incoming couples, was to be discarded.[97] The 1988 revision was officially ratified in 1990 and re-ratified on January 1, 1991, after the unification of Germany.

In 1992, there was pressure on the federal government to further adjust the law regarding asylum seekers. Therefore, the so-called Asylum Compromise was adopted in 1993. From then on, only politically persecuted individuals and those threatened by inhumane treatment in their home country could seek asylum in Germany. However, the terms of *Sicherer Drittstaat* were applicable according to section 26a of the Asylum Act, which refers to those countries that are part of the European Union or countries where

[96] Münch, *Asylpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 104-105.

[97] Herbert, "History of Foreign Labor," 279-280, 282-283.

fundamental human rights and freedoms are sufficiently enforceable.[98] Thus, according to the Asylum Compromise, individuals coming to Germany could not use poverty, civil war, or natural disasters as a valid reason for seeking asylum. Figure 3 below highlights the various legislative actions affecting foreign workers.

Return of Xenophobia

In 1989, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany witnessed a considerable rise in xenophobia and racial segregation caused by religious preferences and an increase in support for extremist political parties. Even though it is difficult to pinpoint the exact cause of these changes, few are considered. For instance, the differences in historical traditions between Turks and Germans; the economic fluctuations in the 1970s; and the political factors such as the anti-immigration agenda of the Christian Democratic Union during Helmut Kohl's era as a German Chancellor—any of these could explain the rise in xenophobia. Realistically, however, xenophobia was likely shaped, albeit slowly, through some combination of these factors.

[98] Kay Hailbronner, "Asylum Law Reform in the German Constitution," *American University International Law Review* 9, no. 4 (1994): 160-165.

Figure 3. Timeline of Legislation Affecting Foreign Workers.

Source: thesis author

The rise in such xenophobic behavior can also be traced to the world oil crisis. Although the crisis was to some extent successfully averted, many Germans feared job loss. With more and more asylum seekers showing up at German borders, many local Germans were convinced that these individuals were after social benefits as well. Such individuals were often viewed as a burden to society and the economy because secure employment was no longer prioritized.

Given these societal changes and the rise in popularity of right-wing political parties in the early 1990s, racism and violence against Turkish communities began to surface. Throughout the 1990s, Turkish communities were subjected to different kinds of violence, leaving many injured or killed. In 1990, several incidents took place, mainly in Berlin. Multiple Turks were beaten in the western part of the city; a young Turk was left severely wounded during a neo-Nazi riot in the city center; and another attack against Turkish individuals occurred in the main square.[99] The situation was further exacerbated in the coming years. In 1991 in Hoyerswerda, several asylum households with many Turks were attacked for several days until they had to flee and relocate elsewhere.[100] A year later, two Turkish households in the town of Mölln were set ablaze by two neo-Nazi supporters while heiling. The fire killed two children and their grandmother.[101]

After this initial wave of hatred, many Turks felt both outraged and hopeless. The federal government was not inclined to implement any further changes or alleviate the hopelessness that many felt. The only solution was to take to the streets with

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[99] Panikos Panayi, "Racial Violence in the New Germany 1990-93," *Contemporary European History* 3, no. 3 (1994): 266.

[100] Panayi, "Racial Violence," 266.

[101] Daniel Faas, "Muslims in Germany: From guest workers to citizens?" in *Muslims in 21st Century Europe* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 108.

demonstrations demanding that the government improve the situation. The cities of Hamburg and Mölln hosted the first two massive demonstrations, which remained largely peaceful. Many Germans expressed solidarity with the Turkish victims, as witnessed by the attendance of German Foreign Secretary Klaus Kinkel at the Hamburg demonstration, which also served as a funeral for the Mölln victims.[102]

However, these two demonstrations did not calm the situation. On the contrary, they sparked further violence against Turks and Turkish communities in the coming months. Soon after, asylum hostels in east and west Germany were attacked, while neo-Nazis murdered a middle-aged Turk in Berlin.[103]

From February to June, racially oriented attacks against Turkish communities occurred in many German cities. However, the May 1993 Solingen arson attack was the most significant as it became the bedrock for further demonstrations. Solingen is an industrial city with a population of some 20,000 foreigners.[104] During the attack, a Turkish mosque and the home of Turkish immigrants were set on fire, killing three children and two women.[105] Multiple waves of Turkish demonstrations started the next day. The first demonstration was positioned in the city of Solingen and remained relatively peaceful. However, the same evening a demonstration turned into a Turkish riot, with multiple buildings set on fire. Several days later, protests spread beyond

[102] Faas, "Muslims in Germany," 108

[103] Panayi, "Racial Violence," 274.

[104] According to 2012 consensus.

[105] Faas, Muslims in Germany: 108; Panayi. Racial Violence in the New Germany: 274.

Solingen into cities like Hamburg, Bonn, and Cologne. Another round of demonstrations took place in June in the cities of Duisburg and Augsburg.[106]

After the funeral for the Solingen victims (with German President Richard von Weizsäcker in attendance), Chancellor Helmut Kohl was criticized by the domestic and international media for not attending any of the funerals. Adding fuel to the fire was his famous phrase *Beileidstourismus*,[107] or "condolence tourism," which further outraged Turkish demonstrators and set off renewed anti-racist demonstrations in several larger German cities, including Solingen. While these demonstrations caused some solidarity among Germans—who now experienced similar fears that the Turkish communities felt daily—the demonstrations also accelerated a further spate of attacks against foreign residents in general. Two of the most severe attacks occurred only a few days after the Solingen memorial, where suspects threw firebombs at a Turkish house in Hattingen and a Turkish restaurant in Konstanz. Fortunately, there were no deaths.[108] For the rest of the year, more acts of violence targeted Turkish communities throughout Germany. Finally, in 1994, the situation began to improve. These attacks are highlighted in the timeline shown in Figure 4.

[106] Panayi. Racial Violence in the New Germany: 274.

[107] Faas. Muslims in Germany: 108

[108] Panayi, "Racial Violence," 275.



Figure 4. Timeline of Attacks on Turkish Communities.

Source: thesis author

Hopeless Future?

From the investigation of Turkish workers, it becomes apparent that at the start of the so-called "economic miracle," most of the German society shared the government's desire to rebuild the country and improve conditions under which the German population could continue to live—at least in the west. The enormous demand for workers and ever-improving societal and economic conditions meant that many foreign workers also wanted to continue living in Germany. Their desire was solidified as a result of the federal government's revisions of the civil codes as well as economic incentives that encouraged family reunification. Like many other liberal democracies, even before the reunification, the federal government showed enormous tolerance toward immigrants. However, the common flaws in liberal democracy, and in West Germany specifically, were the ethnic and linguistic heritage, xenophobia, and a nationalistic sentiment that often placed outsiders at the edge of the society through a variety of societal, economic, and political processes.

More importantly, over the years, the federal government focused on revising and amending the law to make it much more difficult for newcomers and their children to

become integrated. Early in the 1990s, citizenship was mainly awarded to individuals who could prove their German ancestry; citizenship was denied to foreigners' children born on German soil. In such a case, the rather lengthy and complicated process of naturalization based on the *jus sanguinis*[109] and the deliberate exclusion of the *jus soli* principles caused a considerable number of foreigners to contemplate economic offers to leave the country. It is fair to say that even after unification, the federal government did not pass any laws that intentionally worsened the situation for foreigners. However, the constant battle between political parties did not improve the problem either. Such sluggishness, combined with the world oil crisis and an endless tide of new asylum seekers, provided a basis for extremists and nationalistic sentiment to grow.

The pretext and the conditions then closely resembled the xenophobic situation that involved Polish workers a century earlier for the same reason: fear of losing employment in addition to social welfare provisions for foreigners who had either lost their jobs or came to seek asylum. As the government sat idly by, xenophobia surged, and so did racial violence because people felt the need to take matters into their own hands. This combination of factors sparked massive and violent attacks against Turkish communities at the end of the 1980s. Although the number of racial attacks and violence decreased after 1993, the extremist and nationalistic sentiment rooted in the liberal democracy and the society of West Germany and its successor, the Federal German Republic, remained an outstanding issue. Therefore, the re-emergence of xenophobia and nationalism become the next chapter's symbols, which focuses on measures to improve the process of integration in the 21st century.

[109] Citizenship through descent

Chapter IV

Era of Reforms

During the first two decades after the reunification, immigrants to Germany experienced major social revolutions stemming from political turbulence and economic fluctuations. The "welcome" culture of the 1970s and 1980s was disappearing; violence against various diasporas was still present; nationalism continued but was largely hidden—only visible in the violence against minorities committed by individuals of former West Germany who felt that the German core culture should not intermix with other groups and those whom they regarded as lesser cultures.

But as the number of violent attacks began to decrease at the start of the 21st century, nationalism also faded since the agenda of integration became a low priority for both society and policymakers. Society gave little attention to the pursuit of comprehensive integration policies, and policymakers implemented societal changes in ways that did not interfere with notions of how, who, and what constituted German identity. It seems clear that until a shift occurs in the willingness of German policymakers and the German people themselves to accept other cultures and to become willing to create living space for others to improve their socioeconomic standing, profound changes will not take place or prevail.

This chapter focuses on whether political, social, and economic factors drove Germans to become willing to integrate others into German society. Aside from

nationalism, integration (of Turks and other minorities) is a significant and resonating theme that requires closer attention and evaluation. It should also be noted that although a variety of attitudes toward integration exist even among the scholars noted below, they tend to agree that integration cannot be mistaken for assimilation or acculturation. *Assimilation* refers to a process of stripping one's cultural identity while embracing the culture of the receiving country. In other words, individuals must accept the dominant cultural identity instead of injecting their own cultures to form multiculturalism. Unlike assimilation, *integration* is a two-way process that requires a willingness to integrate migrants without interfering with their culture, values, and traditions; also a motivation among migrants to follow and obey domestic laws and social norms. In practice, Terry Threadgold and Geoff Court argue that immigrants and asylum seekers are often forced into a one-way process of acclimating themselves to the dominant culture.[110]

One of the most recognized scholars on the subject of integration, Tom Kuhlman, believes that while immigrants are undeniably forced to assimilate into the dominant culture of the receiving country, immigrants also remain inclined to hold onto the norms and traditions with which they grew up. Kuhlman posits that immigrants cannot be physically stripped of their identity since they tend to maintain it even during the process of naturalization.[111] Such maintaining of identity is often shared with second and third generations as their parents choose to raise their descendants in the same traditions.

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[110] Terry Threadgold, and Geoff Court, "Refugee Inclusion," Cardiff School of Journalism, *Media and Cultural Studies* 2005: 7–9.

[111] Tom Kuhlman, "The Economic Integration of Refugees in Developing Countries," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 4, no. 1 1990): 4, 9.

Furthermore, networks and organizations connect foreigners with their homeland and provide social and political representation that plays a vital role in creating living space for foreigners, specifically Turks in Germany. On the other, Kuhlman explains that Germans preferred integration rather than assimilation, assuming that the influx of foreigners was a temporary phenomenon. Therefore, any German integration model included separate education, employment, and social benefits for foreigners, so that the core German culture remains unadulterated. Such a concern not only began political debates about national identity but also caused political fluctuations and social reforms throughout the 1990s.

Political Issues and Foreigners

In 1990, a democratic election held for the first time became a mandate for rapid unification, with more than 93% of voters participating.[112] The conservative Alliance for Germany (*Allianz für Deutschland*) won the election with almost 48%.[113] They formed a coalition with the West German Christian Democratic Union (*Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands*) and agreed to support Helmut Kohl's bid to become Chancellor of Germany. In opposition was the Social Democratic Party (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*), whose approach supported a much slower pace toward unification, receiving 22% of the votes. The Party of Democratic Socialism (*Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus*) received 16% of the vote; the Association of Free

[112] Milan Katuninec, "Spolková republika Nemecko," *Filozofická fakulta Trnavskej univerzity v Trnave*, 2009: 74.

[113] Katuninec, "Spolková republika Nemecko," 74.

Democrats (*Bund Freier Demokraten*) received 5%, and the Alliance 90/The Greens (*Bündnis 90*) finished last with 3%.[114] Figure 5 illustrates the election outcomes.



Figure 5. 1990 Election Results.

Source: Katuninec, 2009: 74.

The first and last democratically elected Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Lothar de Maiziére, formed a coalition with the Social Democrats and Liberals and immediately began negotiating with the new German government to pass monetary, economic, and social reforms. In May 1990, a state treaty was signed by the finance ministers of both countries. In July, another reform unified the national social security system while approving the Deutschmark as the official currency.

[114] Katuninec, "Spolková republika Nemecko," 74.

Also in July, Kohl met with Mikhail Gorbachev to discuss the possibility of unifying the two German nations. Surprisingly, Gorbachev agreed to Kohl's proposition without any objections. In 1990 and 1991, Kohl further strengthened Germany's regional position through several cordial treaties signed with the neighboring countries. He declared: "Our unified country wants to continue serving world's peace and become a reason for further unification of Europe."[115] He viewed Germany as the main force to enlarge the European Union by incorporating newly established democratic countries of central and eastern Europe.

Internally, the Christian Democrats pressured the People's Chamber of the GDR to renew a state order abolished by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*), which divided eastern Germany into several regions, and thus to approve the resolution to conjoin the GDR with the Federal Republic of Germany. The resolution dealt mainly with legal issues and established the validity of the Basic Law for the territory of the former GDR, which was to remain significant in force parallel to the federal and European Community law. Shortly after ratification, a dramatic political change followed since few GDR's political parties announced their dissolution.

During the 1990 election, Kohl's previous success in unifying Germany significantly contributed to the Christian Democratic Union as it increased votes to 44%.[116] Their new coalition partner, the Free Democratic Party (*Freie Demokratische Partei*), received a mere 11% of the vote. The opposing Social Democratic Party received

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[115] Clayton Clemens, R. Granieri, M. Haeussler, M.E. Sarotte, K. Spohr, and C. Wicke., "In Memory of the Two Helmuts: The Lives, Legacies, and Historical Impact of Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl," *Central European History Society of the American Historical Association* 51, no. 2 (June 2018): 288. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008938918000389.

[116] Katuninec, "Spolková republika Nemecko," 77.

34% and The Greens only 4% as they failed to unite with the Alliance 90[117] (see Figure 6). Four years later, the Christian Democrats remained the ruling party, and Kohl retained his position as Chancellor.



Figure 6. Second 1990 Election Results.

Source: Katuninec, 2009: 77.

The coalition's immense success during the 1990s was anchored in their political agenda, which focused on the continued repression of minorities, especially guest workers. Societal turbulence sparked by several arson attacks against Turkish communities at that time meant that most of the support came from proponents of the populist *Republikaner* agenda, whose rallying issues centered on uncontrolled

[117] Katuninec, "Spolková republika Nemecko," 77.

immigration and cultural threats.[118] Supporters often shared the same xenophobic tendencies as Kohl and his cabinet. The *Republikaner* agenda began during the world oil crisis when financial incentives and other provisions were offered to guest workers in the late 1970s and early 1980s as an incentive to leave Germany.

Although Kohl successfully drove out many foreigners from Germany, his success began to diminish after a critical law was passed in 1989. The Foreigner's law granted voting rights in local elections to foreign residents residing in the country for at least five years. From that point on, the opposing Social Democrats substantially reconsidered their political agenda to include guest workers as part of their potential electoral support.

Consequently, with the rapid integration of guest workers and foreigners into their political realm, the Social Democrats became the most active political party in the early 1990s. The Turkish Social Democrats saw such an agenda as highly rewarding and decided to further cooperate with Social Democrats. Although many Turks have been politically active since the late 1960s to counter the anti-migration political tendencies and activities of Christian Democrats, many Turks viewed Social Democrats and The Greens as a gateway for future societal changes. Nevertheless, Kohl stubbornly continued with his political aspirations and in 1997 made two announcements: he was ready to seek another Chancellor candidacy, and he supported the re-formation of a coalition with the Free Democratic Party.[119] The Social Democratic Party also showed interest in a possible cooperation with the Christian Democratic Union. Kohl appreciated such potential,

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[118] Thomas Faist, "How to define a foreigner? The symbolic politics of immigration in German partisan discourse, 1978–1992," *West European Politics* 17 (1994): 61-63.

[119] Katuninec. Spolková republika Nemecko: 78

though the partnership never materialized. As a result, in the 1998 election, the Christian Democratic Union only won 35% of the votes and recorded the worst electoral result since 1949[120] (see Figure 7). That outcome was devastating news for the future of Christian Democrats and resulted in the departure of Kohl as Chancellor.



Figure 7. 1998 Election Results.

Source: Chovancova, 2005: 10.

In the 1998 elections, Oskar Lafontaine of Social Democrats, an opponent of unified Germany, had been Kohn's main rival. However, his rating suffered greatly after being defeated by Kohl in 1994. Thus he accepted the party's decision to run Gerhard Schröder as the primary candidate. Consequently, the Social Democrats won 41% of the

[120] Katuninec, "Spolková republika Nemecko," 79.

votes and became the strongest political entity in the Federal Assembly.[121] After his victory, Schröder became the Chancellor, and Lafontaine became the Minister of Finance.

However, the issue of foreigners and guest workers remained unanswered due to political scrambles right after the election. During that time, both the Social Democrats and The Greens put their socially-oriented political agendas aside and negotiated terms under which a coalition could be established. The coalition only lasted for a short time, as The Greens eventually became too radical for the Social Democrats.

In terms of the Social Democrats' outlook in the late 1990s, the party espoused three main principles, each of which could further solidify the position of foreigners in Germany. First, Germany urgently needed to lose its reputation as a "country with no immigrants," which had stained politics for the past 30 years. Second, Schröder wanted to quickly introduce citizenship reform to help solidify the failing relationship between foreigners and guest workers. There were also talks about the possible introduction of dual citizenship, to move even further from the past politics of Kohl, who vehemently stated in 1997: "If we today give in to demands for dual citizenship, we would soon have four, five, or six million Turks in Germany, instead of three million."[122] Lastly, in 2000, Schröder announced a Green Card initiative to cope with a significant demographic change sparked by low fertility rates, the economic downturn, and shortages of highly skilled professions.

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[121] Nicole Chovancova, "Politicko-ekonomický vývoj Nemecka po zjednotení 1990," *Slovenská politologická revue,* 2005, 10-11.

[122] Martin, "Germany: Reluctant Land of Immigration," 38.

Socioeconomic Issues and Reforms

Before the 1871 unification, Germany was considered a nation of ancient settlers. However, Chancellor Otto Bismarck saw ethnic redefinition and German nationalism as the bedrock for developing a cohesive society that would include all people from the various German Reich regions. The notion spilled over into the German definition of citizenship, and until German reunification in 1990, citizenship was exclusively rewarded on the principle of *jus sanguinis*. The principle was enshrined in the Citizenship Act of 1913 and granted acquisition of German citizenship through descent. Although changes such as the Nazi amendments of 1934, the Nuremberg Laws of 1935, the Eleventh Decree, among others, set tight restrictions and abolished the possibility of naturalization for Jews and Austrians under Nazi rule, they were eventually revoked in 1945 when the Citizenship Act of 1913 was restored.[123] From 1945 on, children born anywhere could once again acquire German citizenship only through descent. The principle of *jus sanguinis* also guaranteed German citizenship to people in central or eastern European regions who were once under the authority of either the German Empire or the Protectorate during the Second World War.

However, the descendants of foreigners born in Germany had only sparse opportunities to legally become German citizens. Such limitations meant that newborns of foreigners could not acquire German citizenship at birth since the German authorities legislated their requirements for the *jus soli* principle. The primary goal of this principle was/is the integration of immigrants shaped by their customs, culture, traditions, and religion into the newly formed society and then mold it from within. Hence, in countries

[123] Anushcen Farahat, and Kay Hailbronner, "Report on Citizenship Law: Germany," *European University Institute* (2020): 3.

such as Germany that traditionally revoked integration, representation of other cultures and traditions acted as a handbrake in the process of naturalization via the *jus soli* principle. Consequently, foreigners residing in Germany could either naturalize via intermarriage with a German citizen or undertake a long and closely monitored naturalization process. That process required at least ten years of residence, knowledge of the German language, sufficient economic means, and loyalty to German democratic principles.[124]

A change followed in 1991 with the passage of a new Act that concerned the entry and residence of foreigners. Foreigners aged 16 to 23 who had lived continuously in Germany for eight years could no longer be arbitrarily refused citizenship if they were raised and educated in Germany or maintained a permanent residence for at least 15 years.[125] While the Act brought a few essential changes, it did not allow dual citizenship, which meant that the immigration authorities no longer expected a substantial upsurge in the number of applications for naturalization.

Furthermore, the authorities accounted for Kohl's anti-immigration politics as an important anchor for the future development of German society, but the reality proved different. Between 1990 and 1998—two terms with Kohl as Chancellor after German unification—the number of foreigners grew from 5.5 to 7 million. Most of them had resided in Germany for decades; in fact, some 30% had not even relocated for more than 20 years.[126] On the other hand, more Turks kept arriving, which meant that the entire

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[124] Christina Gathmann, and Nicolas Keller, "Returns to Citizenship? Evidence from Germany's Recent Immigration Reforms," *Institute for the Study of Labor* (2014): 9.

[125] Farahat, "Report on Citizenship Law," 4-5.

[126] Rainer Münz, and Ralf Ulrich, "Immigration and Citizenship in Germany," *German Politics & Society* 17, no. 4 (1999): 7-9.

immigration and citizenship scheme required a second look. But Kohl resisted any changes, wanting to avoid them at all costs. Thus, in the early 1990s, the political and societal difficulties rested on the debate of the *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* principles, which also became the primary reason for further political scrambles.

Consequently, politicians from both the opposition and within the coalition that had scrambled for more voter recognition, especially among the foreigners, proposed the introduction of dual citizenship. The goal was to ensure an even easier avenue for the naturalization and assimilation of foreign residents. Even though support for dual citizenship grew rapidly, the change did not take place at that time. The second round of debates broke out after a proposition was submitted to the public by a coalition of Social Democrats and The Greens in late 1998. They proposed a *jus soli*-based amendment to the citizenship law that would allow dual citizenship and grant German citizenship at birth to children of foreigners under certain conditions: either of the parents had to reside continually in Germany since the age of 14 and had to possess a valid residence permit at the time of the child's birth.[127] In terms of the naturalization of foreigners, the coalition proposed that the process should not be interfered with if such individuals were employed or actively searching for employment, could sustain themselves financially, entered the country legally, and had no prior criminal convictions.[128] Furthermore, the age requirement to obtain a residence permit shall be lowered from the age of fifteen to eight.[129]

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[127] Farahat, "Report on Citizenship Law," 7-8.

[128] Susan McFadden, "German Citizenship Law and the Turkish Diaspora," *German Law Journal* 20 (2018): 80.

[129] McFadden, "German Citizenship Law," 80.

Such a radical proposition met harsh opposition, especially from the Christian Democrats, whose primary activity still revolved around anti-immigration policies. Nevertheless, in early 1999, the Ministry of Interior accepted the proposition with minor changes. Such a long-awaited breakthrough in the Citizenship Law was only possible due to recent political changes at the time. As mentioned before, the Social Democrats won the 1998 election, and in this case, they were able to overcome the opposition by a majority of votes. The citizenship reform entered into force on January 1, 2000, and for the first time, introduced the principle of *jus soli* to children born on German territory. However, it required at least one parent to possess a long-term residence permit of at least eight years or a permanent residence permit of at least three years.[130] Upon birth, these children acquired German citizenship and that of their parent's country of origin. Then, at age 18, these children had to decide which citizenship they wished to keep. To remain a German citizen, the individual had to prove the renouncement of his/her other citizenship to the German authorities by age 23.

Aside from introducing the *jus soli* principle, the citizenship reform also introduced changes to the *jus domicile* (right of residence) principle. An entitlement to German citizenship became available after eight years of residency. The conditions required sufficient knowledge of the German language, the German constitution, and the renouncement of the original citizenship. Dual nationality was also accepted under the *jus domicile* principle in cases like financial hardships or societal disadvantages.[131]

In 2004, some minor changes were introduced in the Immigration Act:

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[130] Martin Weinmann, "Naturalisation in Germany," *Instytut Spraw Publicznych* (2012): 8-9.

[131] Eva Sladičeková, "Politika štátov Európskej únie voči imigrácii z tretích krajín po roku 2000: prípad Nemecka, Švédska a Talianska," *Charles Universtiy* 29 (2013): 48.

1. Its first provision was to introduce a more straightforward yet more efficient system of residence permits. Under the 1999 Citizenship Act, newcomers had to obtain an entry visa before coming to Germany and then be required to attain a residence permit. If the residence permit was revoked, an individual had to leave Germany immediately. Permanent residence permits were automatically issued to individuals who successfully completed the naturalization process. Under the new system, an entry visa was automatically converted into a temporary residence permit for the duration of the stay. In terms of permanent residence permits, these were now under the scrutiny of immigration officers and were issued to individuals if they had a temporary residence permit for at least five years and met the exact requirements as proposed in the 1999 Citizenship Act.[132]
2. The Act also aimed to standardize both the critical understanding the German language and constitution, which until then varied from region to region. Successful completion of the test reduced the period of residence needed for a permanent residence permit from eight to seven years.[133]
3. A controversy over granting reciprocity was resolved as well. The Act proposed that Germany allow a foreigner to obtain German citizenship under the condition that the foreigner's country of origin did not force the German national to renounce his/her German citizenship.

[132] Sladičeková, *Politika štátov Európskej únie,* 25.

[133] Farahat. "Report on Citizenship Law," 17.

4. Lastly, a more restrictive proposition of the *jus soli* principle by the opposition (both parents had to be born in Germany) did not receive the majority needed to introduce such a change.

The 2007 reform of the Immigration Act introduced further amendments to reform previously introduced standardized tests. One of the significant changes introduced by the Federal Administrative Court was an amendment that concerned the tests. Successful completion of a certificate now requires a grade of B or higher in the Common European Reference Framework for Languages.[134] The amendment also introduced a few exceptions for disabled and older individuals who did not receive the required grade. In that case, an individual could receive a certificate upon completing a simpler questionnaire and a revision of his/her social and economic conditions by the immigration authorities.

In terms of the naturalization process, some major changes were also introduced. First, minor criminal offenses no longer prevented a foreign individual from achieving naturalization. However, every person was now held responsible for the correctness of the information given to the Immigration office. Even the slightest error could result in termination of the residence permit and, in a worst-case scenario, expulsion from the country.[135] Second, the previous reciprocity requirements were abolished, and dual citizenship was also reintroduced. Lastly, the naturalization process could be shortened if the individual scored above-average results on the standardized tests.

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[134] Farahat, "Report on Citizenship Law," 10.

[135] Farahat, "Report on Citizenship Law," 10.

After the 2007 reform, German authorities offered no major tweaks or reforms to allow for easier naturalization. It is safe to assume that at that point, German authorities did not feel the need to improve the process of gaining citizenship because cultural intermixing showed clear results. According to the Allensbach 2008 study, almost 50% of respondents stated that they have a good relationship with at least one resident alien compared to a mere 16% three decades earlier.[136] In terms of the younger population, the study revealed that youngsters often retain good relationships with their resident alien peers in school or sports. In fact, 65% of respondents stated that they had a good relationship with at least one resident alien of the same age.[137] However, even the reforms that focused on providing smoother naturalization opportunities did not automatically go hand in hand with democracy and the democratic stability that the European Union offers. Figure 8 provides a timeline of German citizenship and immigration reforms.

It is not only society but also the political and economic situations that are the driving force for retaining democracy in a country. Suppose those fail in any instance, such as an economic downturn or far-right politics that contradict the norms of open borders and providing a haven for immigrants. In that case, society then develops fears that immigrants will either fail to integrate (the case of Germany is even more difficult due to German nationalism and core culture) or that immigrants will take over jobs and employment opportunities from the domestic population.

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[136] Oya Abalı, "German Public Opinion on Immigration and Integration," *Migration Policy Institute* (2009): 9. Note that the results come from 1985 (4053) and 2008 (10018) Allensbach studies of which I have no further information (who conducted the survey or the number of respondents, etc.) besides the information provided by Oya Abalı. The same applies for any further references of the same source, however, year and the number of studies might change, thus, they will be referenced accordingly.

[137] Abalı, "German Public Opinion," 9. Note that the results come from 2008 (10018) Allensbach study.



Figure 8. Timeline of Citizenship and Immigration Reforms.

Source: thesis author.

For these reasons, xenophobia, which has been a longstanding issue in Germany, halts the fluency of integration since democratic norms such as participating in society or personal freedoms are omitted. These societal problems and conflicts are most evident in daily interactions between non-ethnic Germans and domestic Germans, especially in

schools where less integration is most obvious. The Allensbach 2008 study confirmed this xenophobic rationale among Germans: the share of respondents who believed that children of foreigners are the leading cause of problems in schools rose from 47% in 1997 to 67% ten years later.[138] Furthermore, economic concerns and fears led to a similar conclusion, with 75% of respondents believing that providing employment for Germans rather than caring for and integrating minorities into society should be given a much higher priority.[139] Nonetheless, since integration is a two-way process, evaluation of the other side of the coin, i.e., Turkish integration, must be given attention as well.

Turkish Response

While most of these reforms and changes indicated a positive outlook for the future well-being and successful naturalization of foreigners, it is crucial to assess the political, social, and economic factors. The assessment focuses mainly on the Turkish diaspora since Turks constitute the largest minority in Germany. Thus their ever changing trends and reactions are easiest to follow amongst foreigners in Germany. Although political, social, and economic differences exist even in the diaspora (e.g., Kurds and Alevi), the Turks' individual experiences seem to be similar.

The previously discussed policy developments, without a doubt, eased the naturalization process, especially when considering the number of naturalized Turks in Germany. According to the Turkish Ministry of Labor and Social Security, some 778,000

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[138] Abalı, "German Public Opinion," 9. Note that the results come from 2008 (10018) Allensbach study.

[139] Abalı, "German Public Opinion," 13. Note that the results come from 2007 (10013) Allensbach study.

Turkish citizens acquired German citizenship between 1972 and 2009.[140] Like the Poles a century ago, Turks have also resorted to creating Turkish organizations to gain formal representation not only socially but politically as well. The relatively long under-representation of foreigners in policymaking meant that Turkish found organizations could complement newcomers' well-being and integration efforts. These organizations played a vital role in maintaining their cultural element and a connection to the ethnic group in Turkey.

During the early 1960s, most organizations avoided organized political activity and focused exclusively on providing cultural cushioning. However, as more Turks started to settle, problems with naturalization arose, and some Turkish organizations resorted to political bargaining with the German authorities. Throughout the 1980s—the period of Christian Democratic rule—Turkish problems were pushed aside, resulting in internal divisions over goals and strategies, which severely weakened the Turkish community's potential.

By the mid-1980s, further fragmentations developed into political factions representing a variety of political backgrounds and affiliations, ranging from radical left to right-wing nationalists.[141] Since Turkish organizations could not generate the same unity as Polish organizations, Turks individually developed a parallel society where their societal problems remained unanswered. Even then, most Turks preferred to stay in the country, although a considerable number decided to emigrate. In this case, they could

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[140] Yaşar Aydın, "The Germany-Turkey Migration Corridor Refitting Policies for a Transnational Age," *Transatlantic Council on Migration* (2016): 6.

[141] Selcen Oner, "Turkish Community in Germany and the Role of Turkish Community Organizations," *European Scientific Journal* 10, no. 29 (2014): 79.

apply for the so-called *Mavi* or Blue Card, which granted returnees to Turkey living, working, and inheritance rights.[142] However, after introducing legislation that applied the *jus soli* principle to citizenship requirements, returnees could not apply for Turkish citizenship as they voided that right at the age of 23. This meant forfeiting the right to vote in Turkey.

The Blue Card scheme was highly favored before citizenship reform passed in 2000, but the reform did not lower the number of emigrants. Even the slightly easier naturalization process did not ensure a worry-free life for Turks in Germany as three major pressures for emigration emerged. These societal, educational, and employment hardships resulted in a roughly constant number of 30,000 to 40,000 Turkish emigrants leaving Germany each year between 1992 and 2009.[143]

In terms of societal problems, a spokesperson for one of the Turkish organizations in Germany (the Turkish Union in Berlin Brandenburg) revealed that even after the 2000 reforms, legal, social, and political equality has been difficult for Turks to achieve in Germany. Many still experienced discriminations based on ethnicity, religion, and culture; thus, complete naturalization or integration resembled assimilation into German culture.[144] In this sense, such societal pressure on first-, second-, and third-generation

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[142] Barbara Pusch, and Julia Splitt, "Binding the Almancı to the 'Homeland': Notes from Turkey," *Perceptions* 18, no. 3 (2013): 147.

[143] Aydın, "Germany-Turkey Migration," 11. Note that the number of Turkish emigrants form Germany is an estimate taken from Figure 1, found on page 11, and titled "Annual Migration Flows between Germany and Turkey, All Nationalities, 1992-2012." The information was published in a Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF), Migrationsbericht study in 2014.

[144] Liu Isabell, "Germany's Largest Minority: What it means to be Turkish in a 'non-immigrant' country," *Berlin Beyond Borders*, 19 July 2019.

Turks to choose after reaching the age of 23 meant forfeiting their Turkish cultural elements in favor of German values and norms.

Most Turkish parents favor raising their children under Turkish traditions and culture. Also, most parents prefer to speak Turkish outside of work, which means the primary language of their children is also Turkish. Consequently, only 14% of Turkish students passed the German language exam in high school, according to the 2019 study.[145]

A study by the Center for American Progress revealed that most parents value the German school system and believe that their children are offered better opportunities in Germany. However, discrimination and threats against their culture in the schools lowered these opinions.[146] In an interview for the *Berlin Beyond Borders Journal*, 24-year-old Miran Max Kessel explained how societal discrimination had altered his high school life. Although Miran was born in Germany after legislation that applied the *jus soli* principle to citizenship requirements was introduced and always viewed himself as a German citizen first, he could not deny his Turkish roots, culture, and traditions. As a result, Miran became a target amongst peers because of his Turkish ancestry. This highlights the fact that German citizenship does not automatically mean German acceptance.[147] Cases like Miran's suggest that many young people could still find strong impulses to emigrate rather than live in despair because of their ancestry and culture.

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[145] Isabell, "Germany's Largest Minority."

[146] Max Hoffman, et al., "The Turkish Diaspora in Europe: Integration, Migration, and Politics," *American Progress* (2020): 4-8.

[147] Isabell, "Germany's Largest Minority."

Another significant pressure for emigration comes in concerns over losing cultural ties and a feeling of being removed from society. In a 2008 survey by *Die Zeit*, some 89% of respondents felt that German society is not considerate enough of Turkish customs and traditions.[148] A Center for American Progress study also revealed that while most respondents valued the prospect of living in a more liberal democracy than Turkey, some felt that improved bilateral relations with Turkey could serve the diaspora even better. Almost half thought that the Turkish community could be better integrated into German society, but a majority felt that Turks should also maintain their identity. To complement the second viewpoint, as many as 93% of Turkish adults preferred marriage within the Turkish community. They felt concerned that marriage to a German spouse could threaten their cultural norms.[149]

The cultural separation was also significant due to differences that Germans perceived between themselves and Turks, and themselves and other minorities. For instance, during the guest worker period, a significant number of workers came from Italy. However, Germans did not hold a strong prejudice against Italians as they did against Turks. Some 47% of respondents felt Italians are somewhat culturally different, while 69% felt that such a statement was true of Turks.[150] More than ten years later, another Allensbach study revealed that only 24% of respondents felt that Italians were

[148] Jörg Lau, "Wir wollen hier rein!," *Die Zeit* (2008): 12. Note: some of the data was obtained from the report titled "Bevölkerung in Deutschland mit türkischem Migrationshintergrund," which is made available on the last page of the article.

[149] Hoffman, "Turkish Diaspora in Europe," 5; "Study Shows Turkish Immigrants Least Integrated in Germany," *Deutsche Welle,* 26 January 2009.

[150] Abalı, "German Public Opinion," 10.

culturally different, while 58% of Germans felt this was true of Turks.[151] However, in the violent and xenophobic era of the 1990s, 76% of respondents felt that Turks are culturally different.[152]

While such beliefs could be ascribed to the "enclosure and separation" of the Turkish diaspora, some could also be the result of differences in religion since a vast majority of Turks were Muslims, living in a predominantly Christian culture in Germany. The growing skepticism and fears following September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States resulted in even broader discussions of the integration of Muslims in Germany. Such discussions only increased following the attempted 2006 train bombing by Islamic terrorists, which significantly lowered German belief that Muslim immigrants could integrate into German society. In fact, in the 2008 Allensbach study, only 18% of respondents believed that resident Muslims accepted German values.[153]

Furthermore, a *Die Zeit* study revealed that Turkish men are more likely to intermarry than Turkish women since Islam does not permit women to marry non-Muslims. As a result, women either prefer marriage within the community or resort to bringing their husbands from Turkey. In the case that young Turkish individuals remain in Germany, a considerable number of these individuals decide to leave between the ages of 40 and 50 to reunite with their spouses and families in Turkey.[154] Consequently, the

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[151] Abalı, "German Public Opinion," 10.

[152] Abalı, "German Public Opinion," 10.

[153] Abalı, "German Public Opinion," 11.

[154] Sladičeková, "Politika štátov Európskej únie," 25.

annual number of Turkish immigrants fell from a relatively constant number of 25,000 throughout the family reunification period to some 8,000 individuals in 2002.[155]

A somewhat complex scenario unfolds in terms of employment and opportunities offered to German Turks. In the early 2000s, the German economy entered a slight decline, translating to a lower number of Turkish newcomers. For instance, in 2002, almost 60,000 Turks immigrated to Germany, while in the mid-2000s, the number dropped to about 35,000.[156] Germany's gross domestic product (GDP) rate also dropped after 2002 to less than 1%, which resulted in an unemployment rate of almost 10% in the next few years.[157] Many of the unemployed came from Turkish communities, and since most Turkish households rely on a single wage, the pressure on such individuals to emigrate mounted.

Although the German economy regained its strength in the late 2000s, Turkey's massive social, economic, and political revival made a choice to emigrate even more attractive. Greater market liberalization and integration meant that qualified and skilled German Turks, who now benefited from being multilingual, were in high demand in Turkey at that time. Consequently, in 2006, Germany started experiencing a negative migration balance for the first time, as more Turkish individuals emigrated to Turkey than immigrated to Germany.[158] Although the increased number of German emigrants during the mid-2000s has been insignificant to the German population in 2005 (82

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[155] Farahat, "Report on Citizenship Law," 7-8.

[156] Farahat, "Report on Citizenship Law," 7-8.

[157] Aydın, Germany-Turkey Migration," 11.

[158] "The Emigration of Highly Qualified German Citizens of Turkish Descent to Turkey," *Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung*. https://www.bpb.de/themen/migration-integration/kurzdossiers/132850/the-emigration-of-highly-qualified-german-citizens-of-turkish-descent-to-turkey/

million), it was the nature of such emigration that was alarming. Those emigrating were highly educated professionals, thus, an essential part of the German economy to remain a competitive world superpower. Doctors and physicians that remained had required higher wages and better working conditions to which the German government devoted more than €100 million in the next few years.[159] Since then, the economy has revived itself, and instances of "brain drain" did not reappear at that time.

Chancellor Schröder found hope in the implementation of the Green Card initiative. That policy lowered the annual salary requirement for obtaining residence and work permits while also granting foreign students a longer stay (up to 18 months) after graduation to pursue career opportunities.[160] Yet, Schröder did not believe in a wage increase for German Turks. In fact, no minorities were offered such incentives, which in return did not dispel the possibility of another "brain drain" scenario in the future.

Qualitative Changes?

The assessment showed that throughout the late 1970s and into the early 1980s, Turkish newcomers immigrated to an environment that offered considerable support to cultivate and preserve their culture and language. German society showed little discrimination, and it held few prejudices against Turkish guest workers. But that changed after Germany reunited in 1989, when considerable xenophobia appeared, especially among the underprivileged individuals from the GDR, which resulted in widespread discrimination against those who many Germans believed should not be

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[159] Margret Steffen, "Brain Drain Hurting Germany," *Deutsche Welle*, 2 Sep 2004; Mark Landler, "Germany Agonizes Over a Brain Drain," New *York Times*, 6 Feb 2007.

[160] Aydın, "Germany-Turkey Migration," 12.

there. Consequently, the idyllic environment of the 1980s changed radically through the 1990s and 2000s.

Politically, Germany entered one of its most turbulent eras due to political scrambles between the Christian and Social Democrats. Christian Democrats and especially Kohl's anti-migration politics spotlight the Turkish diaspora, which resulted in countless arson attacks and other forms of discrimination in the everyday lives of Turks living in Germany. The situation did not improve until Social Democrats began arranging political changes after realizing the potential that the Turkish diaspora could offer.

The party's political rise also brought a few important societal changes that improved integration and naturalization for foreigners. Despite the changes at the social level, such as the introduction of legislation that applied the *jus soli* principle to citizenship requirements, as well as a significant reduction in the period of residency needed for naturalization, these societal changes did not allow for the normal naturalization process. Instead, they led to the development of a parallel society where Turks and other minorities could find a cultural safe haven and remain in contact with their homeland. While these changes at least offered foreigners the possibility of becoming German citizens, beyond that, there were no avenues to deconstruct the wall between the parallel societies.

Economically, the Turks and other minorities appreciated that they received a respectable salary and social benefits in Germany. But widespread discrimination, coupled with the political, social, and economic revival reappearing in Turkey, became decisive factors for the *Blue Card* emigration scheme to Turkey in the mid-2000s. As apparent in the responses and opinions held by German Turks throughout the late 2000s,

many remained concerned about preserving their culture while still feeling unwelcomed—even after all the years spent in the country. The choice to stay in Germany no longer resembled integration but rather a pressured assimilation: Turks could either accept German norms and values or rebel against them and live a disconnected Turkish life. For some Turks, pressured assimilation and discrimination turned into despair and eventual emigration from Germany. Others believed they had little choice but to assimilate into the German society, which in principle remained nationalistic since the values and norms were essentially that of German nationalism. It seemed that Germans were/are open to change, but the fact remained that the change had to be implemented in a way that did not interfere with the core values that make up the character of the German people. In this regard, German nationalism was indirectly present, even during this period, because while societal reforms allowed easier naturalization, they did not resolve cultural problems.

A study undertaken by Sabine Pokorny in 2016 revealed that about one-third of foreign respondents felt very satisfied with German democracy, and almost 90% were somewhat satisfied with the political system.[161] However, only 50% of foreigners believed that politicians had a free hand to do whatever they wanted, but their efforts were vested elsewhere than helping foreigners to integrate.[162] Also, both sides (ethnic and non-ethnic Germans) had their own opinions on integration. On one side, Germans felt that foreigners did not want to integrate themselves culturally; on the other side, foreigners felt that Germans were not willing to allow foreigners to integrate into society.

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[161] Sabine Pokorny, "Immigrants Lead the Way in Demanding Assimilation, Study Finds," *Deutsche Welle,*16 Dec 2016.

[162] Pokorny, "Immigrants Lead the Way."

In a 2006 Allensbach study, more than 60% of respondents felt that foreigners were only merely integrated into society.[163] Even though German society was conscious of poor integration, it still retained the long-standing pragmatic approach to the country's diverse nature and showed no support for better integration efforts. In the next chapter, more emphasis will be placed on further political and societal events to evaluate if the German society could become more willing to accept other cultures while loosening its nationalistic tendencies so that a true qualitative transformation can occur.

[163] Oya Abalı, "German Public Opinion on Immigration and Integration," *Migration Policy Institute*, 9 (2009): 13.

Chapter V

Migration Crisis and the German Response

The early 2000s introduced some significant improvements while also resolving a few of the social difficulties foreigners had faced for decades. Problems such as lengthy naturalization and the inability to receive German citizenship were at last given some attention by German policymakers, and political parties began to use the relatively large Turkish diaspora to their advantage. In return, minorities benefited from some noteworthy societal changes that, at the very least, granted naturalized individuals the possibility of citizenship. However, full-scale integration was not achieved because cultural and religious differences prevented minorities from fully integrating into society.

Such integration failures could also be blamed on German nationalism, as it prevented the complete acculturation of minorities and aided in the formation of parallel societies. Nonetheless, minorities no longer faced the kinds of violence and extremism as before, which gave the illusion that this approach saw a departure from the second hypothesis. Moreover, it seemed that German authorities and policymakers were preparing Germans to become willing to acculturate and integrate minorities into society via immigration reforms. Thus, the goal of this chapter is to explain and evaluate the importance of the 2015 migration crisis and use this scenario to ascertain if Germans have a continuing tendency to rule anyone out of their *Leitkultur* or alternatively that after the long period of political changes and societal reforms, Germans now understand the importance of integration.

Impact of Arab Spring

Since the late 1970s, West Germany projected itself as a lucrative destination for many incoming immigrants because it offered a well-established democracy, economy, and social welfare system. That image did not disappear after the 1990 reunification. Indeed, on the contrary, newly established asylum laws and continuing economic prosperity propelled the country to become a prime destination in Europe. In fact, some 30% of all European asylum requests in the past 30 years inquired about entry into Germany.[164] West Germany had already discussed asylum seekers when it experienced a sudden burst of Turkish asylum seekers in the 1980s. Since then, the number has declined rapidly, and between 2002 and 2012, less than 100,000 asylum seekers arrived annually. Hence, none of the recent political discussions focused on issues regarding asylum seekers.[165] Such an approach changed following the outbreak of the so-called "Arab Spring," which once again revived the decades-old discussion of how to deal with the massive number of asylum seekers already en route to the country.

The initial event that sparked the massive response now known as the Arab Spring came from neglected Middle Eastern problems, such as widespread unemployment, extreme poverty, and government corruption. The Arab Spring was propelled forward by Mohamed Bouazizi, a young Tunisian street vendor who immolated himself publicly in late 2010.[166] Following his death, slogans and symbols were shared across social media,

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[164] "Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015," *PEW Research Center,* 2 Aug 2016.

[165] Teresa Talò, "Public Attitudes to Immigration in Germany in the Aftermath of the Migration Crisis," Migration Policy Centre 23 (2017): 2. Note: the number of asylum seekers to Germany is an estimate from Figure 1. found on page 2 and titled as Flows of non-Germans. The information has been published by Statistisches Bundesamt.

[166] Rania Abouzeid, "Bouazizi: The man who set himself and Tunisia on fire," *Time*, 21 Jan 2011.

enabling millions of people to see and learn of the struggle. Videos of Tunisians and Egyptians expressing their joy after the collapse of several authoritarian regimes flooded the media. Such a massive positivity illustrated the possibility that the pan-Arab world shared common desires and goals despite cultural and ethnic differences. The Arab Spring eventually found its way into Yemen and Bahrain. However, the largest protests erupted in Syria because of the ruthless and relentless regime of Bashar al-Assad, who had continued his stronghold for over 40 years, despite various efforts to topple him.[167]

As the revolts grew, Assad decided to use his military might to crush the first wave of Syrian uprisings. That caused countless more civilians to join the civil war to fight for democracy and political, social, and economic reforms. In an attempt to remain in power, Assad retaliated with chemical weapons, which resulted in the deaths of more than 120,000 people.[168] In 2011 alone, almost 8 million people left the countries most affected by civil wars, including some 400,000 Syrians who fled their homeland.[169] As the situation in Syria and northern Iraq escalated dramatically throughout 2015, and the situation in crowded refugee camps around Syria also deteriorated, thousands of refugees and asylum seekers began seeking refuge by migrating to Europe.

At first, refugees migrated to countries outside the Schengen borders. Still, as the numbers grew, the first target countries could not cope with the vast influx and began releasing refugees into Schengen countries. Those who immigrated during the first wave

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[167] Kheder Khaddour, "The Assad Regime's Hold on the Syrian State," *Carnegie Middle East Center* (8 Jul 2015): 3.

[168] Varol Sevim, and Merve Sune Ozel, "Rethinking the Russian Mission in Syria," *European Scientific Journal 9*, no. 19 (2019): 455.

[169] Philippe Fargues, and Christine Fandrich, "Migration after the Arab Spring," *Migration Policy Centre* (2012): 16.

were considered refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention since the widespread violence recognized most countries of the Middle East as unsafe.[170] However, as the numbers grew, Europe began to deal with the phenomenon of irregular migrants. Such immigrants were either political or economic migrants who decided to enter illegally, meaning without making any formal request for asylum. Economic migrants often relocate with their diaspora or attempt to reach powerful countries with strong economies and open-door policies, as in the case of Germany.

Germany's Stance on the Migration Crisis

As the magnitude of the crisis grew, various political judgments began to form among policymakers in several European countries. On the one hand, countries once behind the Iron Curtain vindicated results in line with the nationalistic German movement of the late 1990s. On the other hand, democratic countries welcomed refugees and asylum seekers with open arms. To date, more than 20% of Germans have a background that includes migration, and even though Germany has had a decent history of migration, the welcome culture appeared sentimental and optimistic only during the first phase of the migration crisis.[171]

To put the magnitude of this crisis into a perspective, statistics show that some 1.3 million migrants arrived in 2015 in southern European countries, which meant that the

[170] Ashlynn Kendzior, "Relocation, Regulation and Rigor: How Germany's New Integration Act Violates the Refugee Convention," *Minnesota Journal of International Law* (2018): 537-538.

[171] "Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts," BBC News, 4 March 2016.

European Union had to rapidly develop relocation strategies and policies.[172] However, several EU states deemed such relocation efforts untenable due to fears that migrants will either become economic and social liabilities or that they might threaten the cohesion of society.

As the situation in border refugee camps began to deteriorate, commissioners of the European Commission agreed to introduce immigrant quotas.[173] Although different from the immigration lottery in the United States, in Europe, these quotas aimed to relocate refugees and asylum seekers based on calculations tailored for each member state. These calculations depended on the physical size of the country, the size of its population, and the country's economic well-being based on GDP.

The quota system was also developed to bolster the deteriorating Dublin Regulation, which held that country of first contact was responsible for evaluating the validity of asylum requests. However, most of these countries were simply unable to cope with the large number of requests.[174] In addition, the same member states that wished not to participate in relocation efforts also refused to accept the quota system since they believed it violated the country's national sovereignty. Such polarization of opinions further complicated the steps to resolve issues that surrounded the migration crisis.

The effects of polarization can vary greatly, but polarization can also become extreme, which is what occurred in the case of Germany's political and public preferences throughout the migration crisis. During the early stages of the crisis, German

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[172] Philippe Fargues, "Who are the Million Migrants who Entered Europe Without a Visa in 2015?," *Population & Societies* 532, no. 4 (2016): 1-2.

[173] Natascha Zaun, "States as Gatekeepers in EU Asylum Politics: Explaining the Non-Adoption of a Refugee Quota System," *Journal of Common Market Studies* (2017): 44-45.

[174] Zaun, "States as Gatekeepers," 53-54.

society held a generally positive attitude toward immigrants. Their arrival saw an increase in assistance as visible in public engagement and voluntary initiatives in the form of complimentary language programs, housing accommodations, humanitarian assistance, etc. In fact, after Angela Merkel's July 2015 speech that signified Germany's willingness to resolve the crisis and her promise that Germany would accept as many asylum requests as possible, the number of requests skyrocketed, from 30% to almost 70% within a few months.[175] However, such open-mindedness did not resonate well with the public. The positive attitude rapidly degenerated over the next two years, and the government's ongoing pro-refugee policies became harder to defend against public preferences.

Such declining public support was shaped not only by fear, such as loss of employment, wage decreases, or racial prejudice but also became the consequence of a spike in violence committed against Germans. According to a survey that studied German perception of immigrants, as many as 42% of respondents considered refugees and asylum seekers a cultural threat—an increase from the initial 33% at the time of Merkel's 2015 speech.[176]

Furthermore, some 55% of respondents considered the decision-making process of the federal government and Chancellor Merkel as a burden on German society—a mere 5% increase from the previous year.[177] However, 70% of Germans believed that the

[175] Alessandro Sola, "The 2015 Refugee Crisis in Germany: Concerns about Immigration and Populism," German Socio-Economic Panel, 2018: 7.

[176] "Poll: Germans Increasingly Skeptical of Refugees," *Deutsche Welle*, 15 Jan 2016.

[177] "Poll: Germans Increasingly Skeptical of Refugees."

continuously growing number of refugees and asylum seekers constituted a potential security threat as well.[178]

As the patience of Europeans was running out toward the end of 2015, leaders of the European Union eventually agreed that the countries of origin and transit must become at least partially responsible for resolving the negative progress of the crisis. The Valletta Summit focused on proposals to strengthen external borders and invest in a joint plan to relocate asylum seekers. The first security measure introduced as the Italy-African Fund promised a donation of €200 million to curb illegal migration to Europe by sealing the northern African borders.[179]

Merkel hoped to achieve a similar degree of cooperation in Germany through the EU-Turkey refugee return agreement. However, the agreement was in jeopardy from the beginning because most member states opposed Turkey's initiative to join the European Union. Similar opposition grew after Turkey's President Erdogan called for visa-free travel for all Turkish citizens between the European Union and Turkey. More frequent and visa-free travel could threaten the internal security of Europe.[180] However, the promise that the European Union might lessen the burden of asylum seekers in countries of first contact by returning them to Turkey outweighed any nepotism against Turkey. Thus, the EU-Turkey refugee return agreement became a reality and Europe was able to relocate many illegal migrants to Turkey by ensuring sufficient funding (roughly €6

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[178] "Poll: Germans Increasingly Skeptical of Refugees."

[179] Zach Campbell, "Europe's Plan to Close Its Sea Borders Relies on Libya's Coast Guard Doing Its Dirty Work, Abusing Migrants," *The Intercept*, 25 November 2017.

[180] Dogachan Dagi, "The EU-Turkey Migration Deal: Performance and Prospects," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 25, no. 2 (2020): 198-199.

billion) for the construction of several refugee camps in Turkey.[181] The terms of the Agreement meant that the Turkish government would implement tighter restrictions on its borders with Europe. At the same time, the European Union would endorse the resettlement of Syrians who had qualified for asylum in one of the member states.

Although Merkel was able to ease the situation in Europe, the agreement was harshly criticized for violations of the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees. These violations included instances such as depriving immigrants of the possibility of registering; refusing to provide child protections, which resulted in the separation of families; and declining access to essential healthcare. Considerable negative publicity became the primary reason for growing skepticism among Europeans.[182] As dissatisfaction within the public prevailed, anti-immigration and Eurosceptic political parties suddenly emerged. The right-wing populist political parties rapidly amassed support among Europeans as political failure drove them toward nationalistic measures.

Nationalism, Xenophobia, and Violence

While the political failures vastly contributed to the breakdown in European solidarity, in Germany, these failures were responsible for the immense growth of the radical right-wing political party, Alternative for Germany (AfD). The AfD was founded in 2013 on the principles of Euroscepticism, which is based on supposed deficiencies in the European Union's agenda. Attributes such as lack of transparency, neoliberal

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[181] Mariana Gkliati, "The EU-Turkey Deal and the Safe Third Country Concept before the Greek Asylum Appeals Committees," *Movements Journal* 3, no. 2 (2017): 213-220.

[182] Charles Lees, "The 'Alternative for Germany': The Rise of Right-wing Populism at the Heart of Europe," *Politics* 38, no. 3 (2018): 297, 299.

practices, elitism, and openness to large-scale immigration are among the core values of AfD's political beliefs. At the height of the migration crisis, AfD had already established itself in the German national parliament despite promoting an anti-Islam manifesto.[183]

In the context of Merkel's 2015 speech, Germany was bound to become a role model in dealing with the magnitude of the migration crisis since Merkel invited millions of refugees to Germany. However, as masses arrived and mechanisms for relocation failed, Germany and Merkel were immediately persecuted for the disastrous system of mandatory quotas. Beyond that, as Merkel's respected reputation suffered, the AfD capitalized on growing support for its nationalistic and anti-immigration agenda. The AfD believed that this was the period of European unity, although, in reality, conflicts between member states over asylum laws and migration quotas led to further disintegration and political chaos. After that, the party recalibrated its ambitions and called for measures to reestablish Germany's sovereignty and promote asylum policies to curb the growing number of illegal migrants.[184]

Immense support for right-wing radicalism also became responsible for increased terrorism—a phenomenon tightly linked to international and transnational migration. Although no universal definition of terrorism exists, there is some debate about at least a partial definition following the ruling of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in 2011. The tribunal referenced the 2004 UN Security Council Resolution 1566, which states that an individual or organization is engaged in terrorist activities if:

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[183] David Patton, "The Alternative for Germany's Radicalization in Historical-comparative Perspective," *Government and International Relations Faculty Publications* (2017): 170-171.

[184] Patton, "Alternative for Germany's Radicalization," 167-168.

> Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.[185]

Although Germany did not experience any major terrorist acts for two decades, by early 2011, Europeans began to suspect that Muslims—especially Syrians—were responsible for the increase in terrorism in Europe. Many accused Islamic immigrants of committing terrorist attacks in France, Belgium, and Germany, even though many of the perpetrators were already naturalized Europeans.

From that time on, Islamophobia was seen as the prime reason for increased danger to unity, democratic order, and the peaceful coexistence of Europeans in the EU, who perceived Muslims as a security threat to Europe.[186] Germans also seemed to share the same perception not only because of the rapid propaganda campaign against Islam that came from right-wing political parties but also due to several terrorist events that occurred in Cologne. The German public's perception of Islam seemed to be diametrically different in 2015 as compared to 2011.

It also became evident that after the terrorist events, Islamophobia grew significantly in countries with refugee-friendly policies, such as Sweden and Denmark. Hence, as long as the migration crisis remains a political and social issue, right-wing political parties will find wide support among Islamophobic Europeans, a sentiment that

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[185] United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1566. Adopted at its meeting on 8 October 2004.

[186] Przemysław Osiewicz, "Europe's Islamophobia and the Refugee Crisis," *Middle East Institute,* 19 September 2017.

often translates into terrorism against immigrants.[187] After 2015, however, both right-wing nationalists and Islamic perpetrators began to engage in activities classified as terrorism. Consequently, society viewed the growth of Islamic terrorism as a byproduct of open and non-regulated migration. In contrast, right-wing terrorism was perceived as a form of retaliation against Islamic terrorism.

One of the first Islamic attacks that shook the German public occurred in February 2016, when a 15-year-old minor attacked two police officers at Hanover train station. One of the officers sustained stab wounds to the neck, requiring an immediate surgery. According to the investigators, the girl was radicalized and given orders to commit a martyrdom attack by the Islamic State prior to the attack.[188]

Several more attacks linked to Islamic terrorism occurred over the next few months. In April 2016, two young Muslims radicalized by the Islamic State assembled a homemade explosive device detonated in a Sikh temple in Essen. Three people were injured.[189] A month later, an unknown man was stabbed to death at the Grafing Bahnhof train station. Although authorities could not find any link to Islamic State, witnesses testified that they heard *Allahu Akbar* being shouted.[190] In July, a young Afghan refugee attacked four bystanders with an axe on a train in Wűrzburg. Among the four injured, one had moderate wounds, but the perpetrator was gunned down by police. A letter was later

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[187] Osiewicz, "Europe's Islamophobia."

[188] "ISIS-obsessed German teen girl faces jail for slitting cop's throat," *Toronto Sun,* 21 January 2017.

[189] "German Sikh Temple Attack Suspect 'on Anti-Extremism Programme'," *BBC News,* 28 April 2016.

[190] Kate Connolly, "One Dead, Three Injured in Knife Attack at Train Station Near Munich," *Guardian,* 10 May 2016.

found in his belongings, which stated that he prayed he could kill all the infidels.[191] A few weeks later, a failed asylum seeker from Syria was killed, and 15 bystanders were injured during an unsuccessful attempt to plant a bomb in the center of Ansbach. Investigators believed that the culprit had a solid motive to engage in further violence as several exploding devices and pledges to the Islamic State were found in his temporary apartment.[192] During the Christmas holidays, a Tunisian asylum seeker, whose application was rejected, deliberately drove a truck into a mass of people in the center of Berlin. He later testified that the Islamic State instructed him to commit such atrocity to become an Islamic martyr. The attack left 12 dead and more than 50 injured.[193] In July 2017, a failed Palestinian asylum seeker killed one person and wounded six in a Hamburg supermarket. The attacker shouted *Allahu Akbar* and called himself an Islamic martyr as well.[194] See Figure 9 below for a partial list of Islamic terrorist attacks.

Crimes committed by refugees and immigrants recorded an all-time high of 79% compared to 2016.[195] Reports of rising burglaries and sexual assaults, such as those on New Year's Eve in 2015 in Cologne, Hamburg, Stuttgart, and other cities, only further fueled public safety concerns and sparked demands for better state security.[196]

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[191] "Germany: 3 People Killed in Würzburg Knife Attack," *Deutsche Welle*, 26 June 2021.

[192] M. Weaver, and Martin Farrer, "Ansbach Bombing: Attacker Pledged Allegiance to Isis, Says Official," *Guardian*, 25 July 2016.

[193] "Islamic State Claims Responsibility for Berlin Attack," *Deutsche Welle*, 20 December 2016.

[194] M. Eddy, "One Dead in Knife Attack at German Supermarket," *New York Times*, 28 July 2017.

[195] Tomáš Beňuška,"Spoločenské dopady medzinárodnej migrácie na príklade Spolkovej Republiky Nemecko," *Univerzita Mateja Bela v Banskej Bystrici*: 2001: 6.

[196] Rick Noack, "Leaked Document Says 2,000 Men Allegedly Assaulted 1,200 German Women on New Year's Eve," *Washington Post*, 16 July 2016.

Figure 9. Attacks by Islamic Terrorists.

Source: thesis author.

The public demanded a quota system reform, explicitly requesting a cap on the number of refugees admitted into Germany. Based on the rise in terrorism, it seems Germans were right in demanding a change since more than 1,200 sexual assaults on women and others killed at the hands of immigrants.

Germans also demanded justification for the controversies that prevailed after the attacks. First, German authorities could identify only two culprits among 300 suspects from Syria and neighboring countries, who were convicted and sentenced for sexual assaults. Second, the public was outraged by the misinformation and lack of clarity from the media and police, who refrained from providing any information on foreign suspects due to fears that right-wing extremists would resort to even more violence.[197] Third, most Germans faulted Angela Merkel's welcoming culture, and her outsize leadership in

[197] "New Year's Eve in Cologne: 5 Years After the Mass Assaults," *Deutsche Welle*, 31 Dec 2020.

developing the quota system as the leading causes of events connected to Islamic terrorism. Consequently, the German parliament introduced stricter laws for sexual offenses coupled with deportation if convicted. Still, issues of Islamic terrorism, right-wing extremism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia remained unreported.

As Isaac Newton famously said, every action has an equal and opposite reaction. This proved to be the case with Islamic terrorism, which soon experienced opposition as right-wing extremists began to attack Muslims in Germany. The first right-wing attack occurred in September 2017 when a man equipped with a knife attacked and seriously injured the mayor of Cologne. The attack was a sign of opposition to the mayor's open immigrant policies and general support for refugees.[198] Two months later, members of the right-wing terrorist organization Gruppe Freital attacked a refugee camp in Freital, with one person sustaining minor injuries.[199] A second attack committed by the same organization occurred a year later when several bombs were simultaneously detonated in Dresden's Mosque and at its Congress Center. No injuries were reported.[200]

The second wave of Islamophobia and xenophobia appeared later in 2019 when several massive shootings occurred. Although the Halle synagogue shooting perpetrator acted out of anti-Semitic beliefs and opened fire against people currently in the synagogue, he went from there to a Turkish store and gunned down several more people.

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[198] "Testifying Against Attacker, Cologne Mayor Reker Recounts Brutal Stabbing," *Deutsche Welle,* 29 April 2016.

[199] Andrea Hentshcel, "East German neo-Nazis Face Terror Trial Over Refugee Attacks," *Times of Israel,* 2017.

[200] "Trial Against Germans Accused of Attacking Refugee Homes Starts," *Reuters,* 7 March 2017.

The perpetrator was not injured, but two people died, and several more were injured.[201] In 2020, two shootings occurred in Hanau. The gunman carefully selected two bars that were primarily occupied by Turkish citizens. German authorities confirmed that at least 11 people died, and 5 others were seriously injured while the attacker fled the scene. He later killed his mother and committed suicide.[202] See Figure 10 below for a partial list of attacks by right-wing terrorists.

Figure 10. Attacks by Right-Wing Terrorists.

Source: thesis author.

Hypotheses and Future

The evidence presented in this thesis does not represent an original collection and evaluation of data—which is true of statistical research per se. Thus the empirical evidence gathered from various sources can only provide a hypothetical answer to what the future might be. By fusing the events described above with incidents that sparked the

[201] 2020. "Life Sentence for Halle Synagogue Shooter Who Killed 2 in Yom Kippur Rampage," *The Times of Israel*.

[202] Ewing, Jack and Melissa Eddy. 2020. "Far-Right Shooting Shatters an Already Fragile Sense of Security in Germany," *The New York Times.*

migration crisis and Germany's open-door policies that attracted many immigrants to the country, I could reach a partial conclusion as to why society's perception of foreigners began returning to its pre-reform era.

Furthermore, the methods and theoretical approach in the previous chapters examined different time periods based on their own set of historical events that contributed to the formation of opinions and prejudices that Germans held against immigrants. However, to assess and understand the scope of these time periods, the two hypotheses must be evaluated through interchangeable objectives.

There are three different objectives, and in each, one of the two hypotheses will remain plausible, and the other one will be refuted based on the decision of policymakers and societal response to these decisions. These objectives are

1. morality vs. responsibility
2. immigrant terminology
3. German multiculturalism

Figure 11 below illustrates the thesis methodology and hypotheses**.**



Figure 11. Methodology and Hypotheses.

Source: thesis author

Morality versus Responsibility

First, applying Max Weber's ethic of conscience (*Gesinnungsethik*) and ethic of responsibility (*Verantwortungsethik*) could contribute to the evaluation of the migration crisis on a conceptual level. According to Weber, these ethics often contradict themselves during almost any decision-making process.[203] Weber also states that understanding the differences between these ethics is essential to comprehend the actions and decisions of policymakers.[204] On the one hand, *Gesinnungsethik* (which in the Weberian dictionary translates as an ethic of moral conviction) is based on adherence to moral principles regardless of consequences.[205] On the other, *Verantwortungsethik* is based not only on

[203] Tony Waters, and Dagmar Waters, *Weber's Rationalism and Modern Society* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015): 30.

[204] Waters, *Weber's Rationalism,* 30.

[205] Waters, *Weber's Rationalism,* 30.

moral principles but also on the expectation that a decision-maker will be held responsible for the consequences of his/her actions.[206] The tension and friction between these two schools of ethics remain at the heart of any political decision-making, however, Weber does not necessarily see them as opposites. As is typical of Weberian thinking, the boundaries between the two schools must be amorphous and dialectical.

Thus, the dispute over migration policies could potentially be evaluated through Weber's two ethics as it became a struggle between proponents of the ethic of moral conviction and the ethic of responsibility. As the migration crisis unfolded toward the end of 2015, proponents of the ethic of conviction spoke about moral principles while also referring to the crisis as a situation that requires extraordinary solutions regardless of consequences.[207] It is crucial to remember that exceptional situations measure the strength of our (societal) moral principles. Hence, in the context of moral conviction, Merkel's statements and decisions seemed accurate at the time, which she defended later: "We had to give a strong signal of humanity to show that Europe's values are valid also in difficult times. Hungary's handling of the crisis is unbearable."[208]

Although proponents of the ethic of responsibility vaguely agreed with Merkel's statement, they argued that while the argument was morally sound, consequences were not considered.[209] It appeared that decision-makers could not assume that all right-

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[206] Waters, *Weber's Rationalism,* 30.

[207] Ludger Helms, F. Van Esch, and B. Crawford, "Merkel III: From Committed Pragmatist to 'Conviction Leader'?" German Politics 28, no.3 (2019): 352. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2018.1462340.

[208] Michael Nienaber, "Merkel Splits Conservative Bloc with Green Light to Refugees," *Reuters,* 06 Sept 2015.

[209] Helms, "Merkel III," 363.

minded decisions always lead to acceptable outcomes since decisions made in good faith and in accordance with moral principles can often result in harsh and negative consequences. In this case, Merkel's critics drew attention to possible security risks, capacity concerns, and economic hardships while also discussing the welcome culture as overly naive and short-sighted.

The wave of criticism further targeted German President Joachim Gauck, who, after visiting a refugee camp in August 2015, declared:

> The involvement of volunteers in refugee camps resembles a shining light for Germany (*helles Deutschland*). However, those that spread violence and hostility against migrants and asylum seekers place Germany into darkness (*dunkles Deutschland*).[210]

The President's condemnation of violence against refugees seemed a natural and appropriate way of justifying Germany's moral obligation. However, the statement collapses exactly where Weber's dilemma of unintended consequences begins.

Dividing society into those who welcomed and sheltered refugees and those who rejected them based on possible threats to social cohesion can only remain as hollow moralization. In fact, the phenomenon of migration is a far more complex and internally differentiated problem. Thus, simply perceiving it exclusively in the categories of good and evil can ultimately become an obstacle to the debate, which presupposeds finding possible solutions that could combine the two ethics in the greatest possible measure. Consequently, dividing society into two camps will naturally result in further prolonging conflicts within the society, and such problems can eventually lead to a total breakdown of solidarity. Thereafter, the positive bonds between society can become permanently affected, especially after an event of such magnitude as the migration crisis. If solidarity

[210] "Gauck Praises Commitment Against Dark Germany," *Die Zeit*, 26 Aug 2015.

breaks down, society cannot take a unified stand for or against migration. Thus, the problem of integration will most likely not see any successful resolution and implementation.

In the case described in this thesis, the events that complemented the rapid growth of the migration crisis revealed that German nationalism and xenophobia stemmed from divisions in society due to a lack of unity at the political level. German nationalism has always been present; it is an inseparable part of what constitutes a German person. However, xenophobia appears as a reaction to events that trigger a mutiny in society, which in fact occurred as a result of Merkel's continual battle for an open Germany. In this sense, xenophobia did not stem from the period of immigration and citizenship reforms. These events did not significantly alter society's perception of immigration, nor did they bring any uprisings. The renewed xenophobia appeared in reaction to decisions where consequences were not considered, i.e., security threats due to Islamic terrorism. Thus, the suggestion that the period of immigration and citizenship significantly reduced German nationalistic tendencies to tolerate and integrate others cannot prevail. Germans remained overly nationalistic, as stated in the second hypothesis, and visible via society's division that stemmed from the consequences of political decisions.

Immigrant Terminology

With respect to ever-increasing globalization and labor migration, it is necessary to evaluate societal willingness to integrate others regardless of Weber's ethics. While the influx of foreign workers during the 1950s reassessed Germany as an immigration country, the terminology of *Einwanderungsland* and *Zuwanderungsland* (both relate to

immigration but use different terms) remains unsolved and divides the society even today. Although *Einwanderungsland* has been the primary term in discussions as to whether Germany should be open to immigration, *Zuwanderungsgesetz* was the term used in the 2005 Residence Act, which proposed measures to better regulate the issuance of residence permits. What is the difference between *Einwanderungsland* and *Zuwanderungsgesetz*, and how do these terms fit into the discussion of hypotheses?

Zuwanderungsgesetz allows an individual entry into the country for the purpose of long-term residence but without the possibility of acquiring citizenship.[211] *Einwanderungsland* allows entry for the purpose of a permanent residence with the aim of naturalization and obtaining citizenship.[212] In this case, the individual becomes a permanent part of society, indifferent to racial and cultural differences. However, the subtle change of prefixes could also be considered a step toward implementing measures by which migration policies would reflect the current societal stance on immigration and foreigners at a specific time.

The Ein- vs. Zu- argument is extremely important for understanding the contemporary debate on immigration, refugees, and foreigners and understanding the historical scope of these two terms and how they might be responsible for social divisions in Germany. Not a single political faction or party is united as to how to regulate migration policies. For instance, those who criticize the German parliament, especially Merkel's decisions, divide into two camps. The first camp advocates for a right-wing

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[211] Radoslav Štefančík, "Zákon o prisťahovalectve v legislatívnom procese Spolkovej republiky Nemecko," *Sociálne a politické analýzy* 1, no. 2 (2007): 46-47.

[212] Herbert Brücker, "Optionen für die Neuregelung der Einwanderung," *Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung* (2015): 4.

system that rejects any form of immigration, believing that German society must remain nationalistic and homogeneous. Moreover, they support *Zuwanderung* as the primary approach to curbing immigration because they believe *Zuwanderung* is the only way to manage an influx of foreigners to maintain the interests of German society.[213]

The second camp is represented by left liberals who believe that multiculturalism is a natural progression of a society that will eventually become heterogeneous and pluralistic. Hence they demand that the current immigration philosophy shifts from *Zuwanderung* to a state-run immigration scheme following the positions of *Einwandererung*. Liberals also emphasize that the large influx of asylum seekers and migrants was only a temporary phenomenon. Therefore, on the grounds of citizenship and immigration laws, immigrants must be able to receive citizenship.[214]

Whatever the future outcomes of these discussions, it is evident that Germany has been and remains a sought-after destination for many immigrants due to its strong economy and employment. Yet, society and policy makers continue to engage with the "utopian" past through *Zuwanderung*, allowing nationalism to be the focus of decision and policymaking. Such a suggestion comes from the simple fact that German policymakers made great strides to introduce groundbreaking citizenship reform in 2000, which implemented the *jus soli* principle for children born on the German territory. In the following years, some minor reforms were introduced as well. Therefore it could be suggested that *Einwanderung* became the main proposition for dealing with immigration

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[213] Knut Bergmann, Matthias Diermeier, and Judith Niehues, "Parteipräferenz und Einkommen: Die AfD – eine Partei der Besserverdiener?," *Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft*: (2016) 2; Herbert Brücker, Philipp Jaschke, and Sekou Keita, "Zuwanderung und Asyl, Integrationsfähigkeit und Fachkräfteeinwanderungsgesetz," *Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung,* 3 (2019): 4.

[214] David Abraham, "Einwanderung im Wohlfahrtsstaat: Die Solidarität und Das Problem der Homogenität," *Der Staat* 56, no. 4 (2017): 6-7.

in the future. However, the term *Zuwanderung* reappeared in the 2005 Residence Act. It introduced policies that significantly restricted access to residence permits for foreigners and refugees who showed little or no likelihood of employment or education in Germany. Even though German policymakers attempted to utilize an open-door policy between 2000 and 2005, the first wave of welcome culture became overshadowed by tighter restrictions on incoming foreigners because Germany needed skilled workers to further expand its economy. Beyond that, past failures became visible as Germans would not coexist with Poles. Their experience with Turks was often labeled as a failure of integration, and the future may very well remain stagnant unless integration, assimilation, and acculturation are given much more attention at the political level. It also seems that until policymakers unify under one scheme, willingness to integrate others will continue to collapse through countless political debates that bear no significant improvements. Ultimately, until the Residence Act is reformed along the guidelines of an *Einwanderung* regime, Germans will continue to seek a nationalistic utopia, as stated in the second hypothesis.

German Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism has become a growing concern in Germany over the past decade. In terms of integration, Merkel saw failures of integration as a direct consequence of German society separating into parallel societies and as a partial consequence of immigrants' unwillingness to adopt the German culture and values. Nonetheless, the inner core of multiculturalism spreads far beyond just the integration or adoption of cultures and values. Consider how multiculturalism developed in countries of the New

World—for example, in the United States, where the country's national identity was always intended to be built upon multiple cultural identities. The first settlers to the U.S. came from diverse ethnicities and identified with different religions, which enabled the development of a super culture that fused these different cultures together.[215] In contrast, in the Old World, national identity was always understood as a legacy of ancestors who inhabited a particular area for centuries. Long-established traditions, norms, and values passed from generation to generation were upheld, practiced, and passed on to future generations. As tribes formed into civilizations and later into nations with distinct interests, their national identity developed into what is known as "ethnic nationalism."[216]

In the countries of the New World, national identity was viewed through the prism of the present rather than the past, unlike their ancestral nations in the Old World. Although Germanic tribes were once under the rule of a multi-ethnic Holy Roman Empire, each culture flourished in its separate regions. Later, during the late Middle Ages, the Holy Roman Empire lost a significant degree of its authority in Europe, causing an even larger separation between ethnicities. Europeans realized that the only way to ensure peace among such diversity was through negotiation. Soon, the Peace of Westphalia was negotiated, which allowed for a high degree of autonomy and nation-state building.[217] In Germany, however, the process of achieving hegemony and

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[215] Vladimiras Gražulis, and Liudmila Mockienė, "Multiculturalism Through the Prism of History: Experiences and Perspectives and Lessons to Learn," *Human Resources Management & Ergonomics* 11 (2017): 34.

[216] Gražulis and Mockiene, "Multiculturalism," 36.

[217] Leo Gross, "The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948," *American Journal of International Law* 42, no. 1 (1948): 21.

heterogeneity failed during the Napoleonic Wars, which allowed neighboring countries to scramble for German territories.

Following the fall of Napoleon Bonaparte, the first step toward German unification transpired as 39 different states united into a German confederation.[218] Otto von Bismarck took further steps to unify these states, and Prussia, into a Second Reich. Since then, German society began to shape its ethnic-exclusive model based on a particular understanding of migration that is completely different from that of the New World. Despite the different integration propositions, problems of integration policies and especially exclusivism remained outstanding.

To better understand the relationship between citizenship and nationality, Sener Aktürk's terminology is useful and applicable. Aktürk distinguished between three different types of culturalism: (1) a mono-ethnic approach based on limited, discriminatory, and exclusivist access to citizenship—an approach that hinders the creation of ethnic diversity; (2) an anti-ethnic approach signified by legal obstacles that prevent people of other ethnicities from acquiring citizenship; and (3) a multi-ethnic regime characterized by the fact that no legal, institutional, or public limitations are placed on foreign citizens who seek citizenship.[219]

Where does Germany stand in this typology? Bismarck's intention to unite all Germanic citizens under a single state is considered an anti-ethnic approach since non-German workers arriving from Prussia and other regions had no legal ability to obtain German citizenship, as stated in the Citizenship Act of 1913. During the second half of

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[218] Gross, "Peace of Westphalia," 22.

[219] Sener Aktürk, *Regimes of Ethnicity and Nationhood in Germany, Russia and Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 5-6.

the 20th century, Germany became a distinctive illustration of the mono-ethnic approach because citizenship was awarded only via naturalization or intermarriage with a German person. With the beginning of the 21st century, Germany seems to have returned to the anti-ethnic model since virtually all means to integrate foreigners into society have so far failed, as apparent in the current creation of parallel societies.

Politically, Germans seem to maintain their distance from multiculturalism and the integration of foreigners. Socially, it is apparent that nationalistic pride and xenophobia have again made Germany a hostile place, as seen in the migration crisis. It also seems that Germans hold the same prejudices they held against Poles during the Germanization era (acculturation to the *Leitkultur* is impossible) as part of the *Kulturkampf* battle. It was also apparent in the late 1990s against Turks at a time of increasing asylum and naturalization applications.

It appears that German decision-makers remain bonded and committed to the essential protection of German cultural and ethnic hegemony, which on the one, hand prevents natural multiculturalism from emerging, but on the other hand, halts regular integration of foreigners. It is also apparent that immigration and citizenship reforms did not introduce any significant improvements to the process of integration because Germans continue to believe that integration represents a process of acculturation in which German cultures and values must be accepted.

Therefore, a system that is built upon true multiculturalism, and a multi-ethnic regime without the proposition that foreigners must adapt to German culture and values, should be introduced for a change to occur. Otherwise, Germany will most likely continue its path as a relatively multicultural country with parallel societies.

The above evaluation via the three objectives signifies the importance and plausibility of the second hypothesis (i.e., to remain nationalistic). In terms of morality versus responsibility, the first hypothesis (willingness to accept) failed to become plausible because of the immoral political decisions by Merkel's political party, which eventually led to a growing base of opposition. Although changes made to the Citizenship and Immigration Acts could potentially allow the first hypothesis to become plausible in this case, the division of society caused by immorality led to a breakdown in solidarity and eventually resulted in renewed xenophobia. If xenophobia emerges in the domestic society, it is often the case that nationalistic tendencies will also appear. And indeed, in Germany, xenophobia and nationalism went hand in hand, which is a scenario that upholds the second hypothesis.

With regard to the immigrant terminology, the first hypothesis failed to become plausible because of rhetoric established by German policymakers. The utopian past functioning in a *Zuwanderung* regime (no possibility to acquire citizenship), as anchored in the 2005 Immigration Act, instead of *Einwanderung* (permanent residence and naturalization possible) regime, showed that German policymakers only implemented such subtle changes that allowed them to remain in control of immigration policies. In this sense, the second hypothesis is plausible because any interference with immigration policies with the aim to limit the number of foreign residents seems to support nationalistic tendencies.

In terms of German multiculturalism, the first hypothesis was not plausible because of the exclusivism that German multiculturalism was built on. Since the unification of Germany in 1871, immigration rhetoric was based on an anti-ethnic

approach, which is a significant aspect of nationalistic heading. Beyond that, Germans still expected complete acculturation from foreigners, but this kind of pressure only drove immigrants toward even greater separation via the creation of parallel societies. Consequently, the societal pressure to become like Germans supported the second hypothesis: Germans did not necessarily drive foreigners away, but the ethnic exclusivism caused stagnation in the development of immigration reforms, which eventually made the process of natural integration much more difficult.

Finally, migration has always been a natural social reality. Still, as the events of 2015 showed, it became increasingly perceived as a severe political and socioeconomic problem that threatened the social cohesion of modern nation-states. Although Germany has been a *de facto* immigrant country since the 1960s, migration issues were addressed on an ad hoc basis. Furthermore, changes in the legislative and institutional frameworks of migration policy did not result from a proactive approach of German authorities but came as a response to major domestic and foreign policy events. Changes in these frameworks should be based primarily on a society-wide discussion of its normative and philosophical approach as well as a long-term conception of the state's migration policy. If such a debate is neglected within society during events such as a migration crisis, conflicts can often develop on a political spectrum and among different interest groups. It is evident that Germany was politically and socially unprepared for just such a massive influx of migrants and ultimately returned to its nationalistic tendencies of the past.

Chapter VI

Conclusion

Germany's immigration responses, along with the role that nationalism played during the last 200 years, is an interesting case for further study because no other works compile the aspects of xenophobia, cultural segregation, parallel societies, and Islamophobia into a single piece that seeks a comprehensive answer as to whether German society is willing to integrate and tolerate foreigners. Considering my previous interest, experience, and knowledge of the events that affected Europeans during the contemporary migration crisis, led me to speculate if German willingness could be an interesting case for further exploration. Moreover, as a European citizen, it seemed to feel like it was my duty to write about such a contemporary yet historical theme, which hoped to explain how German culture and its nationalistic leanings were formed and research a broader understanding of multiculturalism around the world.

Cultures, ethnicities, and histories of European countries diverge from each other because while some events impacted the entirety of Europe, others were specific to individual countries. In this sense, German history is a fascinating case since most Germanic states have a relatively short but coherent history of some 150 years. Such social coherence led to unprecedented events that altered German history positively and negatively.

Although the 1871 unification promised "Germany for Germans," difficulties such as an economic downturn, the scarcity of workers, and the approach to war soon led

to decisions that would have been previously considered absurd and unimaginable. Nonetheless, these transformations began a multiculturalist era during the 1850s economic crisis, followed by an industry-wide scarcity of workers since Germany invited ethnic Poles from Prussia as a temporary workforce. While such immigration was to remain temporary, German authorities had no legal means to enforce migration policies, thus allowing the situation to spiral out of control. Beyond that, German employers preferred Poles for being cheap labor, as well as the possibility that the recruitment process, although illegal, was controlled by Poles themselves. Consequently, Polish workers often overstayed their permits, and their low salaries significantly decreased the average domestic wage. That led to aggravation within the local workforce that quickly devolved into intolerance and xenophobia.

At the same time, the government's struggle against the Catholic Church (the so-called *Kulturkampf*) became the focus of local social outrage, which became known as anti-Polish hysteria. Germans also began to believe that inadequate social etiquette and lack of manners among the Poles could cause problems in the future. The Poles were incapable of understanding the ethics of core German culture. To negate the growing social outrage and the rapid spread of Polish culture, language, and fast-paced family reunifications, a series of social restrictions were implemented by the German government. These restrictions encompassed fundamental nationalistic elements, such as one language, one culture, and one political entity, as seen in Bismarck's efforts to deprive Catholics of almost all power. At the same time, the notion of *Volk* became the prime subject in discussions about who "real" Germans could be. From then on, the understanding of German nationalism changed frequently between Bismarck's

Chancellery and today's Federal German Republic. However, the ethnic segregation into upper and lower Germany gave a pretext for social polarization that keeps dividing Germans even today.

When the Nazi Party reinvented German nationalism—which no longer represented ethnic separation but rather was founded on a scientific principle of racial belonging and purity—Germany entered an era of social guilt. The guilt-like sentiment was the direct result of the Nazi agenda to exterminate all individuals who did not fit within their definition of Aryan racial traits.

After the end of the Second World War, two separate spheres of German nationalism appeared: the country split into a liberal and democratic West, and an enclosed and socialistic East. West Germany seemed to continue the legacy of Bismarck in the sense that while foreigners were welcomed and even desperately needed to achieve the "economic miracle," they were to remain temporary residents. In East Germany, society remained homogeneous in order to achieve cohesive unity against the evils of liberalism and democracy, all of which revolved around a materialistic conviction. East Germany fell behind the Iron Curtain and remained self-sufficient in terms of economy and workforce; the West German government opened negotiations with southern European countries, as well as Morocco, Tunisia, Yugoslavia, and especially Turkey, as one way to resolve the scarcity of workers.

At first, Turkish temporary workers were cherished and offered financial incentives by the government to reunite with their family members since the rebuilding process in Germany was taking much longer than initially anticipated. However, in the mid-1970s, as the Turkish diaspora grew larger and Turkish asylum seekers kept arriving

daily, the welcome culture soon disappeared, and fears arose that the growing number of asylum seekers represented a potential social problem. To combat rising social dissatisfaction, the government halted any further worker immigration in 1983 amid political discussions calling for a decrease in the number of Turkish asylum seekers. Moreover, a financial plan was proposed to reward those migrants who emigrated from Germany independently. Despite immense efforts to shrink the Turkish diaspora, many Turks remained in Germany since the economic and political climate was substantially better than the situation in Turkey.

That scenario further aggravated Germans just as Germany was nearing the reunification of West and East Germany. West Germans became more xenophobic. After the 1990 reunification, the societal situation deteriorated into xenophobia, and many Turks reported repeated discrimination at work, in schools, and even in public places. The growing xenophobia and dissatisfaction were most apparent in the former Eastern parts due to social conditions stemming from the immense development gap between East and West Germany. East Germans were viewed as people of the lesser Germany since their economy and standard of living were much lower than that of their counterparts in West Germany. Even though the government attempted to counter these stark differences by transferring wealth from West to East, those efforts soon collapsed as East Germans could not control these assets. In this sense, Easterners had no other choice but to remain under the control of the West, which resulted in even larger inequality and poverty. As they became more and more insecure and their anger intensified, many turned to the growing neo-Nazi base and supported violence against communities that “should not belong” in the 1990s.

A significant improvement occurred in 1998 when the Christian Democrats lost their mandate, ending Chancellor Kohl's two-decades-long anti-immigration era. During the so-called "Kohl era," Turks were completely disregarded, consequently driving them to become even more unwilling to integrate. Turks had no other choice but to construct their parallel society in Germany, and that problem remains apparent even today.

Nonetheless, as Social Democrats replaced Kohl and his cabinet, some significant societal changes occurred. Among the most important was the ability to receive German citizenship via the *jus soli* principle introduced in 2000. The *jus soli* principle was a part of the citizenship reform, which for the first time introduced the possibility of obtaining German citizenship for children born within German territory. At birth, a child automatically acquires the citizenship of his/her parents, but upon reaching legal adulthood, that same person could choose either to keep or renounce their former citizenship. If the person renounced his/her original citizenship, they became a German citizen.

Even though the citizenship policies saw frequent changes (such as the introduction of standardized tests), it seemed that German policymakers felt no obligation to improve the integration process. Although foreigners could finally become German citizens via the naturalization process (which at times was lengthy, difficult to complete, and felt like forced assimilation rather than natural integration), still no reasonable means to deconstruct the walls of parallel societies existed during the early 2000s.

Even though the improved political situation under Social Democrats resulted in decreased activity among the neo-Nazis, Turks still faced ethnic discrimination at work, schools, sports, etc. As the situation remained stagnant, an apparent spike in return

migration occurred because many Turks saw emigration to their homeland as a possible way out of the vicious circle of feeling irrelevant while also being targeted for their ancestry. Return migration under the so-called *Mavi kart* granted some fundamental civil rights in Turkey. Even better, Turkey's economic and political revival acted as another incentive to return.

The parallels between Prussian Poles and Turks are alarming since both groups were invited to a country that desperately needed a large workforce for economic reasons. However, as the German economy fared much better than that of Prussia or Turkey, workers tended to overstay their permits and remain in Germany, which soon led to fears of a possible breakdown in social coherence among Germans. In both scenarios, German policymakers did not offer a process of natural progression toward naturalization. Immigrants had no option but to acculturate and accept German values and norms as their own. But that acceptance became very difficult to achieve, especially in a country where nationalism and ethnic belonging are among the most upheld aspects of German nationalism. Such a rationale stemmed from exclusivism and the excluding “non-real” Germans. It also became difficult to bridge the gap between Germans and other cultures in Germany since guilt over Nazi behaviors proscribed any public discussions about German nationalism. Regardless of being taboo, nationalism as established by Bismarck, carried on by Hitler (who introduced an extreme form of ethnic belonging), and concluded by Kohl, still finds a large base of supporters even today.

Despite the dramatic political changes of the early 2000s, and with foreigners now able to acquire German citizenship, the events that began with the Arab Spring in 2011 further complicated the problems of ethnic belonging and effortless integration. The

outbreak of several civil wars in the Middle East was unprecedented, as it triggered a massive influx of asylum seekers to Europe. At first, most European countries seemed inclined to offer asylum, and Germany became a pioneer in open-door policies due to Chancellor Merkel's initiatives and statements. Those countries that stood against the possibility of asylum already had a relatively large base of far-right political parties with anti-migration agendas. The countries of the Visegrad Four and the member states of the Northern region became xenophobic because of growing Islamic terrorism in Europe. In 2015 alone, Islamic terrorism began with mass shootings in Paris, continued with suicide bombers in Brussels, and concluded with a truck attack in Berlin. As the situation deteriorated, Islamophobia and xenophobia predominated in Germany, hundreds of such deaths shook the democratic European foundations and opened doors for right-wing political parties to grow outside of Central and Northern Europe. One example is the Alternative for Germany party, which attracted relatively large support amongst Germans over a short period of time.

Although Islamophobia grew rapidly at the height of the crisis in Germany, it only represented a partial problem that acted as resistance to achieving natural integration and multiculturalism. A more significant issue was, in part, the result of a mismatch between society and decision-makers because of immigration terminology, which encouraged short-term residence without the possibility of acquiring German citizenship. Such carefully constructed terminology also played a vital role in the spread of right-wing parties since their agenda promoted limited possibilities for immigration. Although Prussian Poles and Turks opposed terrorism despite being the targets of discrimination and violence, contemporary Islamic terrorism seemed to degrade German willingness to

integrate foreigners even further. As a result, German society and policymakers remain stagnant and careful to introduce any significant changes unless a considerable security threat appears. In conclusion, the aspects of multiculturalism, immigration, and integration are the pillars of this thesis because of their impact on the evaluation of my hypotheses.

Future Research

In the case of future research, a researcher should consider the fact that the concepts presented here will continue to evolve beyond current situations in 2022. Furthermore, evolution could be temporary and/or long-term change since no mechanism exists to predict the future. In my opinion, the power for a change rests in the hands of policymakers and Germans themselves because everything depends on an effort and willingness to invest in meaningful changes.

I believe the current stance on multiculturalism in Germany must change so that Germans can comprehend, integrate, and view foreigners as equal. Moreover, Germans must depart from their nationalist pride—a relic of Bismarck's Chancellery—in order to allow foreigners to become part of German nationalism that fuses many different cultures together.

Finally, I would recommend that German decision-makers accept their responsibility for developing parallel societies and seek an open political dialogue between Germans and Turks so that basic democratic principles are accepted and can lead to the deconstruction of such a divide. However, for a positive outcome to occur,

these changes must act in tandem, otherwise, a permanent split between Germans and other cultures will undoubtedly arise in the future.

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